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Abstract 
Post financial crisis, economic and business news has generated conflicting narratives where, for 
example, bankers and corporate executives enjoy large salaries while ordinary people find their 
lifestyles under increasing pressure. Accordingly, the issues of income inequality, wealth and poverty 
have attracted increased scholarly attention. Citizens make sense of such issues via the media, and 
most often via TV news which is still the U.K’s primary news provider. Given that U.K broadcast 
media are bound by public service obligations, the intellectual puzzle addressed here is whether 
either side of the financial crisis (2007 and 2014), two TV news providers (BBC1 and ITV1) address 
financial news generally, and income inequality more specifically, in ways that serve all citizens. 
Large-scale content analyses are used to identify recurrent themes within economic, business and 
financial news, and stories containing elements of income inequality, poverty, wealth and the 
“squeezed middle”. To further explore how these issues are covered, typical cases are developed 
using critical discourse and multimodal analyses. 
The study finds that while economic and business news has increased and has been partially 
redefined by the crisis, income inequality is covered less in 2014 than in 2007, and since it is 
embedded within various news stories, the issue is not covered in ways helping citizens to make 
sense of causes and consequences. Despite indicators that “trickle down” economics is broken and 
that wealth remains concentrated among a few, even post-crisis, economic growth is presented as a 
universal solution to ease discomfort and inequality. Although coverage of business actors and 
corporations is often critical, the wider model of capitalism within which they operate remains 
unchallenged. In conclusion, despite the seismic financial events and normative expectations that 
they should discuss issues of social significance, because of institutional, economic and historic causal 
mechanisms, these channels do not provide any such critique. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii | P a g e  
 
Acknowledgements 
I am pleased to write something about the people who have given me so much help along this 
process. First, I am extremely grateful to the ESRC for their postgraduate funding. Without this 
support, this project would have been impossible. I am also grateful to the wider Cardiff University 
community, and to the terrific colleagues who have helped in such positive ways. I am also grateful 
to my external and internal examiners for agreeing to read this thesis and act in an official capacity. 
Thanks also go to Michael Jermey from ITV, for generously giving his time, and for the warmth of his 
welcome at Southbank during a very difficult week for me personally. 
 
My supervisory team has included Professors Pete Turnbull, Justin Lewis, Tim Edwards, Andrea 
Whittle and Mike Reed. All of these people disprove the ridiculous myth that academics of the 
highest standing are distant and self-absorbed. They have all provided me with cheerful and kind 
assistance well beyond the call of duty. I will never forget everything you have all done for me and 
thank all my friends and colleagues at Cardiff Business School for their continuing support. Pete, in 
particular, as only he can, called a spade a “******* shovel” on many occasions when it was 
required, and I am all the better for it.  You got me to the end of this Pete, so thank you. 
 
My student friends have been fantastic supporters, mentors and advisors. Marina, Cassie, Laura, 
Emma P, Emma J, Andy, Meshal, Rachel and many more - you have provided the right words at the 
right times. I want you to know how much I admire and value you all, and the brilliant work you all 
do. Allaina - thank you for doing my intercoder testing – you have been such a big part of the journey 
and have never failed to make me laugh. A special word for the force of nature that is Anna Galazka. 
She will never believe it of herself, but inspires me every day with her courage, resolve and brilliance.   
 
All my friends at Cardiff School of Journalism have been so important. To John, Iñaki and Stephen 
especially – you three are like brothers to me, and the early evenings spent with you in the pub have 
been the highlight of student life. You have all been kind and generous hosts, and made Amanda and 
I so welcome in your homes. Without the opportunities, encouragement and support you have 
provided me, none of this would have ever been possible. Thank you.  
 
Finally, this work is dedicated to all my family with grateful thanks and lots of love. When I became a 
student in 2009 after many years of wondering and wishing, my intention was to simply gain an 
undergraduate degree and enable some vague change of career. I am writing this, seven years later, 
only because my family unselfishly allowed me to indulge my ambition to go further in academia. 
They gave everything, and asked for nothing in return. Often, to my shame, that is exactly what they 
received. 
 
To Grace, Amber and Georgia - I am so proud of you all, and the fine, kind, strong women you have 
become. To Dad - your example and generosity has underpinned everything. To Mum - you weren’t 
quite able to make it to the end of the journey, and your smile and love is missed every day. To 
Betsan, Andy, Eilir, Lorraine and everyone, you have made me realise that with a close and loving 
family, anything is possible. 
And finally, to Amanda. It was my best and biggest stroke of luck to have found you. You made this 
happen, by sacrificing, tolerating, understanding and believing. Love and thanks to you most of all. 
 
 
iii | P a g e  
 
            Contents 
Section Title Page 
Chapter 1. If income inequality is the “great debate”, is it being debated on TV news? 1 
1.1 Income inequality: ubiquitous or intermittent?  1 
1.2 Setting the scene I: the change in global financial well-being. 3 
1.3 Setting the scene II: increasing income inequality. 4 
1.4 Income inequality: what should we expect from our broadcast media? 7 
1.5 Research approach and research questions 8 
1.6 The research narrative: a brief sequential explanation. 9 
Chapter 2. What can we expect from TV news and EBF journalism? 13 
2.1 The “outer layer” factors shaping EBF news.  15 
2.1.1 The theory of critical political economy. 15 
2.1.2 The ownership/governance of BBC1 and ITV1 – funding, objectives and 
obligations. 
16 
2.1.3 Advertisers, sources and “flak”- affecting editorial output? 18 
2.1.4 Ideological motivations of media, and the perpetuation of ideas. 20 
2.1.5 EBF news ideology in focus; the Keynesianism / neoliberalism continuum. 21 
2.2 The “middle layer” factors shaping EBF news. 23 
2.2.1 Normative expectations of news, and EBF/PIE news more specifically. 23 
2.2.2 The possibilities and scope of TV news. 24 
2.2.3 The personal and institutional process of news selection. 26 
2.2.4 Framing: Presenting EBF and PIE news stories once they have been chosen. 30 
2.2.5 Other trends and challenges that shape EBF and PIE news output. 32 
2.3 The “inner layer” - EBF news texts. 33 
2.3.1 Serving which masters? A critique of contemporary EBF journalism. 34 
2.3.2 A narrower focus: the EBF news tradition of BBC and ITV. 38 
2.3.3 Different but also the same: the homogeneity of BBC and ITV. 39 
2.4 Summarising contemporary EBF journalism. 41 
Chapter 3. How are poverty, wealth, the squeezed middle and income inequality 
represented in the media? 
42 
3.1 Poverty and its causes. 42 
3.2 Analysis of poverty coverage. 45 
3.2.1 International / home poverty, and the geographical other 46 
3.2.2 Poverty as entertainment. 48 
3.2.3 The poor are faceless, blameworthy and unlucky. 49 
3.2.4 Poverty delivered by an unprepared media system. 50 
3.3 The “squeezed middle”. 51 
3.3.1 Factors contributing to the squeeze. 54 
3.3.2 Middle class discourses, and media coverage of the squeezed middle. 55 
3.4 Wealth. 56 
3.4.1 The impact of increasing high-end remuneration. 57 
3.5 Media coverage of “wealth”. 60 
3.5.1 The wealthy are presented both positively and negatively. 60 
3.6 Income Inequality: a developing issue, and one difficult to present 63 
3.7 Income inequality: why it matters from the socio-health perspective. 67 
3.8 Income inequality: why it matters from the economic perspective. 69 
3.8.1 Political factors - reduced regulatory regimes and weaker welfare 70 
iv | P a g e  
 
3.8.2 Economic factors - globalisation and technology. 70 
3.8.3 Institutional factors - declining trade unions, increasing high-end pay, 
precarious work and changing worker demographics. 
72 
3.9 Solving income inequality - predistribution and redistribution. 71 
3.10 Media coverage of income inequality. 78 
3.10.1 OCCUPY and its coverage. 80 
Chapter 4. Watching the news: researching EBF and PIE reporting on BBC1 and ITV1. 82 
4.1 Ontological choices:  PIE phenomena are real. 82 
4.2 Epistemological positioning: discovering “what” and “how”, then “why”. 84 
4.3 The selection of TV channels, bulletins and years. 87 
4.4 Research design: methodological choices, and complementing quantitative 
with qualitative methods. 
89 
4.5 Quantitative phases: using content analysis. 90 
4.6 Level 1 Content Analysis: examining general news agendas and EBF news in 
particular. 
92 
4.7 Level 2 Content Analysis: Examining PIE issues in detail. 95 
4.8 Qualitative Phase - wider understandings of discourse, and the choice of 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). 
98 
4.8.1 Semiotic carriers of meaning. 102 
4.9 Supplementary interview providing the practitioner viewpoint. 103 
4.10 Ethical considerations. 104 
Chapter 5. What’s the story? BBC1 and ITV1 news agendas in 2007 and 2014. 106 
5.1 Quantity and format of 10pm bulletins on BBC1 and ITV1 in 2007 and 2014. 106 
5.2 EBF news: less data-driven. 112 
5.3 Content of TV news bulletins:  more EBF news, and a change of approach? 113 
5.4 General news categories: dominant categories and major movers. 117 
5.5 EBF news: an increased prominence. 119 
5.6 The shift in balance between hard and soft news. 122 
5.7 Reflections about news agendas. 125 
5.8 EBF news: part of the shift towards harder news? 127 
5.9 Key findings from Chapter 5. 129 
Chapter 6. EBF reporting on BBC1 and ITV1 - Probing or Perfunctory? 130 
6.1 The impact of EBF reporting: Northern Rock and the “run of the bank”. 131 
6.2 Reporting the economy. 135 
6.3 Reporting business. 138 
6.4 The business of conflict: energy suppliers versus consumers. 140 
6.5 Banks: the villains of the piece. 143 
6.6 The knockabout nature of EBF news. 148 
6.7 Reporting remuneration: a key EBF issue. 151 
6.8 Advertiser influence: Influence or impotence? 158 
6.9 ITV1’s relationship with Barclays: the fearless coverage of a channel 
sponsor. 
160 
6.10 Barclays adverts: getting their retaliation in first? 167 
6.11 The relentless promotion of neoliberalism.   170 
6.12 The partial redefining of EBF news. 177 
Chapter 7. PIE in the news: a poor show, or a wealth of coverage? 181 
7.1 Preparedness of news channels to report PIE, and levels of embeddedness. 182 
7.2 PIE coverage: volume, prominence, geography and themes. 186 
7.3 PIE issues: Causes. 192 
v | P a g e  
 
7.4 PIE issues: Consequences. 197 
7.5 PIE issues: Blame. 203 
7.6 PIE issues: Action. 204 
7.7 PIE issues: Other discourses. 207 
7.8 Political actors, images and metrics. 210 
Chapter 8. Rich material but poor journalism? Reporting PIE issues on TV news. 218 
8.1 Poverty: business as usual, then famines to foodbanks. 218 
8.2 Poverty in focus, or celebrity in danger? 223 
8.3 U.K poverty in 2014:  new type of “bank” and new types of tyranny. 225 
8.4 Wealth: spend, spend, spend. 233 
8.5 Executive pay: people, rather than systems under pressure. 238 
8.6 The squeezed middle: a more recent phenomenon. 246 
8.7 Income inequality: sparse, embedded coverage, and solved by growth. 260 
8.8 PIE coverage: the summary. 281 
Chapter 9. BBC1 and ITV1: Natural homes for social justice, or the status quo of 
capitalism?  
283 
9.1 Increasing homogeneity: masking a lack of serious coverage? 284 
9.2 The humanisation of EBF news: does “City” now compete with “citizen”? 287 
9.3 Refining homogeneity: ITV1’s different approach. 290 
9.4 PIE coverage: more similarity, and the resilience of political economy. 292 
9.5 Articulations of consumption without consequence. 294 
9.6 The championing of economic growth and the absence of redistribution. 297 
9.7 Defending the indefensible, absent trade unions and a lack of alternatives. 299 
9.8 Why is coverage so unsatisfactory? The thesis of unsuitability. 304 
9.9 Defining unsuitability in terms of absence. 310 
Chapter 10. Change is unlikely, but still possible. 313 
Chapter 11. References. 316 
Appendix 1. Missing Bulletins. 380 
Appendix 2. Coding manual. 382 
Appendix 3a. Reliability testing for coding. 411 
Appendix 3b. Intercoder testing. 412 
Appendix 4a. Level 1 Content Analysis Coding Sheet. 414 
Appendix 4b. Level 2 Content Analysis Coding Sheet. 416 
Appendix 5. Glossary of CDA terms. 418 
Appendix 6. Interview consent. 420 
Appendix 7. Ethical approval. 422 
Appendix 8. Interview transcript. 427 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi | P a g e  
 
List of table and figures. 
Table Figure Title URL of news report (if appropriate) Copyright  Page  
Chapter 1 
 1.1 Neighbours in Cardiff.   1 
Chapter 2 
 2.1 Organising framework for examining EBF news 
output. 
  14 
 2.2 Images associated with executive remuneration: a 
never-ending flow of cash. 
Images obtained as screen shots from DVD recording. BBC and 
ITV 
25 
Chapter 3 
3.1  Summary of themes within literature about poverty 
and its media coverage. 
  43 
3.2  Summary of themes about the squeezed middle and 
its media coverage. 
  54 
 3.1 Average weekly earnings in the U.K since 2000.   54 
3.3  Summary of themes within literature about wealth 
and its media coverage. 
  57 
3.4  Summary of themes within literature about income 
inequality and its media coverage. 
  63 
 3.2 “I look up to him but down on him…” Social Mobility 
on The Frost Report. 
  64 
 3.3 Chart showing historical rate mentions of phrase 
“income inequality”. 
  65 
vii | P a g e  
 
 3.4. Selected Gini Coefficients of income inequality, 1985-
late 2000s. 
  66 
3.5  Summary of Meta-Analyses regarding inequality-
health hypothesis.  
  69 
Chapter 4 
4.1  The research paradigm for investigating EBF and PIE 
issues on TV news. 
  87 
 4.1. The research sequence.   90 
Chapter 5 
5.1  Overview of bulletins and stories.   107 
5.2  Sample and average lengths of bulletins across 
channels and years. 
  107 
 5.1 The distribution of item lengths in 2007 and 2014.   108 
 5.2 Examples of “short item clustering” across channels 
and years. 
  111 
5.3  Frequencies, means and medians of EBF categories (in 
seconds). 
  112 
5.4  News bulletin content by category (shown in terms of 
percentages and with EBF categories highlighted in 
green). 
  114 
 5.3 EBF issues across news and channels.   115 
5.5  Prominence of category types in relation to each 
other (with EBF categories highlighted in green). 
  117 
5.6  The five most prominent categories measured by   118 
viii | P a g e  
 
times and rank. 
5.7   Refined prominence of EBF news categories by 
channel and year. 
  119 
 5.4  The prominence of EBF categories within bulletins.   120 
 5.5 Overall EBF news expressed in terms of story order.   121 
 5.6 Hard news as a percentage of all news time across 
news and channels. 
  124 
5.8  Summary of notable movements by category and 
channel between 2007 and 2014. 
  125 
5.9  Changing nature of ITV1 bulletin lengths from 2007 to 
2014. 
  125 
5.10  Changes in EBF categories across channels and years.   127 
Chapter 6 
 6.1  BBC1 report the first signs of the Northern Rock crisis 
on 13/9/07. 
Images obtained as screen shots from DVD recording. BBC 131 
 6.2 ITV1 report the first signs of the Northern Rock crisis 
on 13/9/07. 
Images obtained as screen shots from DVD recording. ITV 133 
 6.3 BBC1 and ITV1 images associated with the “run” on 
Northern Rock. 
Images obtained as screen shots from DVD recording. BBC and 
ITV 
134 
 6.4  ITV1’s report about “the run on the bank” on 
14/9/07. 
Images obtained as screen shots from DVD recording. ITV 135 
6.1  Economy stories across channels and years (by 
percentage). 
  136 
6.2  The descriptions of growth on BBC1 and ITV in 2014.   138 
6.3  Sectors in general and specific business reporting (by   139 
ix | P a g e  
 
percentage). 
6.4  Subtopics when the focus is on energy (by 
percentage). 
  139 
 6.5 BBC1’s report covering the OFGEM referral on 
27/3/14. 
https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/06C0AF08   BBC 140 
 6.6 ITV1’s report covering the OFGEM referral on 
27/3/14. 
https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/06C5731B  ITV 141 
 6.7 ITV1 reports OFGEM’s challenge to the “Big Six” on 
10/6/14. 
https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/072A5BB7  ITV1 142 
 6.8 BBC1 reports OFGEM’s challenge to the “Big Six” on 
10/6/14. 
https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/0723BB2  ITV 142 
6.5  Dominant themes where banks/lenders are the focus.   144 
 6.9 BBC1’s report about losses at the Co-operative Group 
on 17/04/14. 
https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/06DBE90D  BBC1 145 
 6.10  ITV1’s report about losses at the Co-operative Group, 
17/4/14. 
https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/06DFC849  ITV1 145 
 6.11 BBC1 explains Co-operative principles on 11/3/14. https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/06B0CCE6 BBC1 146 
 6.12 Descriptions of the Co-operative ethos. https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/06B349BE   
https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/06D36470   
BBC and 
ITV 
146 
 6.13 Descriptions of the Co-operative structure and 
strategy. 
https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/06B0CCE6 
https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/06B349BE 
BBC and 
ITV 
147 
 6.14 ITV1’s report about “the run on the bank” on 
14/9/07. 
https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/07ADA940    ITV 148 
 6.15 The changing face of Robert Peston. Images obtained as screen shots from DVD recording. ITV 150 
 6.16 BBC1 coverage of Barclays pay award on 26/3/07. Images obtained as screen shots from DVD recording. ITV 152 
x | P a g e  
 
 6.17 Barclays’ falling profits and increasing bonuses on 
BBC1 on 11/2/14. 
https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/068B3816  BBC 152 
 6.18 Robert Peston interviews Antonio Horta-Osorio on 
13/2/14. 
https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/068B3896  BBC 153 
 6.19 Barclays’ falling profits and increasing bonuses on 
ITV1 on 11/2/14. 
https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/068D470C  ITV 154 
 6.20 Comparative settings for interviews with Anthony 
Jenkins on 11/2/14. 
https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/068B3816 
https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/068D470C   
BBC and 
ITV 
156 
 6.21 ITV’s reports executive remuneration at Aviva on 
3/5/2012 and 8/5/12. 
Images obtained as screen shots from DVD recording. ITV 160 
6.6  Barclays stories and advert breaks in 2014 on ITV1.   161 
 6.22 ITV1’s report about Barclays on 24/4/14. https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/06E97DE1  ITV 162 
 6.23 ITV1’s report about Barclays on 17/2/14. https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/0696F914  ITV 165 
 6.24 ITV1’s report about Barclays on 7/5/14. https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/06FB8BCD  ITV 165 
 6.25 Barclays adverts punctuating ITV1 News during 2014. These adverts were taken from the range of ITV reports 
previously mentioned. 
ITV 167 
 6.26 BBC1 reports the potential cap on Banker’s bonuses 
on 15/1/14. 
https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/06509DFB  BBC 171 
 6.27 ITV1’s report about the potential cap on Banker’s 
bonuses on 15/1/14. 
https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/0651310B  ITV 172 
 6.28 David Cameron’s responses to bonus capping at RBS. https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/0651310B 
https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/06509DFB  
BBC and 
ITV 
175 
 6.29  BBC1’s report on the Lloyds Banking Group story on 
3/2/14. 
https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/0681F8D2  BBC 176 
Chapter 7 
7.1  Overview of all PIE news items (by percentage).   182 
xi | P a g e  
 
7.2  The location of PIE issues (by percentage).   184 
 7.1 Framing of PIE news items (by percentage).   185 
 7.2 Total distribution of PIE stories (by percentage).   186 
 7.3 Percentage of news items where PIE issues were 
substantive. 
  187 
 7.4 Geographic locations of PIE stories (by percentage).   188 
7.3  Breakdown of poverty stories (by percentage)   189 
7.4  Breakdown of wealth stories (by percentage).   190 
7.5  Breakdown of income inequality stories (by 
percentage). 
  191 
7.6  Breakdown of squeezed middle stories (by 
percentage). 
  191 
 7.5 The frequency of causal explanations in all PIE stories.   192 
7.7  Expressed causes of poverty.   193 
7.8  Expressed causes of wealth.    194 
7.9  Expressed causes of the squeezed middle.   195 
7.10  Social actors expressing causality across PIE issues.   196 
7.11  Expressed consequences of poverty   198 
7.12  Expressed consequences of wealth.   199 
7.13  Expressed consequences of squeezed middle.   199 
7.14  Expressed consequences of income inequality.   200 
7.15  Social actors expressing consequences across PIE 
issues.  
  201 
xii | P a g e  
 
 7.6 The frequency of causes and consequences within PIE 
stories. 
  202 
7.16  PIE stories attributing blame (by percentage).   203 
7.17  The attribution of blame in poverty stories.   204 
7.18  PIE stories including calls for action is called for (by 
percentage). 
  205 
7.19  Breakdown of actions called for within all PIE stories 
(by percentage). 
  205 
7.20  Social actors advocating action within PIE reporting 
(by percentage). 
  206 
7.21  Affiliations of politicians advocating actions (by 
percentage). 
  207 
7.22  Other poverty discourses (by percentage).   207 
7.23  Other wealth discourses (by percentage).   208 
7.24  Other squeezed middle discourses (by percentage).   209 
7.25  Other income inequality discourses (by percentage).   210 
7.26  Party representation of all political actors (by 
percentage). 
  211 
7.27  Images shown in association with poverty.   212 
7.28  Images shown in association with wealth.   212 
7.29  Images shown in association with the squeezed 
middle. 
  213 
7.30  Images shown in association with income inequality.   213 
 7.7 Frequency of PIE items where some sort of metric 
was quoted (by percentage). 
  214 
7.31  Breakdown of types of measures used within PIE 
reporting. 
  215 
xiii | P a g e  
 
7.32  Summary of quantitative findings from Chapter 7: the 
characteristics of PIE news. 
  217 
Chapter 8 
 8.1 BBC1’s report about Zimbabwe on 2/7/07.  Images obtained as screen shots from DVD recording. BBC 219 
 8.2 ITV1’s report from Zimbabwe on 24/09/07. Images obtained as screen shots from DVD recording. ITV 220 
 8.3 ITV1’s report about Sienna Miller’s trip on 23/6/14. https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/073EB738  ITV 223 
 8.4 BBC1’s report about modern day slavery on 7/1/14. https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/06451A9E  BBC 226 
 8.5 ITV1’s report about modern day slavery on 7/01/14. https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/0645B46C  ITV 227 
 8.6 BBC1’s report about increasing poverty in the UK on 
8/12/014. 
https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/08362B5F  BBC 228 
 8.7 ITV1’s report about increasing poverty in the UK on 
16/04/14. 
https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/06DFC813  ITV 229 
 8.8 ITV1 reports the conclusion of Conrad Black’s trial on 
13/07/07. 
https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/075A1539  ITV 234 
 8.9 BBC1 reports the sentencing of Conrad Black on 
10/12/07. 
https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/08362BE1  BBC 236 
 8.10 ITV1’s report about CEO remuneration at Burberry on 
11/7/14. 
https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/0750C65A ITV 239 
 8.11 BBC1’s report on 30/07/14 about how bank bonuses 
might be repaid.  
https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/0765001E  BBC 241 
 8.12 ITV1 report that Falcao has signed for Manchester 
United on 1/9/14. 
https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/079C74E7 ITV 245 
 8.13 ITV1’s report on the Chancellor’s comments on 
16/1/14. 
https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/0651313F  ITV 247 
 8.14 BBC1’s report about increasing rail fares on 19/8/14. https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/0786A948  BBC 249 
 8.15 BBC1’s report about economic growth on 29/4/14. https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/06ECC132  BBC 252 
xiv | P a g e  
 
Regarding screenshots, no infringement of copyright is intended and they are they reproduced in this thesis according to advice from Learning 
on Screen (The British Universities and Colleges Film and Video Council). Screenshots are presented under the exception clause available under 
‘Criticism and Review’ in Section 30 of the 1988 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, which allows for limited use, provided that they are 
specifically related to the text and are confined within a non-commercial publication. 
 8.16 ITV1’s report about potential interest rate increases 
on 13/6/14. 
https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/072A5C56  ITV 254 
 8.17 BBC1’s report about rent reform on 1/5/14. https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/06ECCA7C  BBC 257 
 8.18 ITV1 explains how MPs quizzed private equity bosses 
on 20/6/07. 
Images obtained as screen shots from DVD recording. ITV 261 
 8.19 BBC1 explains how MPs quizzed private equity bosses 
on 20/6/07. 
Images obtained as screen shots from DVD recording. BBC 263 
 8.20 BBC1 report about income inequality and the 
educational divide on 13/12/07. 
Images obtained as screen shots from DVD recording. BBC 267 
 8.21 BBC1’s report on the State of the Union speech on 
29/1/14. 
https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/06773D36  BBC 269 
 8.22 BBC1’s report from Davos on 23/1/14. https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/065872D2  BBC 271 
 8.23 ITV1 reporting the Chancellor’s claims on 28/1/14. https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/06773CF3  ITV 274 
8.1  Income inequality stories in 2014.   276 
 8.24 BBC1’s report about Mark Carney’s speech 28/01/14. https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/06773CF3   275 
Chapter 9 
 9.1 The changes in news content and delivery from 2007 
to 2014. 
  286 
9.1  Total breakdown of social actors featuring during PIE 
coverage (by percentage). 
  288 
9.2  The use of “income inequality” in UK 
broadsheets (by percentage).  
  293 
xv | P a g e  
 
Glossary of terms. 
Barclays PLC - A major international banking organisation. 
BBC1 - The primary channel within the British Broadcasting Corporation portfolio and the location of 
the 10pm bulletin, which is one of the two featured in this research. 
 
“Big Six” - The companies supplying most of the U.K’s energy. They are British Gas, EDF, Électricité de 
France, npower, Scottish Power and SSE.  
 
Bimodal distribution - A distribution which has two distinctive peaks. 
 
Bulletin - The group of news stories appearing as a fixed time during television schedules. 
 
“Burglar alarm” - A type of news coverage where acute issues are reported ahead of routine 
background events.  
 
Business Generic - Business stories about industry sectors rather than specific organisations and 
people. 
 
Business Specific - Business stories about specific organisations and people rather than industry 
sectors. 
 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI) - An organisation representing businesses on a local and 
national level. 
 
CEO - Chief Executive Officer. 
 
Content - The issues that are actually in the news, rather than the detail of how they are presented. 
 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) - A means of identifying how language promotes and perpetuates 
underlying ideologies. 
 
Critical Political Economy (CPE) - A theory within media research that concerns the 
tension/balance/imbalance between commercial objectives and public service. 
 
Critical realism - An epistemological approach which explains the social world in terms of the 
mechanism that shape actions and ideas. 
 
Economy - A description of the fiscal affairs of a country in the widest context, embracing elements 
such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), interest rates, inflation, taxation and so on. 
 
Economic growth - The rate at which Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increases year on year. 
 
The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) - A theoretical curve, and part of a proposition that 
economic growth eventually stops causing environmental damage. 
 
Episodic framings - TV news coverage that articulates stories through specific narratives offered by 
people, rather than discussing issues in wider, more generic terms. 
 
Executive remuneration - The salary packages given to top ranking corporate figures. 
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Fatalistic causes - Causes of poverty outside the agency of human beings such as circumstances of 
birth, and acts of God. 
 
Format - The form taken by a news bulletin, story or item, embracing the order, composition and 
conventions used to deliver information. In other words, the means of delivering information. 
 
Framing - The central thrust of news. Reports are framed to feature some particular elements in the 
front and centre, while marginalising others. 
 
Filters - A series of editorial decisions made by editors that shape and influence news output. 
 
Financial sector - A generic name comprising banking and associated industry sectors, such as private 
equity.  
 
Gini coefficient - The most popular way to measure income inequality. 
 
Global Financial Crisis - The extraordinary financially-related events, beginning in 2008, that provide 
the temporal focus for this research. 
 
Hard news - More serious news, the provision of which is thought to enhance public knowledge and 
democracy. 
 
HSBC - a major international banking organisation. 
 
Income distribution - A more neutral way to describe how the total available income is spread 
among all recipients.  
 
Income inequality - A less neutral way to describe a state of affairs whereby more of the available 
income is concentrated at one end of the distribution. 
 
Individual causes - Where poverty is caused by the actions and decisions of individuals.  
 
Inequality-health hypothesis - The hypothesis proposing that there is an association between 
increasing income inequality and increasing levels of poor health.  
 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) - An organisation consisting of a large group of countries which 
promotes prudent financial management, trade links, increased employment, economic growth and 
the reduction of poverty. 
  
Items - The individual news conventions (edited packaged, live interviews and so on) that contribute 
to make a single story. 
 
ITV1 - The primary channel on the U.K’s main commercial broadcaster, which must both create value 
for shareholders, and provide public service for viewers. 
 
Keynesian economics - An economic system that advocates government intervention in a nation’s 
financial operations. 
 
Level 1 Content Analysis - The content analysis that considers all news reports in the sample, 
capturing basic data and identifying the location of PIE issues, but stopping short of analysing them. 
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Level 2 Content Analysis - Moves beyond Level 1 analysis, and captures additional detail about PIE 
issues. 
 
Lower tail - The lower (less well off) end of the income distribution. 
 
Market summary - An ITV1 only convention that summarised stock market movements and currency 
fluctuations. 
 
Mean - The average value within a range of observations. 
 
Median - The mid-point of a distribution, and the line, either side of which, lie 50% of the total 
number of observations. 
 
Mode - The most popular observation within any distribution.  
 
Multimodal analysis - A method of analysis taking account of modes of communication beyond 
words, and embracing film, image, captions, graphics and so on. 
 
National Minimum Wage (NMW) - The lowest legal threshold for pay in the U.K, expressed in terms 
of a rate per hour.   
 
Neoliberal economics - An economic system that favours a lack of regulation, allowing markets to 
find their own level.   
 
News agenda - The mix of news provided by a media organisation. Can be expressed in terms of 
categories (e.g. politics, war, sport and so on), or more generally (e.g. hard or soft). 
 
News category - The type of news (e.g. politics, war, sport and so on). 
 
New story - One or more consecutive news items all concerning the same event or topic. 
 
News values - The elements within a news story that make it interesting and appealing to editors and 
audiences. 
 
Occupy - Global movement who in 20011, arranged a series of protests against inequality, and more 
specifically against “the 1%” that they felt were receiving an unfair share of the world’s income. 
 
Othering - The differentiating between familiar groups of people, and those who do not belong 
within these groups. Can be done on cultural political, and racial grounds, for example. 
 
PIE - Abbreviation to denote poverty, wealth, the squeezed middle and income inequality on a 
collective basis. 
 
Poverty - The state of being poor, officially measured as when a household income represents less 
than 60% of the national median income. 
 
Payment Protection Insurance (PPI) - An insurance policy often sold alongside lending. During the 
period covered by this research, a number of major banks were accused of selling these policies 
unfairly to customers, and were forced to pay large amounts of compensation.  
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Predistribution - A way of rearranging the distribution of income before taxation, such as the capping 
of executive pay for example.   
 
Propaganda Model - The model suggesting that news output is heavily influenced by commercial 
considerations (see “Filters”). 
 
Public Relations (PR) - The industry promoting the interests of particular organisations.   
 
Public Service Broadcasting (PSB) – A broadcasting system that determines that public interests 
should be served in terms of the types, mix and style of programming. 
 
Qualitative methods - Research methods that move beyond quantification to provide rich detail. 
 
Quantitative methods - Research methods that deal in numerical data.  
 
Royal banks of Scotland (RBS) – A major international banking organisation. 
 
 “Run on the bank” - An extraordinary event when a large number of a bank’s customers all attempt 
to withdraw their money at the same time. 
 
“Shareholder spring” - An extraordinary event in 2012, when the shareholders of a number of large 
corporations voted against the pay awards of the senior executives employed by those companies. 
 
Social actors - Any human beings involved in the construction, delivery and content of a TV news 
report. 
 
Soft News - Less serious news, the provision of which is thought to detract from public knowledge 
and democracy. 
 
Squeezed Middle - The large proportion of people whose lifestyles have been diminished by the 
global financial crisis, and the age of austerity. 
 
Systemic causes - Where poverty is caused by wider, government or societal factors.  
 
Tabloidization - The alleged shift, across content and style, towards more trivial and less serious 
news. 
 
Thematic framings - TV news coverage that articulates stories through wider, more generic narrative 
rather than those referring to people (as in “episodic”). 
 
Upper tail - The high income end of the income distribution continuum, and the opposite of the 
lower tail. 
 
Wealthy - The state of being well off, with high discretionary incomes and none of the concerns 
associated with poverty. 
 
World Economic Forum (WEF) - An annual global summit attended by those running many of the 
world’s largest economies.  
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Chapter 1.  If income inequality is the “great debate”, is it 
being debated on TV news? 
 
1.1   Income inequality: ubiquitous or intermittent?  
 
The notion that income inequality pervades contemporary life is no better illustrated 
than by neighbouring businesses on a Cardiff street. A well-established car dealership 
selling expensive marques including Aston Martin and Bentley is adjacent to a bureau 
offering “fast cash loans” (Figure 1.1). The close proximity of easy credit serving one 
demographic to the provision of luxury cars serving another is a salutatory reminder 
of the ubiquity of inequality. Symbolically at least, the days when the poor and the 
wealthy occupied different spaces (Philo 1995; Toynbee 2003) might now be over. 
 
Figure 1.1    Neighbours in Cardiff. 
 
 
Recently, income inequality and the extremes of wealth and poverty have gained 
traction as social issues, and like many economic phenomena, are frequently viewed 
through the prism of the financial crisis. The consequences of what is described as 
“the most serious crisis of capitalism since the crash of 1929” (Atkinson 2014, p.472) 
are far reaching, and contain conflicting narratives. While bank executives for 
example, continue to enjoy high salaries, the fall in real wages for ordinary people in 
the United Kingdom (U.K) is much higher than that experienced by the citizens of 
other nations (Machin 2015). Furthermore, millions of “ordinary people” - the 
squeezed middle-class1 - have found their lives more financially challenging. 
Increasing inequality can be explained by the wealthy “pulling away” from everyone 
else, permitted by the “market forces” advocated by neoliberalism. Indeed, the 
economic crisis can be summarised as having a dramatic impact on citizens, while 
                                                          
1 Hereafter called “the squeezed middle”. 
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complicit financial sector actors have not so obviously suffered (Butterick 2015). But 
how do citizens find out about these events and make sense of them?  
 
Most people in the U.K use television as their primary source of news (Ofcom 2015), 
and the prevailing broadcasting system is shaped by the overarching principles of 
public service. As such, citizens justifiably expect that such seismic financial changes 
are explored and debated in useful and informative ways by a range of social actors 
within news reports adhering to noble journalistic principles. The core intellectual 
puzzle addressed here therefore, is whether such expectations are met the U.K’s two 
major TV news providers (BBC and ITV), and if not, why not?  Funded by a legally 
enforced licence fee paid by the public, it seems reasonable to expect that the BBC 
should serve the people who pay for it by scrutinising those apparently driving 
inequality. In contrast, ITV might be expected to be more deferential to those who 
may be simultaneously funding its programme output by paying for advertising slots 
punctuating a range of programmes, including news bulletins. 
 
This study’s objective is to explain the “social phenomena” of news stories, and the 
“causal mechanisms” shaping them (Danermark et al. 1997, p.1). Investigating these 
mechanisms is consistent with the approach of critical realism. In practice, these 
influencing factors include “organisations, people, relationships, attitudes, and 
resources” (Easton 2010, p.120). Within the context of this research, these can be 
represented by the different core missions, levels of regulatory burden, governance, 
traditions and regulatory constraints relating to these two channels and their 
employees.  
 
In sum, the objective is to examine how economic, business and financial news (EBF 
news) more widely, and income inequality, poverty, wealth and the squeezed middle 
(PIE)2 more specifically, are covered within flagship bulletins on channels carrying 
different public service obligations. The choice of years bookends the financial crisis 
(2007 and 2014), and allows for the possibility that events might have redefined EBF 
                                                          
2 Hereafter, the acronym “PIE” is used to refer to poverty (P) income inequality (IE), wealth 
and the squeezed middle. When income inequality is referred to as a standalone concept, 
then it will be referred to as “income inequality”. “PIE” was among several acronyms 
considered during this project. It was chosen to reflect the notion that available resources and 
wealth might be conceptualised as an economic “pie”. The inferred premise of course, is that 
such a “pie” is divided unequally. 
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and PIE coverage. While the quantifying of themes and trends is important, without 
some “broader explanatory framework”, such data is “meaningless” (O’Mahoney and 
Vincent 2014, p.4). Therefore, exemplar cases identified by content analysis are 
developed using critical discourse and multimodal analyses. More specifically, while 
recurrent themes and trends are explored and identified using quantitative data 
analysis, the tones, style and ideological approach of these reports are interrogated 
and exposed using qualitative analysis. The shaping influences of EBF news on BBC1 
and ITV13 are drawn upon as a means of organising and analysing data, on the basis 
that news output is a function of the rules, traditions, habits, style and objectives of 
those producing it. 
 
The data generated by this research shows that while EBF news has to some degree 
been redefined by the financial crisis, coverage of PIE issues is sparse and 
inadequate, and is insufficiently substantive to ensure that these issues become 
regular topics for public and policymaker concern. Despite clear indicators that 
“trickle down” economics promising benefits for all is not a reality, economic growth 
is presented as a universal and unidimensional solution to ease financial discomfort 
and inequality. Overall, it is empirically demonstrated that the analytical lens of 
ownership/governance, economic objective, tradition and personnel (in other words, 
the critical political economy) remains a robust way to explain and evaluate TV news 
coverage. Despite being normatively expected to expose and discuss issues of social 
significance, this study shows that because of institutional, economic and historic 
causal mechanisms, these channels are unlikely to provide any critique of such 
important contemporary issues. In fact, instead of stirring the public opinion which 
precedes policymaker action, these broadcasters appear to be part of the central 
problem, which is that a key socio-economic issue of the 21st Century is becoming 
increasingly serious while media take an indolent attitude towards it. 
 
1.2   Setting the scene I: the change in global financial well-being. 
 
This study must be firstly contextualised within wider socio-economic conditions. 
Financial inequality existed before the financial crisis, and is expected to continue 
beyond it (Clark and Heath 2014). In the 1980s, for example, the issue was implicitly 
                                                          
3 When the wider organisations are referred to, they are described as “BBC” and “ITV”. Both 
are multi-channel television broadcasters (for example BBC1, BBC2, BBC3, BBC4, and ITV1, 
ITV2, ITV3, ITV4). When the specific news bulletins are discussed, the channels are referred to 
more specifically (i.e. “BBC1” and “ITV1”).  
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introduced into national consciousness, as comedian Harry Enfield developed two 
characters which, intentionally or otherwise, highlighted income distribution. While 
his character “Buggerallmoney” emphasised one extreme, with his reliance on 
benefits, his alcoholism, his violence and dysfunctional family, the self-made 
“Loadsamoney” bragged about his "wad" of cash, exemplifying an era of “personal 
greed” (Butterick 2015, p.80), and emphasised the other extreme.  
 
The choice of 2007 as the first year for analysis provides a pre-crisis point of 
reference. At that time in the UK, there were high numbers of companies in 
administration and house repossessions or homeowners in negative equity 
(Muradoglu 2010). In August 2007, French bank BNP Paribas advised investors that it 
was unable to honour some investor demands (BBC 2009), a statement described in 
the blog of BBC’s Business Editor Robert Peston4 as “scary, to put it mildly” (Peston 
2007). The bail out of Northern Rock in mid-September 2007 is considered the first 
British manifestation of the abnormal and unprecedented economic conditions that 
followed, acknowledged to have begun with the spread of U.S subprime lending 
problems (Linsley and Slack 2013; Wisniewski and Lambe 2013).  
 
In 2007, Peston was the BBC’s high profile and influential voice on business matters 
(Robinson 2008; Kleinnijenhuis et al. 2013; Hulbert 2015) and he described income 
inequality as “fast becoming one of the great debates of our age”5. In 2008, when the 
crisis began in earnest, more banks required government help and taxpayers found 
themselves unwittingly supporting banks whose remuneration practices they 
considered excessive.  
 
 1.3   Setting the scene II: increasing income inequality. 
 
Pen (1971) defined income distribution as a process fashioned by numerous variables 
that no single individual, group, institution or government is wholly responsible for, 
albeit each has some impact. Central to income distribution, according to Pen (1971), 
is neo-classical distribution theory where actors are remunerated according to the 
value they contribute. Depending on these contributions, some earn more than 
others (Ott 2005; Thomas 2016), and the starting point is that the UK’s prevailing 
                                                          
4 During the course of this research, in early 2016, Peston moved from his job as BBC 
Economics Editor to become the Political Editor of ITV. 
 
5 This is described and analysed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
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system of liberal market capitalism incorporates inherent income disparity, and that 
it is subject to economic, social and geo-political debate. 
 
The political narrative 2007-2014 meanwhile, has developed from the Labour 
government’s stewardship of the banking bailout to a Conservative administration 
whose response to the financial crisis was to pursue policies associated with austerity 
(Shaw 2015). Simultaneous with such policies affecting many ordinary people, 
between 2010 and 2015 the number of UK billionaires doubled (Clarke-Billings 2015), 
while Oxfam report that 62 individuals now own more than poorest half of the 
world’s population (Elliott 2016). Wealth, however, has become tarnished; executive 
salaries and perks are still considered unjustifiably high (Colvile 2014), and are often 
associated with greed and a lack of conscience rather than with endeavour and 
success. Such concerns are enhanced by stories about the wealthy exercising power 
to the detriment of the powerless (Chakrabortty 2014). Accordingly, scholarly 
attention has focused on remuneration practices, the advent of the “super-rich” and 
the processes that benefit them (Turnbull and Wass 2010).  
 
Alongside the prosperity of top-end earners, increasing numbers of people have 
become reliant on foodbanks and pay day loans to satisfy their basic daily needs 
(Poverty and Social Exclusion 2013). Forecasts for child poverty are similarly bleak 
(see Owen 2015). The Conservative Party’s austerity policies were given renewed 
impetus by their victory in the 2015 General Election, with commentators suggesting 
that since the Liberal Democrats were no longer part of the government, the loss of 
their regulating impact would result in the hardening of key policies, and the further 
development of free-market ideals. One month into the new administration in 2015, 
and amid plans for further cuts to welfare and public services, Julia Unwin of the 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation declared that “thirteen million people in poverty is still 
too many in the world’s seventh richest country” (Joseph Rowntree Foundation 
2015).  
 
Through seminal, popular and accessible studies by various scholars including 
Wilkinson and Pickett (2010), Stiglitz (2013), Dorling (2014) and Sayer (2014), the 
issue of income inequality has gained wider recognition among less scholarly 
audiences. Piketty’s (2014) Capital in the Twenty-First Century for example, was an 
Amazon bestseller and became a “conversation piece” (Moore 2014). Indeed, 2014 
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was “a year of unprecedented inequality” (Williams 2014). In January of that year, for 
example, the World Economic Forum placed income inequality as the fourth greatest 
global risk, rating it higher than other phenomenon including climate change and 
extreme weather (World Economic Forum 2014). However, as determined by 
sustained periods of economic growth, by 2014, in the U.K at least, the crisis and 
recession was considered to have ended. Consequently, 2014 is compared to 2007 to 
determine whether income inequality features more prominently in TV news 
coverage. 
 
As the rich/poor gap widens, the more appropriate binary comparison may no longer 
be that between the “haves” and the “have nots”, but between the “have nots” and 
“have yachts” (see Jordan and Adam 2007; Wollaston 2007; Hoggart 2012). Amid 
widely held perceptions that income inequality was too great (Wilkinson and Pickett 
2010), and that huge salaries alongside widespread redundancies are unfair (Ladd 
and Bowman 1998), professional practices and personal behaviours are more closely 
scrutinised, and the 1%-99% income inequality meme has “inserted itself in the 
national discourse” (Karlin 2013). If income inequality is indeed the major challenge 
of contemporary life, then it is also a site worthy of academic study. 
 
Even given the worldwide “Occupy”6 protests in 2011, it is unclear as to whether 
there is any will from politicians and policymakers to ease income inequality. Indeed, 
even before “Occupy”, senior banker Lord Griffiths prescribed that the public should 
"tolerate inequality as a way to achieve greater prosperity for all" (Hopkins 2009). In 
2013, then London Mayor Boris Johnson claimed it was "futile" to try to end 
inequality and that it is essential to foster "the spirit of envy"; further, he hailed 
greed as a "valuable spur to economic activity" and called for the "Gordon Gekkos of 
London" to display their avidity for economic growth (Watt 2013a). Shortly 
afterwards, then Chancellor George Osborne expressed at least partial support by 
suggesting “an increasingly common agreement across the political spectrum is that 
you can't achieve equality of outcome” (Mason 2013).  This study asks whether TV 
news speaks on behalf of the poor, or those being “squeezed”, or whether the 
interests of the wealthy prevail.   
                                                          
6 “Occupy” is the name given to the hundreds of protests across the world (albeit it mainly in 
the United States) between September 2011 and February 2012, where citizens expressed 
their dissatisfaction with a number of socio-political issues, and with rising income inequality 
in particular.  
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1.4    Income inequality: what should we expect from our broadcast media?  
 
In the event of a lack of political intent to address income inequality, as inquisitors 
and challengers, the media are critically important. Their duty, justifiably expected 
within a regulatory system of public service, is to explain and make sense of the 
complex, determining causality and consequence with probing and incisive 
questioning.  
 
Information about poverty and income inequality generally emanates from the 
media (Page and Shapiro 1992; Zaller 1992; Power 1999; McCall 2013), which not 
only provides a forum for debate, but also shapes attitudes towards such issues 
(McKendrick et al. 2008). The case of Royal Bank of Scotland Chief Executive (RBS) 
Stephen Hester and his bonus demonstrates how coverage contributes to shifts in 
public opinion. In January 2012, following coverage of plans to put the issue to a 
parliamentary vote, Hester waived his bonus of £963,000. Since his decision was 
made before the vote, it could be reasonably concluded that news coverage was an 
influencing, if not decisive factor.  
 
However, and ahead of scrutiny into how the issue is covered by the media, income 
inequality cannot simply polarise into the differential between wealth and poverty. 
The very poorest and very wealthiest for example, are outnumbered by those who 
are neither rich nor poor, but find their pay frozen, their savings reduced, their 
pensions delayed and their weekly shopping less affordable. Accordingly, in addition 
to the media coverage of wealth and poverty, coverage of the “squeezed middle” 
provides another important point of debate. Since this is a much wider category 
covering a greater proportion of the population, media coverage of the “squeezed 
middle” might be even more influential, with dimensions extending beyond financial 
wellbeing towards political realms. During elections for example, the “squeezed 
middle” are “swing voters” that potentially hold the balance of power (Woods 2014). 
 
Traditionally, normative models of economic, business and financial (EBF) reporting 
expect it to reliably and impartially explain complex issues (Seymour 2009; Schifferes 
and Coulter 2013). The compelling critical narrative is that financial reporting falls 
short of its ideals, amid concerns about the narrow backgrounds, outlooks and 
training of journalists themselves (see, inter alia, Edwards and Cromwell 2009; Fahy 
et al. 2010; Merrill 2012). Furthermore, there are compelling arguments that it 
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promotes big business and the accumulation of wealth (McChesney 2003; Lewis 
2013a), and that it has failed to anticipate notable and impactful financial scandals 
(Doyle 2007; Tunstall 2009; Tambini 2010).  A priori, a case can be made that the 
U.K’s media system appears unlikely to challenge and probe current inequalities. A 
key question addressed by this study is whether TV news editors and journalists have 
changed their approach to this significant social issue across the period of the 
financial crisis. 
 
There are sound reasons for examining the coverage of these issues on TV news 
rather than on any other media platform. Despite the exponential increase in 
internet use, 67% of British adults use television as a news source (Ofcom 2015). In 
addition, TV news is claimed to be both more trusted (McKendrick et al. 2008) and 
more influential (Bell and Entman 2011) than newspaper journalism, while the 
impact of audiovisual data is also greater (Graber 1990; 1991). Television has long 
since been a unifying medium and a “new national force”, integrating its audience 
(Kellner 1990, p.49). In times of crisis particularly, TV news is especially important 
(Livingstone 1998; Voorhees et al. 2007).  
 
More widely, TV bulletins have strategic, iconic and ritual importance (see Fiske 
1987, Casey et al. 2002; Cushion 2012) and amid “the proliferation of audio-visual 
devices”, TV remains central within the cultural landscape (Lewis 2013b). If texts 
have casual impact (Fairclough 2003), then TV news bulletins will be among the most 
influential. What follows therefore, is the analysis of how one compelling 
contemporary socio-political and economic issue is covered on the most consumed 
and potentially impactful media platform. Analysis and discussion evolves from a 
broad context where quantitative data enables conclusions about wider news 
agendas, to a much narrower context focusing on EBF news in particular, and PIE 
issues most specifically. 
 
 1.5     Research approach and research questions. 
 
It is taken as a given, and indeed is well established in research literature, that the 
ways these news channels present particular issues will influence viewer opinion. In 
the same way that the media is part of the social conditioning of the viewer, media 
organisations themselves are also fashioned by a number of surrounding factors. 
These factors shape the type of news that is reported and the way it is reported. 
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Operationally, the research aims were to firstly determine which stories were 
reported, who contributed to them, and in which ways their discourses may shape 
the overall presentation of these important issues. The wider ontological architecture 
for this investigation is provided by critical realism, as the description of news 
coverage is enhanced by a discussion regarding the mechanisms that potentially 
fashion it.   
 
The empirical research questions are as follows: 
 
 What were the general news agendas, and what proportion of news attends to EBF 
issues on BBC1 and ITV1 10pm bulletins in 2007 and 2014? 
 
 How and why has the coverage of EBF news on these channels changed across the 
financial crisis 2007-2014? 
 
 What discourses, themes, and social actor contributions do these channels use to 
articulate the issues of poverty, wealth, income inequality and the “squeezed 
middle”? 
 
 How can the ways these news providers cover poverty, wealth, income inequality 
and the “squeezed middle” be explained? 
 
 
1.6   The research narrative: a brief sequential explanation. 
   
In simple terms, and when broken down into a series of questions attended to by 
each chapter, this study is structured as follows: 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 - What are the potential mechanisms that influence news, and how 
might we expect EBF and PIE news to be reported?  
Chapter 4 - What was the research approach, and how was the research carried out? 
Chapter 5 - What are the broad news agendas of both channels, and what quantity 
of EBF news is present? 
Chapter 6 - How was EBF news actually reported, and what conclusions can be 
drawn? 
Chapter 7 - What quantity of PIE news is covered, and what are its characteristics? 
Chapter 8 -  How was PIE news actually reported, and what conclusions can be 
drawn? 
Chapter 9 - Why is EBF and PIE news covered as it is, and what are the implications 
for those affected by PIE phenomenon? 
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Chapter 10 – Looking back at the research, what reflections can be made? 
 
In Chapter 2, a series of key shaping mechanisms are synthesised from extant 
literature as an important precursor to what follows, including the concept of critical 
political economy and the wider normative ideals of journalism. Two key and 
recurrent themes are that traditionally EBF journalism serves business communities, 
and that generically, TV news has considerable linguistic and visual power to 
influence. In sum, Chapter 2 establishes the overarching theoretical approach, which 
is that news output is shaped by a range of tangible and intangible factors, and that 
EBF and PIE news will be fashioned accordingly. While Chapter 2 establishes the 
theoretical landscapes, Chapter 3 evaluates and summarises existing empirical 
research into the ways PIE issue news is presented, systematically considering each in 
turn, defining them, and reviewing research considering the causes, consequences 
and cures associated with each. This chapter has two functions. First, it establishes 
the debates that define the coverage of PIE issues, which in turn inform the content 
analysis coding. Secondly, it provides a series of assumptions against which empirical 
findings can be positioned.  
 
Having established this landscape and the empirical points of reference, the research 
approach and operational processes themselves are described in Chapter 4. The 
approach is to describe social phenomenon, then to identify and analyse the 
structures and mechanisms shaping them. It explains the understanding of 
“discourse”, and the reasons for choosing the specific research sample. The merits of 
mixed method research (quantitative and qualitative) are also explained, before an 
explanation regarding the two levels of content analysis, and the textual, multimodal 
discourse analysis and interview that follow. The empirical results generated by Level 
1 Content Analysis detailed in Chapter 4 are duly outlined in Chapter 5. This Level 1 
analysis considers the broad news agendas on BBC1 and ITV1, and reveals that news 
is homogenous, increasingly covered more serious issues (“hard” news) and featured 
more EBF news in 2014 than in 2007. Potentially therefore, these channels provide 
potentially appropriate platforms for the informative and useful reporting of EBF and 
PIE issues. 
 
In order to develop the EBF news themes identified in Chapter 5, Chapter 6 
demonstrates that qualitative analysis helps to explain quantitative data. It shows 
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how in 2014, economic growth is presented as a panacea, how the financial sector 
dominates, how EBF news is often simplified and trivialised, and how alternatives to 
neoliberal capitalist models are absent or marginalised. This chapter also describes 
how EBF news has become more people-focused and less reliant on statistical data, 
and through a case study concerning Barclays PLC, it challenges traditional theories 
that EBF reporting is deferential to corporate affairs, concluding that the financial 
crisis has, to some degree, redefined the way such news is presented. While Chapter 
6 provides conclusions about the wider category of EBF news and generates some 
expectations ahead of analysis of PIE issues more specifically, Chapter 7 uses Level 2 
Content Analysis to quantitatively explore stories containing implicit or explicit 
references to these issues. Level 2 Content Analysis describes the capturing of 
additional detail for PIE stories only, moving beyond the basic categories, lengths and 
ordering of stories determined by Level 1 analysis. Thereafter, each issue within the 
PIE spectrum (wealth, poverty, income inequality and the “squeezed middle”) is 
examined in terms of key themes, causes, consequences, actions, blames, social 
actor contributions, the dominant discourses associated with each issue, and the 
images visually underpinning them.  
 
Chapter 7 concludes with a synthesised model of the typical coverage of each PIE 
issue; this is then represented by a series of typical case analyses in Chapter 8. Using 
multimodal analysis to examine how messages are delivered by words and images, 
this chapter explains that during the financial crisis, poverty coverage for example, 
moved from Africa to the U.K, increasingly featured individual or specific stories 
(episodic presentation) and more citizen voices. Imagery remains stereotypical and 
unimaginative, and the issue was seen as one where the state, rather than the 
private sector, has agency. Wealth coverage was consistently U.K-based, and almost 
always episodically presented. There were strong themes of criminality and unethical 
behaviour, and wealth was typically indexed and described in terms of what it 
provides, with an emphasis on consumerism. Coverage of the “squeezed middle” was 
hardly detectable in 2007, but considerable in 2014. Any misdeeds or questionable 
behaviour within the middle classes was absent, but there is evidence of causality, 
and a continuing preoccupation with pay and prices. The chapter culminates in an 
analysis of income inequality coverage, which was often dominated by political 
framings and hardly ever covered as a standalone issue. In sum, therefore, in terms 
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of PIE issue coverage, the chapter concludes that citizens are not being served by a 
broadcasting system that is fundamentally designed to do exactly that. 
 
Driven by a critical realist principle to follow description with explanation, the key 
empirical findings developed in Chapters 6-8 are then discussed in Chapter 9. These 
are the general convergence of TV news in terms of format and content, but a 
divergence in terms of style which contributes to the redefining of EBF journalism. 
The ubiquity of economic growth and lack of challenge to traditional capitalism are 
also discussed and explained, in addition to the ultimate inadequacy of PIE issue 
coverage. Finally, Chapter 10 outlines the impact and contribution of this research, 
which is to demonstrate that despite its status as a compelling social issue, BBC1 and 
ITV1 do not really cover or debate income inequality, and that this can be explained 
by the governance/ownership, commercial motivations, traditions and operational 
constraints of both channels.   
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Chapter 2. What can we expect from TV news and EBF 
journalism? 
 
On the basis that citizen perceptions of EBF news are shaped by TV news coverage, 
and ahead of quantifying, investigating and explaining ways that EBF and PIE topics 
are reported, this chapter and the one following discuss what citizens might 
reasonably expect from the U.K’s broadcasting system. Pre and post crisis findings 
(see Chapter 5 onwards) will then be compared and evaluated against these 
assumptions and expectations. This chapter examines scholarship and research 
relating to EBF journalism more generally, with an emphasis on TV coverage. It 
considers a range of factors shaping EBF news output, ranging from institutional, 
regulatory and historical influences to more subjective and operational factors. 
Having established the general landscape of EBF news reporting, Chapter 3 more 
narrowly focuses on individual PIE elements.  
 
There are many mechanisms influencing TV news coverage, and in order to 
understand TV news texts, attention must be paid to the context within which they 
are produced. The news reports themselves are at the heart of this study, and yet the 
analysis also operates beyond these texts. By examining the detail and composition 
of news reports by way of content and textual analyses, but then attending to the 
different objectives of the broadcasters in question, TV news reports can be 
scrutinised, described, and also explained in terms of institutional, cultural, financial 
and political influences. In order to present these cohesively, this chapter is 
structured according to a multilevel model originally proposed by Fairclough (1995), 
modified by Thomas and Turnbull (2016), and further adapted here (Figure 2.1). This 
model shows the surrounding and shaping mechanisms driving textual output - EBF 
and PIE news reports themselves. Fairclough’s (1995) model was originally developed 
for Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which examines how text and talk are often 
ideologically loaded, and present a “selective version of reality” (Thomas and 
Turnbull 2016, p.6). Here however, this model is adapted to reflect the wider critical 
investigation of EBF and PIE news reporting. 
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Figure 2.1   Organising framework for examining EBF news output. 
 
Adapted from Thomas and Turnbull (2016, p.8). 
 
The theoretical framework in Figure 2.1 shows influencing factors that operate from 
the outside and move inwards. The outer layer, or “social and cultural goings on” 
(Fairclough 1995, p.57), exert influence on the circumstances of text production and 
the product (text) itself. Together, the outer layer elements embracing ownership, 
funding, political motivations and deference to elite news sources combine to create 
the deep, ideological underpinning of these channels, which fashions their approach 
to news. Collectively these elements are what Murdock and Golding (2005) call the 
concept of critical political economy. The middle layer considers the more 
operational, regulatory and industrial circumstances within which EBF and PIE news 
texts are constructed, and also reflects the institutional structures contributing to the 
process of conception and delivery of news reports. These middle factors include the 
general protocols adopted within EBF news reporting, the operational ways stories 
are chosen, and the practical constraints and opportunities associated with EBF news 
broadcasting in particular. These, in effect, are the operational newsroom and 
personal possibilities, constraints and traditions that determine news output. Finally, 
the inner layer attends to the consequence of all these shaping and influencing 
mechanisms - EBF and PIE news “texts” themselves: how they are constructed, who 
contributes to them and the range of other characteristics identified by previous 
research. This chapter considers EBF output, while Chapter 3 attends to PIE news 
reports. 
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2.1    The “outer layer” factors shaping EBF news.  
 
The “outer layer” factors working inwards to shape EBF and PIE news are concerned 
with the ownership, funding, motivations, regulatory constraints, legal obligations 
and ideological backdrops of the two channels.  These are now considered in detail. 
 
2.1.1   The theory of critical political economy.  
 
Political economy is central to how media delivers news. It is defined differently 
within media studies than in “mainstream economics”, and is often referred to as 
“critical political economy” (Murdock and Golding 2005, p.61). Critical political 
economy (CPE) facilitates the examination of how communication products move 
through “a chain of production and distribution processes and structures before 
finally getting to the consumer” (Shaw 2015, p.121). Even more broadly, it attends to 
the “totality of social relations” within “economic, political, social and cultural fields” 
(Boyd-Barrett 1995, p.186), and is “centrally concerned with the balance between 
capitalist enterprise and public intervention” (Murdock and Golding 2005, p.61). This 
tension between serving citizens and generating revenue is addressed by the 
research sample incorporating the U.K’s main public service broadcaster and its 
largest commercial rival, reflecting links to capitalism “both though ownership” and 
“its reliance on advertising” (McChesney 2000, p.3).  
 
Finally, CPE engages with “basic moral questions of justice, equity and the public 
good” (Murdock and Golding 2005, p.61). In this context, this research asks whether 
EBF and PIE news output serves the public, post crisis, by assisting their 
understandings of the financial landscape. In sum, EBF and PIE news output is shaped 
by the interaction between broadcasters and their economic, political and ideological 
characteristics. News is “economically determined”, performs “an ideological 
function” and explicitly operates within political realms (Garnham 1995, p.219). This 
research seeks to interpret media texts via the “real world” causal mechanisms 
(Fairclough et al. 2004, p.24) that influence them. 
 
Within the wider realm of critical political economy as it relates to media 
organisations, the “Propaganda Model” (Herman and Chomsky 2002) proposes that 
news is fashioned by five “filters” which can also be described as a series of editorial 
decisions. These are ownership/governance and the need for profit, the leverage of 
advertisers, the availability of sources, the wish to avoid criticism, and an ideological 
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bias against communism. These filters embrace the key shaping mechanisms 
associated with critical political economy as it applies to this research, and each is 
now addressed in turn. 
 
2.1.2    The ownership/governance of BBC1 and ITV1 - funding, objectives and 
obligations. 
 
The prevailing broadcasting system in the U.K is a duopolistic environment (Corner 
2010) combining public service broadcasting (PSB) and commercial imperatives. The 
BBC is a wholly public service broadcaster funded by a licence fee, its output 
determined by Royal Charter1. Founded in 1922 and under Lord Reith’s stewardship, 
the ethos of public service was established through a corporation operating “at arm's 
length from the government” and placing “public interest” before profit (BBC 2016a).  
 
The Royal Charter - which expires at the end of 2016 - outlines the operational ways 
in which the public interest should be served, and includes elements such as 
citizenship, the promotion of learning, and the proper representation of all U.K 
nations, regions and communities (Department for Culture, Media and Sport 2006).  
In practical terms, this entails a mandate “to enrich people's lives with programmes 
and services” while being “independent, impartial and honest”, putting audiences “at 
the heart of everything”, and taking “pride in delivering quality and value for money” 
while demonstrating “creativity”, “respect” and “diversity” (BBC 2016b). These 
objectives are often synthesised into Lord Reith’s established aims to “inform, 
educate and entertain” (Debrett 2010, p.34) and in news terms, the setting of the 
highest possible standards of reporting (Machin 2008, p.60).  
 
Even amid proposed changes to the BBC’s governance, bringing the corporation’s 
output under the jurisdiction of Ofcom, in 2016, then Culture Secretary John 
Whittingdale appeared to recognise the preservation of the iconic Reithian objective 
as he decreed that the BBC must “act in the public interest, serving all audiences with 
impartial, high-quality and distinctive media content and services that inform, 
educate and entertain” (Lawson 2016). This public service imperative, and the 
attraction of advertising-free programming establish the BBC as the most trustworthy 
news supplier (Cushion 2012; Plunkett 2016), and the dominant supplier of TV news 
                                                          
1 The current Royal Charter can be found here: 
http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/about/how_we_govern/charter.pdf 
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(Wayne at al. 2010). Superficially at least, the corporation is “immune from market 
forces” (Cushion 2012, p.20), with more social, cultural and educational imperatives 
taking precedence. Therefore, it could be reasonably expected that BBC coverage of 
EBF and PIE issues will represent the interests of the public. 
 
ITV, in contrast, was established in 1955 as a commercial broadcaster with more 
limited public service obligations (Cushion 2012). It comprises several independent 
regional organisations owned by Carlton-Granada and like other commercial 
broadcasters, must generate value for shareholders (Cushion 2012). ITV seeks to 
“build a global pay and distribution business” (ITV 2014), and this objective is 
primarily achieved through advertising (Johnson and Turnock 2005). A basic premise 
associated with commercially-funded news platforms is that the wider business 
interests of media owners and sponsors will prevail (McChesney 2000; Herman and 
Chomsky 2002). Such assumptions are more problematic in the U.K (Shaw 2015), 
since its broadcasting system combines commercial interests and various degrees of 
public service obligation (Leiss and Botterill 2005). Nevertheless, the commercial 
raison d’être of ITV is some way removed from that of the BBC. 
 
ITV’s public service regulatory burden is the heaviest among the U.K’s other 
commercial broadcasters (Cushion et al. 2012). Its output is determined by Ofcom 
(Barnett 2012), which in return for granting ITV their broadcasting licence stipulates 
that the channel must not cause offence, must protect children, and must ensure 
political impartiality as well as provide news, current affairs, educational 
programmes and so on (Ofcom 2010). Nonetheless, ITV’s key strategy is to “maximise 
audience and revenue share” (ITV 2014), which means that its political economy has 
“the profit motive” (Boyd-Barrett 1995, p.186) at the front and centre.  
 
While BBC and ITV differ in terms of their public service obligations, in contrast to the 
written press, they are legally bound to be impartial (Montgomery 2007). Traditional 
impartiality, in simple terms, is “balancing both sides of the story” (Cushion 2012, 
p.45). However, the concept has been redefined as a “wagon wheel”, incorporating 
“a broader range of perspectives and spectrum of opinion than the more binary ‘see-
saw’” (Bridcut, 2007, p.7) which is often evident in political news as a simple 
left/right contrast.  The BBC, in its role as a “fully blown” public service broadcaster, 
is subject to far greater scrutiny about the impartiality of its news coverage (Cushion 
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et al. 2016, p.5) and as a consequence, “is regularly under attack from right and left-
wing perspectives” (Cushion et al. 2016, p.2).  The concept of impartiality is often 
clouded by the prefix of “due”, which can be interpreted as excusing broadcasters 
from being impartial within a single story as long as this is achieved over a longer 
period (McNair 2003). As this study generates empirical data drawn from two years 
separated by the financial crisis, it is possible to determine whether broadcasters live 
up to such exacting standards of impartiality.  
 
Ahead of any empirical analysis, with such markedly different objectives, it could be 
expected that these channels might cover EBF news and PIE news differently. ITV 
might serve business communities (including their sponsors) and marginalise any 
wider negative impacts of capitalism, while the BBC might offer a more balanced, 
socially-conscious approach embracing the interests of the ordinary citizens 
responsible for funding it.  
 
2.1.3   Advertisers, sources and “flak”– affecting editorial output? 
 
ITV follows a model whereby audiences are sold to advertisers (Smythe 1994; Kendall 
2012). The relationship between news platforms and advertisers is a contentious one 
(see Fahy et al. 2010). It is described as “double-edged sword” - advertising is 
required for funding but the power of potential sponsors might compromise 
“editorial integrity” (Butterick 2015, p.7). The issue is especially pertinent in the case 
of EBF news, since reporting misdeeds, mismanagement and even criminality might 
be compromised by the need to secure advertising revenue from those who are 
being reported on. Editorial decisions are often driven by advertisers (see, inter alia, 
Doyle 2007; Machin and Niblock 2010; Nye 2015; Taylor 2015), and the notion that 
businesses influence news challenges the principle of a freely-operating media 
(Winston 1994). 
 
Accordingly, ITV must balance providing EBF news with the fact that the companies it 
reports on might be current or potential advertisers. Former BBC journalist and later 
politician Martin Bell claimed although “once a proud name in journalism”, ITV was 
nonetheless “in hock to the advertisers” (Bell 2002). Bell’s implicit message is that 
ITV’s need to please advertisers shapes its news output. This influence for example, 
may take the form of a tendency to report advertisers in positive terms, even when, 
objectively, the news about them is anything but. An obvious example is ITV’s 
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coverage of executive remuneration; they might not hold advertisers to account, 
since those whose pay is being discussed would likely have some influence as to 
whether ITV should be used as an advertising platform. The licence fee model that 
funds the BBC, on the other hand, does not contain these channel-advertiser 
relationship tensions. Since they are funded by the public, a normative expectation of 
the BBC is that their reporting should serve all interests and demographics. 
 
Another potential shaping factor identified by the “Propaganda Model” is the impact 
of the sources used to inform the news, and the interaction between journalists and 
those they report on (Roberts 2015; Taylor 2015). The importance of gaining access 
to, and building relationships with, for example, important and credible financial 
sector actors is key, since the information they have is often unavailable elsewhere 
(Butterick 2015; Tambini 2015; Thompson 2015). While some suggest antagonistic 
relationships between journalists and commerce (Tiffen 1989; Ericson et al. 1991), 
the counter argument that these relationships compromise the independent, 
objective ideals of EBF journalism (Schifferes 2015; Shaw 2015; Thompson 2015) 
appears more compelling. There are concerns therefore, that these relationships are 
mutually beneficial when they should be much less comfortable (see, inter alia, 
Oberlechner and Hockin 2004; Schifferes 2011; Manning 2012; Butterick 2015; 
DeMartino 2015). 
 
The fourth filter - or news influencer - is the threat of “negative responses” in the 
form of “letters, telegrams, phone calls, lawsuits, speeches and bills…” or other types 
of “complaint, threat or punitive action” which prove costly for media organisations 
(Herman and Chomsky 2002, p.26). For example, in May 2016, when ITV chose UKIP’s 
Nigel Farage to face Prime Minister David Cameron in a televised debate prior to the 
in/out EU referendum, the “Vote Leave” campaign issued a press statement claiming 
that unless Farage was replaced with either Boris Johnson or Michael Gove from the 
Conservative Party, there would be “consequences for its (ITV’s) future” (Wright 
2016). The likelihood of such reactions - known as “flak” (Herman and Chomsky 2002, 
p.26) - might influence editorial decision making. 
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2.1.4     Ideological motivations of media, and the perpetuation of ideas. 
 
The governance, traditions and intentions of these channels can be said to create an 
ideological backdrop. In proposing the existence of anti-communist bias, Herman and 
Chomsky’s (2002) final filter attends to economic and political ideology. Ideology is 
the development of “political, social and economic relations” into “coherent patterns 
as a critique of current circumstances and a plan of action for the future” (Windt 
1991, p.191). Ideology is often considered as the way that ruling classes perpetuate 
power and privilege (Richardson 2007), with this power often naturalised or 
concealed. 
               
The concept of power is central to the study of mass communications (Hartley 2011). 
More specifically, it is difficult to resist notions that ideological messages developed 
by the media are promoted by those holding power, rather than by those being 
suppressed (Van Dijk 1998).  For example, if language is always ideological and never 
neutral (Fowler 1991), then ideology is ubiquitously carried by practically every 
medium. Such language can be mobilised to guide people onto “the desired path” by 
“sharing one’s convictions” (Resche 2004, p.742). While some media texts, like party 
political broadcasts, are overtly ideological, news broadcasts are more subtle in the 
ways they maintain power dynamics. Much communications research assumes that 
the media simply reproduces ideology (Blommaert 2001), but despite examples of 
news content reflecting the specific interests of particular media owners (Jukes 2012; 
Jones 2014), Fairclough (2003, p.209) advocates more careful “case-by-case” 
examination. This guides the analysis that follows (Chapters 5-8), where themes and 
trends are firstly identified, quantified, and then qualitatively examined. 
                                       
Suggestions that ideology is a pejorative concept only ever possessed by others 
(Eagleton 1991; Leonardo 2004) may be too unyielding for an examination of 
contemporary and multi-dimensional news-making. All-embracing definitions of 
ideology might be a useful starting point, but in reality may be too simplistic. For 
example, superficially, two TV news providers (BBC and ITV) with fundamentally 
different objective aims are likely to demonstrate different ideologies. When 
covering poverty, income inequality and so on, the BBC’s public service obligations 
might be expected to provide the public (who fund it) with wider discussions about 
capitalism and its variances. The funding of a commercial channel like ITV on the 
other hand, actually relies heavily on the capitalist system, and the channel might be 
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reasonably expected to produce content that does not challenge or criticise such a 
system. 
 
However, this binary model cannot be simply adopted as a working assumption 
ahead of empirical study. In reality, the line dividing commercial logics and public 
service logics is less clearly defined. Despite their mainly commercial objective for 
example, ITV is still obliged to adhere to the regulatory requirements of public 
service and the legal requirements of impartiality (Cushion 2015). The BBC on the 
other hand, with its greater obligation to public service, is not completely free of 
commercial interests (Harcourt 2005), and generates some of its own revenue by 
selling its programmes globally (Franklin 2001; Sweney 2015a). 
 
Furthermore, ideological loadings might not be confined to single news events, and 
instead might be less obvious agents, developing over time. Considering news output 
between two points (2007 and 2014) enables the detection of such ideology, the 
journalistic trends and recurring discourses associated with EBF and PIE issues, and 
the social actors developing them. 
 
2.1.5   EBF news ideology in focus: the Keynesianism / neoliberalism continuum. 
 
The manifestation of ideology in EBF journalism will likely sit between the two 
extremes of Keynesian and neoliberal economic theories. According to Keynesianism, 
governments should intervene to stimulate economies (Butterick 2015; Shaw 2015), 
providing “state-sponsored redistribution” (Gintis and Bowles 1982, p.341) and “a 
compromise between capital and labour” where “the interest of both sides would be 
jointly upheld” (Ciddi 2009, p.135).   
 
Keynesianism however, is often considered by many on the political right to be 
outmoded, unfashionable and no longer credible (Farrell and Quiggin 2011; Butterick 
2015; Shaw 2015). Herman and Chomsky (2002) describe the ideological 
underpinning of American media as being anti-communist, but this seems outdated 
and unwieldy for a U.K context. Rather than “anti-communist” motives, a more 
appropriate description of modern media organisations might be “pro-capitalist”. 
There were signs, even before WWI, that market logics and the promotion of growth 
and prosperity prevailed over political will, and Financial Times editor Ellis Powell (in 
Parsons 1989, p.43) asserted that despite perceptions that collective “destinies” 
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were in political hands, “financial and economic forces have become the 
predominant factors… while the political elements have receded into second place”.  
 
In its broadest form, “the guiding assumption of every neoliberal community of 
ideas” is that “human flourishing in life in general requires that one particular domain 
of life should rule” (Glendinning 2015, original emphasis). Accordingly, neoliberalism 
dominates Europe (Orenstein 2013; Schmidt and Woll 2013); it favours individualism 
and competition (Tabb 2003), restoring hegemony to capitalism by removing state 
interference (Schmidt 2000) and emphasising market dominance (Erjavec et al. 
2008). Economies, it is claimed, will prosper when the state recedes since it “is 
believed to leave more space for private initiative and inspire confidence” (Schui 
2014, p.2). Considered resilient and unflinching (see Du Gay and Morgan 2013; 
Schmidt and Thatcher 2013), neoliberalism is advocated by many as the system most 
able to navigate modern economies through recession (see De Ville and Orbie 2014), 
promising “the sunny uplands of the future” (Schmidt and Thatcher 2013, p.30). 
 
One way that either of these ideological extremes can be identified within EBF and 
PIE news discourse is by establishing which arguments and positions are preferred by 
which social actors. For example, the defence of free markets consistent with 
neoliberalism might be the championing of growth, wealth and prosperity (see, inter 
alia, Solomon 2001; McChesney 2003; Tambini 2010; BBC 2012; Berry 2013; Barber 
2015; Lewis and Thomas 2015), and the prevalence of pro-business views (Schiffrin 
and Fagan 2012). In contrast, more labour-centred arguments that regulated markets 
protect workforces, and others defending the welfare state may feature trade 
unions, activists or charity representatives. The promotion of either ideological 
position is developed through a combination of reporter or other commentary, 
graphics, visual settings and so on.  
 
This continuum embracing interventionist policies or the more laissez-faire regime of 
the free markets is key to EBF and PIE issue reporting. Arguments can be made that 
poverty, the squeezing of the middle class and income inequality can be addressed 
by the actions of either the private sector (for example through higher wages and 
improved employment conditions), or the state (through for example, taxation and 
benefits). This discussion now moves to the middle layer outlined in Figure 2.1.  
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2.2     The “middle layer” factors shaping EBF news.  
The “middle layer” factors influencing EBF and PIE news concern the general 
protocols adopted within EBF news reporting, the operational ways that stories are 
chosen, the relevant journalistic trends and practical constraints and opportunities. 
While the institutional ideology and approach of each channel is placed in the 
overarching outer layer of the three layered model (see Figure 2.1), these 
institutional factors are also present in the middle layer in the form of the 
professional and organisational procedures, norms and processes involved in the 
selection and shaping of news reports. 
 
2.2.1    Normative expectations of news, and EBF/PIE news more specifically. 
 
In the widest context, the media is important and necessary within a process where 
action follows public opinion (Sartori 1987). One popular notion is that journalists 
seek the truth (Machin 2008), but that this truth might be elusive. More 
pragmatically, Watergate journalist Carl Bernstein advocates that news should reflect 
"the best available version of the truth” (Rusbridger 2011). Normative models of 
“watchdog” journalism, therefore, advocate critical and objective reporting (McQuail 
1987; Kovach and Rosentiel 2007), and that journalism should function as the “fourth 
estate” alongside legislative, religious and legal systems (Kinsey 2005). Such an 
undertaking is made on the basis that businesspeople and politicians are powerful 
figures who should be held to account (Kalegeropoulos et al. 2015). 
 
Such aspirations however, may be problematic when news organisations must 
balance normative ideals with commercial imperatives and increasingly fickle 
audiences (McKendrick et al. 2008). Media ownership is increasingly concentrated 
into fewer and fewer private hands, hampering such watchdog ideals (Curran 2011), 
and also restricting choice.   
 
Turning to EBF news in particular, the sheer volume of financial information available 
(Schifferes 2011) has increased the complexity of the average person’s financial 
affairs. This presents new opportunities for EBF journalism (Saporito 1999), as the 
apparent failure of the prevailing economic system provides grounds for it to be 
strongly challenged.  Idealistic objectives for EBF journalists indicate that they should 
be “trusted allies” for citizens (Schifferes and Coulter 2012, p.2) and that they should 
“untangle the complicated” (Seymour 2009, p.8). Peter Jay of The Times (in Roberts 
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2015, p.253) outlined a general raison d’être for the discipline, advocating that it 
should provide economic insight into “such things as prices, output, employment, 
balance of payments, the world of economic environment” and “monetary 
conditions”.  
In addition, Jay proposed that the EBF specialism should provide interpretation and 
comment beyond that offered by academics and economists. EBF journalism in the 
U.K does not have the same investigative thrust as it does in the U.S (Schifferes and 
Knowles 2015, Tambini 2015), but nevertheless, it still involves uncovering the truth 
(see Taylor 2015). Objectives for EBF journalism centre around the needs of large 
commercial organisations, incorporating the provision of a “sphere through which 
the corporate world prefers to interact with society”, somewhere they can receive 
“legitimation and validation” (Butterick 2015, p.xi) or simply supply information so 
that audiences can become successful speculators (German 2000). Most compellingly 
of all however, EBF journalism should serve citizens with clarifying, accurate and 
objective reporting.   
 
2.2.2   The possibilities and scope of TV news.  
The easy credit culture implied by programmes such as Escape to the Country, A 
Place to the Sun and Location, Location, Location2 can be considered complicit in 
increasing levels of personal debt (Schifferes 2011). It is, however, the fact-based 
genre of TV news that citizens expect to inform them about EBF and PIE issues. 
 
Even despite technological advances providing more choices when consuming news, 
TV retains its pre-eminence (Lewis 2013b). TV is the most popular news platform in 
the U.K (Ofcom 2015), in addition to being of strategic, ritual and iconic significance. 
Furthermore, viewers are considered less discerning than readers (Belk and Kozinets 
2005), and since TV contains the most focused of news agendas (Hanley 2009) and 
incorporate the time constraints inherent in fixed time bulletins (McCombs and Shaw 
1972), these bulletins can be said to be the most influential news medium. The 
Ethiopian famine in the early 1980s is exemplar of how TV news can seize public 
attention. Singer Bob Geldof was among those affected by a BBC news report, 
                                                          
2 These are all entertainment programmes regularly screened in the U.K. The format involves 
an individual, couple or family attempting to sell their existing home and the programme 
presenter showcasing a number of relocation possibilities. 
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recalling that “it was clear that this was a horror on a monumental scale… I felt 
disgusted, enraged and outraged…” (Geldof 1986, pp.269-271). As a direct result, 
Geldof created Live Aid to spearhead the humanitarian relief effort.  
 
Television also delivers messages that can be understood irrespective of literacy 
levels (Morgan and Signorielli 1990). Therefore, news imagery is important (Graber 
1990; Gilens 1996). Video maximises news producer intentions (Tuchman 1978) and 
viewers find images “highly salient” (Gilens 1996, p.528), to an extent that they can 
“take precedence over the story itself” (Robinson et al. 2009, p.15). Paradoxically, 
therefore, TV both pacifies and heightens public consciousness (Perucci and Wysong 
2008). Furthermore, video images reveal “warts and all” texturing to enhance verbal 
discourse (Deacon et al. 2007, p.226), and business news in particular offers 
attractive opportunities for a multimodal platform such as television (Saporito 1999).  
Figure 2.2 shows an example of how visual data enhances spoken commentary 
during EBF reporting. In a SKY report from 3/7/12, reporter Martin Stanford describes 
the pay of Barclays’ Bob Diamond alongside a moving graphic showing an ATM 
machine continually dispensing banknotes. The clear inference, delivered through 
visual means, is that banking is characterised by limitless remuneration. 
 
Figure 2.2   Images of executive remuneration: a never-ending flow of cash. 
 
 
 
Antother paradox in contemporary TV news reporting is that it is obliged to be more 
impartial than the written press (Montgomery, 2007), yet it provides opportunities 
for strong emotion within presentations and the responses to them (Pounds 2012). 
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However, by positioning items in news or editorial sections, differentiating fact from 
opinion is much easier for print journalists than those working in TV news (Pounds 
2012). 
 
Despite normative suggestions that journalism should be objective and “cool” (see 
Schudson 2001), emotion can be relayed verbally using lexical choices and voice 
intonation (Thomas 2016), and non-verbal means such as facial expression, gestures 
and body language (Pounds 2012). It is claimed, for example, that Robert Peston’s 
“excitable” tone reporting the Northern Rock bailout in 2007 might have instigated 
panic (Hulbert 2015, p.281). If, as Pounds (2012) suggests, emotional reaction is 
equally significant as fact, the emotional reaction of news, incorporating body 
language, gestures and facial expression might also be indicative of falling journalistic 
standards and tabloidization (Pantti 2010), where news is reduced to a less serious 
(soft) level. In sum, TV news presents multimodal possibilities and opportunities to 
present all news, including news about EBF and PIE issues, in high impact forms that 
potentially influence the opinions of millions of people. 
 
2.2.3   The personal and institutional process of news selection. 
A key operational process shaping EBF news output across all media platforms is 
story selection. If TV is influential, then this can be achieved through the stories it 
features, and those it chooses to omit. While what is present has influence, those 
stories that are not mentioned may be not considered worthy of scrutiny, and 
viewers/readers may not raise questions about “something that is not even there” 
(Huckin 1997, p.82). The selection of news stories considers the relationship between 
journalists and audiences, and whether news caters to the preferences of those 
watching it, or whether journalists and editors present news irrespective of demand. 
 
An early study of news output found individual prejudices had significant influence 
on which stories were and were not reported (White 1950). Such idiosyncratic 
decision-making is exemplified by a news editor selecting the day’s news agenda on 
the basis of “‘what do I fancy today?’” (McKendrick et al. 2008, p.41). Consequently, 
the types of people populating newsrooms may have some bearing on output as they 
bring personal opinions and whims to this process. Accordingly, there are concerns 
that journalists are drawn from elite demographics (Journalism Training Forum 2002; 
Edwards and Cromwell 2009; Merrill 2012; Butterick 2015), and that unpaid 
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internships supplying the media industry preclude all but the wealthy (Dennis 2013; 
O’Neill 2013; Paton 2014). Put simply, the profession has become increasingly “white 
collar”, and this more “privileged” approach may impact story selection, with 
ideology interacting with idiosyncrasy as journalists are often less able - or prepared - 
to understand, for example, socio-economic approaches different to their own. It is 
reasonable to assume that in addition to more institutional editorial decision-making, 
BBC and ITV will be driven by personal preferences and operational norms. 
 
On a wider professional level, the story characteristics that news producers 
anticipate viewers will find most attractive are known as “news values”. News value 
theory places audience preference at the heart of the editorial process, and news 
values can be summarised as those elements journalists consider as congruent with 
public interest (McCall 2013). In practice, they are an unwritten, notional taxonomy 
of editorial selection criteria originally proposed by Galtung and Ruge (1965) and 
since refashioned (see, for example Watson 1998; Harcup and O’Neil 2001; Harrison 
2006). 
                    
In general, news value theory suggests that stories are more likely to be covered if 
they contain elite nations or events, elements of personalisation and negativity, are 
clearly defined, have high impact affecting a large number of people, and so on. 
Some stories it suggests, will be omitted unless they include a crescendo or crisis, like 
perhaps, the financial crisis. Stories with “a semblance of novelty” are also more 
likely to be included (Sorenson 1991, p.225), and while personality, sensationalism 
and conflict are emphasised, wider social, economic, or political implications are 
marginalised (Callaghan and Schnell 2001).  
 
Moreover, individual journalists may devise their own criteria to attract editors 
(Hetherington 1985), and journalism is also defined in terms of “a set of culturally 
negotiated professional values and conventions that operate mostly behind the 
backs of individual journalists” (Hanitzsch et al. 2011, p.273). Such cultures include 
decisions about zeitgeist issues or others resonating with the “climate of opinion” 
(Epstein 1973). Personal paradigms may vary, but elements such as negativity, shock, 
drama and subject matter evoking public empathy (McKendrick et al. 2008) are all 
likely to interest editors deciding what stories should be screened. As “ﬂuent, 
intelligible versions of the world” (Montgomery 2007, p.20) however, TV news is 
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different from the written press in that it does not, out of necessity, separate space 
and time but can simultaneously transmit “live” action (Montgomery 2007). 
Consequently, and aside even from the obvious difference in the range of news that 
can be covered (Hanley 2009), some stories are not considered as suitable for TV 
news (White 2005). Harrison (2006) stylises previously-established news values to 
more closely reflect TV news selection, suggesting that stories are more likely to 
appear on TV if… 
 
 Events are large scale, and pictures and film are available. 
 There are short occurrences that can be dramatized. 
 The issue can be presented simply and contains novelty. 
 Events are negative and violent, criminal, conflicting or catastrophic. 
 Events are unexpected but meaningful, and already evident within news agendas. 
 The story provides bulletin balance.  
 The story contains elite nations or people, and/or personal or human interests are 
included. 
 
In sum, for stories to appear on TV, they must be dramatic, emotional (see Kaniss 
1993, Underwood 1998; Allern 2002; Meyer 2003) and visual (Hetherington 1985). 
The concept of news values within EBF and PIE realms is not appreciably different 
(Tumber 1999). For example, poverty and inequality affect many people, are 
negative, ongoing and contain inherent potential for binary comparison. Wealth for 
example, embraces elements of elitism, while the sheer scale and sums of money 
involved in some remuneration stories make them compelling (Butterick 2015). Amid 
the many extraordinary events associated with the financial crisis, news value theory 
facilitates the unpacking and analysis of news stories. Further, by considering the 
presence of these elements and the differences between “hard” (more serious) and 
“soft” (more trivial) news, news value theory enables some conclusions as to 
whether these stories have been chosen according to public service logics or 
commercial imperatives. 
 
Taking a sacerdotal approach, editors might perceive certain news as essential for 
democracy (Semetko et al. 1991; Picard and Salgado 2015). While this may be a 
consideration for public service broadcasters such as the BBC, a more pragmatic 
approach - evaluating stories in terms of their attractiveness and appeal (Blumler and 
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Gurevitch 1987; Picard and Salgado 2015) - may appear more pertinent to 
commercial stations. Economic and financial events such as interest rate fluctuations, 
bank bailouts, large remuneration awards or announcements of growth are 
standalone and newsworthy, but despite their omnipresence, the “slow burn” nature 
of PIE issues might mean they lack obvious and compelling news values. For example, 
and as explained in Chapter 3, income inequality is consequent of a wide range of 
political and socio-economic factors, and develops over decades. 
 
Finding newsworthy events within slow moving themes resonates with the “burglar 
alarm” standard of reporting (Zaller 2003). Adapting a model developed by 
McCubbins and Schwartz (1984), Zaller (2003, p.112) proposes that news should 
comprise of attention-catching information about “acute problems” rather than 
“police patrol” coverage providing routine reporting about issues posing no 
immediate danger. This model advocates highlighting issues in “excited and noisy 
tones” at regular intervals, rather than more muted, continuous coverage (Zaller 
2003, p.122). This, proposes Zaller (2003), attracts the attention of “monitorial 
citizens” who are sufficiently informed to recognise important societal issues, and in 
order to become acquainted with these issues, absorb information about many 
issues on a superficial level (Schudson 1998). Instead of supporting intensive, 
relentless dissemination of information, the “burglar alarm” model represents 
climactic coverage, enabling citizens to acquire information with less effort, their 
attention grabbed by “alarms” rather than the “slow burn” routines of “general 
patrols” (Zaller 2003, p.119).   
 
Although these wide-ranging social issues might be better addressed by longer 
format genres such as documentaries which elicit more “compelling emotional 
response” (Scott 2013, p.13), “burglar alarm” coverage offers a “workable and yet 
normatively defensible standard for popular news” (Zaller 2003, p.127). The 
extraordinary behaviour, practices and remuneration of some banking sector actors 
for example, can be conceptualised as “burglar alarm” opportunities to discuss 
broader themes within the banking system (Tumber 1993). In particular, the 
personalisation of events is “essential” to news narratives (Puustinen et al. 2015, 
p.99). For example, previously revered, bankers became “widely detested” (Whittle 
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and Mueller 2012, p. 112) and “greedy” (Joutsenvirta 2013)3. Alongside this potential 
refashioning of some elements of EBF journalism, it is possible that post-crisis, 
reporting may have become more sensational, simplified or “dumbed down”. Shaw 
(2015) for example, describes that while the more complex subprime mortgage crisis 
was downplayed by some media, the less ambiguous horsemeat scandal of 2013 was 
escalated and emphasised in more alarmist ways. Some decry blending news with 
entertainment and simplification (Jensen 1979; Franklin 1997; Doyle 2007), while 
others (see Langer 1998; Marr 2004; Temple 2006) contend that simplifying news is 
necessary to engage wider audiences. The lack of “burglar alarm” coverage might 
explain why developing scandals such as Enron, for example, went unnoticed. 
However, one criticism of “burglar alarm” coverage of on-going issues such as 
poverty and income inequality is that when such coverage ends, viewers may think 
that the issue has been reduced or even solved.    
 
2.2.4   Framing: Presenting EBF and PIE news stories once they have been chosen. 
 
Within the operational news construction process addressed by the middle layer of 
the model shown in Figure 2.1, once stories have been chosen, editors and 
journalists face further choices when deciding how they are packaged and presented 
to audiences. Inequality for example, might be described as a pejorative 
phenomenon that should be reduced, or as an acceptable by-product of capitalism.  
 
News editors make decisions about how such stories are presented (Reese 2007). 
Aside from the number and type of sources and so on, another major decision 
concerns how stories should be “framed”. News story “framing” has been widely 
researched (McCall 2013; Xu 2013) and is key within communication studies 
(Goffman 1975; Iyengar 1990). It can be understood as a process comprising of 
“individual” and “media” frames (Scheufele 1999; Sabir and Rasul 2011). Individual 
frames are mental clusters of knowledge determining how individuals process 
information (McLeod et al. 1987; Kinder and Sanders 1990; Conaway 1996). Media 
frames however, are the ways of organising information (see Tuchman 1978), 
                                                          
3 Examples of literature about the banking crisis especially critical of the sector include 
Making It Happen: Fred Goodwin, RBS and the men who blew up the British economy (Martin 
2013) and Bad Banks: Greed, Incompetence and the Next Global Crisis (Brummer 2014). 
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drawing out the “central organizing idea or story line”, and providing the story’s 
“essence” (Gamson and Modigliani 1987, p.143).   
 
When framing stories, journalists and editors use words, sources and images 
(McLeod and Detenber 1999), highlighting salience and promoting one line of 
interpretation or the interests of some groups, while marginalising others (see, inter 
alia, Tuchman 1978; Entman 1993; 2007; Terkildsen et al. 1998; Hannah and Cafferty 
2006; Reese 2007; Kim et al. 2010). In turn, these will influence audience perceptions 
(McCombs et al. 1997; Callaghan and Schnell 2001) or “individual” frames. For 
example, corporate profits might appear considerable when presented in isolation, 
but when compared to a competitor’s returns might seem less impressive (Butterick 
2015). Frames function to define issues, propose causality, evaluate and advocate 
solutions (Entman 1993); Level 2 Content Analysis specifically examines the presence 
of these elements within PIE issues coverage (see Chapter 7). 
 
Wider discussions regarding the cause and effect of poverty often depend on 
whether the issue is framed episodically or thematically (see Chapter 2). Thematic 
framings describe general trends including quantification, geographic differences, 
changes and so on; such general coverage may involve graphics, statistics, and wider 
explanations (Iyengar 1990). While thematic frames more often refer to causality, 
statistics are often difficult to understand (Dorling 2011), and such presentation can 
be impersonal (Kendall 2012). In contrast, episodic framings describe poverty “in 
terms of personal experience”, where “the viewer is provided with a particular 
instance of an individual or family living under economic duress” (Iyengar 1990, 
p.21). Consequently, a focus on those with personal experience of poverty is often 
the most effective means of engaging wider audiences (Duffy and Pierce 2007; 
Delvaux and Rinne 2009; Robinson et al. 2009). More negatively, episodic framings 
can simplify issues to the level of “anecdote” (Iyengar 1990), or a “fleeting parade of 
events” (Dimitrova and Strömbäck 2010, p.493), meaning that understandings of 
issues are “disorganized, and isolated” (De Vreese 2003, p.38). 
 
Iyengar (1990, p.21) suggests that TV news is “inherently episodic" or “event-
oriented”, focusing on “concrete acts” or "live" events at the expense of “general 
contextual material”. In contrast to research findings that thematic framings are 
more frequent (Hannah and Cafferty 2006), the more compelling argument is that in 
TV news, episodic framings are more common than thematic ones (Iyengar 1990), 
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consistent with ideas that human stories are more interesting for audiences than 
social causes (McKendrick et al. 2008). In contrast, simplifying complex issues might 
ignore wider context, with policy solutions ignored (Callaghan and Schnell 2001); 
moreover, episodic framings inevitably promote some elements of reality, while 
others are omitted (Kim et al. 2010). 
 
Framing choices are also important since public perceptions of “causes and cures” 
are thought to be dependent on TV news frames (Iyengar 1990). For example, while 
governments might be held responsible within stories presented thematically, 
episodic frames engender more individual attribution (Iyengar 1990; Kendall 2012). 
Such outcomes inevitably shape private sector and policymaker actions, since there is 
“virtually no aspect of life in which attribution of causal responsibility does not 
significantly influence attitudes and behaviours” (Iyengar 1990, p.23). Further, 
“game” frames are often present in political stories (Aalberg et al. 2012), meaning 
process takes preference over policy. Beyond politics, “game” frames involve “media 
logics” embracing elements including “dramatization, conflict and personalization” 
(Olsson and Nord 2015, p.346). Once Level 1 and 2 Content Analyses determine what 
sort of news is reported and whether episodic or thematic frames are preferred, 
qualitative analysis explores how, and by whom these news frames are developed.  
 
2.2.5   Other trends and challenges that shape EBF and PIE news output.  
There are other mechanisms influencing EBF journalism within the “middle layer” 
outlined in Figure 2.1. These incorporate operational, institutional and ethical 
challenges (Doyle 2007: Manning 2012). According to Harrison (2006), news is 
selected according to the organisational constraints of those choosing it. First, 
corporate misdeeds might only be revealed through investigative journalism, but this 
specialism is considered to be in decline as redundancies, budget cuts and changing 
editorial approaches all determine news output (Tunstall 1996; Barnett and Seymour 
1999). Newspapers and bulletins must be delivered by fewer journalists (Sommers 
2014)4, and alongside such staffing cuts, less general resources and higher workloads 
(L’Etang 2004; Murdock 2015) might also partly explain why the most recent financial 
crisis was not anticipated (Butterick 2015).  
 
                                                          
4 Sommers reports that in an attempt to save £48 million by 2016, the BBC announced a net 
loss of 225 jobs in BBC News and Current Affairs. 
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As a consequence, the deficit in journalist-generated news copy is countered by using 
information subsidies provided by “powerful media experts” in the Public Relations 
(PR) sector (Hulbert 2015, p.284), who set corporate agendas and determine the 
availability of sources (Davis 2000; Fahy et al. 2010; Butterick 2015). PR has grown 
considerably (Tumber 1993; Tunstall 1996; Davis 2002) and professionally-presented 
stories from corporate communications departments are increasingly replacing 
independent, journalist-sourced content (Lewis et al. 2006; Schifferes 2011).  
Professional PR teams skilfully “manage” journalists into positive, or at least neutral 
discourses when the news is generally bad (Butterick 2015, p.96). A vicious circle is 
completed as time pressures mean journalists cannot verify corporate information so 
rigorously (Oberlechner and Hockin 2004; Schifferes 2011; Tambini 2015). As they 
change from “hunter gatherers” of stories to “data processors” (Butterick 2015, 
p.113), journalists, therefore, rely increasingly on PR.   
 
Even as far back as 2008, before budget cuts and redundancies within media 
organisations had taken such a serious grip, Lewis et al. (2008, p.10) found that “52 
per cent of broadcast news items contain PR materials”, noting that their findings 
could be even more startling, since PR influence was suspected in more stories but 
could not be verified. As well as competing with the influence of PR, mainstream 
journalists also face other contemporary challenges, such as ensuring their 
adherence to stringent U.K libel laws (McChesney 2003; Taylor 2015), and 
competitive pressures from non-professional bloggers (Tambini 2015). 
 
Furthermore, given the complexity of EBF affairs (Doyle 2007: Tambini 2015; 
Schifferes 2015; Davis 2015), there are concerns that journalists lack professional 
competencies, knowledge and training (see, inter alia, Davis, 2007; Schifferes 2011; 
Schiffrin and Fagan 2012; Butterick 2015). In practice, this might manifest itself as an 
inability to accurately or clearly present data (Poynter Institute 1998; Maier 2002), or 
a failure to challenge stories beyond superficial levels (Doyle 2007). As large news 
providers, BBC and ITV will be inevitably affected by all such trends and professional 
norms and/or deficiencies.  
 
2.3   The “inner layer” - EBF news texts.  
The outer layers in the organising framework shown in Figure 2.1 consider the wider 
governance and ideological influencers of EBF news texts. What emerges from this 
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shaping process are EBF and PIE news texts themselves. The final, inner layer 
therefore, attends to EBF and PIE5 reporting, and what follows is an examination of 
the themes, trends and conventions as determined by scholarly research. These 
provide a series of expectations for what might be revealed by the quantitative and 
qualitative analysis outlined in Chapters 5-8. 
 
2.3.1   Serving which masters? A critique of contemporary EBF journalism. 
As might be expected from the examination of influencing mechanisms within the 
outer and middle layers in Figure 2.1, the inevitable conclusion drawn from research 
into EBF journalism is that it fails to meet normative expectations. Although until 
comparatively recently an infrequent site for academic inquiry (Butterick 2015), 
several financial crises have intensified the scrutiny of EBF journalism. Criticism of the 
discipline is well established (Schifferes and Coulter 2012; Tambini 2015), but often 
seems based on anecdotal intuition (Shaw 2015) rather than systematic empirical 
work. More recently, concerns regarding EBF journalism have been regularly outlined 
(see for example, McChesney 2003; Butterick 2015; Shaw 2015; Tambini 2015; Taylor 
2015).  
 
Aside from playful suggestions that Joseph warning the Pharaohs about “agricultural 
depression” was the first example of financial punditry (Parsons 1989, p.11), the 
consensus is that financial journalism began in the 16th and 17th centuries with the 
distribution of mercantile trade information (Parsons 1989; Winston 1994; Starkman 
2014). A banking family - the Fuggers of Augsberg – were the first to trade economic 
data (Parsons 1989; Bakker 2015; Butterick 2015; Shaw 2015). The profession was 
further developed by John Castaing (Butterick 2015), and by the beginning of the 19th 
century, EBF reporting was responsible for shaping “economic attitudes” (Parsons 
1989, p.18). Eminent journalists such as Alsager (see Butterick 2015; Taylor 2015) and 
Bagehot (see Schifferes 2011; Butterick 2015; Shaw 2015) advanced the specialism by 
raising standards of reporting and knowledge. By WWII, EBF journalism was 
increasingly professionalised (Butterick 2015), and post war, the volume and choice 
of EBF news increased, with specialist titles growing alongside mainstream titles 
containing business sections. Broadcast coverage however, was infrequent apart 
from during times of crisis (Roberts 2015). The traditions of EBF reporting are rooted 
                                                          
5 Coverage of PIE issues is examined in Chapter 3.  
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in print journalism, and this format must be considered as an influencing mechanism 
as EBF journalism transitioned into broadcasting. 
 
EBF news audiences have become increasingly mainstream, since events more 
obviously attract wider audiences as they embrace conflict and the human elements 
of corporate life (Doyle 2007; Kleinnijenhuis et al. 2013). Contemporary news 
landscapes therefore, are willing platforms for EBF news, as the specialism moves 
from “Wall Street” to “Main Street” (Joutsenvirta 2013, p.474; Bromley 2015). 
Chakravartty and Schiller (2010; p.685) report the “sheer ubiquity of financial news 
and infotainment since the 1990s”, and this popularising of EBF news is driven “by 
the need for individuals to know more about their own financial situation as they are 
being required to take more responsibility for it” (Schifferes 2011). 
 
EBF reporting is an especially important specialism, since journalists can influence the 
stories they report (see, inter alia, Tambini 2010; Engleberg and Parsons 2011; 
Manning 2012; Casarin and Squazzoni 2013; Shaw 2015). For example, volatile 
markets may be influenced (Thompson 2015), and the central dilemma - notably 
faced by Robert Peston when reporting the Northern Rock bail out (Kleinnijenhuis et 
al. 2013) - is to balance the professional duty of reporting the news with the impact 
of that duty on citizens, investors, employers and markets (Tambini 2015). Peston’s 
initial reporting on Northern Rock for example, is often seen as instigating the “run 
on the bank” that followed (Hulbert 2015).   
 
Some EBF journalist practitioners see their role as wholly market-serving, with no 
discernible ethical or social obligations other than remaining within the law (Shaw 
2015; Tambini 2015). EBF journalist Peter Jay for example, once said that his writing 
was for the benefit of three people, two of whom worked in the Treasury (Schifferes 
2011). Such comments define target audiences as narrow and elite (Davis 2000; 
McChesney 2003; Doyle 2007; Tambini 2015). The contemporary challenge however, 
is to satisfy two discrete audiences - one with specialist knowledge, and another 
simply wishing to better understand their own financial affairs (BBC 2012).  
Within a commercial media model reliant on advertising, news organisations might 
cater for a powerful, high income demographic (see Baron 2006). In contrast, Shaw 
(2015) suggests that EBF journalism should be redefined as “public business 
journalism” attending to a much wider demographic. While much of the U.K’s media 
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remains in private hands, this is difficult to conceive. However, and while the 
appetite for EBF news is greater and wider, new types of audience engagement 
might be required. Serving this audience is compounded by lower levels of financial 
literacy; despite Gillian Tett’s cautious advocacy for example, the Financial Times 
“could not find a way of translating her specialist knowledge into a front-page story” 
(Fay 2011, p.53). In sum, traditional financial stories are often dry, and lack elements 
likely to excite and engage audiences (Shaw 2015); non-specialist audiences 
therefore, may require a different style of EBF news presentation (Thomson 1998). 
Audiences must be able to trust EBF journalists. On the BBC especially, since citizens 
fund its operations, those operations should reflect wider public interests. While 
trust is explicitly described as fundamental for titles such as the Financial Times 
(Lambert 1998; Butterick 2015), confidence in journalists has declined alongside that 
for politicians and corporate figures, especially bankers (Schifferes 2015). The deficit 
of trust is fuelled by scandals such as the “city slicker” case (Tambini 2010, Butterick 
2015), when journalists were accused of tipping shares and inflating their value for 
personal benefit. Pertinently here, Schifferes (2015) finds that generically, broadcast 
EBF news is even less trusted than other media, perhaps surprising given that in the 
U.K, TV news has additional obligations of impartiality.  
 
One major concern is that in exchange for information, interviews and access, 
business sources implicitly, or even explicitly, expect positively spun stories on a 
“quid pro quo” basis (Tambini 2015, p.123). Accordingly, relationships between 
journalists and their sources are variously described as “symbiotic, incestuous” and 
“Machiavellian” (Nye 2015, p.215). Throughout Parsons’ (1989) useful history of EBF 
reporting, it is clear that even the earliest EBF journalists served business 
communities rather than wider readerships, and generally functioned as carriers of 
raw data, lacking mass appeal (see also Taylor 2015).  
Accordingly, a “merger between the media and the political/business classes” is 
thought to create “a cosy network” (Fay 2011, p.52). The Guardian’s Simon Jenkins 
(cited in Hulbert 2015, p.286) explains that relationships between EBF journalists and 
their sources are similar to those between political journalists and politicians, and are 
so unhealthy that “mishaps” are unsurprising. The dilemma facing EBF journalists is 
that “burning” one’s sources apparently hampers their ability to function (Barber 
2015, p.xxv). Where media are commercially commandeered and choice is limited, 
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there are claims that elite interests are perpetuated and inequalities are promoted 
(Davis 2003; Petrova 2008), and that instead of holding business to account, 
journalists are “safe conduits” to disseminate positive corporate information 
(Butterick 2015, p.91). This is a point that is perhaps amplified further by the 
reduction in investigative journalism. The qualitative analysis in Chapters 6 and 8 
examines contributors to EBF and PIE reports, and the language and presentation 
that they use. 
In practice, acquiescing to business and investor communities is demonstrated by the 
limited coverage of labour markets and workforces (Chakravartty and Schiller 2010; 
Butterick 2015), and the regular and narrow use of stock markets to index “business” 
(Devereux 1998). Statistically-driven news reflects the interests of businesses 
themselves (Lewis 2013a), and is prone to deliver advice and gossip rather than 
critical analysis (Curran 1978). Moreover, which statistics are featured and how they 
are presented might also be problematic (Wren-Lewis 2015).  
 
Often chosen because of their ability to “perform” on TV or radio, financial analysts 
are frequent contributors to business news (BBC 2012). Risks to objectivity and 
accuracy are intensified by suggestions that sources may compete for media 
exposure (Thompson 2015), realising that their appearances enhance and 
consolidate reputations (Saporito 1999; Fay 2011). The motives of sources, therefore, 
might be more problematic than the straightforward dissemination of fact and 
comment, and often the only available “experts” may have vested corporate 
interests (Doyle 2007; Chakravartty and Schiller 2010; Tambini 2015; Butterick 2015). 
Further, Chakravartty and Schiller (2010, p.684) point out that “the business media 
have helped transform captains of industry as acceptable experts and public 
intellectuals” on a range of “economic or social” issues.  
 
The symbiotic nature of the relationship between the media and the corporate world 
is fundamental to the central concern that EBF journalism is insufficiently probing 
(Kleinnijenhuis et al. 2013; Shaw 2015). During financial crises, EBF news is especially 
important (Anderson 2004; Kjær and Slaatta 2007), but it is considered to have failed 
to anticipate, for example, the Wall Street Crash of 1929 (Barber 2015; Roberts 2015) 
and more recently, other corporate collapses (see, inter alia, Dyck and Zingales 2002; 
Madrick 2003; Doyle 2007; Manning 2012; Murdock 2015). As for the recent financial 
crisis, “when business and finance became the best story in the world, almost every 
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business journalist missed it” (Fay 2011, p.53). Consequently, normative models of 
“watchdog” journalism6 are compromised (see, inter alia, Starkman 2014; Butterick 
2015; Schifferes 2015; Tambini 2015). 
One explanation for such ineffectual reporting is that when the economic outlook is 
good, caution is unfashionable (Barber 2015; Tambini 2015). While this might explain 
the indolence of some EBF journalists, other practitioners are resolutely critical 
(Butterick 2015), and retain “the capacity to be canaries in the mine” (Barber 2015, p. 
xxviii). Gillian Tett of the Financial Times for example, is oft-quoted as exemplar of 
more pragmatic reporters (see, inter alia, Fay 2011; Barber 2015; Schifferes and 
Knowles 2015; Thompson 2015), and was expressing concern well before the 2008 
crisis. While much EBF journalism does not sufficiently probe and investigate, it 
cannot be simply generalised as indolent.  
However, amid claims that EBF journalism is mostly negative (Dominick 1981; Carroll 
2004), the compelling discourse is that it is elite-driven (Schifferes 2011; Davis 2015), 
irrespective of the nature of the wider political backdrop (Schifferes and Knowles 
2015; Walsh 2015).  
 
2.3.2    A narrower focus: the EBF news tradition of BBC and ITV. 
ITV1 and BBC1 are the two most trusted broadcasters of EBF news (Eaton 20127; 
Higgins 2015; Schifferes 2015). When first introduced, ITV/ITN news offered a fresh 
alternative to the more formal BBC (Marr 2004; Barnett 2012; Cushion 2015; Higgins 
2015). This manifested itself as an increase in reporter involvement (Marr 2004; 
Barnett 2012) and the introduction of male and female anchoring duos (Marr 2004; 
Montgomery 2007; Cushion 2012). Editorially, ITV traditionally follows a lighter news 
agenda, complementing hard news with elements often found in mid-market 
newspapers (Barnett 2012). ITV can therefore be summarised as consumer-driven, 
populist and mainstream (Barnett 2012; Cushion 2012).  
 
                                                          
6 Continuing the canine metaphor, Forbes magazine states that regarding Enron, journalism 
was “the dog that didn’t bark” (Roush 2011, p.3) and was “lapdog not watchdog” (Schifferes 
2015, p.164; see also Starkman 2014; Butterick 2015). 
7Eaton (2012) reports the YouGov poll, where 44% of respondents believed BBC journalists 
told the truth. ITV were a close second, with 41%. These values are higher than those 
expressed in “upmarket” newspapers (38%), and notably higher than the trust expressed in 
mid-range (18%) and tabloid newspapers (10%). 
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BBC’s news ethos, on the other hand, can be described thus: 
 
Free from commercial interests, lacking the baser instincts of 
newspapers or independent broadcasters who must satisfy the whims of 
proprietors and shift copies or sell advertising space… BBC news, 
theoretically at least, is … ineffable, truth-telling the kind of God the 
father of journalism… (Higgins 2015, p.146).  
 
In addition, the BBC is often associated with “Britishness” (Marr 2004; Higgins 2015), 
which might embrace staidness and excessive bureaucracy (Barnett 2012; Higgins 
2015). The BBC itself states an intention to reflect a range of views and voices within 
coverage of economic issues, and to avoid giving undue weight to specific 
institutional perspectives (BBC 2012). Contributors to a BBC seminar about EBF 
reporting in 2012 concluded that plural and diverse opinions were “essential” (BBC 
2012). Under the BBC’s “wagon wheel” model of impartiality, this plurality should 
justifiably extend beyond the traditional binary of neoliberalism versus Keynesianism 
to include a range of ideas from free-markets to interventionism, embracing new 
economic models which are less reliant on the relentless pursuit of growth. 
 
The apparent lack of commercial imperatives and self-proclaimed even-handed 
intentions however, do not mean media organisations are “ideologically inert” (Porto 
2007, p.23). In contrast with requirements of impartiality, the traditional argument - 
usually promoted by those in the political right - is that the BBC’s role as a public 
service broadcaster means that it is allied to the political left (see Marr 2004; Barnett 
2012; Jones 2014). This view was endorsed in 2010, by then BBC Director General 
Mark Thompson, who described the corporation in the late 1970s as being 
characterised by “a massive bias to the left” (in Helm 2013). There is little evidence to 
support this analysis (Hopmann et al. 2010; Higgins 2015). However, there is 
compelling evidence, regarding financial matters at least, showing that that the BBC 
lean to the political right (Berry 2013a; Wahl-Jorgensen et al. 2013; Burrell 2014). The 
broadcaster is considered to offer an “establishment view” (Hargreaves 2003, p.27); 
the BBC Radio 4 Today programme for example, “has a business slot fronted by a 
former city executive, in which CEOs are rarely criticised” (Dorling 2014, p.23). 
 
2.3.3    Different but also the same: the homogeneity of BBC and ITV. 
Research shows that news reports are increasingly homogenous. Despite claims of 
diversity within “news formats, news philosophies and news values” (Harrison 2000, 
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p.106) and some obvious differences between the two channels, news is becoming 
increasing similar (see, inter alia, Harrison 2000, 2006; Paterson 2003; Barnett et al. 
2012). A pro-establishment BBC1 and an ITV1 that does not challenge advertisers, 
might, in practice, operate according to similar editorial principles. Moreover, if ITV1 
is engaged in comparatively few disagreements with government by virtue of its 
private funding, and has a lesser appetite for investigative reporting (see Barnett 
2012), then its relationship with “the establishment” might also be comfortable and 
unchallenging. Further, Marr (2004) muses ITV’s future possible acquisition by an 
American conglomerate (see also Sweney 2015b), and suggests that the inevitable 
pro-business output would not concern any British government in power at the time. 
 
Further, it is claimed - anecdotally - that BBC1 is taking an increasingly lighter 
approach, adopting more commercially-driven onscreen protocols and practices 
(Barnett 2012) often associated with ITV. Former senior BBC figures, for example, are 
quoted as suggesting that of the objectives to “inform, educate and entertain”, 
entertaining viewers is paramount, since unless viewers found programming 
“agreeable”, they would not watch or listen long enough to be educated and 
informed (Higgins 2014, p.52-3). That the BBC has softened its news agenda seems 
undeniable given evidence from its own staff. Over a decade ago for example, World 
Affairs editor John Simpson cited “a lack of interest” in foreign affairs, and War 
Correspondent Kate Adie described the corporation as “far more tabloid than it used 
to be” (Jury 2002). Martin Bell observed that The Six O'Clock News seemed as if it had 
“inherited the values as well as the audience of [the soap] Neighbours, which so 
seamlessly precedes it" (Jury 2002). Other BBC staff members also expressed regret 
that programming had “dumbed down” amid “over-emphasis on celebrity led, 
contrived reality and lifestyle formats” (Bingham 2008).  
Any convergence between BBC1 and ITV1 news might be considered through the 
prism of institutional isomorphism (Dimaggio and Powell 1983) where the “politics 
and rituals” of many realms – “including mass media” – operate with increasing 
similarity (Clausen 2003, p.33). The large scale content analysis central to this project 
examines homogeneity within the wider news agendas of both channels; channel 
divergences are referred to, but wider trends followed by both channels are 
considered as being more significant. 
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2.4     Summarising contemporary EBF journalism. 
Using the model outlined in Figure 2.1, this chapter has examined the mechanisms 
potentially influencing EBF and PIE news, and develops a series of expectations for 
the ways that such news might be reported by BBC1 and ITV1. 
 
Among the outer layer mechanisms, channels are governed by remits to be impartial 
and to varying degrees, to act in the public interests. Beyond these wider obligations, 
it might be expected that BBC1 will adhere closely to its public service obligations, 
providing probing and analytical journalism from various stakeholder perspectives. 
ITV1 on the other hand, might be reasonably expected to defer to the interests and 
ideological interests of the corporate world generally, and its own advertisers more 
specifically.  
According to the more operational mechanisms within the middle layer of the model, 
the personal, professional and practical factors shaping the reporting of EBF and PIE 
issues mean that there are subjective reasons for the selection and presentation of 
news. Stories might appear on the basis that they will appeal to wider audiences, but 
reporting is also constrained by what is practically possible given the available 
resources, and the competencies, preferences and habits of editors and journalists. 
The inner layer of analysis considers evidence showing how EBF news has actually 
been historically and traditionally shaped by all these factors. The conclusion is that 
despite the normative ideals of journalism, EBF reporting is often indolent towards 
capitalism, operating on the basis of a comfortable symbiosis between those 
reporting and these being reported. The financial crisis has evoked a new level of 
interest in EBF news and offers an opportunity for EBF specialists to redefine their 
discipline according to more normative aims. The empirical work that follows 
examines whether this opportunity has been grasped.  
This chapter ends with a focus on EBF texts, and Chapter 3 continues this focus by 
attending to the narrower field of PIE issues, examining the characteristics associated 
with this type of news reporting, and where possible, on TV news in particular.  
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Chapter 3. How are poverty, wealth, the “squeezed 
middle” and income inequality represented in the 
media?  
 
Using the three-layer model in Figure 2.1, Chapter 2 considered the factors shaping 
EBF and PIE news reports. Continuing with the focus on the inner layer of “text” 
established towards the end of Chapter 2, Chapter 3 now more closely considers 
news reports containing PIE themes, and has two functions. First, it identifies and 
examines the themes, topics and academic debates that extant literature suggests 
will characterise the media coverage of PIE issues. This generates a series of 
reference points against which empirical findings can be compared. Secondly, these 
themes inform Level 2 Content Analysis, as they provide a series of likely categories 
that will capture the data required to answer the research questions. The chapter 
therefore considers research about human conditions (poverty, wealth and the 
“squeezed middle”), and then the distance between them (income inequality).  
 
3.1   Poverty and its causes. 
Poverty is the condition experienced by those whose resources are so limited that 
they are adrift from locally accepted minimum ways of life (European Council 1975; 
Seymour 2009). More simply, poverty represents the inability to meet one’s own 
basic needs (Fosu 2010), which might be the lack of food, shelter, access to clean 
water or medicine, and the lack of opportunity for improvement (Addae-Korankye 
2014). Poverty also involves marginalisation and exclusion (European Anti-Poverty 
Network 2009), incorporating the challenge of making choices and sacrifices, and 
living in the state of “perpetual fear” (Seymour 2009, p.9). More widely, poverty 
impacts health, life expectancy, lifestyle, and levels of power (Flaherty et al. 2004).  
 
Aside from the discursive constructions of poverty, the condition is officially 
measured in relation to earned income. In the U.K, a household is “poverty” when it 
receives less than 60% of the national median income (Office for National Statistics 
2012). According to this metric, around 20% of the U.K’s population lives in poverty 
(see MacInnes et al. 2013; Milmo 2014; Oxfam 2015). Table 3.1 summarises the 
themes and topics emerging from literature on poverty and its coverage, which are 
then examined in more detail in sections 3.1 and 3.2. 
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Table 3.1.   Summary of themes within literature about poverty and its media 
coverage. 
 
 
 
Poverty varies nationally or internationally (Lugo–Ocando 2015), and there is a 
consensus that the causes of poverty are many and varied (Lynch et al. 2004; 
Alderson et al. 2005; Wilkinson and Pickett 2010), as well as being dynamic and 
complex (Jenkins 1996; Lemieux 2008; André et al. 2013). 
 
The causes of poverty can be described as being either individualistic or structural. 
Poverty can be caused by “individual weaknesses, failings and inadequacies” (Royce 
2009, p.14), while structurally, more systemic factors embracing societal, political 
and economic elements transfer blame “away from the poor and toward society as a 
whole” (Dordick 2007, p.215). While systemic causes are usually the precursor for 
individual causes (Ambert 1998), Feagin (1972) adds the dimension of fatalism - 
fatalistic causes are not associated with individual choice or systemic decisions but 
are connected to circumstances of birth, upbringing and unforeseen misfortune. Each 
type of cause is now addressed in turn. 
 
In the Royal Commission on Poor Laws and Relief of Distress (1909), Beatrice Webb 
was one of the first to propose that poverty has wider, societal causes. This idea has 
since gained support (see, inter alia, Commission of the European Communities 1990; 
Kim et al. 2010). First within this systemic paradigm, poverty might be caused by 
cruel and/or corrupt national administrations (Addae-Korankye 2014; Luis-Ocando 
2015) whose policies favour the wealthy (Downes 2012). Such regimes are often 
accompanied by economic instability from which nations are unable to recover 
(Addae-Korankye 2014). Further, the servicing of national debt cripples economies 
(Ambert 1998; Borgen Project 2013), preventing investment in infrastructure, albeit 
such causes are typically associated with African nations.  
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While globalization is blamed for causing international poverty (Ambert 1998), 
colonisation is claimed to have caused division, conflict and civil war (Downes 2012; 
Addae-Korankye 2014; Dogra 2014), and the lack of adequate and accessible 
education is another contributing factor (Weiner 1995; Halik et al. 2010; Addae-
Korankye 2014; European Anti-Poverty Network 2015). Beyond such pejorative 
legacies, assistance offered by institutions such as the World Trade Organisation and 
the International Monetary Fund has been considered inadequate (Downes 2012; 
Borgen Project 2013). Poverty is also caused by crop failure, famine, natural disasters 
(Downes 2012) or other factors associated with “Mother Nature”. The impact of such 
disasters is such that people become refugees within their own countries, the ability 
to recover from disaster hampered by the lack of resources (Addae-Korankye 2014), 
often due to overpopulation (Dogra 2014).   
 
Such causes are clearly not as applicable to the U.K in the 21st century. More locally, 
causes of poverty include the quality and availability of adequately paid work (see, 
inter alia, Bobo et al. 1997; Harkness et al. 2012; European Anti-Poverty Network 
2015), low and falling wages (see, inter alia, Weiner 1995; Halik at al. 2010), 
unhelpful taxation or welfare systems (see, inter alia, Ambert 1998; Sider 2007; 
Harkness et al. 2012), and exploitation and prejudice (see, inter alia, Royce 2009; 
Halik et al. 2010). 
 
The individualistic approach to poverty has less legitimacy than the structural 
alternative (Royce 2009). However, and despite contrary evidence (see Kim et el. 
2010), Iyengar (1990, p.22) found that “from the perspective of television news, 
poverty is clearly an individual-level rather than a societal phenomenon”. This idea 
has gained traction (see Pew Research Center 2007); indeed, stereotypical 
perceptions are often shaped by beliefs that the poor are to blame for their own 
misfortune (Cozzarelli et al. 2001). Notwithstanding the contentious nature of the 
structural versus individualistic causality debate, some research proposes that 
individualistic causes are more compelling (Feagin 1972; Kluegel and Smith 1986). 
Such factors include laziness (Gans 1995; Weiner 1995; Gilens 1999; Halik et al. 
2012), lack of motivation and ambition (Weiner 1995; Ray 2006), substance abuse 
(Weiner 1995; Halik et al. 2012), the lack of adequate financial planning (Weiner 
1995; Wilson 2010) and poor behaviour or life choices (Royce 2009; Kim et al. 2010) 
often including “a legacy of worklessness” (Harkness et al. 2012, p.5). When 
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subjected to such environmental conditioning, citizens might have less agency than 
suggested by such an individualistic framework, and causes might be more fatalistic. 
 
Such fatalistic causes of poverty (see Viljoen and Maseko 2013; da Costa and Dias 
2014) are often considered more compelling than individualistic causes (see Schwartz 
and Robinson 1991), and include misfortune, ill-health, dysfunctional family 
backgrounds (see, inter alia, Ambert 1998; Abouchedid and Nasser 2001; Halik et al. 
2012), being part of a minority social group, or living in a remote geographical area 
(European Anti-Poverty Network 2015). In practice, the causes of poverty are many 
and varied (Sider 2007) and the empirical analysis in Chapters 7-9 examines whether 
the causes of poverty might be categorised as structural, individualistic of fatalistic. 
These categories also inform Level 2 Content Analysis, since they provide a basic 
taxonomy of causes that may reasonably be expected to appear within TV news 
reports.  
 
3.2   Analysis of poverty coverage. 
As a constituent element of income inequality (see McCall 2013), there is more 
research regarding the reporting of poverty than of any other PIE element; this 
however, is concentrated more on newspaper coverage than on TV coverage 
(McKendrick et al. 2008). What poverty coverage there is on TV news is often 
embedded in a range of story categories (Gilens 19961; Kendall 2012) and is regularly 
mentioned in passing, rather than appearing as a main issue (see McKendrick et al. 
2008). Consequently, journalists find it difficult “to give poverty a focus”, since it is 
“ongoing and amorphous” (Robinson et al. 2009, p.11).   
 
Consistent with the increasing reliance on PR (see Chapter 2), reports about poverty - 
especially in newspapers - are often prompted by reports or research (Hanley 2009). 
Much such research is conducted on behalf of the Joseph Rowntree Foundation to 
highlight discussions about poverty and injustice (Joseph Rowntree Foundation 
2014). However, the conclusion from extant literature is that there is little poverty-
centred news (Cohen 1997; deMause and Rendall 2007). For example, even though 
when in office, former Prime Minister Gordon Brown made reducing poverty a key 
policy, the media rarely covered the issue, and poverty was lost within the political 
struggle (Seymour 2009). When poverty is reported however, there are some 
                                                          
1 The range included homelessness, welfare, education, charity, employment, law, crime and 
various others. 
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commonly-held perceptions regarding its presentation. This series of themed 
debates provides the context against which empirical findings can be compared and 
discussed, while also helping to determine the variables in Level 2 Content Analysis.  
 
3.2.1   International/home poverty, and the geographical other. 
Poverty is often associated with certain locations (Lugo-Ocando 2015), rather than a 
general and widespread lack of resources and opportunity (Spectacle Productions 
2014). Coverage of non-U.K poverty such as that experienced during African famines 
for example, contributes to wider understandings of the issue (McKendrick et al. 
2008). Indeed, McKendrick et al. (2008) found that international poverty was covered 
more than U.K poverty. However, there are concerns; while day-to-day events might 
be ignored, international crises such as famines and wars draw media attention but 
the urgency of coverage does not always attend to the most important elements 
(Lugo-Ocando 2015). Famine, for example, can be reduced to a natural disaster 
devoid of any discussions regarding multiple causes, with education and guidance 
from “the west” seen as the key to recovery (Sorenson 1991). 
 
Moreover, there is evidence that ethnic groups are treated less sympathetically in 
poverty reports than the white population (see, inter alia, Gilens 1996; Clawson and 
Trice 2000; deMause and Rendall 2007; Voorhees et al. 2007). Ethnic groups are also 
shown to have less power and status (Graves 1999; Lugo-Ocando 2015), and as an 
underclass presenting a deviant threat to white “victims” (see, inter alia, Van Dijk 
2000; Shields 2001; Mantsios 2005; Hodgetts et al. 2005; Hanley 2009). 
 
Often, media employ visual and verbal discourses associated with the concept of the 
“other” when reporting poverty (Sorenson 1991; Lister 2004). These include showing 
the poor as homogenous, unruly and passive (Lugo-Ocando 2015), with images often 
showing inactive victims (especially children). While journalists may be prepared to 
apportion blame, this may not implicate “the west”, and the championing or 
demonization of African leaders in particular depends on their allegiance to elite 
western nations (Luis-Ocando 2015). Dogra’s (2014) taxonomy of “postcolonial” 
discourses associated with international poverty includes children, and the binaries 
of superior/inferior, safe/dangerous and order/disorder, besides other themes such 
as overcrowding, famine and war. In sum, albeit within a U.S context, Gilens (1996 
p.537) concludes that “apparently well-meaning, racially liberal news professionals” 
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construct “destructive” reports that do not reflect racial realities. One danger of 
employing such familiar stereotyping is that “warts and all” poverty is not accurately 
expressed, and those not conforming with acceptable, familiar and unproblematic 
norms are unseen (Robinson et al. 2009, p.19). In this regard, and ahead of the 
empirical analysis in this study, the consensus is that media coverage of poverty is 
inadequate and misleading. 
 
Since this research focuses on the presentation of UK poverty, one key question will 
be whether the BBC and ITV frame coverage as an international issue, rather than 
one more focused on the U.K. Such local poverty is constructed, reinforced and 
contested by media (Gamson 2004), and representations of poverty in the Big Issue, 
the Guardian, and on TV (for example Ministry of Food and The Secret Millionaire) 
have been described as positive (Robinson et al. 2009). Lugo-Ocando (2015) asserts 
that it is easier to define international poverty than local poverty; indeed, local 
poverty is especially difficult to demonstrate during relative prosperity. For TV news, 
coverage of U.K poverty may be problematic; this research examines what images 
and narratives are used to index poverty on a more local basis, and how, for example, 
the reporting of such local poverty differs from reporting with an international focus.  
 
Poverty must compete within a “market place” of news (Robinson et al. 2009), and is 
often embedded within other stories. For example, Dorling (2014) cites a story 
reporting how 700 care homes were due to close, potentially leaving many elderly 
residents homeless. These events he suggests, were presented with an emphasis on 
business rather than focusing on the medical and social consequences for displaced 
residents. Consequently, because it is difficult to represent and is generally 
downbeat, poverty reporting is minimal, inadequate, and when it occurs, may be 
overly sensational (McKendrick et al. 2008; Robinson et al. 2009). The social actors 
most prominently featured are children (Seymour 2009) and single mothers (Iyengar 
1990), albeit contrasting evidence presents poverty as a male problem (Shields 2001; 
McKendrick et al. 2008).  
 
Poverty coverage therefore, generally focuses on narrower demographics and 
generates “more individual and less societal conception of responsibility for poverty” 
(Iyengar 1990, p.36). However, coverage exclusively featuring “vulnerable” groups 
like the old or young often draws attention away from other groups whose stories 
are also worthy of telling (Seymour 2009). Perceptions of the groups most afflicted 
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by poverty shape the level of support for policies seeking to address it (Iyengar and 
Kinder 1987; Iyengar 1990). Therefore, the types of social actors featured most often 
might impact the influencing power of TV news reports, and the subsequent 
responses to them. As channels with public service obligations, normative 
expectations of ITV and the BBC are that at a time when poverty levels are increasing, 
they should cover poverty accurately, sensitively, without sensation and offer 
policymakers both the motivation and support for corrective action. Examining which 
social actors are present is a key indicator of poverty framing, and the empirical 
phase of this research quantifies social actor categories appearing within identified 
PIE reports. 
 
While poverty may be a worthy issue, editors are faced with choices between 
“important but dull” stories and “trivial but interesting” ones (Robinson et al. 2009, 
p.11). Consequently, the “packaging” of poverty is important. Food, clothing, food 
banks, dilapidated buildings, cramped living conditions and other “Dickensian” 
themes are regular indexes of the condition (see, inter alia, Devereux 1998; deMause 
and Rendall 2007; McKendrick et al. 2008; Seymour 2009; Blundell and Etheridge 
2010).  
 
3.2.2   Poverty as entertainment. 
Poverty is often presented as entertainment (Sorenson 1991; Hanley 2009; Spectacle 
Productions 2014; Dogra 2014). Narratives are often constructed using familiar yet 
powerful images (Schraeder and Endless 1998), with “usual” types of imagery being 
preferred to the more “unusual” that audiences might struggle to identify with (Lugo-
Ocando 2015). For example, pictures of starving Africans indicate vividly how the first 
world dominates the third (Escobar 2012), but such “flies in the eyes” imagery shows 
victims as “needy, passive, helpless, and vulnerable”, stripping away the “agency” 
and “dignity” of those involved, in “patronizing, orientalizing, and dehumanizing” 
ways (Orgad 2013, p.8). 
 
When part of poverty and humanitarian coverage, celebrities are often a distracting 
focus (Devereux 1998; Shields 2001; Lugo-Ocando 2015), as overly theatrical reports 
emphasise their celebrity lifestyles, which will sharply contrast with those they might 
be helping (Van den Bulck and  Panis 2010). Within a U.K prism, Paul (2015) identifies 
myths which many may still believe to be true, including suggestions that “people are 
49 | P a g e  
 
better off on benefits than working”, “people have large families in order to claim 
benefits”, and “people on benefits are defrauding the system”. Such themes 
contribute to the development of “poverty porn”, which forms the basis of non-news 
programmes such as Benefits Street. Accordingly, “the poor” are treated as if they 
are “a separate group of people with a completely different way of life” (Paul 2015). 
Level 2 Content Analysis coding is able to determine the ways in which poverty is 
packaged, and if these can be interpreted as voyeuristic. 
 
3.2.3    The poor are faceless, blameworthy and unlucky.  
Even when offered the opportunity to discuss poverty, there is a significant trend 
among media not to do so (McKendrick et al. 2008). Further, the poor themselves are 
often not visible in poverty reports (DeMause and Rendall 2007; McKendrick et al. 
2008), and while millions are impacted by poverty, other crises affecting far fewer 
people often secure more coverage (Mantsios 2005). Finally, there are inconclusive 
debates as whether U.K poverty is presented heterogeneously (McKendrick et al. 
2008), or whether the poor are aggregated and are not clearly identified (Mantsios 
2005). If poverty coverage is characterised by an absence of the poor themselves, 
then once again, determining which social actors featured within TV news reports 
can either support or challenge such a theme.  
 
The concept of the poor being either “deserving” or “undeserving” is strongly 
reflected within extant literature (see, inter alia, Breen and Devereux 2003; deMause 
and Rendall 2007; Seymour 2009; Robinson et al. 2009; Redden 2011). The poor are 
considered as “undeserving” for example, when coverage focuses on criminality, 
begging and deviance (Shields 2001; Kendall 2012). Research considering ITV 
coverage of poverty showed that despite many poor people having long employment 
histories, the homeless still “need to be taught the value of work and that any work 
provides positive benefits for people” (Hodgetts et al. 2005, p.44). The work-shy and 
lazy, migrant workers and asylum seekers draining welfare systems are also regular 
themes (Redden 2011; Sayer 2016). Similarly, reports were found to neglect “the 
reality of low-paid occupations, which can be overly coercive and humiliating” 
(Hodgetts et al. 2005, p.44). 
 
Research shows that the poor are often shown as powerless (Van Dijk 2000; 
Voorhees et al. 2007) and “passive recipients” of welfare (Devereux 1998, p.88). They 
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are also suggested to be irritants, and a drain on resources (Mantsios 2005), 
anecdotal evidence showing that journalists seek extreme cases of poverty, rather 
than more typical, ordinary examples (Harper 2001). Moreover, poverty is often 
shown as self-inflicted (Mantsios 2005) where people lack “motivation or morality” 
(Iyengar 1990, p.32).  
 
 In sum, while the visual, visceral, personal and shocking elements of poverty are 
emphasised, because coverage may be superficial, wider discussions of cause, effect 
and policy are marginalised, and wider socio-economic connections are ignored (see, 
inter alia, Belle 2006; deMause and Rendall 2007; McKendrick et al. 2008; Allen and 
Silver 2014). Emancipation is a key objective of critical realist research (Archer et al. 
1998), and one important question addressed within the empirical phase of this 
project is whether either side of the financial crisis, TV news reporters on BBC1 and 
ITV1 have moved beyond such unidimensional presentations of poverty. The analysis 
that follows evaluates the extremes of this debate, and determines whether the poor 
are shown to be complicit or innocent in terms of their own plight. 
 
3.2.4    Poverty delivered by an unprepared media system. 
Operationally, institutional constraints and deadlines within newsrooms may 
necessitate fast decisions about which images to use without any deep analysis of 
their consequences. Practicality may therefore prevail over ideological intention 
(Devereux 1998). However, the construction of PIE news reports still involves 
considerable choice on the part of journalists and editors. 
Pertinently, Royce (2009) recognised that “political and media rhetoric” disparage 
the poor, objectivising them, isolating them and removing them from view. 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, notions of elite hegemony dominate scholarship about 
poverty, and even though coverage might be expected to include the poor 
themselves, reporting often defers to government or corporate “experts” (deMause 
and Rendall 2007; McKendrick et al. 2008; McCall 2013), with third sector agencies 
featured less often (McKendrick et al. 2008; Kim et al. 2010). Indeed, as Cottle (2009) 
notes, in the aftermath of humanitarian disasters, there is often a media parade of 
elite figures, implicitly supporting primary definer theories where powerful and 
establishment figures provide the key commentary. 
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Amid claims that the political right has “figured out” how to “play” the media 
(Champlin and Knoedler 2008, p.140), there have been claims that news discourses, 
particularly on the BBC, were designed to appease the then Coalition government 
(Gilligan 2013). The arrival of TV channel Al Jazeera, however, has introduced new 
perspectives on poverty, and empirical evidence shows that it features the issue 
more often than the BBC (Lugo-Ocando (2015). In general, despite those covering 
poverty often lacking empathy because of their social and geographical distance 
(Spectacle Productions 2014; Lugo-Ocando 2015), Shaw (2012) advocates that 
journalists should provide moral testimony rather than dispassionate reporting. 
 
Generally, the compelling argument is that when covering poverty, media maintain 
the status quo of privileged power (Chomsky 1998; Devereux 1998; Shields 2001), 
while critiques of capitalism and the way it generates poverty are missing (Redden 
2011). Research into media coverage of poverty represents a microcosm of the 
general criticisms of EBF journalism, repeating narratives that powerful elites are 
privileged within narrow discourses, and not obviously inspiring active debate or 
change. Wealth, the open market, liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation are 
not challenged, and news is constructed according to suit market–driven economies 
(Lugo-Ocando 2015). Journalists and editors often have a narrow view of the world, 
and rarely stray from tried and tested news conventions and practices (Lugo-Ocando 
2015).  
 
The analysis in Chapters 7-9 examines whether this can be challenged within PIE 
news reports in 2007 and 2014, and whether the financial crisis has redefined 
poverty coverage. Further, at a time when free market economies are criticised for 
not providing universal prosperity, the analysis that follows examines whether social 
actors with alternative views are given airtime, and whether other economic systems 
are offered as credible alternatives. 
 
3.3    The “squeezed middle”. 
Poverty represents one extreme of the income inequality continuum. Many of its 
subthemes are also pertinent, perhaps in a milder form, to the “squeezed middle”. 
The “squeezed middle” is less clear-cut than the concept of poverty, and might be 
more usefully described as “middle-class pain” (O’Brien 2011). Hitherto, the phrase 
“middle class” has embraced ordinary people and those with considerably 
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comfortable lifestyles. Indeed, in a major study about social class, both types of 
middle class - “established” and “technical” - possess “high economic capital” 
(Savage et al. 2013, p.12). In contrast, as it has become a more quoted concept 
(Plunkett 2012), the “squeezed middle” clearly excludes the wealthy, since it 
implicitly describes a group who have suffered under neoliberal economic systems, 
especially during the financial crisis (Economist 2014). Instead, it relates to 
“employees whose security and relative earnings have suffered in the wake of 
economic deregulation and globalisation” (Perkins 2015, p.36).  
 
The “squeezed middle” therefore, is largely a political construct, developed primarily 
to move economic debates beyond the measurement of GDP, to instead 
acknowledge and examine that while the wealthy may have been largely insulated 
from the financial crisis, the wages of many millions of others have stagnated. 
Former Labour Party leader Ed Miliband adopted the phrase (see O’Brien 2011; 
Monaghan 2014), suggesting that it applied to hard working people who are neither 
rich nor poor. This was further interpreted by the BBC’s Nick Robinson as "pretty 
much everyone - bar, perhaps, the very poor and the very rich” (BBC 2010). The 
definition adopted here is that the “squeezed middle”, as a consequence of the 
“draconian cutbacks” within the new fiscal landscape (Dittmann et al. 2011), are 
those “ordinary” citizens who are finding debt more difficult to service, their ability 
to borrow restricted, their welfare payments cut, their non-essential purchases less 
possible, and in general, their everyday lives financially challenging (Thomas 2016)2.  
 
Accordingly, this group are described by pollsters Ipsos Mori as representing “the 
majority of the population”, and containing “more swing voters than any other 
group” (Woods 2014). Government fortunes, it is claimed, are “umbilically tied” to 
the British economy and Eurozone (Kenny 2012, p.152). This can be demonstrated 
for example, by the Conservative Party featuring their economic record as the 
cornerstone of their successful 2015 General Election campaign (Cushion and 
Sambrook 2015; Deacon et al. 2015). Moreover, when, in June 2016, U.K citizens 
voted to leave the European Union, the defeat was sufficiently serious that Prime 
Minister David Cameron resigned as a consequence. It is clear therefore, that the 
                                                          
2 Since the “squeezed middle” has been defined for the purposes of this research, hereafter it 
will be quoted without inverted commas. 
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middle classes, however stratified, are politically important since without their 
support, ruling power is unstable (Bourguignon and Verdier 2000; Dorling 2014).  
 
While the “squeeze” is an international phenomenon (Barbehön and Haus 2015), in 
the U.S, the middle class are now more prone to economic insecurity (Kendall 2012), 
as “middle-income Americans have fallen further behind financially in the new 
century” and “their median wealth (assets minus debts) fell by 28% from 2001 to 
2013” (Pew Research Center 2015). Indeed, even if it was ever a realistic proposition 
to begin with, the “American Dream” is threatened (Ladd and Bowman 1998) to the 
extent that it “appears to be well and truly broken”, and without heeding the 
precedent, the U.K “may well witness the decline and fall of the middle class on this 
side of the Atlantic, too” (Woods 2014). Indeed, the U.S crisis “should be a wakeup 
call to the U.K policymaking community” (Parker 2013, p.11), and Level 2 Content 
Analysis examines whether news reports are descriptive, analytical, and prescribe 
change or remain passive. 
 
Accordingly, this research empirically examines whether coverage attends to the 
localised problems that interest and concern the squeezed middle, such as house 
prices, pensions, the cost of borrowing and so on, and whether these issues are 
viewed thorough their eyes, or from the point of view of corporations and 
governments with discussions about growth, currency and the wider economy. 
Under a public service broadcasting system, it is reasonable to expect that licence fee 
payers are privileged. There are calls therefore, for public discourse to appeal to 
“ordinary people” (Hanley 2009), and that EBF reporting in particular, should reflect 
the interests of the majority rather investors and corporations (Shaw 2015). While 
there is an official measurement to determine poverty (see section 3.1), the 
squeezed income is a nebulous category. However, it is key within this research 
project, since the category can be reasonably expected to include a large percentage 
of the audience watching these news bulletins, and those, who, according to 
normative models of television journalism, the coverage should serve. Table 3.2 
shows the emerging themes from extant literature, which are examined in section 
3.3. 
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 Table 3.2 Summary of themes about the squeezed middle and its media coverage. 
 
 
 
3.3.1   Factors contributing to the squeeze. 
If the squeezed middle is a milder form of poverty, it might be caused by many of the 
same factors. Notwithstanding such generalisations, even within such a relatively 
undeveloped field of research, there appears to be a consensus that some specific 
factors are involved. First, real wages in the U.K have fallen more than in almost all 
other OECD countries (see, inter alia, Woods 2014; Machin 2015; Resolution 
Foundation 2015). Figure 3.1 tracks the fluctuations since 2000, and the decline since 
the beginning of the financial crisis in 2008. 
 
Figure 3.1    Average weekly earnings in the U.K since 2000. 
 
(from Corlett and Gardiner 2015, p.8) 
 
Corlett and Gardiner (2015, p.8) conclude that “with average weekly earnings still 
more than £25 below their peak it will be some time before pre-crash earnings are 
restored”. Moreover, “with wages falling and tax credits no longer providing the 
support they did” many households “face a daily struggle to keep up with the rising 
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costs of essentials” (Whittaker 2013). Accordingly, the U.K economy pays “wages too 
low to sustain a family” (Plunkett et al. 2014, p.29), and “the real value of the 
National Minimum Wage has now fallen for five years in a row”. This minimum wage 
mechanism designed to offer some form of “protection” has therefore deteriorated 
in terms of its efficacy (Plunkett et al. 2014, p.29). 
 
Machin (2015) asserts that “falling real wages and reduced living standards are one 
and the same”, however this wage crisis is further amplified when considered 
alongside a general increase in prices. Even between 2001/2 and 2007/8, when the 
U.K median income remained stable (MacInnes et al. 2013), the cost of living 
increased. This is especially pertinent in the case of housing, which inevitably attracts 
considerable attention since it represents the largest cost for many families. For 
increasing numbers of people, home ownership is “out of reach” (Wardrip 2013, 
p.105), especially since 100% mortgages are no longer offered (Whittaker 2013). 
Consequently, the deposit for an averagely priced home would take over 40 years to 
save if potential homebuyers saved 5% of their income (O’Brien 2011) and as a result, 
many people now live in rented accommodation (Resolution Foundation 2013; 
Plunkett at al. 2014). 
In addition to more expensive housing, the cost of the traditional “basket of goods” 
(Office for National Statistics 2016) embracing many of the elements of modern life 
such as food, fuel, and energy prices has risen disproportionately (see, inter alia, 
O’Brien 2011; Niemietz 2012; Resolution Foundation 2013; Plunkett et al. 2014). 
Furthermore, unprecedented increases in childcare costs (Plunkett et al. 2014) 
hamper the aspirations of second earners within families (Resolution Foundation 
2013), while university tuition fees have also risen (Brown 2013; Plunkett et al. 2014; 
Woods 2014). At the same time, debt is increasingly problematic, especially since the 
U.K is now “a nation of spenders rather than savers” (Smith-Ramani and Mehta 2013, 
p.117). For many, solving income/cost deficits with consumer credit is the sole option 
(Collard and Hayes 2014). In sum, the perfect storm of low wages, inflationary price 
increases, rising debt and a lack of savings leaves many “vulnerable” to even small 
financial “shocks” (Resolution Foundation 2013).  
 
3.3.2   Middle class discourses, and media coverage of the squeezed middle. 
In their meta review of contemporary middle class discourses in Europe, and 
Germany in particular, Barbehön and Haus (2015) define the middle class as a focal 
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point of concern within various public, media and intellectual debating forums. Such 
discourses can also be mapped to the UK; the middle class is variously described as in 
decline, debilitated, abandoned, targeted, precariously positioned, and generally 
eroded in terms of prospects. Level 2 Content Analysis examines whether on BBC1 
and ITV1 bulletins the middle class are framed as being so disadvantaged. 
 
Champlin and Knoedler (2008) note that from the 1980s, middle class decline was 
covered by the media, but that this disappeared during late 1990s and 2000s. 
Mirroring the causes explained earlier, more recent coverage often focuses on 
downsized lifestyles, credit problems, education costs, pensions and the cost of care 
insurance (Kendall 2012). Media coverage of the middle class include notions of the 
new poor (Devereux 1998; Breen and Devereux 2003) who find their lifestyles 
suppressed, resonant with the “faded blue collar” framing where the previously 
prosperous are now more financially stretched (Kendall 2012). 
 
The ways that the media present “class” strongly influence perceptions about 
inequality and associated issues (Kendal 2012). Middle classes prefer news narratives 
reflecting cultural and economic elites and stories about the types of lives they aspire 
to; these are to be found among entertainment, business and military news, and do 
not challenge hopes of social mobility (Champlin and Knoelder 2008). Media also 
distort reality, so that the middle classes become fearful of those who have less than 
they do, rather than blaming those who have more (Mantsios 2005).  
 
By virtue of their middle class, citizens are often shown to be blameless, the 
inference being that, for example, the achievement of home-ownership should be 
rewarded (Devereux 1998). Consequently, the middle classes are often shown to be 
victims (Mantsios 2005) and increasingly vulnerable from corporate downsizing 
(Kendall 2012). So while the poor are marginalised and subject to narrow media 
framing, the declining nature of the squeezed middle is emphasised in broad financial 
terms, embracing the wider economic landscape. In sum, this research examines 
whether the squeezed middle is prominent within TV news and whether, as 
Devereux (1998) claims, coverage is connected with calls for government 
intervention. Their means extending beyond those of the middle class, the wealthy 
are more likely to be taken notice of than any other social class (Hacker and Pierson 
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2010; Bartels 2008; Mantsios 2005), and this is now the next PIE category to be 
considered. 
 
3.4   Wealth. 
Almost half of the U.K’s private wealth is concentrated among the wealthiest 10% of 
the population (Glasgow University Media Group 2010). Even a critic of the prevailing 
economic system providing such prosperity concedes that society needs 
“entrepreneurs, inventions and innovators” (Piketty 2014, p.443). In contrast 
however, most wealth is inherited (see also Ryan 1994; Piketty 2014) since, as 
Beckert (2008, p.1) notes, “everyone who owns property leaves it behind”. If wealth 
therefore, can be presented as either positive or negative, Level 2 Content Analysis 
seeks to determine the prevailing framing on BBC1 and ITV1 in 2007 and 2014. Table 
3.3 summarises the themes identified within extant literature regarding wealth, 
which are then explored in sections 3.4 and 3.5. 
 
Table 3.3   Summary of themes within literature about wealth and its media 
coverage. 
 
 
 
3.4.1   The impact of increasing high-end remuneration. 
High-end executive remuneration is a significant contributor to earned wealth; 
banker pay in particular has been especially scrutinised during the financial crisis 
(Pryce et al. 2011; Whittle and Mueller 2012; Thomas 2016). Numerous stakeholders 
take an interest in such pay arrangements, particular their size (Crean 2004; Kay and 
Van Putten 2007), and debate ranges from opinions that high pay is justified (Murphy 
1985), to assertions that remuneration levels are “madness” (Loomis 1982). Such 
remuneration is highly newsworthy, and an inevitable driver of inequality as 
executive salaries increase faster than wages at the opposite extreme of the 
continuum. Coverage of such high pay is likely to be a reliable indicator of the way 
that income inequality is reported, and this research considers whether in a capitalist 
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system, the news reports in question take a critical line towards such corporate 
affairs, or whether such pay awards are defended. This indeed, is a key variable, since 
it seems logical and likely that many of those receiving high pay might also, for 
example, be sanctioning advertising spend on ITV. Alternatively, a public service 
broadcaster such as the BBC might reasonably be expected to hold those paying and 
receiving such salaries to account. 
 
Since Plato originally advocated a ratio of 4:1 or 5:1 between the highest and lowest 
paid (Tilley 2010; Kakabadse et al. 2004), this ratio has increased steadily (see Crystal 
1991; Wagner and Minard 1999). It is now measured in the hundreds (see, inter alia, 
Subramanian and Kawachi 2004; Judge 2010; Wilkinson and Pickett 2010; Dorling 
2014), the most extreme examples occurring in the U.S and U.K (Kaplan and Rauh 
2009; Bell and Van Reenen 2010; Thomas 2016). Sayer (2014, p.217) for example, 
notes that the CEO of J.C Penney earns over 1700 times more than the average salary 
paid to his employees.   
 
In the U.K, research covering the period 1979 - 2012 conclusively shows that top 
executive salaries increased far faster than average pay and inflation (Atkinson 1997; 
Finch 2007; Topham 2013). By 2016, evidence from corporate reports shows that the 
increases were continuing without restraint (Mongahan 2016). Though they 
represent only a relatively small percentage of the working population, a 
disproportionate share in the increase in the top decile3 is accounted for by financial 
sector employees (Bell and Van Reenen 2010). The leitmotif of “excess” 
predominates remuneration scholarship (Lissy and Morgenstern 1994; Brown 1992). 
This is particularly pertinent during “austerity”, since many people find their lifestyles 
compromised, while seemingly executive remuneration awards are not subject to 
any form of constraint (Gómez-Mejia and Wiseman 1997: McCall 2013).  
 
The rewarding of substandard performance unsurprisingly causes angst (see, inter 
alia, Brown 1992; Conyon and Leech 1993; Lissy and Morgenstern 1994; Perkins 
2009), as does the way remuneration packages are “camouflaged” (Bebchuk and 
Fried 2004; Bolton et al. 2006; Kay and Van Putten 2007; Weisbach 2007). Indeed, as 
executives have become skilled at setting their own pay, basic salaries are a 
diminishing element (Piketty and Saez 2006; Bell and Van Reenen 2010), and 
                                                          
3 The top 10% of earners. 
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elements such as bonuses, stock options and pensions (Dymond and Murlis 2008) 
now account for large percentages of total remuneration packages. 
 
The relationships between remuneration committees and the executives whose pay 
they are setting are charged with being symbiotic and collusive (see, inter alia, Crystal 
1992; Lambert et al. 1993; Main et al. 1995; Bolton et al. 2006; Gregory-Smith 2012). 
Pay-setting processes serve executives but not others (Crystal 1992; Jensen and 
Murphy 2004; Farmer et al. 2013), and corporate governance is undermined since 
CEOs in particular, are so powerful (Main et al. 1995). Under intensified scrutiny, and 
against a backdrop of increasing inequality and poverty, and discourses of greed and 
clandestine self-serving (Dorling 2014), these salaries will inevitably require 
justification. While legitimation is essential for organisational credibility (Main et al. 
1995), such credibility is nonetheless extremely difficult to maintain (Elsbach and 
Sutton 1992). TV news reports therefore, might frame corporate actions as justified 
and credible, or greedy and unethical. 
 
One possible justification offered by social actors in news reports, and wholly 
resonant with free-market principles, is that remuneration is driven by supply and 
demand (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996; Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman 1997). Another 
is that remuneration levels and recruitment must be considered through a global 
prism (Hampel 1998; Conyon and Murphy 2000; Tan and Crombie 2011) as the “war 
for executive talent” represents a preoccupation for large organisations (Chambers et 
al. 1998). In reality however, there is compelling evidence indicating that the cross-
border recruitment of executive staff is rare (High Pay Centre 2013). 
 
Other options available to social actors attempting to justify high pay in news reports 
include notions that executive roles require unusually high commitment, sacrifice 
(Smith 2007; Takala and Aaltio 2007) and longer hours (Reynolds 2006; Gwartney et 
al. 2011). Furthermore, and contextualising these high salaries in relation to wider 
corporate budgets, in reality they may be no greater than expenditure on stationary 
(Smith 2007) and charitable donations (Perkins 2009). A further possible justification 
for large executive remuneration is “tournament theory” (Lazar and Rosen 1981), 
where the income gap between senior managers and those below them is purposely 
wide to provide incentive and motivation (see Lloyd 2010). As a consequence, junior 
colleagues aspire to the salaries paid to more senior colleagues, and increase their 
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effort and performance accordingly (Bell and Van Reenen 2010; Rosen 1981). In such 
a case, critics might conclude that executive focus is on personal advancement rather 
than job performance. If social actors are indeed shown to defend and justify 
prevailing remuneration practices, this research examines whether such established 
arguments are used, if the financial crisis has shaped new forms of justification, or if 
they have been abandoned entirely.  
 
 
3.5    Media coverage of “wealth”. 
The concept of wealth itself appears to attract comparatively little media coverage. 
Instead, the emphasis is on those who have acquired it. The media’s fascination with 
wealthy people is demonstrated by the annual focus on The Sunday Times Rich List, 
and a general enthrallment with the “financial excesses of footballers, City fat cats 
and lottery winners” (Seymour 2009, p.7). More specifically, discussions about 
wealth often amount to “a few peremptory and largely arbitrary assertions about the 
relative merits of this or that individual” (Piketty 2014, p.444), confirming the media 
focus on the wealthy themselves.  
 
As key contributors to research into media coverage of the wealthy, Kendall (2012) 
and Mantsios (2005) provide loosely parallel theories regarding media framings, 
which can be simplified into “positive” and “negative” presentations. Similar to the 
focus on executive remuneration, a wider focus on wealth enables conclusions as to 
whether the financial crisis has redefined themes of financial success, and if the 
creation of wealth has a narrow focus on individuals and is shown as being somehow 
tarnished. 
 
3.5.1    The wealthy are presented both positively and negatively.  
The default for reporting the wealthy, according to extrapolations of the wider 
theories about EBF journalism (see Chapter 2), is that their wealth is not probed, and 
that the powerful are not challenged with any hostility (see Ladd and Bowman 1998; 
McCall 2013; Dorling 2014). Regular currency, stock market and ski reports on TV 
implicitly suggest these are issues of universal interest when for most they are wholly 
irrelevant (Kendall 2012). Consequently, the concerns of the wealthy are presented 
as applicable to all (Mantsios 2005); while coverage of the poor may be characterised 
by deviance, in the U.S at least, the “upper” and “middle” classes have lives often 
seen as the “norm for how things ought to be” (Kendall 2012, p.119).  
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The celebrity lifestyles of the wealthy are a regularly recurring theme within U.K 
media (Sedghi 2013). According to more positive framings, stories reflecting “rags to 
riches” transitions are highly newsworthy, and offer the impression that anyone can 
succeed, despite overwhelming odds (Kendall 2012). Central to the “American 
Dream” are notions that small business owners are exemplar of endeavour and graft, 
and aspire to become part of the bourgeoisie (Kumar 2005). The reward of enterprise 
is more generally pertinent, as are descriptions of successful individuals possessing 
special skills (Mantsios 2005) and identifiable leadership “traits” (Stogdill 1974; Smith 
and Foti 1998). Finally, in “admiration” framings, the media focus is on the 
philanthropic side of wealth, charitable donations and good deeds (see McKendrick 
et al. 2008; Kinsley and Clarke 2008). Cassidy (2011) for example, suggests that the 
positive sentiments expressed at the death of Apple’s Steve Jobs is indicative that 
“great entrepreneurs are still celebrated”.  
 
The acquisition of wealth however, can also be framed more negatively. Inevitably, 
increased spending power is closely associated with consumerism, which, fuelled by 
advertising, has become “insatiable” and characterised by “gratification” 
underpinned by a “permanent discontent” (Lewis 2013a, p.54). Media coverage often 
attends to the cost of material possessions - most notably houses - giving insight into 
what it must be like to be wealthy and what high-end consumerism facilitates 
(Kendall 2012).  However, these are not the only negative frames associated with the 
wealthy; others reflect notions of “schadenfreude” (Thomas 2016), the deriving of 
satisfaction when the rich fail, and the realisation that their wealth might be flawed 
(Seymour 2009; Kendall 2012). Large-scale frauds at major banks are exemplar of 
such stories (Taibbi 2014).  
 
Similarly, the wealthy might believe that no purchase is outside of their reach, and 
are be “bad apples” with apparently good taste and style (Kendall 2012; Mantsios 
2008). Moreover, the wealthy are also presented as scoundrels and their 
misdemeanours described with distaste (Mantsios 2005). Such coverage however, 
ignores the types of system that facilitate abuses of privilege and how often they 
occur (Mantsios 2005). Accordingly, free-market systems might be considered to 
facilitate, or even encourage high-end remuneration; this can be identified as one of 
the “outer layer” factors driving news reports described in Chapter 2.  
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Both the media and the public overwhelmingly classify executive pay as excessive 
(Tan and Crombie 2011). In the same way that CEOs may be shown to be “saints and 
then sinners”, coverage is subject to “fits and fads” (Hamilton and Zeckhauser, 2004, 
p.4), and intensifies during economic crises. Resonating with notions that editors 
take a news value approach, one TV news anchor proposed that “big pay packages 
for executives”, “big takeover targets” and the “huge corporate egos involved” were 
stories to “beat an episode of Dallas any day” (Hamilton and Zeckhauser, 2004, p.3). 
Surprisingly, scholarship considering coverage of executive pay is scarce. That which 
does exist finds high salaries often result in critical media coverage (Core et al. 2008). 
The complicating factor for ITV is that they may rely on the corporations in question 
for advertising revenue, and may feel pressure to defer to these potential sponsors. 
The BBC on the other hand, are normatively expected to serve their licence payers 
with probing, incisive journalism.  
 
Whittle and Mueller (2012) reveal metaphors and narrative constructions offered by 
bank executives, but seemingly, little research exists into how recipients of high 
salaries defend them in public forums, such as the media. Similarly, Tan and Crombie 
(2011) investigate stakeholder legitimisations regarding the pay of the New Zealand 
Telecom Chief Executive, and use “remuneration logics” synthesised from social actor 
statements. This is a list of potential remuneration reactions and discourses, many of 
which were adapted and included in the Level 2 Content Analysis coding framework 
(see Chapter 4).  
 
Otten (2010) finds that once Dutch media had identified certain corporations as 
newsworthy in terms of their remuneration practices, these organisations were 
revisited, irrespective of their size or level of remuneration. Level 2 Content Analysis 
examines whether TV news has some “favourite” organisations in this regard. Tienari 
et al. (2003) show that executive discourses are more regularly featured than those 
from rank and file employees. However, their work considers corporate acquisition, 
and the more compelling argument is that when coverage considers remuneration, 
as well as inadequately communicating with internal audiences (Ellig 2007; Dymond 
and Murlis 2008), executives themselves are often absent for external audiences (Tan 
and Crombie 2011), with surrogate spokespeople often acting on their behalf (Staw 
et al. 1983; Elsbach 1994). As part of its examination into coverage of PIE issues, this 
research examines which social actors and discourses are privileged in BBC1 and ITV1 
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news reports. While being wealthy or poor are human conditions, this chapter now 
considers the difference between these two measures: income inequality. 
 
3.6    Income Inequality: a developing issue, and one difficult to present. 
 
Income inequality “does not resemble a single policy issue”, and is a “meta-issue with 
a galaxy of cases, consequences, forms, values and policy solutions affiliated with it” 
(McCall 2013, p.57). Therefore, “income inequality” does more than describe the gap 
between rich and poor (Schramm 2005; Wong et al. 2009); it is evaluative and 
pejorative, reflecting the negativity of injustice and the “positive ethical value” of 
“equality” (Charles-Coll 2011, p.17). Table 3.4 summarises the identified themes that 
provide the framework for this section. 
 
Table 3.4   Summary of themes within literature about poverty and its media 
coverage. 
 
 
 
While poverty and wealth can be represented pictorially and verbally, despite being 
relatively simple to measure, income inequality is more difficult to describe. 
Metaphor is ubiquitous in everyday discourse (Lakoff and Johnson 2003; Morgan 
1997), and has been used to conceptualise income inequality. Pen (1973) for 
example, describes the phenomenon in terms of an imaginary procession where each 
citizen’s height is proportionate to their income. The result is “a parade of dwarfs and 
a few giants” which “really tells us something” about income inequality (Pen 1973, 
p.48). The imbalance of a significant short population and a few very tall people 
clearly indicates a disproportionate distribution of incomes. While average income 
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recipients are of average height, professional classes are measured in yards, with 
some CEOs standing 120 yards high. Billionaire John Paul Getty’s height for example, 
is estimated at “ten miles, maybe twice as much” (Pen 1973, p.53), the uncertainly in 
the statement implicitly alluding to the difficulties in quantifying the assets of the 
mega rich. Intentionally or not, Pen’s parade might have been inspired by an episode 
of The Frost Report in 1966, when John Cleese, Ronnie Barker and Ronnie Corbett 
performed “the classic comedy sketch on social mobility” (Telegraph 2005)4. Like 
Pen, the comedians used height, this time to demonstrate the prosperity of the 
various layers within the British social class system (See Figure 3.2). 
Figure 3.2 “I look up to him but down on him…” Social Mobility on The Frost Report. 
 
 
 
In another metaphor, Toynbee (2003) describes a caravan crossing the desert with 
sheiks and their entourage leading the procession, and the working poor trailing 
behind; she rhetorically asks whether they can still be described as travelling 
together. 
Despite such accessible discourses, academics cared little about the way that income 
is distributed until relatively recently (Atkinson 1997). Figure 3.3 is basic chart 
showing the worldwide use of the phrase “income inequality” within a large corpus 
                                                          
4 This sketch is available on http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p00hhrwl (Accessed on 8th 
March 2016). 
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of books, articles and other texts5. It indicates that the phrase only gained significant 
traction after the late 1970s, and has fluctuated thereafter.  
 
Figure 3.3    Chart showing historical rate mentions of phrase “income inequality”. 
 
 
 
 
Academically, income inequality became more mainstream during the 1990s 
(Atkinson 1997), the new interest perhaps indicating a shift away from official data 
sources (Jenkins 2007) to more empirical and independent analysis. Pryce et al. 
(2011) list the major quantitative measures of income inequality; these include the 
Robin Hood index (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010; Schiff 2010); the Decile ratio (De Maio 
2007; Haughton and Khandker 2009) and the Theil index (Oyelere 2010).  
  
Despite such an array of measures (Dorling 2014), the most popular is the Gini 
Coefficient (see, inter alia, Haughton and Khandker 2009; Badolo and Traore 2012; 
Yang et al.  2012). A Gini Coefficient of 0 (zero) means that individuals in a defined 
population have identical incomes, and a coefficient of 1 (one) reflects a population 
where one person receives all available income (Saunders 2010; Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 2011).  
 
Notwithstanding concerns that the Gini Coefficient does not comprehensively 
describe inequality (Jenkins 2009), it has been widely adopted. As part of this 
examination of income inequality coverage, the use, or absence, of this official metric 
enables some conclusions as to how deeply the issue is covered; mentions of the Gini 
Coefficient for example, might indicate that income inequality is considered a 
standalone issue worthy of discussion. Income inequality has increased in most 
countries during the last few decades (Goesling 2001; Subramanian and Kawachi 
                                                          
5 This chart was generated using Google Ngram, which can establish the frequency of a word 
or phrase within around 5 million books, articles and other written texts. 
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2004; Jäntti and Jenkins 2010); Figure 3.4 confirms that the trend is global and that 
over the last 30 years, income disparity has generally increased across the U.S and 
Western Europe (Bok 2010). 
 
 Figure 3.4    Selected Gini Coefficients of income inequality, 1985-late 2000s. 
 
 
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2011, p.24). 
The length of the arrow indicates the magnitude of change; longer upward arrows 
indicate a greater increase. 
 
There is further compelling evidence showing that the increase in U.K income 
inequality has been more dramatic than that experienced in other developed 
economies (see, inter alia, Fritzell 1993; Atkinson 1997; Alderson et al. 2005; 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2008). It has been “well 
above the OECD average in the last three decades” (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development 2015, p.1), and Atkinson (1997, p.300) asserts that 
within the global context of income inequality, “if you want to see a big increase then 
it is to the United Kingdom that one has to look”.  
 
The trend is confirmed by Dorling (2016) who, shortly before the nation voted to 
leave the E.U, showed that “the U.K is the most economically unequal state within 
Europe”. Between 2007/08 and 2013/14 however, U.K income inequality generally 
fell, but rose again in 2013/4, from 0.337 to 0.343 (Belfield et al. 2015, p.33). 
Projected growth, welfare cuts and changing taxation thresholds are likely to fuel 
further increases (Cribb et al. 2013). It could be reasonably expected therefore, since 
data shows income inequality to be increasing, that such a narrative would feature 
strongly in TV news reports about the issue. 
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3.7   Income inequality: why it matters from the socio-health perspective. 
Regarding the effects and social outcomes associated with income inequality, intra-
national research has largely replaced inter-nation study (Goesling 2001; 
Subramanian and Kawachi 2003). However, within “flagship” sociological journals at 
the end of the 20th century, academics were “strangely and remarkably silent” on the 
issue of income inequality (Morris and Western 1999, p.624). This appears to have 
notably changed in recent years and accordingly, it is reasonable to expect that the 
issue would justify coverage on mainstream TV news, especially when, through public 
service regulations, broadcasting systems must serve the public by discussing issues 
of social importance. 
 
Inequality results in less compassion and more shame, almost to the extent that poor 
are dehumanised (Dorling 2014). Income inequality “constrains pupil achievement at 
the lower tail of the distribution”, and so for pupils from poorer households, learning 
can be problematic (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 1995, 
pp. 81-2). Inequality also generates protest and instability, as elites seem to benefit 
disproportionately (see, inter alia, Miller 1982; Lloyd 2010; Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 2011; Kelley 2012; Stiglitz 2013).  
 
Further, within the European Union, income inequality may retard cohesion and 
integration (Van Stolk et al. 2011). Moreover, there is strong evidence suggesting 
income inequality drives poverty (see, inter alia, Allegrezza et al. 2004; Bakare 2012; 
Khan et al. 2013), which is then a “powerful social divider” stratifying society and 
separating rich and poor geographically and socially (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010, 
p.162). Indeed, one representative of the global banking sector described growing 
inequality as a “social time bomb” (in Dorling 2014, p.116). Egalitarian societies seem 
more desirable, and simplistically, drawing people closer together seems more 
attractive than dividing them (Thomas 2014). Such discontent however, might 
increase the appeal of more extreme political parties (Duca and Saving 2012; 
Goodwin 2014), or encourage people towards a more individualist outlook where 
they “bowl alone” (Putnam 2000). These are all potential themes within TV news 
reports regarding income inequality. 
 
Inequality has economic, social and political implications (Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development 2011), in addition to other outcomes such as divided 
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communities, environmental degradation and democratic efficiency (Shaheen 2011). 
The new emphasis on linking income inequality with numerous pejorative outcomes 
(see Kaplan et al. 1996; Jenkins 2007; Van Stolk et al. 2011) is a strong determinant 
for policymaker action. Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) bring new thrust and focus to 
the study of inequality, and provide evidence that inequality leads to anxiety about 
status, incorporating emotions such as envy, greed, anxiety and shame. Wilkinson 
and Pickett’s (2010) basic thesis concludes that among other issues, teenage 
pregnancy, life expectancy, trust, crime (see also Deaton 2003; Dorling 2014), 
violence and mental illness (see also Dorling 2014) are more prevalent in unequal 
societies.  
 
Importantly, their intra-national research concludes that the effects of income 
inequality are not confined to those with the lowest incomes. Of these undesirable 
outcomes, the most compelling research strand concerns connections with health 
outcomes. Such are the wide-reaching impacts and implications of income inequality, 
in order to fulfil their social obligations, news broadcasters can be expected to 
feature this issue regularly and appropriately.  
 
It seems reasonable to conclude that higher incomes positively affect health, since 
they enable consumption and environments conducive to healthier lives (see 
Thorbecke and Charumilind 2002). Besides well-documented links between poverty 
and children’s health and well-being (Seccombe 2000; Lewit et al. 1997), a 
considerable corpus of evidence shows that income levels and/or socio-economic 
positioning strongly determine health outcomes (see, inter alia, Subramanian and 
Kawachi 2006; Rowlingson 2011). 
 
At national level, “inequality is highly predictive of health” (Wilkinson and Pickett 
2009, p.502), and tangible links have long since been found between income 
inequality and mortality across a range of ages (see, inter alia, Preston 1975; Lynch et 
al. 1998; Babones 2008; Idrovo et al. 2010; Torre and Myrskylä 2013). Table 3.5 
summarises key meta-analyses assisting the evaluation of the inequality-health 
hypothesis. It shows that the correlation between income inequality and pejorative 
health outcomes is supported, in full or in part, by around 75% of the research 
studies referred to. 
 
69 | P a g e  
 
Table 3.5. Summary of Meta-Analyses regarding inequality-health hypothesis.  
 
 
3.8    Income inequality: why it matters from the economic perspective. 
The profile of income inequality was raised considerably by Piketty (2014), whose 
book was variously described as a “publishing sensation” (Giles 2014), “the most 
important economics book of the year - and maybe of the decade” (Krugman 2014a), 
and “an unexploded bomb within mainstream, classical economics” (Mason 2014). 
Differentiating between wealth and income, Piketty (2014, p.571) proposes that 
given the contemporary era of moderate growth, returns on capital (such as 
inherited wealth) will outperform wages, causing the gap between the wealthy and 
those who “own nothing but their labour” to increase. Such a move towards 
“patrimonial capitalism” means that the circumstances of birth matter more than 
entrepreneurial endeavour (Krugman 2014a).  
 
The fundamental issues with such “powerful forces of divergence”, claims Piketty 
(2014, p.571), is that they threaten “democratic societies” and “the values of social 
justice on which they are based”. Mason (2014) asserts that if Piketty’s analysis is 
accurate, then “the implications for capitalism are utterly negative: we face a low-
growth capitalism, combined with high levels of inequality and low levels of social 
mobility”. Piketty’s thesis has attracted unsparing criticism from those promoting 
free-market economics (see, inter alia, Edsall 2014; Giles 2014; Wile 2014). However, 
Nobel prize winning economist Paul Krugman (2014b) judges that “with painstaking 
data analysis”, and “a tour de force of economic modelling”, Piketty “has 
transformed our economic discourse” and that “we’ll never talk about wealth and 
inequality the same way we used to”. This research project enables conclusions pre 
and post crisis, and indeed pre and post Piketty, about whether TV news views 
income inequality through different economic prisms. Prior to examining existing 
research into media coverage of income inequality, this appraisal now considers 
academic research considering its causes, and what solutions may be available to 
ease it. 
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3.8.1     Political Factors - reduced regulatory regimes and weaker welfare. 
Income inequality is caused by a range and combination of political, social, economic 
and institutional factors. In the U.K, Margaret Thatcher’s influence permeates much 
of the economic theorizing about income distribution, especially since she cast doubt 
on the concept of “society” (Turnbull 2003). Instead, she advocated that “people 
must look to themselves first” (Brittan 2013), in line with the individualist culture 
prevalent within Anglophone nations (Hofstede 1980). Consequently, the sharp 
increase in income inequality in the late 1970s and early 1980s coincides with a 
change in U.K economic governance towards a neoliberal free market approach 
(Dorling 2014). Even though attributing increasing income disparity to Thatcherism is 
too simplistic (Jenkins 1996), the abolition of The Royal Commission on the 
Distribution of Income and Wealth in 1979 (Atkinson 1983; Jenkins 1996) 
demonstrates purposeful deregulation (Turnbull and Wass 2010), and an ideological 
shift towards the supremacy of liberalised markets (Budrys 2003, McGuigan 2005). 
The de-regulation of the U.K’s financial markets has further hardened this resolve 
(Dorling 2014), and given that such de-regulation can be judged as not assisting those 
in most financial need, this study examines whether TV news probes and critiques 
such free market principles. 
 
For those in financial need and not directly benefiting from free-market systems, 
welfare is a main income source (Atkinson 1997; Dorling 2014). Although traditional 
Keynesian theory advocates “state-sponsored redistribution” (Gintis and Bowles 
1982, p.341), there is considerable contemporary evidence that welfare budgets are 
being cut and criteria for eligibility are becoming more onerous (Mulholland 2010; 
Butler 2013; Watt 2013b). Consequently, lower tail income distribution6 is seriously 
impacted. The state pension system in particular is also under pressure as resources 
are transferred from the “greying population” to other demographics (European 
Commission 2013, p.11).  
 
3.8.2     Economic factors – globalisation and technology. 
As growth and investment increase alongside less stringent regulation and lower 
shipping, communication and production costs (Dreher and Gaston 2007), in a 
                                                          
6 “Upper tail distribution” is the difference between the 90th percentile and the median and 
“lower tail distribution” is the difference between the median and the 10th percentile (Bell 
and Van Reenen 2010). 
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process of globalisation, neoliberal market-driven economic policies can spread more 
easily across Anglophone countries.   
 
Research proposes several ways in which globalisation affects income inequality. 
First, while some export-led economies in the global market re-invest in 
infrastructure, education and jobs, other economies do not, instead reducing “social 
expenditures and progressive taxation” (Stiglitz 2013, p.80), meaning that only the 
wealthy benefit. Next, “offshoring” means that jobs are relocated from richer to 
poorer countries (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2012; 
Lee at al. 2013), and demand for labour and income inequality potentially increases 
in both affected areas (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996). Thirdly, cross-border risk is more 
difficult to control (see Atkinson 2001; Kawai and Prasad 2011; United Nations 2012), 
meaning that financial crises for example, can move across borders, bringing other 
causes of inequality with them. Finally, as the scale of commerce has increased 
(Gabaix and Landier 2008) so has the demand for high-profile executives (Gordon 
and Dew-Becker 2008; Lemieux 2008). Reductions in high-end income tax rates have 
benefited the highly skilled and highly educated, further increasing income inequality 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2011). In sum, 
globalisation increasingly benefits those “at the top”, while those “in the middle” and 
those “at the bottom” increasingly lose out (Stiglitz 2013, p.80). 
 
Technological advances mean leadership/managerial skills have become more 
generic, facilitating easier cross-industry and cross-border transition (Piketty and 
Saez 2006). More generally, technology has clearly benefited some more than others 
(Manning 2004). The “Skills-Based Technological Change” or “SBTC” (Lemieux 2008) 
fuels conclusions that “the population will soon be divided into two groups: those 
who are good at working with intelligent machines, and those who can be replaced 
by them” (Economist 2013). In sum, technological advances have been more 
beneficial to the highly skilled and educated (Machin, S. 2008; Van Stolk et al. 2011; 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2012; André et al. 2013), 
and this research examines whether TV news presents income inequality in ways 
reflecting wider interests, rather than just those of the well-paid. 
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3.8.3    Institutional factors - declining trade unions, increasing high-end pay, 
precarious work and changing worker demographics. 
 
Trade union weakness is thought to be major contributor to income inequality (see, 
inter alia, Piketty and Saez 2006; Machin, S. 2008; Bell and Van Reenen 2010; Van 
Stolk et al. 2011). In simple terms, where unions are “weak”, low pay is depressed, 
and where unions are stronger, the lower paid are more protected and inequality 
does not increase (Lemieux 2008). Despite union pay bargaining being valued by 
members, especially for its impact on reducing income inequality (Kaufman 2002; 
Turnbull 2003), deals between workers and bosses have increasingly replaced 
collective bargaining (Turnbull and Wass 2010). The general decline of trade union 
influence has occurred alongside globalisation (Dreher and Gaston 2007), and when 
multinationals are active across international borders, collective bargaining across 
whole workforces is weakened (Morris and Western 1999).  Unionisation, therefore, 
is considered by some to be a challenge to the legitimacy of free trade (Rodrik 1999); 
as it is, weak unions disadvantage lower tail conditions, while upper tail incomes 
continue to increase, without apparent restriction. 
 
Accordingly, contemporary income inequality is often determined by the increasing 
imbalance of income at the high end of the distribution continuum (Lemieux 2008; 
Hoeller 2012; Stewart 2012) as executive remuneration has risen faster than average 
incomes (see, inter alia, Alderson et al. 2005; Jenkins and Van Kerm 2006; Income 
Data Services 2010; Jowitt 2012). The prevailing Anglo-Saxon corporate culture is 
“increasingly aggressive” (Giddens 2004, p.53) and characterised by corporate greed 
(Kendall 2012; Dorling 2014). Even two decades ago for example, there was concern 
that high end remuneration was out of control (Lublin 1996).  
 
“Deindustrialization” (Morris and Western 2002) has increased the availability of low-
paid jobs such as those in the service sector (Goos and Manning 2007; Turnbull and 
Wass 2010). At the lower end, employment is now often measured in terms of 
“precarity” (see, inter alia, Vosko 2004; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 2011; International Labour Organisation 2012; Kalleberg 2013), which 
embraces characteristics including low earnings, uncertain hours, vague job 
specifications, limited security, few in-work benefits, and high vulnerability (Rodgers 
1989; Tucker 2002; Laparra et al. 2004; MacDonald et al. 2012). Organisations benefit 
from precarious work since they can replace costly, fixed-contract staff with 
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temporary workers to whom they offer few benefits, pensions, and holidays 
(Standing 2011). However, there are few if any advantages for workers themselves, 
especially where trade union influence is diminished. The increase in precarious work 
is only facilitated by workforces prepared to supply it. Liberal Market Economies 
(LMEs) are characterised by diverse workforces including women, immigrants, part-
timers and job sharers who are generally paid less (see Turnbull and Wass 2010; 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2011; European 
Commission 2013), and so more people might find higher paid work more elusive.  
 
Furthermore, the change in family structure is a further factor in the increase in 
income inequality during the 1990s (McCall 2013). The key shifts are identified as the 
attrition of the nuclear family (Bullock et al. 2001), an increase in single adult 
households (Brewer et al. 2012; European Commission 2013), and the traditional 
two-parent, one-earner families increasingly replaced by low-income single-parent 
families and higher-income two-parent, two-earner families (Levy 2008). All the 
elements described in sections 3.7 and 3.8 might reasonably contribute to news 
coverage about income inequality, previously identified in Chapter 1 as “one of the 
great debates of our age”. This research examines whether coverage extends to the 
discussion of such causes and consequences, and also the possible cures/solutions 
now outlined in section 3.9.   
 
3.9   Solving income inequality – predistribution and redistribution. 
There is considerable evidence to show that economic rewards go to the “top” 
(Hacker 2011; Stigilitz 2013; Dorling 2014; Sayer 2014). Indeed, Hacker (2011, p.35) 
proposes that the state has “remade markets to advantage the top”, as policies 
supporting workers have not been enforced, while “corporate governance rules all 
but asked top executives to drive up their own earnings”. Addressing income 
inequality therefore, is most often associated with redistributive measures, where 
taxes and benefits “take from some and give to others” (Hacker 2013, p.148). 
However, “predistribution” is another alternative - the term refers to reforms 
encouraging “a more equal distribution of economic power and rewards even before 
government collects taxes or pays out benefits” (Hacker 2011, p.35). This is said to be 
“both more popular and more effective than after-the-fact mopping up” Hacker 
(2011, p.36). The U.K’s prevailing economic system is characterised as one of low 
intervention, or at the most, one involving light touch regulation. The thrust of 
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predistribution fundamentally challenges such neoliberal economics, by suggesting 
that markets and elements like top-end remuneration should be limited. 
Redistribution however, is a wider concept. Mechanisms associated with 
redistribution range from improved public services to the provision of more equal 
opportunities (Rowlingson 2011). This series of policy levers are all indicative of a will 
to address income inequality, and this research considers whether they are present 
in TV news coverage, and which types of social actors are seen to advocate them. 
 
Adapting various taxonomies (for example Seymour 2009; Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development 2011; Van Stolk et al. 2011; Oxfam 2014), poverty 
and inequality solutions can be grouped as being pay-related, employment-related, 
welfare-related or support and training-related. Accordingly, these categories inform 
the coding framework within Level 2 Content Analysis. There is an implicit dilemma in 
that “it seems right to redistribute resources from people who have plenty to those 
who have little, but on the other hand, it seems wrong to take resources away from 
people who have worked hard or taken risks simply to make others more equal” 
(Saunders 2010, p.5). Notwithstanding such tensions, wealth redistribution is 
important within economic and political debates (Boadway and Keen 2000); in 2002, 
for example, then Prime Minister Tony Blair claimed that poverty was a multi-
dimensional concept and addressing it would involve “income, public services and 
jobs” (Guardian 2002).   
 
Perhaps easiest to address, in the short term, is income. Increasing pay at the lower 
tail of the income distribution continuum is one clear way to reduce inequality. The 
minimum wage, for example, is a “plimsoll line”; incomes below it make on-going 
survival more problematic (Spender 1912). In the U.K, the National Minimum Wage 
(NMW) was introduced in April 1999, indicative of the Labour government’s 
determination to reverse inequality (see Dickens and Manning 2004; Giddens 2004).  
It has since been described as a significant intervention in the labour market 
(Economic and Social Research Council 2015), and there is considerable evidence 
indicating that the NMW has reduced income inequality (see, inter alia, London 
School of Economics 2008; Autor et al. 2010; Dolton et al. 2012).   
 
While the NMW  has great potential newsworthiness since it impacts the lives of 
millions, the general arguments against it are that it increases inflation and interest 
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rates (London School of Economics 2008), that it has a narrow impact (Horrigan and 
Mincy 1993), and that employers downsize workforces to accommodate it 
(Thompson 2008; Roháč 2011; Dorn and Cooper 2013). In the U.K however, there is 
little evidence of a negative impact on employment (Machin and Manning 1994; 
London School of Economics 2008), and also little evidence showing a “spillover” 
impact benefiting workers earning above the minimum level (Dickens and Manning 
1994; Stewart and Swafﬁeld 2002; Stewart 2012). Though the NMW is strictly 
enforced (Malik 2013; Grice 2014), it is not perceived as a comprehensive panacea 
(London School of Economics 2008). However, the Living Wage - a further, voluntary 
advancement of the NMW - has been adopted by a number of high profile 
corporations and is supported by former Conservative Prime Minster David Cameron, 
and Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn (Living Wage Foundation 2016). 
 
There is a compelling evidence that “transfers” (“welfare” or “benefit” payments) are 
pivotal in reducing income inequality (see, inter alia, Mahler and Jesuit 2006; 
Brandolini and Smeeding 2009; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 2011, 2012; André et al. 2013). Similarly, nations with social-
democratic welfare states have lower income inequality (Rodríguez-Pose and Tselios 
2008). Reversing cuts to welfare, such as those made in the name of austerity, 
suggests Atkinson (2014, p.205), “is a key step towards returning to the lower levels 
of inequality successfully achieved in the past”.  
 
However, one contemporary neoliberal counterargument is that robust benefit 
systems offer little incentive to work and create poverty traps and long-term 
dependency (André et al. 2013). Consequently, U.K policies have been more 
orientated towards encouraging claimants to return to work (Daguerre and 
Etherington 2009). There are recent doubts that the welfare state is able to provide 
protection and stability (Barbehön and Haus 2015), and there are calls for benefit 
payments to be “more or less equal for everyone, especially in the areas of health, 
education and pensions” (Piketty 2014, p.479). Such changes would require major 
investment, paid for by tax revenue raised from the wealthy (Dorling 2014). 
 
Besides increasing wages, another solution to counteract poverty and inequality is via 
taxation (see, inter alia, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
2011, 2012; André et al. 2013; Draut 2013), as it raises revenue which can be 
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redirected to welfare transfers. If the wealthy pay a lesser proportion of their 
incomes on income tax and national insurance, income inequality increases (Office 
for National Statistics 2013). In contrast, progressive taxation, where the rate 
increases with incomes (Brown and Cook 1983) “is a crucial component of the social 
state”, capable of transforming contemporary inequality (Piketty 2014, p.497). 
Meanwhile, taxing “pollution” and “addiction” (Layard 2005), or taxing what we want 
less of (pollution) and not what we want more of (Daly 2008) may not help those on 
low incomes (see also Dorling 2014).  
 
Most recently, taxation has been regressive and indirect, while progressive, direct 
taxation has been unpopular (Prasad 2008; Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development 2012). For example, the multiple dimensions of executive pay are 
taxed differently (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2006; 
2012), enabling corporations to construct remuneration packages in tax-efficient 
forms. If, indeed, income inequality is a “great debate”, then its TV news coverage 
can be reasonably expected to include the general issue of redistribution. 
 
Besides addressing tax avoidance (Giddens 2004), taxing the super-rich class provides 
more effective solutions to income inequality (Dorling 2011). In addition to more 
conventional taxation addressing land, inheritance and capital gains (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 2012), wealth taxes have also been 
advocated (Dorling 2014; Glasgow Media Group 2014), despite such remedial policies 
in general being difficult to enforce (Saunders 2010). Such ideas to address 
inequality, including higher taxation on inherited wealth and gifts, a minimum 
compulsory tax for corporations and increasing the higher rate of income tax to 65% 
(Atkinson 2014) are likely to generate considerable political debate. Further 
recommendations by Atkinson (2014) include directed technological change, the 
reduction of market power and capital endowment for all; while these have been 
received with some degree of optimism by the political left, many of these ideas 
appear to be extremely ambitious, especially when set against a generally continuing 
trend towards neoliberalism.  
 
Income inequality has increased due to the polarisation of high and low wage 
employment (Lee at al. 2013). Enabling more people to work should lower income 
inequality, and evidence supports this (see Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
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and Development 2012; Prasad 2008). Indeed, the Lisbon Strategy and Europe 2020 
agenda promotes labour force participation and reducing income inequality, inferring 
that these objectives are connected (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 2011). Increasing youth employment and mothers returning to work 
are thought to be especially important (André et al. 2013). As part of his 
comprehensive anti-inequality proposals, Atkinson (2014, p.142) recommends that 
individuals seeking employment and meeting some basic eligibility criteria would be 
“guaranteed a position for a minimum number of hours per week… paid at the 
minimum wage working for a public body or an approved non-profitmaking 
institution”. Services and policies providing employment, education and other 
amenities are all reliant on public spending, and such budgets currently under 
extreme pressure (Wright 2013; Elliott 2014). 
 
Improved public services, especially health care and education are also proposed as 
solutions to ease income inequality (World of Work Report 2008; André et al. 2013). 
There is a strong case that higher educational attainment eases income inequality 
(see, inter alia, Berry and Glaeser 2005; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 2011, 2012; André et al 2013) and increases social mobility (Blanden et 
al. 2005). Nevertheless, education can be problematic; the cost of university 
education has increased in the U.K (Wyness 2012; Paton 2012). Moreover, due to 
“credentialism”, educational standards are raised meaning that some professions are 
only accessible to the more educated (Goos and Manning 2007) who by definition, 
will be the better off. A simple “needs-blind” meritocracy within university admission 
is therefore advocated as a better potential solution (see Giddens 2004).  
 
Due to the current economic, social and environmental nadir, those advocating 
change often propose new economic systems incorporating egalitarianism. For 
example, there are calls to regulate incomes and reduce corporate excess (Daly 
2008), to return to a culture of repair rather than replace (Wilkinson and Pickett 
2010; Lewis 2013a) and to establish flatter systems of corporate governance (Lloyd 
2010). The missions of the organisations promoting such thinking are summarised as 
advocating economies that work “for people and the planet” (New Economics 
Foundation 2014). Such calls fundamentally challenge many of the founding 
principles of neoliberal ideology. The prominence of ideas about new types of 
economy, different types of redistribution, taxation and investment (or, indeed their 
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absence) within TV news reports enables some conclusions about the level of 
commitment to neoliberal economics on the BBC and ITV.   
 
3.10     Media coverage of income inequality. 
A paucity of associated research promotes the compelling conclusion that despite 
being “the elephant in the room” (Lugo-Ocando 2015, p.17), income inequality is 
covered infrequently by the media (Al Jazeera 2015). Within four major works 
specifically discussing inequality comprising a total of over 1300 pages (Wilkinson and 
Pickett 2010; Dorling 2014; Piketty 2014; Atkinson 2014), “media” is featured in the 
index of only one, and corresponds to one brief mention, indicating that the 
connection between income inequality and the media is tenuous at best.  Though it 
does not address TV news coverage, a study considering three significant US 
newsweekly publications shows that the phrase “income inequality” was completely 
absent until 1988 (McCall 2013).  
 
Studying the media coverage of income inequality therefore, represents a departure 
from the traditional ways of examining the phenomena; these include examining 
income trends, differentials and mobility (Jenkins and Van Kerm 2006). It is claimed 
that the media focus on income inequality has increased of late (Packer 2011; 
Schroders 2015), albeit there is little evidence of this within extant literature, which is 
most often U.S-based. This study examines the magnitude and characteristics of 
income inequality on TV news, and with an approach consistent with critical realism, 
seeks to explain the structural mechanisms shaping such coverage. 
 
A study of coverage in major US newspapers between 2002-2007 reveals a two-fold 
increase in income inequality stories versus the previous 5 years, but also that 
analysis rarely extended beyond describing the issue within a political framing, with 
globalisation and technological change seen as outside policymaker control 
(Champlin and Knoedler 2008).  
 
Further, and in addition to the political contextualisation and superficial examination, 
U.S TV news coverage of income inequality rarely uses expert commentary (Bell and 
Entman 2011; Harrington 2016). Instead, coverage does not consider the value of 
equality (Lugo-Ocando 2015) and follows the familiar mantra that economic growth 
is always good (see also Lewis and Thomas 2015). This research considers whether 
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especially post crisis, such themes are evident. As has been made clear in this 
chapter, income inequality gains real context and significance when it is discussed in 
terms of its consequences; coverage according to normative theories of public 
service broadcasting for example, might be expected to frame income inequality in 
terms of its danger to society. 
 
However, as was explained in Chapter 2, coverage is also shaped by news values - 
story characteristics that the public relate to. It is possible, therefore, that “economic 
inequality” means little to audiences (Ladd and Bowman 1998, p.3), and that people 
might not understand it (Dorling 2014) or even care about it (McCall 2005). This 
would inevitably mean a lack of coverage, yet among emerging themes, the contrast 
between affluence and poverty is clear (Livingstone 1998; Xu and Garland 2010), the 
binary enhanced by the contrast between extravagant lifestyles and job layoffs or 
cut-backs. The issue, in essence, has many newsworthy elements, and yet it does not 
appear to be prominent within news agendas, perhaps because it a difficult to 
represent visually.   
 
Within research of media coverage of income inequality, albeit both studies 
considered U.S news content only, research by McCall (2013) and Harrington (2016) 
provide perhaps the closest points of reference. Albeit she considers American 
newsweeklies rather than broadcast media, in a research sample spanning over 30 
years McCall (2013) finds only 57 pertinent articles.  Income inequality, she finds, was 
noticed first in the 1980s, but stories about it decreased between 1995 and 2000, 
and as a consequence, people may perceive that income inequality may not have 
risen (McCall 2005). There was a minor increase between 2004 and 2010, and despite 
executive greed, economic instability, unemployment and cuts in public services, 
levels of coverage were similar to those in the peak years in the mid-1990s when 
there was a tangible sense of alarm (McCall 2013). Harrington (2016) meanwhile, 
more pertinently examining broadcast news, finds that in the first quarter of 2016, 
discussions about “economic inequality” fell away on major U.S broadcast and cable 
news stations. However, within the same sample, poverty coverage increased 
slightly, suggesting again, that income inequality is perhaps more difficult to depict in 
ways that conform to TV news production protocols, and in a form that is meaningful 
to audiences. 
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As it is “at the heart of the matter”, inequality might feature within media coverage 
of high-end remuneration (McCall 2013, p.75). In addition, McCall (2013) finds that 
income inequality is embedded within stories about welfare cuts, CEO pay, taxation, 
trade union decline, and the rise of the uber-rich; dominant frames include job 
security, social class, executive pay and perks, and injustice and the backdrop of the 
downturn. In general, however, McCall (2013) concludes that once income inequality 
had “taken root” as a fact, the momentum of coverage did not continue; despite 
ongoing real world events justifying a change to traditional “American Dream” 
ideology, media did not take the opportunity and coverage continued without a 
compelling central narrative. By not constructing such a narrative, (Chakravartty and 
Schiller 2010, p.683) summarise that the “steady dominance of the financial news 
field in the last two decades has played a strategic role in legitimating the visibly 
unequal class beneficiaries of globalization”.  
 
3.10.1    “Occupy” and its coverage. 
Even if the issue of income inequality does not interest media audiences, protests 
and agitation are more newsworthy. Increasing inequality is cited as the root cause of 
multiple protests (Occupy London 2012; Lugo-Ocando 2015). Despite claims that 
people accept inequality “just as they accept the weather – there is apparently 
nothing they can do about it” (Scott 1982, p.57), the “Occupy” movement, beginning 
in the U.S, fundamentally challenged such notions. Despite criticism that their 
protests were incoherent (Katrandjian 2011; McKinley 2011), the theme of unjust 
inequality was globally-adopted as the movement’s central mantra (Occupy London 
2012). 
 
This strategy was effective in raising the profile of the issue (Packer 2011; Dorling 
2014) as increasingly inequality was not only “hitched to an ailing economy”, but was 
also connected to social isolation, the resentment of the rich (Pocock 2011), and 
reckless triumphalism of acquiring wealth (McCall 2013). In the U.S, audience 
research across a wide sample found that the widening gap between rich and poor 
was a more compelling issue than drug abuse, free speech, gender equality, child 
mortality, malaria, leprosy, polio and landmines (Sutter 2013). “Occupy” represents a 
tangible manifestation of inequality, and this research examines the veracity of 
claims that such protest groups are largely absent from U.K media (McKendrick et al. 
2008). 
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This chapter has firstly identified and synthesised debates and themes within the 
media coverage of PIE issues. These also inform the empirical coding framework, 
providing categories and variables that are likely to appear on the news bulletins in 
focus. The chapter has also assisted in terms of the identification of a gap in 
knowledge; there is little apparent research into the media coverage of U.K income 
inequality as a specific issue, let alone through the prism of TV news. The empirical 
analysis in Chapters 5-9 draws upon many of the themes within the appraisal 
detailed in Chapters 2 and 3, and examines their relevance within the coverage of 
EBF and PIE issues on BBC1 and ITV1 bulletins in 2007 and 2014. 
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Chapter 4.  Watching the news: researching EBF and PIE 
reporting on BBC1 and ITV1. 
 
Previous chapters have established income inequality as a major contemporary issue; 
some people are wealthy, many others are poor, and the gap between them is 
increasing. How do we hold TV news to account so that the public are informed 
properly about this issue? Do broadcasters meet their regulatory obligations and act 
in the public interest? This chapter describes the fundamental research approach, 
and the methods used to answer the following questions first outlined in Chapter 1:  
 
 What were the general news agendas, and what proportion of news 
attends to EBF issues on the BBC1 and ITV1 10pm bulletins in 2007 and 
2014? 
 
 How and why has the coverage of EBF news on these channels changed 
across the financial crisis 2007-2014? 
 
 What discourses, themes, and social actor contributions do these 
channels use to articulate the issues of poverty, wealth, income 
inequality and the squeezed middle? 
 
 How do we explain the ways these news providers cover poverty, 
wealth, income inequality and the squeezed middle? 
 
This chapter follows the research framework outlined by Giola and Pitre (1990, 
p.585) which attends, in sequence, to the “nature” of phenomena (ontology), “the 
nature of knowledge about those phenomena” (epistemology), and “the nature of 
ways of studying those phenomena” (research methods). This chapter discusses the 
general philosophical approach to this research, the choices, benefits and details of 
content, critical discourse and multimodal analyses and one supplementary 
interview, and how these facilitate the intended level of investigation. The research 
process can be summarised as firstly quantifying the major themes, trends and social 
actors characterising the TV news coverage of EBF and PIE issues (WHAT and WHO) 
on BBC1 and ITV1 (WHERE), during 2007 and 2014 (WHEN). Once these have been 
determined, qualitative analysis reveals the tone, language, and style of these 
reports (HOW), before the data is discussed and explained (WHY). 
 
4.1    Ontological choices:  PIE phenomena are real. 
Critical research often attends to suppression or disadvantage (Robinson 1996) and 
sustaining “conditions and ideologies” (Knight 2002, p.34). Consequently, this 
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research is not neutral (Williams 2003), and personal axiology determines research 
worthiness (McDonald 2004; Saunders et al. 2007; McGrath 2008).  
 
At the core of this study is a wish to investigate EBF news, most specifically how PIE 
issues are reported, and how some groups, actors and discourses are marginalised 
and others are privileged. This research is socially, economically and politically 
positioned, and such motivations are often considered essential for research projects 
(Burman and Parker 1993). Such objectives often precede good research; the study 
of poverty for example, may be driven by the belief it is undesirable (Williams 2003). 
Accordingly, explanations about ontological and epistemological positioning are 
necessary in order to facilitate “intellectual honesty and transparency” (Shields 2007, 
p.7). 
 
Ontology entails a choice between nominalism and realism (Burrell and Morgan 
1979). While nominalism contends that the social world exists in terms of “names, 
concepts and labels”, in contrast, realism proposes that it exists independently of 
human understandings and comprises of “hard, tangible and relatively immutable 
structures” (Burrell and Morgan 1979, p.4). In sum, the key ontological choice is 
between whether reality exists independently of human perception, or whether it is 
the outcome of individual meaning-making (Bracken 2010); reality is either “out 
there” and real, or “the product of one's mind” (Burrell and Morgan 1979, p.1). This 
research contends that the social world has its own reality, and that social actor 
behaviour is determined by context, situation and circumstance (Burrell and Morgan 
1979). Some people are wealthy, while others are poor; their levels of comfort or 
discomfort are tangible and visible. Since we live “vicariously” (Kendall 2012, p.7), 
journalists and editors construct messages (McNair 1999; Callaghan and Schnell 
2001) and shape our perceptions of these social conditions. More specifically, this 
study adopts the starting position that journalists report according to editorial 
policies, and that other social actors perform according to conditioning; corporate 
actors for example, will act in their employer’s interests, trade unionists will promote 
their member’s interests, and politicians will “toe the party line”.  
 
Early media theory attributed almost full agency to those creating news and culture 
(Curran and Seaton 1991; Ang 1995; Negus 1995), but such “cultural pessimism” 
(Stevenson 1997, p.231) is outdated. Instead, the way that contemporary media 
transmits messages is more complex. Callaghan and Schnell (2001) propose three 
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possibilities for politically-associated coverage. First, media could present only one 
side of a debate, or secondly, a balanced report with journalists as arbiters. The third 
option is to create a media-constructed version of the debate in question. In this 
third instance, media more actively shapes public discourse by selecting from “many 
available frames offered by interest groups and politicians” (Callaghan and Schnell 
2001, p.203). The concept of mediatization explains the process whereby media 
moves nearer “the centre of the social process” (Blumler and Kavanagh 1999, p.211), 
and shapes news itself, rather than allowing other actors to do so (Semetko et al. 
1991; Cushion and Thomas 2013). It is perhaps, the epitome of media influence if 
governments can be compelled to act because of news coverage; the so-called “CNN 
effect” is exemplar (Feist 2001). Live Aid in the 1980s is another instance of 
empowerment (Robinson 2005) where “elite decision makers” lost “policy control” to 
the media (Livingston and Eachus 1995, p. 413).  
 
If, as seems logical, politicians act when they sense public concern (Culpepper 2010), 
the news media is pivotal in presenting EBF and PIE issues (Champlin and Knoedler 
2008) in ways that audiences will find interesting and concerning. It is “far from 
conclusive that media changes opinions” (McCombs and Shaw 1972, p.176), 
nevertheless there is a considerable consensus (consistent with the influencing 
factors at the heart of critical realism) that media has an impact on audiences 
(Callaghan and Schnell 2001). Besides reflecting public opinion and reporting policy 
and practice, media actively shapes ways citizens, business leaders and politicians 
understand and respond to issues (Fourie 2001; Lewis 2001; Baron 2006), particularly 
in regard to EBF and PIE issues. 
 
4.2    Epistemological positioning: discovering “what” and “how”, then “why”. 
 
This research moves beyond constructions of reality to examine underlying processes 
(Wahl-Jorgensen and Hanitzsch 2008), including the personal, political and 
institutional factors informing social actor contributions to EBF and PIE news reports. 
The epistemologically pluralistic critical realism is “ethically and politically suited” to 
media analysis (Wright 2011, p.160) since it holds newsmakers responsible for their 
output. Critical realism resolves the dilemma of constructions co-existing with 
tangible outside factors, and represents a philosophical bridge embracing both 
positivist and constructionist elements (see, inter alia, Burgoyne 2008; Reed 2009; 
Bracken 2010). For example, constructed reality is complemented with attendance to 
85 | P a g e  
 
wider social and cultural contexts (Bhaskar 1989). Most pertinent for investigating 
PIE news, critical realism is emancipatory (see, inter alia, Bhaskar 1986; Sayer 1997; 
Bratton 2007; Vandenberghe 2013), and in addition to explaining the social world, 
critical realism also seeks also to change it (Schostak 2002; Alvesson and Sköldberg 
2010). 
 
Critical realism proposes that reality is the outcome of social conditioning (Dobson 
2002; Saunders et al. 2007), and considers ideas, but also what lies behind them 
(Bhaskar and Collier 1998). In sum, it examines how meaning is developed, before 
examining why (Guba and Lincoln 2003; May 2001). More viscerally, Wright (2011, 
p.160) describes the “obscenity” of “reducing human suffering to social 
constructions”, and the “intellectual irresponsibly” of ignoring what “prompts, 
enables, and perpetuates” such suffering. Accordingly, critical realism extends 
beyond positivism’s descriptive approach and constructionism’s face-value 
acceptance. 
 
More broadly, critical realism is interdisciplinary, embracing insights from across 
human and social sciences (Deacon et al. 2007). While news bulletins offer “itemised 
parcels of data”, the contexts enabling them to be understood are provided by other 
disciplines (Deacon et al. 2007, p.11). In this case, explanatory theories are drawn 
from the realms of economics, organisational studies and media research. Critical 
realism is increasingly prominent within organisational studies (Leca and Naccache 
2009; Al-Amoudi and Willmott 2011) as well as communications research. Reed 
(1997) asserts that reality-constructing processes should not dominate shaping 
structures, and while interpretive analysis does not attend to dimensions of power 
(Yanow and Ybema 2009), critical realism challenges deep-rooted social order 
(Alvesson and Ashcraft 2009).  
 
Organisations can be viewed in terms of their historical, geographical and structural 
factors (Reed 2009). Although these shape human behaviour, organisational and 
institutional actions conflict, cooperate and comply (Friedland and Alford 1991) and 
so do not absolutely determine action, words and behaviour (Edwards and Delbridge 
2013). Giddens’ (1984) implicit suggestion is that social actors retain agency over 
their actions and words rather than behaving in rigid, predetermined ways. This 
could be mapped to organisational discourses expressed by journalists, politicians, 
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executives and third party sector actors as they discuss EBF and PIE issues. This 
research determines whether social actors behave and speak in predictable, 
institutional ways, or act against type; journalists for example, retain the agency to 
act in contravention of institutional influences (Hesmondhalgh and Toynbee 2008).  
 
Underlying mechanisms such as corporate and broadcaster ideology, advertiser 
influence and official policy all inveitably influence editors and journalists as they 
choose news stories and prepare them for public consumption. This study examines 
these mechanisms and consequently, it can be described as retroductive (Olsen 
2007; Reed 2009), which assumes the impact of structures and interrelations that are 
not always observable. Since “reality” may be difficult to observe (Deacon et al. 2007; 
Denscombe 2010), knowledge extends beyond what is visible to embrace concepts 
and theory (Reed 2009; Meyer and Lunnay 2013). The often unobservable 
characterisitic of reality is key to critical realism (Bkaskar 1998). Within the U.K’s 
mixed broadcasting model for example, the influence exerted over news output by 
large advertisers may be tacit rather than obvious. The critical political economy of 
media might not, by itself, explain news output. Consequently this research offers 
alternative theories embracing news selection and construction processes; 
retroductive research works backwards from identifying phenomena within data, and 
offers theoretical explanation based on evidence (Reed 2009). 
 
Critical realism also addresses power relations (Newton et al. 2011; Al-Amoudi and 
Willmott 2011). It attempts to explain the reality extending beyond language, 
symbols and discourse to embrace entities, process and interrelations (Reed 2009). 
Critical approaches seek to examine how news output may be tied to elite structures 
(Reese 2007). Accordingly, critical realism provides a hard focus on structures, causes 
and explanations, and attends to power imbalances as some groups make decisions 
on behalf of others. These imbalances operate both inside and outside the news; 
politicians make policies that might disadvantage some social groups while TV news 
editors make decisions to present stories in certain ways.  
 
In sum, this research aims to examine social actor discourses relating to the TV news 
coverage of EBF and PIE news, and to make a positive contribution to debates 
between media, policymakers, third sector organisations, and ultimately those in 
87 | P a g e  
 
hardship. Its approach embraces the framework developed by Gioia and Pitre (1990, 
p.591), which is adapted and shown in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1   The research paradigm for investigating EBF and PIE issues on TV news. 
 
 
Adapted from Gioia and Pitre (1990, p.591).     
        
 
4.3.   The selection of TV channels, bulletins and years. 
Ahead of a detailed explanation of the research process, section 4.3 describes the 
process of selecting an appropriate sample. The prevailing U.K broadcasting model 
combines public service obligations with commercial elements (Leiss and Botterill 
2005; Robertson 2010). In more recent years, the “cosy duopoly” of the BBC and ITV 
(Rixon 2011, p.74) has been challenged by other prominent TV news suppliers, such 
as Channel 4 and SKY. The key factors determining the choice of parallel weeknight 
bulletins on BBC1 and ITV1 at 10pm were as follows: 
 
 Audience size - Comparable  SKY and Channel 4 News bulletins attract fewer than 
750,000 viewers each (Broadcasters Audience Research Board 2014; Turvill 2014). In 
contrast, the BBC1 and ITV1 weeknight 10pm bulletins habitually attract over 4 and 2 
million viewers respectively (Broadcasters Audience Research Board 2014). They 
represent two of the most watched news bulletins (Ofcom 2015) and logically, those 
with considerable reach and influence. 
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 Comparability - Channel 4’s weekday evening bulletin lasts 55 minutes, and SKY’s 
9pm weekday bulletin is part of a rolling news service, which means that it is difficult 
to consider in isolation without reference to what immediately preceeds and follows 
it. Both ITV1 and BBC1 bulletins have a fixed length and position in their respective 
channel’s schedules, and have both been described as “flagship” (Wallis and Baran 
1990; Barnett and Gaber 2001; Stanyer 2007). They are both part of mixed genre 
programming schedules, and are therefore directly comparable. 
 
 Availability - There was a more complete archive of BBC1 and ITV1 bulletins at 
Cardiff School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies, and the Box of Broadcasts 
online resource1. One additional benefit of studying TV news bulletins from ongoing 
archives is that data can be revisited numerous times (Grasseni 2004). Some bulletins 
were completely unavailable within both archives, and these are listed in Appendix 1. 
Only weekday bulletins were included in the sample, since weekend bulletins are 
considerably shorter, often preoccupied with sport, and generally offer less detail. In 
sum, weekends represent “slow news days” (Gamson 1984, p.21; Stauffer 1994, 
p.127; Eastman and Ferguson 2012, p.262).  
 
The choice of which years to analyse was also shaped by various factors. Most 
importantly, the unusual nature of the 2008 recession justified it as a key milestone 
around which to construct this research sample. First, 2007 was the last complete 
year before the financial crisis began during 2008. This “typical case” sample (Flick 
1998, p.70; Deacon et al. 2007, p.55) enables examination of how EBF and PIE issues 
were reported during ordinary, “non-crisis” economic conditions.  
 
In addition to the “control” year of 2007, 2014 provided the most recent complete 
year of coverage within the project timescale2 and facilitated comparison (see Mason 
2002) and a longitudinal narrative (Hodgetts et al. 2004) showing how EBF and PIE 
reporting evolved across this unusual period. Moreover, by 2014, economic growth 
returned to pre-crisis levels (BBC 2014), indicating that the financial crisis was ending 
                                                          
1 Box of Broadcasts (BOB) is an academic resource provided by the British University Film and 
Video Council. It is an historical archive of TV programmes, but in practice, before around 
2012, there are considerable gaps in programme availability, and the 2007 archive was found 
to be generally inadequate. For 2007 therefore, broadcasts were sourced from the in house 
archive from Cardiff School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies. For 2014, almost all 
broadcasts were available via BOB which is here http://bobnational.net/  
 
2 Data analysis phase was undertaken during 2015. 
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albeit the age of austerity it fostered still prevailed. Larger samples generate greater 
empirical confidence (Deacon et al. 2007); complete years (i.e. complete 12-month 
periods) were chosen on the basis that they would yield sufficient data for the 
various empirical phases.  
 
4.4    Research design: methodological choices, and complementing quantitative 
with qualitative methods. 
 
This interdisciplinary research blends insights from discrete academic realms (Repko 
2012), and draws on journalism, business, management and organisational research. 
The design of the investigative process is fashioned by a critical realist approach, 
which recognises quantitative data as “revelatory”, “allowing connections to be 
made with known or conjected generative processes” (Ackroyd and Karlsson 2014, 
p.35). However, when research designs involve quantification, statistics are not 
always central (Mason 2002), as the compulsion to measure might often overlook 
substance (O’Malley et al. 2013), amid reflections that reality is imperfect and not 
easily categorised (Silverman 2006).  
 
“Epistemological purity” may not be expedient (Miles and Huberman 1984, p.21), 
and tensions between quantitative and qualitative methods are now less distinct 
(Hurrell 2014). Consequently, these two approaches are now considered 
complementary rather than conflicting (Bryman 2004; Mason 1994), and 
methodological blending is increasingly leigitimate, with critical realist research often 
characterised by eclecticism (Ackroyd and Karlsson 2014; Hurrell 2014). The design of 
this research therefore, moves beyond traditional quantitative versus qualitative 
tensions (Flyvbjerg 2011), and the overly simplistic binary where quantification is 
associated with positivism, and qualitative methods with interpretivism (Sale et al. 
2002; O’Mahoney and Vincent 2014). Moreover, conceptualising critical realism as 
bridging epsitomological extremes further supports hybrid research, where 
objectives can be achieved by means of combining quantitative and qualitative 
methods. 
 
By itself, quantitative research cannot adequately capture data richness, since 
statistics miss contextual detail, style, approach, tone, emotional impact, drama and 
so on. Accordingly, this research design can be described as quantitative moving 
towards qualitative, reflecting how results from one phase determine subsequent 
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phases (Greene et al. 1989; Bryman 2009). In practical and operational terms 
therefore, this study identifies the nature of broad news agendas and the location of 
EBF and PIE news stories. Quantitative analysis establishes the dominant themes 
evident within news coverage, and appropriate examples are then selected and 
subjected to qualitative analysis before a general discussion seeks to explain the 
research findings. The operational procedure is shown in Figure 4.1, and thereafter, 
elements are discussed separately. 
 
Figure 4.1. The research sequence. 
 
 
 
4.5    Quantitative phases: using content analysis. 
In line with extant literature (see Chapter 3), preliminary investigation showed that 
PIE issues were almost always found as side issues within stories about a range of 
topics. Poverty, for example, might be briefly discussed within a report about welfare 
cuts, and wealth might be referred to during a report about corporate fraud. In short, 
they appeared rarely as the standalone focus of any news stories. Pragmatically, 
therefore, the generation of a meaningful sample necessitated the scrutiny of many 
news broadcasts. This process not only identified the location of specific PIE stories, it 
also generated a large dataset of general news, including EBF coverage. This data 
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enabled analysis and conclusions about aggregate news agendas, and approaches to 
EBF news in particular.  
 
The study involved two levels of content analysis, described as the exact empirical 
quantification of observable phenomena (Priest 2009). Accordingly, this method was 
able to specifically and accurately identify the features that recurred in EBF and PIE 
news reports, as it employs systematic, predefined steps, describing social 
phenomena through coding of data and the noting of frequencies (Schreier 2014). 
The content analysis used Kerlinger’s (2000) foundational model. Researcher axiology 
may determine what is measured and recorded, and so where possible, personal 
idiosyncrasies were removed to enable objective categorisation (Kerlinger 2000), 
avoiding “issues, topics and messages” included at the researcher’s whim 
(MacNamara 2005, p.9). Any bias was mitigated as key variables were populated 
inductively, not ahead of, but during coding (see, inter alia, Neuendorf 2002; 
Bertrand and Hughes 2005; LeCompte and Schensul 2012). Rather than prejudging 
the causes of poverty for example, these were added as they occurred. 
Consequently, all possibilities were captured3, attenuating claims that researchers 
impose “meaning-systems” rather than objectively determining content (McQuail 
1987, p.184). 
 
Next, Kerlinger (2000) prescribes the systematic application of a repeatable 
framework (see also Wimmer and Dominick 2005; McNabb 2010). Such repeatability 
enables other researchers to replicate findings, assisted in this case by a 
comprehensive coding manual (see Appendix 2) providing operational definitions and 
category differences (Bryman and Bell 2007; Priest 2009). Furthermore, although 
single coder research is less problematic than multi-coder analysis, coding was 
applied consistently (Deacon et al. 2007), validated by reliability testing (Hansen and 
Machin 2013) conducted by another researcher with no prior project knowledge4. 
The researcher used the coding manual to process a sample and the results were 
then compared to those produced by the primary coder. The reliability testing 
                                                          
3 Categories with synergy, and with the obvious potential to be combined were later merged. 
 
4 The researcher in question was Dr Allaina Kilby, a researcher at Cardiff School of Journalism, 
Media and Cultural Studies. Dr Kilby has considerable experience in large scale content 
analysis addressing topics such as the 2015 General Election and BBC-commissioned studies 
considering for example, how statistics are used within broadcast news, and how news 
attends to all parts of the U.K. 
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procedure is outlined in Appendix 3a, and full intercoder results are outlined in 
Appendix 3b5. 
 
Notwithstanding the suitability of content analysis, there are some method 
associated challenges. There are suggestions that it is atheoretical, and deals only 
with what is measurable and observable (Royse 2004; Bryman and Bell 2007; Deacon 
et al. 2007). Recognising that reality exists beyond what is visible indicates that some 
elements may be missed by content analysis. Such unobservable elements could be 
absent social actor groups or indeed, the absence of pertinent events relating to 
poverty, wealth, income inequality or the squeezed middle. Attending to only what is 
manifest maps to a key characteristic of critical realism, in that reality may not always 
be observable. Accordingly, the discussion in Chapter 9 includes discussions 
concerning what EBF and PIE coverage could have been, compared to what it was. 
 
4.6   Level 1 Content Analysis: examining general news agendas and EBF news in 
particular. 
 
Content analysis provided the opportunity to identify dominant or absent features, 
and was conducted across two distinct phases. The coding system for Level 1 was 
influenced by a number of wide-ranging studies; many of the story types replicate 
those used by Barnett et al. (2000; 2012). However, other categories within these 
studies were deemed redundant for my research, and were removed while others 
were added. For example, “Northern Ireland” was removed as it was no longer a 
notable news story, but “Scottish Independence” was added because it was the 
subject of many news reports. Some other categories were merged, expanded and 
redefined to make the coding system both era and topic specific. The first phase of 
content analysis constituted an overall sweep of bulletins within the two sample 
years. This involved watching every single available weeknight 10pm news bulletin on 
BBC1 and ITV1 within the sample, and capturing rudimentary information about 
every news story6.  
                                                          
5 Of the Krippendorf Alpha scores calculated for this study, four variables are between 0.77 
and 0.80, which are described as “substantial” (Landis and Koch 1977, p.165). The remaining 
12 scores are in excess of 0.81, which are described as “almost perfect” (Landis and Kock 
1977, p.165). 
 
6 News “story” refers to the whole topic as reported in the news bulletin. In practice, each 
story might consist of several “items” - and anchor introduction, live interview, edited 
package and so on. 
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This phase had three objectives. First, it provided a record of all news stories enabling 
conclusions about the two respective news agendas. Secondly, it identified the 
location of all EBF news stories. Similar to the study by Shaw (2015), this research 
differentiates between business and financial journalism and accordingly, EBF news 
was identified and categorised thus: 
 
 Business Specific - Business stories about organisations, individuals, or group of 
individuals within an organisation. For example, this might be “senior managers 
within Barclays”. 
 Business Generic - Business stories relating to an industry sector or group of 
organisations, for example, “energy providers”. 
 Economy - Stories relating to the general financial landscape. For example, this 
might include discussions about growth, inflation or interest rates. 
 Market Summary/Stock Exchange - Stories relating to stock and currency 
markets. These are statistically-driven stories concerning the value of sterling, or 
share price fluctuations.  
 
Thirdly, Level 1 analysis identified all stories with any “trace” of a PIE issue, which in 
turn represented the sample for the more probing Level 2 coding. Any “trace” was 
defined as reference to any of the four issues; income inequality for example, is often 
nested in a wide range of stories (McCall 2005), and although this phase involved 
many hours of viewing, it was necessary to watch every news story in every news 
bulletin. Level 1 analysis captured the following data: 
 
 Channel - either ITV1 or BBC1. 
 Date - the date of the bulletin.  
 Story Order - the position of the story within the bulletin. 
 Length - the duration of the story, in seconds. 
 Summary - a short description capturing the implicit “headline”. 
 Subject - the categorisation of the story (war, politics, business, sport and so on). 
 
Using similar, though not identical subcategories to Kalogeropoulos et al. (2015), EBF 
stories only were subject to further coding: 
 
 Business subtopics - the industry sector involved, such as energy, banking, 
pharmaceuticals and so on. 
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 Economic subtopics - the central issue, such as inflation, interest rates, growth 
and so on. 
 PIE - any story (including non-EBF stories) containing reference to PIE issues. 
 
As the bulletins were watched, data was directly recorded by hand into a series of 
formatted notebooks and then entered into an SPSS spreadsheet. SPSS is assistive 
software developed specifically for social science research and data analysis (Bryman 
and Cramer 1997; Huizingh 2007). The software enables the generation of simple 
frequency counts and incorporates filtering techniques enabling the isolation of 
channels, dates, topics, social actor contributors and so on. Such categories were also 
cross tabulated to identify relationships and associations between variables (see 
Chapters 5 and 7).   
 
Coding is not linear (Deacon et al. 2007), and so extensive piloting refined the coding 
frame ahead of use7. There was no “double coding” (Barnett et al. 2000; 
Kalogeropoulos et al. 2014), instead “borderline” stories were classified according to 
the story’s main thrust; in practice stories were often about a range of issues, and in 
such cases, a judgement was made about the central and most prominent element. 
For example, reports covering budget announcements are often multi-faceted and 
may include discussions about measures affecting corporate affairs, personal 
taxation, fiscal planning or social issues. In this case, the most prominent element 
was selected, using a range of notional indicators such as the time spent, framing, 
the accompanying headline and so on. The comprehensive coding framework for the 
Level 1 coding analysis is outlined in Appendix 4. 
 
4.7    Level 2 Content Analysis: examining PIE issues in detail. 
 
The challenges associated with selecting appropriate texts for discourse analysis 
(Phillips and Di Domenico 2009) were overcome by Level 2 Content Analysis, which 
was designed to establish key themes, contributors and discourses. Pertinent stories 
identified by Level 1 were subjected to Level 2 analysis, the focus shifting from news 
generally to stories containing PIE references. As described, these themes are rarely 
central within news stories. Accordingly, measuring journalist or social actor 
contributions by time was impractical, since their interventions were often made in 
                                                          
7 A number of broadcasts were selected and recoded a number of times as the categories 
were refined. 
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passing. For example, a citizen might appear on screen for 30 seconds discussing 
increasing education costs, but only 5 seconds of this might be specifically about how 
a family’s lifestyle had been compromised because of a reduction in discretionary 
income. Consequently, only spoken and visual data pertaining to PIE issues was 
captured, and not any extraneous data surrounding it.  
Some variables contained well-defined categories. For example, whether 
contributors were political actors, third sector spokespeople or journalists, the 
geographical locations associated with stories, and so on. Other less clearly defined 
variables were populated inductively; the rationale was that by capturing every 
discourse, subtle variances would not be missed. It became clear that the range of 
causes, consequences, advocated actions and so on were diverse, and would have 
not comfortably fitted into a compressed range of pre-set choices. The next chapter 
(Chapter 5) discusses results in terms of categories that were conveniently merged at 
the conclusion of the data collection process. Level 2 Content Analysis added a range 
of information regarding the journalistic treatment of PIE issues: 
 Journalistic conventions – PIE news stories were deconstructed by news 
convention. This was a deductive (pre-set) category embracing anchor reports, 
reporter packages, live interviews and so on (see Cushion and Thomas 2013). 
News stories sometimes included multiple items. For example, a story introduced 
by an anchor and the edited package8 following it might both include references 
to poverty. This meant a smaller unit of analysis, enabling judgements about 
whether issues were covered in passing, in detail, or with some sense of 
immediacy (as in the case of live news, for example).  
 Name of reporter - This category was populated inductively, adding names as 
they occurred.  
 Context - If PIE issues were embedded within other stories, their level of 
prominence enabled conclusions about how such issues are covered. This was a 
deductive category; issues were considered “implied/in passing” or “substantive” 
to reflect the level of attention paid to the PIE topic within the news item. In the 
event of rich-poor comparisons, income inequality was the default category (full 
details in Appendix 2).  
                                                          
8 Short anchor introductions lasting a few seconds were included as part of the convention 
succeeding them – in other words, they were considered part of the edited package or live 
interview. 
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 Area - The geographical location referred to within the item was added 
inductively. If there was no specific area, stories were marked “generic”. 
 Causes - If mentioned, PIE cause(s) were added inductively and as they occurred. 
As has been mentioned, causation, or theories of causation are key to critical 
realist research (Ackroyd and Karlsson 2014). 
 Blame - If PIE phenomena were blamed on some person, group or thing, these 
were added inductively. However, some explanation is required to differentiate 
“cause” from “blame”. The assigning of “blame” is achieved through language 
(Wiggins and Riley 2010; Sims-Schouten and Riley 2014) and occurs where a 
specific person or institution is ascribed agency. This might include for example, 
suggestions that a population had been “plunged into poverty” because of the 
specific actions of a political leader. “Cause” however, involves no personal 
agency or a more general reason - for example this might be increasing interest 
rates leading to reduced lifestyles.  
 Consequences - The consequences of any of PIE issues were added inductively. 
 Actions - If journalists advocated actions to counteract or solve PIE issues, these 
were also added inductively. 
 Other discourses - If there were other sections of commentary not qualifying as 
cause, blame, consequence or action, then these were again added inductively. 
For example, suggestions that “the wealthy are greedy” would qualify in this 
category. 
 Images - Any identifiable moving or static images clearly used to index PIE issues 
were added inductively. These may include food queues, expensive cars or 
homes, and so on. 
 Framing - News items were categorised as being presented thematically, 
episodically, or using a mixture of both (see Chapter 2). For example, if poverty 
was expressed entirely through the lens of one family relying on food banks, then 
this was considered “episodic”. If the same issue was addressed entirely using a 
series of charts outlining global trends and policies, then “thematic” was chosen. 
Alternatively, if income inequality was described in terms of global data but 
included a short section where a specific wealthy person was juxtaposed with a 
poor one, this would be “mainly thematic”. 
 Metrics - If PIE issues were expressed using numeric measures, these were added 
deductively. For example, if ordinary people were pushed nearer poverty by 
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spiralling interest rates, then “interest rates” would be added as a metric (and in 
such a case, it would also be coded as “a cause”).  
 
In addition, if other social actors besides journalists were featured, the following 
information was collected: 
 
 Type of actor - This inductive category described whether contributors were 
politicians, businesspeople, ordinary citizens and so on, facilitating 
understandings to what extent influential voices or “primary definers” dominate 
(Allan 2004, p.71).  
 Political party - For politicians, affiliated political parties were added inductively. 
 Causes - As described above. 
 Blame - As described above. 
 Consequences - As described above. 
 Actions - As described above. 
 Other discourses - As described above. 
 Images - As described above. 
 Framing - As described above. 
 Metrics - As described above. 
 Notes - Additional notes were made where appropriate; this was to capture 
extra-ordinary information not otherwise accommodated by the coding 
framework.  
 
The items subjected to Level 2 Content Analysis were scrutinised in detail several 
times, and a coding sheet was developed during piloting. The final coding sheet is 
detailed in Appendix 4. A separate sheet was physically completed by hand for each 
discrete news item, and the data was entered into the same master SPSS 
spreadsheet described in the explanation for Level 1 Content Analysis. Where 
categories were developed inductively, all were entered into the SPSS spreadsheet, 
category merging taking place at the analysis stage9. As the major instrument of data 
                                                          
9 The third party who carried out the intercoder checking was given a spreadsheet containing 
the narrower range of refined, merged categories which are used for the data analysis in 
Chapters 5 and 7. 
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storage, when in use, the SPSS spreadsheet was saved regularly in three separate 
locations10 which were all password protected.  
 
4.8     Qualitative Phase: wider understandings of discourse, and the choice of 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). 
 
Content analysis determines the thrust of the textual analysis following it (Punch 
2005). Accordingly, qualitative analysis “rehumanizes” statistical findings (Gephart 
2004, p.455) and adds “richness and nuance” (Mason 2002, p.3). This qualitative 
analysis examines typical case models containing the key elements identified by the 
two phases of content analysis, in order to add the dimension of how (the way news 
is reported), to what (the type of news that is reported). The concept of discourse is 
central to the qualitative phase, albeit definitions of discourse across disciplines 
reveal significant variance (Phillips and Hardy 2002; Sandoval 2006; Phillips and Di 
Domenico 2009).  
 
To simplify, Gee (1999) subdivides “discourse” into “big D” and “small d”. “Big D” 
discourses are the integration of “language, actions, interactions, ways of thinking, 
believing, valuing, and using various symbols, tools and objects” to create a “socially 
recognizable identity” (Gee 1999, p.21). “Small d” discourses in contrast, refer to 
“language-in-use or stretches of language like conversation or stories” (Gee 1999, 
p.26). Gee’s definition is helpful in that it demonstrates that discourse extends 
beyond language (“small d”) to embrace broader concepts of how objects, 
phenomena and identities are perceived (“Big D”). This breadth of meaning can be 
synthesised into “discourse” being the general reasoning and concepts offered by 
texts (Wodak 2001), operating beyond grammatical levels and attending to “social, 
political and cultural arenas” (Simpson and Mayr 2010, p.5).  
              
Understandings of critical approaches to discourse are informed by Foucault (Phillips 
and Di Domenico 2009; Graham 2012). He suggested that groups of statements 
provide general frameworks within which meaning is constructed (Foucault 1972), 
amounting to a “regime of truth” (Hall 2003, p.49). In the consequent “corpus of 
knowledge” (Foucault 1972, p.33), some interpretations are accentuated, while 
alternatives are excluded or marginalised (Carabine 2001; Robinson and Groves 
2007). Mapping such theories specifically to this research, TV news coverage of PIE 
                                                          
10 These were pen drive, Cardiff University hard drive space and a cloud storage platform. 
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issues develops particular discursive presentations. Operationally, these are 
established through commentaries, sound bites, interviews and visual dimensions 
including images, videos, graphics and situational backdrops. For example, some 
discourses may present income inequality as an acceptable by-product of capitalism, 
or the fault of a particular group, while also showing explanations, descriptions and 
advocacies to be right/wrong or desirable/undesirable (Schöpflin 2010). 
 
In isolation, descriptive statistics are inadequate (Ackroyd and Karlsson 2014), as they 
ignore for example, the language used in news reporting. “Inequality” for example, 
may be considered to be a pejorative word, whereas “gap” may not evoke the same 
reaction (Ryscavage 2009, p.15). Language therefore, can present the same 
phenomena in various ways, some of them extreme (Potter and Wetherell 1987, 
p.35). Those texts selected from the Level 2 Content Analysis for further qualitative 
study were those best exemplifying emergent themes. 
 
Discourse analysis is an “umbrella” term (Sims-Schouten and Riley 2014, p.46) 
embracing sub-disciplines that often share objectives (Wood and Kroger 2000). As 
discussed, Foucault’s influence appears omnipresent within several of these different 
approaches. There is synergy for example, between Foucauldian Discourse Analysis 
(FDA) and the chosen method for this research - Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA).  
Both are politically and ideologically motivated and deal with meaning within texts 
(Wooffitt 2005). Indeed, Cook’s (2008, p.217) description of FDA as attending to 
“how language is used by doctors, parents, the media and government to 
subordinate and marginalize…” resonates with CDA’s objective to analyse how 
minorities and the underrepresented are presented by the powerful (Van Dijk 1998; 
Harding 2006). As demonstrated in Figure 4.1, both levels of quantitative content 
analysis were followed by qualitative analysis. This took the form of a multimodal 
analysis, embracing the complementary approaches of Critical Discourse and Visual 
analyses. 
 
This study uses critical and multimodal analyses as they extend beyond FDA’s focus 
on process (Foucault 1982; Wooffitt 2005; Hulme 2014). Within critical realism, 
discourse analysis locates social actor sense making within “socio-historic-economic-
linguistic communities” which accordingly “are informed by institutional structures” 
(Sims-Schouten and Riley 2014, p.64). Wooffitt (2005) helpfully elaborates, noting 
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that FDA does not connect process to social mechanisms (see also Dean 1999). CDA, 
therefore, embraces a forensic approach to language, syntax and lexicons, taking the 
“linguistic turn” (Hewitt 2009, p.2), and interpreting findings within wider backdrops 
(Taylor 2004). Further, CDA has emancipatory objectives (Mautner 2010; Fairclough 
2001) moving towards intervention (Tenorio 2011); any critical theory without such a 
call to action is vividly described as “bankrupt on its own terms” (Leonard 1990, p. 3).  
The commitment to identify how news producers generate “top down” messages is 
an important feature of this examination of the elite-dominated practice of EBF and 
PIE reporting, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. CDA logically extends critical realism’s 
concern with how structures condition actions and behaviour. The progression from 
epistemology to methodology can be summarised thus: 
 
Some critical realists engage in critical discourse analysis, developing a 
critical realist approach to discourse and semiotics that allows for 
scientific treatment of how intersubjective meanings serve structural 
interests with, for example, ideas in management about individuals 
being commodities serving capitalist structures… (Cruickshank 2012, 
p.77). 
 
In seeking to examine where power lies within EBF and PIE news reports, CDA 
establishes how through discourse, this power and ideology is propagated and 
preserved (Van Dijk 1993; Georgakopoulou and Goutsos 1997; Machin and Mayr 
2012), and which social actors may be marginalised in the process. More specifically, 
CDA seeks to expose hidden meaning and challenge naturalised power (Tenorio 
2011).  
 
The well-established three-dimensional model for applying CDA is similar to the 
framework adopted to structurally organise Chapters 2 and 3 (see Figure 2.1). 
Philosophically consistent with critical realism (Farrelly 2010), the model attends to 
the textual development of inequality and power (Fairclough 1992; 1995). While the 
first dimension considers the text itself, the second considers the circumstances of its 
production and the “inner worlds from which discourse springs” (Marshak et al. 
2000, p.245). The final dimension considers the wider backdrop and “social and 
cultural goings-on” (Fairclough’s 1995, p.57); these could range from government or 
multinational polices to individual circumstances (Sims-Schouten and Riley 2014). 
Practical, operational and regulatory constraints within news organisations (Hansen 
and Machin 2013) might also be included in addition to the prevailing socioeconomic 
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and political environment. Moreover, and resonant with critical realism, Fairclough 
(2001) asserts that CDA addresses elements of unseen reality, since it considers 
connections between language and the contexts within which it exists, even if these 
are unobservable. Omissions in speech - for example, the lack of discussion about 
causality, consequences or blame in PIE reports - are equally important as what is 
actually present, since it is “difficult to raise questions about something that is not 
even ‘there’” (Huckin 1997, p.82). 
 
CDA reveals how PIE issues were addressed by those contributing to reports, how 
those holding power might affect it (Wodak 2001), and how social actors attempt to 
persuade audiences to think of issues in certain terms, often using implicit, rather 
than explicit intentions (see Hansen and Machin 2013). Despite print journalism 
being more widely researched than TV reporting (Hulme 2014), broadcast news 
offers “ﬂuent, intelligible versions of the world” (Montgomery 2007, p.20). In TV 
news research, CDA has been used to examine, for example, political speech on 
Swedish TV news (Ekstrom 2001), how African-Americans were represented in 
coverage of Hurricane Katrina (Johnson et al. 2010) and the SARS crisis on TV news in 
Belgium (Joye 2010).  
 
CDA is well-suited for studying TV news since the “reflective commentary” of 
broadcast news considers “bias, (mis)representation, inaccuracy, distortion, 
ideology... dumbing-down” and “selective construction” (Montgomery 2007, p.20). 
The forensic examination of the minutiae of speech can also be analysed using the 
method of conversation analysis. However, this generally considers extempore 
speech rather than scripted news reporting (Markee 2000). Furthermore, there are 
concerns that it does not extend beyond the analysis of “moment-to-moment 
understandings” (Greatbatch 2009, p.495) and makes no connections to wider 
societal contexts (Wooffitt 2005; Titscher et al. 2000). 
 
However, speech only partly accounts for information imparted by TV news. In 
contrast to written copy, video maximises news producer intentions (Tuchman 1978), 
and despite suggestions that speech is the primary information carrier within TV 
news (Deacon et al. 2007), visual data might be even more expressive and 
memorable than verbal data (Graber 1990; Warren 2009). Images are “highly salient” 
(Gilens, 1996, p.528), can dominate stories (Robinson et al. 2009) and must therefore 
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be considered as an equally important site for analysis as the words they often 
accompany. 
 
4.8.1    Semiotic carriers of meaning. 
If texts are understood in “normal pragmatic ways, inferring meanings” (Widdowson 
2000, p.22), images also carry meaning. Consequently, analysing TV news calls for 
methods capable of accommodating these different modes. Chouliaraki and 
Fairclough (1999) advocate that CDA should be dynamic and capable of transcending 
disciplines. In sum, this research adopted a strategy where linguistic analysis is 
combined with the examination of images, captions, locations and objects via the 
fundamental principles of semiotic analysis (Barthes 1973; 1977). The purely 
descriptive denotative level of analysis is descriptive and one dimensional, while the 
second, connotative level embraces associated cultural concepts (Machin 2007). The 
most general and abstract level of analysis - what Barthes (1973) calls “myth” - 
attends to “social messages” (Bignell 2002, p.22).  
               
Within TV news bulletins, for example, meaning is carried by idents often featuring 
clocks, countdowns, maps and spinning planets to establish notions of speed, 
technological sophistication and worldwide coverage (Machin 2007). News anchors 
sitting behind desks connote notions of traditional authority (Machin 2007) and 
“live” interventions from war zones or in front of legislative buildings add feelings of 
credibility and authenticity (Lewis 2013a).  
                  
The study adopts a multimodal approach, which recognises that language and images 
are analysed on the basis that they are choices made from an available spectrum 
(see, inter alia, Hodge and Kress 1988; Kress and Van Leeuwen 1996, 2001: Machin 
and Mayr 2012). If news constructs reality (Potter 2010), EBF and PIE reporting will 
be represented by visual and verbal versions of the “truth” as determined by TV 
news editors and journalists. As a series of conscious or unconscious choices, TV 
reports include particular elements of reality while others are excluded or 
marginalised (Montgomery 2007).  
 
Without critical and ideologically-motivated approaches, such social problems might 
never be addressed (Richardson 2007), but CDA is more versatile than a simple left-
to-right critique; right-wing causes could use its techniques for analysing left-wing 
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ideology (Widdowson 1998). Indeed, objects subjected to CDA do not have to be 
weighty or political topics at all (Wodak and Meyer 2009). In response to claims that 
CDA and multimodal analysis is not systematic and consistent, within its wide myriad 
of “tools”, only some of these were used to analyse reports containing traces of PIE 
issues. In brief, the specific range of analytical CDA “tools” include presupposition, 
lexical choice, and rhetorical devices including metaphor, modality, and absence. 
These elements of CDA are detailed and defined in the Glossary in Appendix 5, which 
also outlines the elements within images also determined to carry ideological 
messages. 
 
In order to demonstrate how images and language work together, in qualitative data 
analysis Chapters 6 and 8, analysed speech is shown alongside corresponding 
screenshots (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995), taking a more general approach than 
frame-by-frame analysis (Belk and Kozinets 2005). In research into poverty on TV 
news, simple transcripts do not capture the rich additional data offered by graphics 
and moving images (Kim et al. 2010). 
 
4.9     Supplementary interview providing the practitioner viewpoint. 
 
Qualitative data in particular yielded some unexpected results concerning ITV1’s 
approach to EBF news and their relationships with their advertisers. Though not 
envisaged as part of the original research design, given critical realism’s flexible 
research ethos, it was decided that a semi-structured interview would allow further 
interrogation of these particular findings. Within critical realism, interviews are used 
to discover background structures and environments (Smith and Elger 2014).  
 
Accordingly, contact was made with a senior executive at ITV News and Current 
Affairs11 and the request for an interview was granted. This face-to-face encounter 
offered the opportunity to access a particular point of view in terms of attitude and 
experience (Smith and Elger 2014, p.110); the interviewee was a practitioner with 
specific and perhaps unique knowledge, rather than someone subjected to the 
policies and strategies of others (Pawson and Tilley 1997). One-to-one interviews are 
well-established within media research (Flick 1998), and recognise individual context 
(Kvale 1996); it was explained to the interviewee that the topic for discussion would 
                                                          
11 The executive was Michael Jermey, Head of ITV News and Current Affairs. 
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be the relationship between ITV1’s news department and those paying for the 
advertising punctuating its bulletins. The agreement to participate and associated 
conditions are outlined in Appendix 6. 
 
In this case, the interviewer was a “miner” of information rather than a “traveller” on 
a shared journey (Legard et al. 2003, p.139). Some degree of interviewer “steering” 
was required to ensure that the discussion remained focused on meeting research 
objectives (Arksey and Knight 1999), and this was achieved by means of a semi-
structured interview schedule (Deacon et al. 2007) containing pre-determined 
questions functioning as discussion prompts. 
 
One potential concern was that the interviewee might adopt a defensive position 
towards the questions and the questioner, especially given the currently beleaguered 
nature of the journalism profession. There is “no intimacy without reciprocity” 
(Oakley 1981, p.49), and the recommendation given by a colleague12 established a 
friendly and relaxed introduction. This facilitated a face-to-face encounter conducive 
to obtaining useful data (Legard et al. 2003), also the provision of additional “non-
verbal data” such as gestures not evident within telephone interviews (Jones 2004). 
Despite notions that interviewees might respond with popular, acceptable answers 
(Hopmann et al. 2010), the interviewee was reflexive and candid, much like the 
journalists interviewed by Fahy et al. (2010) and Doyle (2007). In sum, this interview 
was not a comparison between personal versions of events, but an opportunity to 
triangulate data from other methods used in this research (Deacon et al. 2007). 
Furthermore, given the interviewee’s professional eminence, the interview 
generated data unavailable elsewhere (Mason 2002, p.66). 
 
4.10     Ethical considerations. 
The research was subject to conditions set out within the Research Governance 
Framework for Cardiff University. The official document giving full ethical approval is 
shown in Appendix 7. Under the model of potential research threats (Ghauri and 
Gronhaug 2002), the sample was not impacted by the research, since analysis began 
after the broadcasts had entered the public domain. Furthermore, the content and 
                                                          
12 An introduction was given by Prof Richard Sambrook Cardiff School of Journalism, Media 
Cultural Studies. Unfortunately, requests to equivalent executives from BBC1 failed to elicit 
any response. 
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discourse analysis data did not include anything that could be private, personal, 
sensitive or potentially damaging to any person or organisations.                
 
Research involving human participants is very common within organisational 
research involve (Saunders et al. 2009), but content and multimodal analyses enable 
researchers to retain the control not always possible when human participants are 
involved. Consequently, wider ethical, reliability and operational concerns (see 
Babbie 1998; Gravetter and Forzano 2012) were largely avoided but for one 
interview, and official university ethics protocols were followed in terms of consent 
and appropriate briefing. The problematic and complex issue of anonymity (Deacon 
et al. 2007) was avoided, since the interviewee agreed to participate on the basis of 
his professional role.  
 
The storage of data throughout the research process was driven by imperatives of 
expediency and efficiency rather than any security concerns. Spreadsheets were 
duplicated and stored safely and securely in multiple locations that were password 
protected, and broadcast DVDs and coding sheets were stored in locked cabinets 
accessible only by the primary researcher. 
 
In conclusion, the addition of an interview was the final element in a process of data 
collection. This sequence of procedures was designed to reveal the efficacy of TV 
news coverage of EBF and PIE issues, and whether BBC1 and ITV1 meet their public 
service obligations. Underpinned by the principles of critical realism to discover and 
then explain, this research can also be considered the first step in an emancipatory 
project whereby, before news reporting can improve, its shortcomings must be 
identified and understood. In the same way that this research design embraces 
quantification and qualification, the chapters that follow reveal the extent to which 
BBC1 and ITV1 provide the quantity and quality of news coverage, and whether these 
are appropriate and befitting of “one of the great debates of our age”.  
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Chapter 5. What’s the story? BBC1 and ITV1 news 
agendas in 2007 and 2014.  
 
As explained in Chapter 4, in order to identify PIE new stories, it was necessary to 
conduct a wide sweep of bulletins and aggregate news agendas. This chapter 
determines what types of stories were covered in weeknight 10pm bulletins on BBC1 
and ITV1 in 2007 and 2014, and what trends and characteristics were present. Ahead 
of the specific analysis of PIE issues in subsequent chapters (Chapters 7 and 8), this 
chapter establishes the extent to which EBF news features within these bulletins, and 
the similarities and differences between channels.  
 
Findings indicate that in addition to a general convergence in terms of format and 
content, there was an increase in EBF news across both channels, consistent with the 
increase in serious news more generally. This chapter begins with a description of 
news in the broadest of terms, and moves on to look at the formats, types and 
conventions of all news, with a particular focus on EBF reporting. 
 
5.1   Quantity and format of 10pm bulletins on BBC1 and ITV1 in 2007 and 2014. 
 
In all, 872 news bulletins were subjected to Level 1 Content Analysis. Some bulletins 
were missing from the archive or unavailable online1; in 2007 particularly, the 
incomplete archive had some impact. For example, in May 2007, local elections in 
Wales, Scotland and England and the disappearance of British toddler Madeleine 
McCann dominated news schedules. Unfortunately, many pertinent bulletins were 
unavailable, meaning that these particular events were generally absent within the 
research sample. In order to mitigate the impact of missing data, statistics 
throughout this analysis are expressed as percentages of wider news agendas, rather 
than as raw numbers.  
 
The ways that TV news delivers messages must be considered alongside the 
messages themselves, so following the protocol established by Harrison (2000), this 
TV news content analysis attends to both format (conventions, story lengths and so 
                                                          
1 All bulletins that were unavailable from both the DVD archive at Cardiff School of 
Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies and the Box of Broadcast online resource are listed in 
Appendix 1. 
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on), and content (type of news covered). The analysis begins by focusing on format.  
At this stage, the unit of analysis is the broader news story, rather than the more 
specific news item2. Table 5.1 shows the total number of bulletins logged as a 
percentage of the total per year, the number of individual stories and average stories 
per bulletin.  
Table 5.1. Overview of bulletins and stories.  
 
 
Table 5.1 indicates that in both years, ITV1 covers more stories per bulletin than 
BBC1. In 2014 for example, it covers almost three more stories per bulletin. In order 
to capture news data accurately, non-news elements such as idents, mid-bulletin 
summaries and warnings of forthcoming stories were not coded (Brunsdon and 
Morley 1978). Therefore, only real news has been counted, and Table 5.2 provides 
temporal detail. 
 
Table 5.2.   Sample and average lengths of bulletins across channels and years. 
 
 
 
Given their compressed format, TV bulletins are carefully arranged and packaged 
(Cushion et al. 2014), and an apparently long-standing shift towards shorter TV news 
stories (Gitlin 1980; Hallin 1994) prompts concerns that less information will be 
                                                          
2 “Stories” and “items” are different. In summary, a news “story” refers to the whole topic as 
reported in the bulletin. In practice, a story might consist of several “items”, which might be 
an anchor introduction, a live interview, an edited package and so on. 
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disseminated (Harrison 2000). The data presented in Table 5.2 does not support this, 
since both BBC1 and ITV1 increased their average story lengths between 2007 and 
2014. This represents a considerable increase in average story lengths from 1996 for 
example, when late evening bulletin averages were 120 seconds on BBC, and 96 
seconds on ITV (Harrison 2000), and also compared to 2002, when averages were 
126 seconds on BBC and 90 seconds on ITV (Hargreaves and Thomas 2002).  
 
ITV1 average story lengths are similar to those found by Montgomery (2007), but 
average lengths of BBC1 stories are appreciably longer in both years, consistent with 
the channel featuring fewer stories. Irrespective of any advertising breaks not 
included in news time, ITV1 have increased both the number of stories per bulletin 
and average time per story. Adding further detail, Figure 5.1 shows the lengths and 
frequencies of all stories on each channel in each year.  
 
Figure 5.1   The distribution of item lengths in 2007 and 2014. 
   
 
  
 
Figures 5.1 indicates that in terms of story lengths, there is a strong degree of 
homogeneity across channels and years. In all cases apart from ITV1 in 2007, these 
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are bimodal distributions. The tallest spike in each chart indicates that for both 
channels and in both years, the modal (most popular) story length is between 16 and 
19 seconds. In all cases, again apart from ITV1 in 2007, the next most prominent 
story length is around 180 seconds on BBC1, and around 150 seconds on ITV1. BBC1 
news stories therefore, tend to be longer in both years, despite ITV1 increasing both 
story time average and number of stories per bulletin. These increases within the 
same ITV1 bulletin are possibly due to less advertising breaks, and less summaries, 
idents and trailers resulting in increased “news time”. 
                
The disturbance to the general pattern of homogeneity is the additional spike evident 
in the chart showing ITV1 lengths in 2007. Here, stories 49 and 50 seconds long were 
the second most popular length after the usual 16-19 second mode. Further analysis 
reveals that 29 of the 38 stories lasting 49 or 50 seconds were previews of the 
following morning’s newspaper headlines. This is entirely an ITV1-specific convention 
and one not featured on BBC1. The additional ITV1 spike had disappeared by 2014, 
and the mean average for the newspaper preview drops from 48.1 seconds in 2007 
to 31.8 seconds in 2014. The disappearance of the 2007 spike, and the return to the 
neater bimodal pattern in 2014 can be therefore explained by ITV1 spending less 
time previewing newspapers. When interviewed for this study, ITV Head of News and 
Current Affairs Michael Jermey3 recalled that truncating the convention was not “a 
profound statement about newspapers, it’s more about making better use of the 
time we have…”. This suggests that ITV1 made specific efforts to increase the 
efficiency of their news delivery.      
    
Previous research by Harrison (2000) describes how ITN News at Ten contained a 
summary of news events late in the bulletins where the featured headlines had been 
previously covered during the bulletin. In 2007 and 2014 however, the ITV1 headline 
convention usually referred to newspaper headlines not featured elsewhere within 
the bulletin. Further contrasting with BBC1 covering fewer stories for longer, and 
supported by the words of Michael Jermey, it could be concluded that ITV1 covers a 
wider news agenda, first by addressing more stories, then by supplementing them 
with a newspaper preview, referring, albeit fleetingly, to more stories not referred to 
elsewhere in the bulletin.  
                                                          
3 The full transcript of this interview is found in Appendix 8. 
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Moving now to address the prevalance of shorter stories, the following are examples 
of stories covered by the modal length in each year: 
 
 
 
Based on these examples above, claims that only trivial stories are covered briefly 
cannot be supported. Instead, major stories might be featured fleetingly merely to 
retain them within wider news agendas, even if these stories have temporarily “gone 
quiet”. However, this explanation seems inappropriate for the significant episodes 
outlined above, concerning, for example, Obama’s suggestion, the Bank of England’s 
reaction, and Jeremy Hunt’s announcement. None of these stories appears to be 
experiencing a “lull”, confirming that the space or time given to stories does not 
correlate with their importance, and that they might instead be shortened in the 
interests of bulletin “balance”.  
 
Despite TV news audiences preferring longer items (Rosentiel et al. 1999), there 
might also be practical and operational reasons for covering such significant events 
so briefly. First, short news items reflect assumptions about viewer attention span, 
and the need for simplicity to satisfy fitful audiences (Williams 1998; Barnett 2012). 
The model of TV news comprising short, self-contained and isolated elements (van 
Ginneken 1998) can be elaborated further, since shorter items are arranged in 
particular ways. Figure 5.2 shows how these stories are often clustered together and 
involve a wide range of topics. 
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Figure 5.2     Examples of “short item clustering” across channels and years. 
 
                                                                                                                                 
 
Grouping short stories might be explained by the requirement for fast-paced TV 
news. However, while such brevity might appease audiences and commercial 
imperatives, the practice might also define TV news as featuring headlines but no 
substance (Mosey 2004; Barnett 2012). Irrespective of TV news conventions, it 
cannot be denied that late evening bulletins are a major source of public knowledge 
(Cushion 2012; Barnett et al. 2012; Ofcom 2015) and “a force to be reckoned with” in 
terms of providing citizens with information (Schaap 2009, p.2)  
 
 
 
112 | P a g e  
 
5.2   EBF news : less data-driven. 
Turning next to Economic, Financial and Business (EBF) news, Table 5.3 shows the 
frequencies of stories and the corresponding mean and median lengths in seconds 
across years and channels. 
 
Table 5.3  Frequencies, means and medians of EBF categories (in seconds). 
 
 
Table 5.3 shows that the focus on EBF categories further amplifies the emerging 
trend of homogeneity, particularly within specific and generic business stories. In 
2007 on ITV1, there were only 15 Economy stories, meaning that the issue was 
confined to an occasional feature rather than being the subject of any routine 
coverage. The gap between the mean time (207.7 seconds) and the median time 
(172.0 seconds) further indicates the existence of a few particularly long items, 
underpinning the “special event” status of the Economy, and perhaps, a stable pre-
crisis financial climate. As ITV1 Economy stories increase in 2014, the mean story 
time reflects more regular and routine coverage. 
 
The exception to the homogenous pattern is ITV1’s Market Summary/Stock 
Exchange. ITV1’s focus on statistical data about shares, markets and currencies 
reflects descriptions of market fluctuations being “ritualistic” (Svennevig 2007, p.10). 
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The Market Summary/Stock Exchange convention clearly distorts the overall average 
for 2007 (67.1 seconds). Without this convention (see bottom of Table 5.3), the 
homogeneous pattern of mean and median times is restored. 
 
In sum, including EBF news and with few exceptions, both channels have resisted the 
urge to truncate story lengths. The abandonment of the Market Summary/Stock 
Exchange is an early indicator (in terms of conventions only at this stage) that EBF 
reporting on ITV1 has shifted from short, data-driven interventions to longer reports. 
This humanisation of EBF news is defined as a new focus on unpredictable and 
irregular human elements rather than quantitative data which can be extrapolated 
into forecasts and predictions. In sum, while there is a “diverse range of terrestrial 
news formats, news philosophies and news values” (Harrison 2000, p.106), in terms 
of EBF story lengths, this cannot be supported by the data presented here. The 
general theme of homogeneity can be further developed by considering bulletin 
content. 
 
5.3   Content of TV news bulletins:  more EBF news, and a change of approach? 
Level 1 Content Analysis provides a detailed backdrop of aggregate news agendas 
and identifies the locations of EBF and PIE stories. During the process, 9,338 news 
stories were logged across two channels and two years, and each was assigned to 
one of 38 different news types (see Appendix 2). 
                                        
The developed taxonomy of categories includes “hardy annuals” such as Crime, 
Foreign Affairs, and Sport, in addition to contemporary and specific issues-of-the-day 
including Scottish Independence. Well-established categories were modified to 
accommodate changing world events; most notably, Terror was added to 
War/Conflict, since terrorism and war are often indistinguishable. Table 5.1 indicates 
that these news bulletins feature between 9.6 and 12.5 stories, versus around 300 
found in an average newspaper (Hanley 2009). Consequently, perhaps conclusions 
about TV news agendas are more robust than those made about print news; these 
dozen or so stories, according to agenda setting theories, are those that audiences 
are being asked to think about (McCombs and Shaw 1972). Moreover, while 
watching news “live”, viewers are unable to pass over items quite so easily as is 
possible for newspaper readers (Lewis 1991). Table 5.4 shows the comprehensive 
BBC1 and ITV1 news agendas by channel and year, as determined by the major 
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categories. These are measured by frequency of categories expressed as a 
percentage of total new stories (F), and the total length of categories expressed as a 
percentage of total news time (T). 
 
Table 5.4   News bulletin content by category (shown in terms of percentage and 
with EBF categories highlighted in green)4. 
 
 
 
The data presented in Table 5.4 further refines understandings of overall news 
strategies; where the frequency of stories is markedly higher than the time spent on 
them (for example, as with Sport across years and channels), then stories are 
generally short. In contrast, where frequencies are notably less than the time spent 
(as with Foreign Affairs), then stories are generally more substantive.  
 
Among major individual shifts, BBC1 increased the time devoted to 
War/Conflict/Terror in 2014, while its coverage of Crime and Foreign Affairs 
decreased. Similarly, ITV1 increased the time devoted to War/Conflict/Terror, and 
also Health/Disease/Research. It also shows a decrease in the number of stories 
about crime, and the time spent reporting it. This may be partly explained by official 
statistics showing that crime was approximately 25% lower in 2014 than in 2007/8 
                                                          
4 Rounding up and rounding down in order to present to one decimal place means that the 
sums of some columns are not exactly 100%. This applies to all subsequent tables in this 
study. 
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(Office for National Statistics 2014). Turning to EBF news, Figure 5.4 isolates the EBF 
data from the previous table and presents it in graphical form. 
 
Figure 5.3     EBF issues across news and channels. 
 
 
Figure 5.3 demonstrates that with the exception of market summary reporting, 
coverage of EBF issues increased across channels and years, both in terms of the 
number of stories and the time spent on them. This is even despite economic stories 
being unpopular with programme editors (Harrison 2000); the compelling and 
extraordinary nature of the financial crisis therefore, might have overridden such 
preferences. 
           
The public service function required of U.K news broadcasters means that more 
attention is generally paid to serious news, contrasting, for example, with the U.S, 
where broadcasting deregulation means that topics such as politics, social affairs and 
business are marginalised by strong commercial imperatives (McChesney 2008; 
Patterson 2000). Invoking correlations between news coverage and world events, the 
increase in EBF news is consistent with audiences having an increasing appetite for 
such coverage, despite finding it difficult to understand (BBC 2012). Michael Jermey 
reflected on this increase and that “post the crash… there was an awful lot more 
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attention on domestic economics and so forth, so I suspect it reflects a bit of a public 
mood…”. 
 
The global financial crisis has intensified this demand for EBF news as scrutiny of 
economic affairs increased (Anderson 2004; Kjær and Slaatta 2007), further amplified 
since the media did not anticipate past financial scandals and crises (Doyle 2007; 
Tambini 2010; Butterick 2015), and might be trying to avoid making the same 
mistakes again. The increasing interest in EBF news continues the general trend 
driven by the establishing of specialist global platforms such as Bloomberg and CNBC 
(Lewis 2013a).  
 
Besides public service approaches and heightened interest, the most plausible 
increase in EBF reporting is explained through the prism of news values, suggesting 
that editorial decision-making is driven by elements such as negativity, conflict and 
others resonant with public sensibilities. The long-established discourse of “excess” 
within the topic of remuneration (Brown 1992; Lissy and Morgenstern 1994) for 
example, is now set alongside widespread cutbacks in the name of “austerity” 
(Dittmann et al. 2011). Furthermore, the financial crisis means that millions of 
ordinary citizens for example, are troubled by, and will be interested in, increasing 
inflation, stagnant wages, debt, uncertain pensions and so on.  
 
Post-crisis therefore, EBF news has larger, more populist audiences, especially since 
financial events follow the U.K parliamentary expenses scandal of 2009 and its 
accompanying narratives regarding moat cleaning, swimming pools and helipads 
(Winnett 2009). Such stories are highly newsworthy, and economic stories become 
more compelling for editors - and audiences - when they focus on people rather than 
data (Harrison 2000). Economic news derives news values from “longer-term 
expectations” of recovery, fragility and so on (Richardson 1998, p.225), and these 
themes are likey to interest wide audiences since they impact millions of people.  
 
The shift away from data-based stories means that EBF reporting has become less 
specialist. Though one might expect market and currency news on BBC1 rather than 
ITV1 (Brighton 2007), Figure 5.4 shows the market summary to be almost exclusively 
an ITV1 convention. Its abandonment, between 2007 and 2014, further indicates that 
ITV1 adjusted its EBF reporting to appeal to wider audiences. EBF reporting has been 
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subject to accusations that it attends to wealth, and the interests of narrowly-defined 
business communities (see, inter alia, McChesney 2003; Tambini 2010; Lewis 2013a; 
Lewis and Thomas 2015), reflecting “the triumph of business over industry” (Winston 
1994, p.19). This deference to corporate interests was thought to manifest itself in 
the reporting of markets and currencies (Devereux 1998), who is “up and down” 
(Lewis 2013a), and stories not reflecting the interests of the wider population.  
 
5.4    General news categories: dominant categories and major movers. 
Table 5.5 shows category data by year and prominence. Before categories are 
deemed more prominent than others, some unifying measurement system is 
required. Rather than attending to story frequency and story time, categories are 
expressed as a percentage of total news time. Percentage category time shows the 
priority given to that news type, and is a regular research protocol (see, inter alia, 
Cushion and Thomas 2013: Cushion et al. 2014, Cushion et al. 2015). 
 
Table 5.5   Prominence of category types (with EBF categories highlighted in green). 
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In Table 5.5, as well as showing percentages of overall news time for each story 
category, column OP indicates its ranking that year when both BBC1 and ITV1 
volumes are combined. At this stage, EBF categories are not addressed since they are 
subject to detailed analysis later. By a notable margin, War/Conflict/Terror 
dominates the agendas of both channels in both years, increasing by a total of 8.6% 
of news time in 2014 compared to 2007. Other notable increases in prominence 
include:  
 
Scottish Independence - up 7.2% (from 0.2% to 7.4%)  
Health/ Disease/Research - up 4.1% (from 4.2% to 8.3%) 
 
Notable overall decreases in prominence include:  
 
Crime - down 6.1% (from 25.3% to 19.2%) 
Animal-related - down 4.1% (from 4.9% to 0.8%) 
Environment - down 3.6% (from 4.1% to 0.5%) 
 
The increases might be explained by a number of year-specific events, such as the 
campaign for Scottish Independence, and the beginning of the Ebola crisis in Africa. 
The idea that news follows events (Harrison 2000; Barnett and Gaber 2001) is wholly 
plausible, but cannot explain why, in 2014, coverage of the Environment (including 
climate change and so on) had all but disappeared.  
 
Table 5.6 shows that when measured by percentage time, the most prominent 
categories of War/Conflict/Terror, Crime, Foreign Affairs and Sport and Politics are 
reasonably consistently positioned across both years and both channels, once again 
contributing to the developing theme of convergence between BBC1 and ITV1 news. 
 
Table 5.6     The five most prominent categories measured by times and rank. 
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The list and positioning of these top categories indicate that the same types of stories 
are common across channels and years, as both BBC1 and ITV1 feature the same 
types of news, and generally arrange them in the same order of prominence. This 
further supports the theme of convergence and homogeneity, and the stability of the 
categories also counters suggestions that news agendas are becoming more trivial 
(see also Barnett et al. 2012).    
 
5.5    EBF news:  an increased prominence.  
Isolating EBF categories from Table 5.5, Table 5.7 shows magnitiude of change in 
these categories, and their relative positions versus the other story types within 
aggregate news agendas. 
 
Table 5.7     Refined prominence of EBF news categories by channel and year. 
 
 
 
Table 5.7 shows that with the exception of the Market Summary on both channels, 
and Business Specific on BBC1, all EBF categories have increased in terms of 
prominence within overall news agendas. If all EBF categories are combined, then 
EBF news increased its prominence from 5th to 4th. The total percentage of time spent 
on EBF issues by BBC1 in 2007 and 2014 is 8.1% and 10.2%; coincidentally, Svennevig 
(2007) also found a result of 10.2% across a wide range of news output. Figure 5.4 
considers the sequence in which stories appear within a bulletin, minus the market 
summary category, which had all but disappeared by 2014. 
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Figure 5.4    The prominence of EBF categories within bulletins.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.4 shows where EBF categories appear within bulletins, they are more 
prominent earlier in bulletin running orders in 2014 than they were in 2007. BBC1 
(red lines) are higher than ITV1 (blue lines), showing that BBC1 features more EBF 
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stories. From the pattern and spread of the observations, it is evident that in general, 
ITV1 feature these issues no earlier or later than BBC1.  
 
One complicating issue is that in 2007, ITV1 bulletins were often (but not always) 
interrupted by advertisement breaks. Important stories are often positioned 
immediately after the advertising break to re-engage viewers after the interruption, 
mitigating criticisms that, post-advertisements, bulletins are entirely occupied with 
less important and more trivial news (Harrison 2000, p.96). By merging data 
generated by both channels, the impact of ITV1’s advertisement break is mitigated; 
Figure 5.5 demonstrates that if channels were merged, EBF news in general appears 
earlier in news bulletins in 2014 than it did in 2007.  
 
Figure 5.5      Overall EBF news expressed in terms of story order. 
 
 
 
 
 
Irrespective of which criteria might be used to select news (public service or news 
values/commercial logics), the most important stories might reasonably be expected 
to feature earlier in news bulletins (Harrison 2000). Findings so far, Market Summary 
aside, are that a larger proportion of BBC1’s overall news agenda is devoted to EBF 
news than is the case for ITV1. The financial crisis bookended by 2007 and 2014 has 
not changed this, but the proportion of EBF news on both channels has increased in 
accordance with audiences taking a greater interest in such issues (Schifferes 2011), 
and consistent with notions that EBF news has become more obviously newsworthy.  
In sum, therefore, in addition to the post-crisis increase in EBF news and a change in 
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the apparent nature of EBF news reporting, these issues were also given greater 
story order prominence. 
 
5.6     The shift in balance between hard and soft news. 
The analysis now moves to the dynamic nature of news content, enabling general 
conclusions about changing trends across channels and years. The conceptualisation 
of news as either “hard” or “soft” has long preoccupied journalism scholarship (see 
for example, Mott 1952). Broadly, this measures adherence to public service logics, 
especially relevant for UK broadcasting research. Put simply, harder news is more 
closely aligned to public service, while softer news resonates more closely with 
commercial logics where audience size is more important than how well that 
audience is being informed and democracy is being served. More specifically, ITV1 
may be expected to include more celebrity-driven stories than BBC1 (Brighton 2007), 
while BBC1 might preference harder content (Cushion 2012) including economic 
issues (see Lewis et al. 2005).  
 
Hard/soft measurements can test theories that news is moving towards infotainment 
(see Franklin 1997) where “lifestyle and consumer journalism are pre-eminent” 
(Thussu 2008, p.11). Moreover, this can also provide some sense of expectation as to 
the likely treatment of PIE issues. In sum, hard news concerns matters of importance, 
while soft news concerns matters of interest (Tuchman 1978). Further, hard news is 
considered as requiring “immediate publication” (Lehman-Wilzig and Seletzky 2010, 
p.37-38), while soft news attends to less urgent matters not unduly affecting the 
audience.  
 
The hard/soft news contrast is pertinent to this research. There is concern for 
example, whether engaged democratic citizens are served by soft news (Zaller 2003, 
p.110); such citizens may for example, be concerned about issues such as income 
inequality. In practice, soft news might consist of “catchy stories about crime, 
Hollywood and sports stars, the Royal Family, and quirky trivialities” (Barnett et al. 
2000, p.13). However, Crime, as a sizeable news category requires some explanation.  
 
Since it is often characterised by distressing events, Crime might be reasonably 
termed as hard or “serious” news. However, since it is often preoccupied with 
episodic events, and with perpetrators and victims rather than with wider societal 
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implications, it is more appropriately judged to be soft news (Curran et al. 2009). 
Furthermore, crime is considered soft since news providers often present it 
disproportionately. For example, violent crime dominates coverage, while in reality, 
it is far outweighed by crime concerning property or possessions (Moore 2014). 
Accordingly, it can be concluded that crime stories contain many of the news values 
identified in Chapter 2, but does not accurately inform citizens about the real world 
(Katz 1987), as instead it distorts reality by sharply and regularly focusing on unusual 
events. Consequently Crime is routinely categorised as soft (Bennett 2003; De Swert 
2007), and research informing coding categories used for Level 1 Content Analysis in 
this research (for example, Barnett and Gaber 2000; Barnett et al. 2012) concur that 
crime is “tabloid”5.   
 
However, the hard/soft comparison can be problematic. Tuchman (1978, p.48, 
original emphasis) highlights “classificatory” difficulties, including determining 
whether stories are “interesting” or “important”, or “interesting and important”. 
Decision-making within analysis is both subjective and complex. For example, stories 
concerning Expeditions/ Adventure are said to be indicative of a “tabloid” agenda 
(Barnett et al. 2000; Barnett et al. 2012). Within this research sample however, on 
12/11/14, BBC1 News anchor Huw Edwards described the Rosetta Space probe 
successfully landing on a comet as “one of the greatest achievements in the history 
of space exploration”. This hardly resonates with wider understandings of soft news.  
 
Accordingly, and because of this inherent subjectivity and era-specific categorisation 
(such as Scottish Independence), definitions of hard and soft vary. Notwithstanding 
this caveat, the taxonomies informing Level 1 Content Analysis (Barnett et al. 2000; 
Barnett et al. 2012) provide a more specific blueprint for decision-making associated 
with what constitutes hard or soft news. Accordingly, Figure 5.6 shows the 
proportions of hard and soft news across channels and years. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 Barnett and Gaber (2000) and Barnett et al (2012) use the nomenclature “tabloid” and 
“broadsheet” rather than “hard” and “soft”. Winston (2002) also contextualises soft news in 
terms of “tabloidization”. 
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Figure 5.6    Hard news as a percentage of all news time across news and channels. 
 
 
 
Previous scholarship has found that since the late 1970s, BBC1’s “broadsheet” 
agenda has rarely dropped below 80% (Barnett et al. 2012; Barnett et al. 2000). 
Findings here cannot be easily mapped to such research since taxonomies of hard 
and soft news vary between studies. Notwithstanding such differences, a general 
move towards hard news is exemplar of what public service broadcasters provide for 
democratic welfare (Barnett et al. 2000). However, the major conclusion here is that 
ITV1 has made a greater move towards the harder news agenda of BBC1. 
 
Further enhancing the emerging pattern of homogeneity between BBC1 and ITV1, 
Table 5.8 indicates which individual categories increased or decreased by at least 4 
positions within the overall channel ratings in Table 5.5. Once again, this shows 
considerable common ground between the two channels, since both have generally 
increased or decreased the same types of news. In addition to finding that BBC1 and 
ITV1 adopt increasingly similar conventions therefore, their dynamic changes in 
coverage are also similar.  
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Table 5.8     Notable movements by category and channel between 2007 and 2014. 
 
 
5.7    Reflections about  news agendas.  
ITV1’s shift to the provision of more serious news might be further supported by the 
sheer amount of news they supply. Using data referring to average story numbers 
and mean story times, it can be concluded from Table 5.9 that bulletin lengths have 
changed across years. 
 
Table 5.9     Changing nature of ITV1 bulletin lengths from 2007 to 2014. 
 
 
The extrapolated average lengths shown in Table 5.9 are the predicted news bulletin 
totals, and are calculated by multiplying average story length by the average number 
of stories per bulletin. As another indicator of channel convergence, both bulletins 
have increased their mean time per story, and a consequence, both channels appear 
to have increased their news time per bulletin. BBC1’s increase in total news length 
appears marginal at around a minute and a half,  but ITV1 seemingly provides almost 
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four minutes more news per bulletin in 2014 than it did in 2007, indicating that it has 
increased the time it actually devotes to news. 
 
In February 2014, the advertisement break featuring within earlier descriptions of 
ITV1’s News at Ten (Harrison 2000) reappeared. The change in ITV1’s news delivery - 
“more news” and “more time” -  might be explained by either a decrease in the non-
news items “disaggregated” from analysis, a longer overall time-slot, or a 
combination of both. This particular chapter does not attend to ITV1’s use of mid-
bulletin advertising, apart from noting that although research acknowledges such 
advertising, it is not widely discussed, despite these commercials containing 
production values “at least as high as the programming they interrupt” (Lewis et al. 
2005, p.463). However, Chapter 6 considers the positioning and content of, and the 
corporations represented by, ITV1’s advertisements, supporting assertions that 
sponsor’s messages are not “ideologically innocent” (Lewis et al. 2005, p.463).  
 
Editors can take pragmatic approaches when choosing stories (Blumler and Gurevitch 
1987), since certain story types are essential for a functioning democracy (Semetko 
et al. 1991). This is consistent with the normative theories of journalism (see, inter 
alia, Kovach and Rosenstiel 2007), which embrace a wide range of hard news 
categories. More specific to broadcast news, Gans (2004) describes an American TV 
news culture embracing ethnocentric interests in local affairs, democracy, 
responsible capitalism, small-town pastoralism, individualism, moderatism, social 
order and national leadership. While such issues - or British versions thereof - may be 
prime considerations for public service broadcasters such as BBC1, pragmatic 
evaluations of stories in terms of their appeal to news consumers (Blumler and 
Gurevitch 1987) may seem more pertinent for ITV1’s commercial objectives.  
 
Therefore, ITV1’s move towards a harder news agenda is an interesting finding. 
Previously, Bell (2002) is among those suggesting that ITV’s editorial decision-making 
was commercially driven, manifesting itself in a softer news output; there were also 
theories that market-led news logics prevailed more widely (Harrison 2000). Instead, 
the data presented here also suggests that like BBC1, ITV1’s news agendas are 
changing from a previously reported shift to softer news (for a wider review, see 
Cushion 2014).  
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By way of explanation, Michael Jermey’s comments are illuminating. He claims that 
ITV’s strategy is “to invest in journalism” and “to offer a high quality and highly 
credible set of programmes”. He cites an expansion into “investigative journalism” 
and “political discussion” for example, which, “for the first 7 or 8 years of the decade 
– weren’t really there on ITV”. This is especially noteworthy, given the general 
perception is that investigative journalism more widely is decreasing. ITV’s broad 
strategy, proposes Jermey, is due to viewers wanting “highly credible journalism 
around foreign and domestic current affairs”. Further, he suggests, ITV have 
“invested in specialist journalism”, citing the engaging of  Social Affairs Editor Penny 
Marshall, Political Editor Tom Bradby, and Business and Economic Editors Richard 
Edgar, Laura Kuenssberg and Joel Hills. All feature in the qualititive elements of this 
research (Chapter 6 and beyond). “At every turn” concludes Jermey, ITV “are looking 
invest in high quality journalism”. Findings here suggest that in terms of the 
quantitative measures of content, this strategy has likely contributed to a hardening 
of the channel’s news agenda. 
 
5.8      EBF news: part of the shift towards harder news? 
To examine how EBF news fits into the identified trend of increasing hard news, 
these categories are now isolated for closer analysis. Since it has been largely 
abandoned since 2007, the Market Summary is withdrawn from this part of the 
analysis, and Table 5.10 breaks EBF news into its three constituent elements. 
 
Table 5.10   Changes in EBF categories across channels and years. 
 
 
 
Table 5.10 shows that all EBF categories have increased, consistent with the increase 
in hard news, with stories about the Economy increasing more than news about 
individual or collective businesses. Despite increases in ITV1 coverage of EBF issues, 
BBC1’s pre-eminence is not seriously challenged, supporting the conclusion that the 
volume of business output of ITV is lower than that of BBC (Svennevig 2007). Further, 
ahead of deeper investigation into the content and framing of EBF stories, the 
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conclusion that the BBC “is a major player in the delivery of business information 
field, particularly for those for whom business matters are not a central part of 
everyday life” (Svennevig 2007, p.29) appears well-founded.  
 
The empirical findings described in this chapter help to develop a picture of BBC1 and 
ITV1 news provision in terms of both format and content. This chapter details the 
widest possible blueprint of the news presented by a public service broadcaster and 
its more lightly regulated commercial rival, and how both channels go about 
delivering their news agendas. Previous research considering the comparison 
between commercial and public service broadcasters can be contextualised as 
following either a model of “constancy”, where channels remain distinctly different, 
or “convergence”, where there they become increasingly similar (Hellman and Sauri 
1994).  
 
Numerous studies (see for example, Moe and Syvertsen 2009) find evidence of both, 
with public service broadcasters carrying serious content while also adopting 
schedules more akin to commercial channels. Other research detected a tangible and 
significant divergence between the BBC and ITV late evening bulletins (Barnett at al. 
2000). Barnett et al’s (2012, p.2) mirror analysis concluded that “the clear 
differentiation between BBC and ITV which we noted in our first study has therefore 
been consolidated but has not widened”. This study does not extend beyond 10pm 
news bulletins, but in contrast with Barnett at al. (2000) and Barnett et al. (2012), it 
finds a degree of convergence demonstrated by increasing story lengths, the 
popularity and clustering of short stories, the delivery of more news, a general 
increase in the same hard news categories, and a more specific increase in EBF 
categories.  
 
At this stage, conclusions can be made only on the basis of conventions, format and 
story type; the style and delivery of this content will be more insightful. For example, 
analysis of imagery and the role of institutional sources (Schaap 2009) offers a 
richness not provided by numerical data, and these elements are considered in 
Chapter 6. However, there can be at least provisional and tentative support for 
Barnett et al.’s (2000, p.13) summary that despite “dire warnings about the 
damaging effect of channel proliferation and market competition”, the nation’s 
broadcasters have continued to maintain “remarkably robust and broadly serious 
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approach to television news”. Moreover, “viewers on the mass audience channels 
still have access to serious coverage of important domestic and foreign issues 
alongside a reasonable proportion of lighter, more tabloid issues” (Barnett et al. 
2000, p.13). The pessimistic outlook that in the current decade, TV news might not 
have continued its “balanced and diversified approach” (Barnett et al. 2000, p.13) 
now seems unfounded given the shift in hard news from 2007 to 2014 across both 
channels. 
 
While this chapter details a quantitative model of broad news agendas, the next 
chapter combines a more closely detailed examination of EBF news, with qualitative 
examples adding some nuance to the emerging themes. It indicates that while 
conventions and content may be increasingly similar, the tone and style of the two 
channels vary; while this chapter shows ITV1 to be less prominent in almost all 
aspects of EBF news, the next chapter shows ITV1 to be more combative than BBC1 
in ways it reports EBF news. Both channels however, share the same, generally 
unchallenging approach to the prevailing system of free-market capitalism. 
 
5.9    Key findings from Chapter 5. 
 
 Notwithstanding some anomalies, BBCI and ITV1 are increasingly homogenous in 
terms of bulletin format. 
 
 Both channels have moved to a harder new agenda between 2007 and 2014. 
 
 EBF news has increased on both channels between 2007 and 2014. 
 
 EBF news conventions relying solely on numerical data have been dropped. 
 
 EBF news is more prominent on both channels, and if EBF sub-categories are 
combined and channels merged, it has moved from 5th to 4th most covered story 
type. 
 
 Both channels feature EBF news earlier within bulletins in 2014 than in 2007. 
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Chapter 6. EBF reporting on BBC1 and ITV1 - Probing or 
Perfunctory? 
 
Chapter 5 described the increasing homogeneity between BBC1 and ITV1 in terms of 
content, format and conventions, and the increase in harder news. There was also an 
increase in the volume of EBF news, and this chapter examines EBF reporting in more 
detail, supplementing quantitative findings with qualitative detail. 
 
To examine quantitatively identified themes and trends within EBF reporting, this 
chapter uses Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Multimodal Analysis (MA) to 
demonstrate the ideological impact of EBF news reporting, and develops 
explanations using appropriate examples1. These examples were selected on the 
basis that they contained pertinent instances of the key themes and trends identified 
by Level 1 Content Analysis. The chapter begins by establishing that EBF news can 
have considerable impact, then develops analysis to reveal that economic growth is 
framed as a positive and universal solution to a range of fiscal difficulties. Using 
energy suppliers as a case study, the analysis shows how, through the theme of 
conflict, contemporary reports about EBF issues contain news values that editors 
might find attractive when deciding which news is shown, and which is not. The 
analysis then more sharply focuses on the banking sector, which dominates EBF news 
agendas in both years and on both channels.  
 
Coverage is shown to be simplistic and light as hard news is often presented in soft 
ways, and BBC1’s approach is found to be more deferential to that taken by ITV1, 
who are more combative in their commentary and interviewing. Through a case 
study focusing on Barclays PLC, ITV1 are further shown to take an unexpectedly 
assertive approach to the reporting of corporations who also fund their programmes. 
The chapter concludes that despite a partial redefining of EBF reporting, the ethos of 
free market economics and neoliberalism prevails. This major theme of neoliberal 
reliance is carried over to the more specific analysis of PIE issues in Chapters 7 and 8, 
and represents a major part of the explanatory discussion in Chapter 9. 
 
 
                                                          
1 News reports are presented as transcribed data alongside corresponding screenshots 
(Hammersley and Atkinson 1995). 
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6.1   The impact of EBF reporting: Northern Rock and the “run of the bank”. 
 
The idea that journalists often promote economic ideology (Parsons 1989) is an 
important precursor to this empirical research. EBF news has impact (see, inter alia, 
Winston 1994; Engelberg and Parsons 2011; Hollanders and Vliegenthart 2011; 
Schifferes 2011). For example, depending on the way EBF and PIE issues are 
presented, citizens, businesspeople, politicians and policymakers may agitate for 
change, or may more passively allow dominant discourses and ideology to go 
unchallenged. This analysis demonstrates the impact of EBF news through the prism 
of one news story in 2007: the “run on the bank” at Northern Rock. These events are 
considered the first local manifestations of the financial crisis, acknowledged to have 
begun as U.S subprime lending problems gained traction (see, inter alia, Linsley and 
Slack 2013; Wisniewski and Lambe 2013; Picard 2015), and spread quickly to the U.K 
because of the “close economic relations” between the two nations (Muradoglu 
2010, p.6).  
 
On 13/9/07, both BBC1 and ITV1 reported that Northern Rock had asked the Bank of 
England, in its role as “lender of last resort” (Gillespie and Cornish 2013, p.88), to 
bolster their resources. The institution had lent to its customers on the basis that it 
could borrow from the global money markets, but there were problems when these 
markets refused to do so (Martin 2013; Brummer 2014). The Bank of England’s 
intervention was to mitigate panic before other organisations were affected 
(Schifferes 2011). Despite funding arrangements not being finalised until early on 
Friday 14/9/07, the story was reported on the preceding evening (Milne and Wood 
2009; Shin 2009; Linsley and Slack 2013). Figure 6.1 shows how BBC1 covered the 
events as its lead story. Anchor Huw Edwards provides the introduction: 
 
Figure 6.1    BBC1 report the first signs of the Northern Rock crisis on 13/9/07. 
 
 
 
Business Editor Robert Peston then gives some general background, and explains that 
Northern Rock had asked for assistance because of the impact of U.S lending 
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practices. Peston discusses the decision by then Bank of England Governor - Mervyn 
King - to acquiesce to the request: 
 
 
 
The report concludes with a live two-way exchange between Edwards and Peston. 
Peston responds to Edwards’ question about why the Bank of England intervened: 
 
 
Though ongoing organisational legitimacy is problematic (Elsbach and Sutton 1992) - 
especially during dramatic events - credibility is nevertheless important (Main et al. 
1995; Hardy and Phillips 1998; Kostova and Zaheer 1999). In his introduction, Huw 
Edwards establishes such plausibility by explaining that “Northern Rock is solvent”, 
and that “customers are being told not to worry”. Robert Peston offers further 
reassurance that “there is no suggestion that this business is fundamentally bust”. 
Tellingly, additional comfort is generated when Edwards invites Peston to send a 
“message” to savers. For a second time, Peston quotes Mervyn King, who explained 
that support would only be given in exceptional and short-term circumstances, and 
that it would have not been forthcoming if the institution was in “serious difficulties”. 
Peston’s coda that “there is no reason for depositors to panic” (see also Gillsepie and 
Cornish 2013, p.88) is a final expression of succour. Figure 6.2 shows ITV1’s parallel 
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report, comprising of a live exchange between anchor James Mates and Business 
Correspondent Mark Eddo: 
  
Figure 6.2    ITV1 report the first signs of the Northern Rock crisis on 13/9/07. 
 
 
 
After his introduction, James Mates asks a question full of presuppositions. 
Presuppositions can be manipulative (Huckin 2002), assisting what appear to be 
“logical” arguments (Machin and Mayr 2013, p.154). In this case, it is taken for 
granted that Northern Rock has problems, and only the extent of these problems is in 
question. In response, Mark Eddo describes events as “very serious” and accentuates 
the dangers facing Northern Rock, suggesting they are “probably more exposed” to 
risk. After Eddo predicts other such incidents, Mates’ final judgement that the 
situation is “very worrying” arguably leaves viewers more concerned than reassured. 
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In terms of tone and content, ITV1 are markedly more doom-laden and implicitly 
critical of Northern Rock than BBC1. Sometime later, Peston reviewed his broadcast 
comments that evening, denying that he had been “excitable” (Hulbert 2015, p.289), 
and asserting that his warning against panic was repeated in his BBC website postings 
(Butterick 2015; Schifferes and Knowles 2015). Irrespective of BBC1’s caution and 
ITV1’s dismay, witnesses to the Treasury Select Committee and senior officials at 
Northern Rock claimed that media disclosure caused public concern (Milne and 
Wood 2009; Linsley and Slack 2013), and that  Peston in particular - in his influential 
role on the most watched UK TV news programme - was a major catalyst in the 
events that followed (Kleinnijenhuis et al. 2013; Hulbert 2015). 
 
The following day, thousands of investors attempted to withdraw money from 
Northern Rock (Mayes and Wood 2008; Shin 2009), representing the first “run on a 
bank” since Victorian times (Milne and Wood 2009, p.89). A “run on the bank” occurs 
when depositors require banks to convert “debt claims into cash” (Calomiris and 
Gorton 1991, p.112), and the ensuing economic panic results in the bank’s collapse 
(Stabile 2001). Previously, banks could be supported more surreptitiously, and 
images would not be shown by a deferential media system (Milne and Wood 2009). 
Events at Northern Rock made it clear that this was no longer the case (Muradoglu 
2010), and indicate a possible shift in the approach to EBF news, where media are 
less sympathetic regarding corporate affairs. Figure 6.3 shows a range of powerful 
images featured within the reports, all with the potential to affect “public confidence 
in the banking system” (Schifferes and Knowles 2015, p.44).  
 
Figure 6.3     BBC1 and ITV1 images associated with the “run” on Northern Rock.  
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Further sensationalising the story, ITV1’s report on 14/9/07 concludes with scenes 
from the famous film It’s a Wonderful Life (See Figure 6.4). Events at Northern Rock 
were dissimilar to those in It’s a Wonderful Life because it was “...the aftermath of 
the liquidity crisis at Northern Rock, rather than the event that triggered its liquidity 
crisis” (Shin 2009, p.102). Notwithstanding such finite analysis, these famous, 
fictional scenes have become indexical of “the run on the bank” (Don et al. 2003; 
Grant 2008; Balkenborg et al. 2011), and here, might also be indicative of issues 
being simplified for popular consumption.  
 
Figure 6.4     ITV1’s report about “the run on the bank” on 14/9/07. 
   
The key question is: where did those who queued to withdraw their money from 
Northern Rock receive the information influencing them to do so? Aside from any 
audience research, the news reports about Northern Rock and what followed are 
strongly indicative that these TV bulletins played some part in what happened, and 
even perhaps, the country’s eventual fall into recession (Shifferes 2015). The concern 
felt by real people, and its mapping to a famous example from popular culture is also 
indicative that EBF news is increasingly driven by human emotions and experiences. 
These are more attractive to news editors than statistically-driven reports requiring 
pre-knowledge or expertise. The impact of EBF news therefore is undeniable; EBF 
journalists can instigate actions and events, and also shape opinions and attitudes.  
 
6.2    Reporting the economy. 
Having demonstrated the influence of EBF reporting, this analysis now examines 
general economic issues, before more narrowly considering organisations and those 
working for them. Table 6.1 shows the key themes within Economy stories across 
channels and years2, arranged in approximate order of prominence. Whereas in 
Chapter 5, news categories were analysed by time (T), here analysing time is more 
                                                          
2 Full coding explanations are found in Appendix 2. 
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problematic, since EBF stories are often difficult to confine to a single category. For 
example, TV news coverage about budgets straddle many economic issues. The 
budget report on BBC1 on 21/3/07 is exemplar; many aspects of the economic 
landscape are featured during a story lasting over 13 minutes. This clearly presents 
coding challenges since single speech acts often contain different themes; assigning 
these, for example, as either Economy, Business Specific or Business Generic was 
difficult to execute with consistency and rigour. Consequently, and as recommended 
by (Barnett et al. 2000), to simplify analysis, stories are not “double coded”, and only 
the most dominant theme within each story is selected. Data is expressed as a 
proportion of total stories rather than a proportion of total time. Table 6.1 shows the 
range of issues addressed within EBF coverage across both channels and both years. 
Table 6.1   Economy stories across channels and years (by percentage). 
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Across years and channels, stories about the wider economy narrowly concentrate 
on interest rates and mortgages. In keeping with the increase in EBF news, both 
channels increased the number of economic stories in 2014 (double on BBC1; almost 
five times more on ITV1), and the range of sub-topics also increased (from 11 to 18 
on BBC1; 6 to 17 on ITV1). Although interest rates and associated issues are less 
dominant, ITV1 maintain emphasis on these areas and embrace new elements such 
as debt, borrowing, jobs, growth and austerity. The broader range of sub-topics 
further emphasises that the focus of economic news has become less data-driven. 
 
One issue absent in 2007 but appearing on both channels in 2014 (particularly on 
BBC1) is economic growth. In 2014, the U.K was still recovering from the financial 
crisis (Giles and Cadman 2015), so the focus on growth is unsurprising. The 
relationship between growth and income inequality is important because of claims 
that “economic growth, not redistribution, is the single most powerful mechanism 
for generating long-term increases in income per capita” (Snowdon 2006, p.75). 
Closer analysis of growth stories therefore, gives some indication as to how PIE issues 
might also be covered. Moreover, analysing growth offers some insight into the 
general ideological emphasis of EBF news.  That growth was not dominant within any 
economic stories in 2007 seemingly indicates a pre-crisis landscape where a growing 
economy was taken for granted. The crisis, therefore, might have “amplified the 
clamour for growth” (Lewis and Thomas 2015, p.84). Accordingly, Table 6.2 shows 
the key themes and descriptions associated with growth in 2014.  
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Table 6.2     The descriptions of growth on BBC1 and ITV in 2014. 
 
 
Financial events are often described using the rhetorical device of metaphor (Bickes 
et al. 2014; Hooker 2014), and Table 6.2 illustrates how growth is regularly 
articulated in terms of its dynamic characteristics. The concept of economies 
“motoring forward” is strongly evident, while low or no growth is pejorative, and 
instigates alarm and disappointment. Such findings are fully consistent with a study 
of growth in U.S and U.K broadsheet newspapers (Lewis and Thomas 2015), where it 
was found to be overwhelmingly positive, supporting suggestions that EBF news 
often lionizes wealth creation without offering ideological alternatives, and without 
addressing concerns about the environment or sustainability.  
 
6.3     Reporting business. 
The increase in Economic news only accounts for some of the overall increase in EBF 
news. Other stories concern industry sectors or groups of organisations, with 
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“business” often referred to generically. For example, on 4/1/07, BBC1 reported a 
growing U.K trend of unpaid overtime, and on 9/10/07, that business leaders were 
unimpressed about increases in capital gains tax. Similarly, on 26/4/07, ITV1 
described an investigation into hidden banking costs, and on 9/5/14, they discussed 
how estate agents were “double charging”. In Table 6.3, the two Business categories 
(Specific and Generic) were merged to show which industry sectors were covered. 
 
Table 6.3   Sectors in general and specific business reporting (by percentage). 
 
 
 
In both years, EBF news agendas are dominated by the banking sector, resonant with 
the notion that banks are the “cause” and “location” of the crisis, and that financial 
sectors are pivotal within modern economies (see, inter alia, Butterick 2015; 
Murdock 2015). However, energy suppliers were also prominent in 2014, and Table 
6.4 shows the specific issues covered in energy sector stories. 
 
Table 6.4   Subtopics when the focus is on energy (by percentage). 
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Table 6.4 reveals that around a quarter of stories on both channels in 2014 refer to 
the profitability and prices charged by energy suppliers, with unethical or illegal 
practices also evident. The energy sector is largely absent in 2007 but features five 
times more on BBC1 and eight times more on ITV1 in 2014. It can be concluded that 
despite being an essential household expense, energy is not a habitual newsmaker, 
but that the extraordinary activities of energy suppliers in 2014 attracted editorial 
attention.   
 
6.4    The business of conflict: energy suppliers versus consumers. 
The major energy story of 2014 was industry regular OFGEM referring the “big six” 
energy suppliers to the Competition and Markets Authority over their pricing 
policies. The themes of pricing and suggestions of malpractice combine within this 
story, which appeared on both channels on 27/3/14. Figure 6.5 shows some of the 
elements within the BBC1 report, beginning with an edited package from Industry 
and Employment Correspondent, John Moylan: 
 
Figure 6.5   BBC1’s report covering the OFGEM referral on 27/3/14. 
 
 
 
The story concludes with a live contribution from BBC1’s Political Editor, Nick 
Robinson.     
 
 
 
BBC1 are implicitly critical of the “big six”, quoting OFGEM’s evocative description of 
“soaring” prices and the “tacit co-ordination” between these suppliers regarding 
pricing. Consequently, Moylan explains, public confidence has suffered. Nick 
Robinson’s explanation concerns political ramifications, how the Labour Party might 
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use the issue to gain political traction, and how public anger might have instigated 
the wide-ranging enquiry. Robinson’s use of “fury” is a strong lexical selection; such 
emotive terms are central in terms of representation (Conboy 2007; Richardson 
2007; Machin and Mayr 2012) and shape audience opinion. Figure 6.6 describes how 
ITV1 reported the story, as introduced by anchor Mark Austin: 
 
Figure 6.6     ITV1’s report covering the OFGEM referral on 27/3/14. 
 
 
 
The story also included an edited package by ITV1’s Business Editor, Joel Hills.  
 
 
 
This report resembles BBC1’s report, with references to increasing prices and “tacit 
co-ordination”. There are also some differences between the reports. For example, 
while BBC1 take a more political angle, ITV1 juxtapose increasing profitability with 
the plight of householders; profits have increased while domestic energy bills 
simultaneously increased and accordingly, ITV1 can be considered to more closely 
identify with the public. Both reports are exemplar of the constructed narrative of 
conflict, where large, profitable energy suppliers are implicitly inferred to be 
profiteering and acting against customer interests. On 10/6/14, both channels (lead 
story on ITV1; second on BBC1) reported that OFGEM had asked the “big six” why 
price decreases were not being passed on in the wake of falling wholesale gas prices. 
Figure 6.7 details ITV1’s report, which included an edited package from Joel Hills: 
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Figure 6.7     ITV1 reports OFGEM’s challenge to the “Big Six” on 10/6/14. 
 
 
The report also included a short contribution from then Energy Minister, Ed Davey: 
 
 
 
Figure 6.8 shows how BBC1 reported the story on the same day, the central element 
being another edited package by Industry and Employment Correspondent, John 
Moylan: 
 
Figure 6.8    BBC1 reports OFGEM’s challenge to the “Big Six” on 10/6/14. 
 
 
 
The report also included a contribution by then Shadow Energy Secretary, Caroline 
Flint: 
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Figures 6.7 and 6.8 demonstrate that in addition to channel homogeneity in terms of 
format and content, report construction is also often similar as channels feature the 
same social actors. In both reports for example, there are contributions from OFGEM 
Chief Executive Dermot Nolan who maps the case against the energy firms, and an 
Energy U.K representative who subsequent responds. Further, both channels also use 
rhetorical contrast to develop a binary conflict, pitting energy suppliers against their 
customers. Rather than comparing household bills with corporate profitability, this 
time the comparison is between increasing bills and falling wholesale gas prices.  
 
These events are exemplar of how an industry sector, having previously merited 
sparse coverage, attracted new editorial attention in 2014. Energy stories included 
several “human” news values such as suspicions of unfair practice, consumer 
unhappiness and the threat of strong corrective action. There is a renewed focus, 
post-crisis, on the need for more ethical and transparent practices following the 
financial crisis (see Linsley and Slack 2013). Business issues are simplified for the 
public, with greater emphasis placed on conflict, and a more populist approach 
focusing on the specific news values of negativity and resonance. BBC1’s embracing 
of a political discourse reflects the view that it privileges a government or 
establishment view (Hargreaves and Thomas 2002, p.6), and that EBF news often 
focuses on political elements (Schiffrin and Fagan 2013). There is no evidence 
suggesting ITV1 offer a milder commentary because of any concerns that this might 
damage potential advertising revenue; the relationship between advertising and 
content therefore, is not as clear-cut as traditional literature suggests. 
  
6.5     Banks: the villains of the piece. 
The 2014 focus on energy companies is episodic rather than indicative of any 
continuing interest. It is emphatically shown in Table 6.3 that the banking/lending 
sector dominates business reporting on both channels in both years, with coverage 
increasing from 17.9% to 25.0% on ITV1, and from 23.8% to 29.6% on BBC1. The 2014 
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percentages are enhanced further in real terms, since a greater number of stories are 
involved. The dominance of banking mirrors the real world shift from manufacturing 
to an economy characterised by “information, cultural goods, communications, and 
intangible assets” where the financial sector is “pivotal” (Murdock 2015, p.6). As 
BBC1 Political Editor Nick Robinson suggested in a BBC1 report on 15/1/14, “it used 
to be the big six energy firms getting all the flak, now it’s the big six banks”. Table 6.5 
shows the themes that dominated reporting about banks in 2007 and 2014. 
 
Table 6.5   Dominant themes where banks/lenders are the focus.  
 
*No other topic amounts to more than 5.7% on BBC1 and 5.0% on ITV1 in 2014. 
 
 
Table 6.5 shows that banking stories were notably different in 2014, as the emphasis 
switched from failing organisations (mainly Northern Rock) in 2007, to themes, in 
2014, of unethical/illegal behaviour (30.2% of BBC1 stories and 37.5% of ITV1 
stories), profitability (15.1% on BBC1; 7.5% on ITV1) and pay (13.2% on BBC1; 20.0% 
on ITV1).   
                   
Switching the focus from performance (failure) to questionable behaviour and pay 
for example, might be interpreted as a switch to new discourses of agency, where 
the crisis is implied to be the fault of individuals or groups (see for example, Martin 
2013)3. This marks a contrast from 2007, when the U.K financial crisis was seen as 
having “floated in” from the U.S as an apparently natural phenomenon. Once again, 
it indicates a more “human” element to EBF news, and an attractive proposition to 
news editors since the assignation of blame is especially newsworthy (Kitzinger 
2009). This new theme is exemplified by coverage of the banking arm of the Co-
                                                          
3 The title of Ian Martin’s book summarises the prevailing discourse of blame: Making it 
Happen: Fred Goodwin, RBS and the Men who Blew up the British Economy. 
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operative Group on 17/4/14. Figure 6.9 shows elements of the BBC1 report by 
Business Editor Kamal Ahmed, who describes considerable financial losses: 
 
Figure 6.9     BBC1’s report about losses at the Co-operative Group on 17/4/14. 
 
 
The BBC1 report also features an interview with the acting CEO, and references to 
redundancies and the bank’s general decline apparently due to numerous failed 
deals which bring “the question of governance” into focus. This issue of governance, 
and the Co-operative’s intransigence was sufficiently problematic that a high-ranking 
politician engaged to reform the Co-operative (Lord Myners) had voluntarily left his 
post (see also Moynihan and Ford Rojas 2014; Treanor 2014). Figure 6.10 describes 
the narrative of the parallel ITV1 report from Joel Hills: 
 
Figure 6.10   ITV1’s report about losses at the Co-operative Group on 17/4/14. 
 
 
Both reports use the same emotive reference to a “colossal loss”; such influential 
lexical choices are key in matters of representation (Conboy 2007; Richardson 2007; 
Machin and Mayr 2012). Both channels include interviews with the acting CEO and 
report job losses and the fall of an organisation that was once successful. This is 
another indication that aside from reporters and graphics, reports are often difficult 
to distinguish. Importantly too, the Co-operative’s problems are reported to be 
manmade, rather than naturally occurring (Whittle and Muller 2011).  
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Exemplar of a need for scapegoats (Joutsenvirta 2013), in the live exchange with Joe 
Hills, ITV1 anchor Mary Nightingale begins with the question: “Is anyone going to 
carry the can for this?” In contrast to the problems at Northern Rock, the failure of 
the Co-operative Bank is presented as the result of unwieldy management and poor 
decisions. Accordingly, this case study informs wider conclusions about the ways EBF 
news is reported. Figure 6.11 shows how Robert Peston explained that the Co-
operative is different to other banks during his BBC1 report on 11/3/14: 
 
Figure 6.11   BBC1 explains Co-operative principles on 11/3/14. 
 
 
 
The ethos of the Co-operative model is briefly touched upon by advocates (not 
journalists) on BBC1 (10/4/14) and ITV1 (11/3/14), and their contributions are shown 
in Figure 6.12: 
 
Figure 6.12    Descriptions of the Co-operative ethos. 
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Though the Co-operative’s different system of governance is referred to, such 
discourses are overwhelmed by more compelling reports about corporate failure, 
high-profile resignations, information leaks, questionably large salaries and most 
notably, the apparent professional and personal shortcomings of its former 
Chairman, Paul Flowers4. The Co-operative model of governance is shown to be beset 
with problems, and is further emphasised in Figure 6.13, which refers to reports from 
11/3/14. Richard Edgar’s description for ITV1 appears alongside criticism from a 
former Co-operative customer on BBC1: 
 
Figure 6.13   Descriptions of the Co-operative structure and strategy. 
 
 
 
 
Implicitly, due to its failure, the prevailing system of governance is seemingly unable 
to provide “fairness, equality and solidarity” (see Figure 6.12). Indeed, as Figure 6.13 
shows, the perception of former Co-operative customer Andrew Baird is that the 
organisation had abandoned its core mission for more market-driven logics, which 
suggests that its route to recovery is the same as that for other banks. The Co-
operative model is an alternative to the traditional model of bank governance, but on 
both channels, it is shown to be failed and broken. 
 
 
                                                          
4 Flowers allegedly made some serious misjudgements while trying to steward a 
merger with Britannia. In May 2014, he was convicted of the possession of illegal 
drugs. 
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6.6    The knockabout nature of EBF news. 
EBF news is complex (Doyle 2007; Davis 2015; Schifferes 2015; Tambini 2015), and 
normatively, journalists should act on behalf of citizens (Schifferes and Coulter 2012) 
and untangle such complexities (Seymour 2009). Some argue that in order to engage 
the public, news should be simplified (see Langer 1998; Marr 2004, Temple 2006). 
Alongside the attendance to news values within EBF events, news editors reduce and 
reframe complex issues to make them easier for audiences to comprehend. In 2012, 
for example, the shareholder revolt at Barclays over executive remuneration was 
presented by BBC1, ITV1 and SKY in terms of conflict, protest and the simplification 
of shareholder dynamics, rather than any detailed explanations about background 
and implications (Thomas 2016). 
 
Further, in reports about Northern Rock, ITV1 refer to famous scenes in It’s a 
Wonderful Life. Figure 6.14 shows how they further simplify the “run on the bank” by 
drawing on the dramatic elements of events at Northern Rock as the story broke: 
 
Figure 6.14   ITV1’s report about “the run on the bank” on 14/9/07.  
 
 
James Mates articulates the crisis in terms of ignoring warnings, falling share prices, 
the withdrawal of £1 billion and a crashed internet site. These seem the obviously 
more sensational elements of the story. Moreover, investors were “trying” to 
retrieve their money, indicating that this might be problematic (see also Gillespie and 
Cornish 2013). Consumer Editor Chris Choi continues the report, and as part of a 
large moving graphic, he stands behind a building called “Northern Rock” and 
explains how subprime lending problems in the U.S caused the crisis:  
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The report takes a knockabout turn, as ITV1’s “financial expert” (Cesarina Holm-
Kander) attempts to persuade Northern Rock customers to not withdraw their 
money. She berates a male customer - a “bright guy” - implicitly suggesting his 
actions are foolhardy. Choi also quizzes a female customer, expressing surprise that 
she was intent on withdrawing her money: 
  
 
 
 
The irony is that “branch deposits were actually the most stable of all deposits”, and 
that they are “far more stable than the wholesale funding raised in the capital 
markets from sophisticated financial institutions” (Shin 2009, p.101). This however, 
was not mentioned. In sum, perhaps the most dramatic banking story for a century 
(Milne and Wood 2009) was expressed in slightly ridiculous, almost comedic terms, 
indicative of the ways in which EBF issues are simplified.   
 
The events associated with Northern Rock represented the first tangible signs of the 
U.K financial crisis (Schifferes 2011; Gillespie and Cornish 2013; Schifferes and 
Knowles 2015), and amounted to a “dress rehearsal” for future banking bailouts 
(Martin 2013, p.17). Northern Rock’s failure represented a moment when the 
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established model of 21st Century capitalism might have been fundamentally 
challenged; instead an apparently light approach to the drama and its 
newsworthiness took precedence.  
 
Further, BBC1’s coverage of EBF issues more generally might be viewed as more 
infotainment-based since, in both years, such news was generally delivered by 
Robert Peston, its Business Editor (2006 - March 2014) and then its Economics Editor 
(March 2014 - November 2015). Perhaps because of his apparent influence (Hulbert 
2015; Schifferes and Knowles 2015; Shaw 2015), considered by some as excessive 
(see, inter alia, Robinson 2008; Schifferes 2011; Kleinnijenhuis et al. 2013; Butterick 
2015), attention has focused on Peston himself. First, his increasingly informal 
appearance (see Figure 6.15) has been widely commented on (see Glanfield 2014; 
Media Monkey 2015; Peston 2015).  
 
Figure 6.15    The changing face of Robert Peston. 
 
 
In addition, Peston’s unusual vocal style incorporating the “slight snaggings and 
elongations of words” (Lawson 2015a) and his general “eccentricity” have also been 
discussed (Day 2013; Gill 2015; Lawson 2015a), while others refer to his “ego” (Fay 
2011, p.53). In sum, as a “stand out” TV correspondent (Lawson 2015a), some have 
expressed concerns that Peston “had stopped merely reporting the story, and had 
become the story itself… and the figure around whom the action moves rather than 
the person who simply reports the action” (Glover 2008). 
 
Rather than facts and data prevailing (see Butterick 2015), the financial crisis brought 
EBF stories about human failing and greed, and a shift from drier, pre-crisis data-
driven stories. Peston has enhanced the visual and vocal elements of EBF news 
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presentation, and aside from the content of the stories themselves, has introduced 
“an aggression and news breaking instinct to the whole culture” (Stockwell Group 
2014). If journalists “are not just reporting a financial crisis” but also “performing it” 
(Fenton-O’Creevy 2008), then such “performances” can be reasonably interpreted as 
making news more dramatic, more mainstream, and by implication, because of the 
way it is delivered, less serious. Even if news agendas are increasingly harder 
(Chapter 6), some categories such as EBF news are treated more softly. 
 
6.7     Reporting remuneration: a key EBF issue. 
Within the banking sector dominating EBF coverage, the issue of remuneration looms 
large and high salaries have been increasingly scrutinised since the financial crisis 
(Farmer et al. 2013; Davis 2015). The issue of executive remuneration has “important 
implications for our understanding of the globalisation of world commerce” (Conyon 
and Murphy 2000, p.669) and addresses a basic tenet of capitalism - that income is 
distributed unequally (Henderson and Frederickson 2001; Ott 2005). This imbalance 
has increased (see, inter alia, Judge 2010; Tilley 2010), and so the reason why 
executive remuneration is increasingly investigated might be explained by concerns 
about increasing inequality (McCall 2013; Joutsenvirta 2013). 
 
By 2014, the emphasis on pay reflected widespread resentment about remuneration 
(Linsley and Slack 2013). The issue had gained traction during the “Shareholder 
Spring” of 2012, when investors expressed disapproval of the pay awards at 
numerous publicly listed U.K companies (Costello 2012; Macalister 2012). Excessive 
salaries paid to those complicit in the financial crisis grate with ordinary citizens, 
many of whom are experiencing financial strain (Thomas 2016), and such reporting 
represents a shift from economic analysis to ethical and moral logics (Moriarty 2009).  
 
Only two stories relating to banker remuneration were identified in 2007, both 
appearing on BBC1. On 30/10/07, they reported that the CEO of Merrill Lynch was to 
receive a severance package of $200 million. The single U.K-based story was 
broadcast on BBC1 on 26/3/07, when Robert Peston reported a pay award to then 
Barclays Chief Executive Bob Diamond. The report (see Figure 6.16), took the form of 
a two-way exchange between anchor Jon Sopel and Peston, who explained the salary 
details: 
 
152 | P a g e  
 
Figure 6.16    BBC1 coverage of Barclays pay award 26/3/07. 
 
 
Aside from some evaluative lexical choices (“staggering” and “unprecedented”), 
Peston offers little analysis. Indeed, by referring to “highly prized skills”, he might 
even be considered to be partly legitimising such sums. He does not mention the 
ethical issues regarding such salaries, or the research evidence challenging the 
deservedness of such remuneration. This resonates with traditional theories that 
journalists do not hold corporations sufficiently to account. Accordingly, such 
reporting is rather insipid, and by concentrating on the breaking of a U.K salary 
record and adding references to footballers and chat show hosts, BBC1 adheres to 
popular news values such as celebrity/elite discourses and novelty. In general, the 
issue is simplified and treated superficially. However, Peston’s suggestion that the 
ever-widening gap between rich and poor was one of the “great debates of our age” 
provides a guiding theme for this research (see Chapter 1). 
 
Bank remuneration stories increased in 2014 and in all, the two channels featured 15 
stories about banker pay. Amid the general pattern of homogeneity established in 
Chapter 6, some channel divergence can nevertheless be identified by analysing the 
coverage of executive pay. Firstly, Figure 6.17 shows parts of Peston’s report about 
Barclays on 11/2/14, which explains that despite a drop in profits, the bank was 
increasing bonus payments: 
 
Figure 6.17    Barclays’ falling profits and increasing bonuses on BBC1 on 11/2/14. 
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The report features Robert Peston interviewing then Barclays CEO Anthony Jenkins. 
Peston begins with this question: 
 
 
 
Jenkins argues that in a global business operating from “Singapore to San Francisco”, 
there is a need to compete and attract the best talent. Peston allows the reply 
without interruption, and asks a second question: 
 
 
 
Jenkins responds that it is more a case of doing business the right way in the future. 
Again, this is unchallenged, with the obvious question as to why it was not apparently 
done “the right way” before remaining unasked. This emollient interviewing style is 
once again illustrated in Figure 6.18, which lists the questions Peston asked of Lloyds 
Banking Group CEO Antonio Horta-Osorio on 13/2/14: 
 
 Figure 6.18       Robert Peston interviews Antonio Horta-Osorio on 13/2/14. 
 
 
 
While BBC1 might provide factual summaries, they do not necessarily adhere to 
normative ideals of EBF journalism. Asking whether “at last Lloyds is mended?” and 
whether you are “absolutely sure that Lloyds has changed its ways?” are mild probes, 
with low modality suffixes such as “is it your view” and “are you sure” inviting 
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predictably positive responses. Peston’s failure to interject, or to seriously challenge 
the bonus culture enables his interviewee to give a measured (and perhaps even, 
rehearsed) response to these non-threatening questions. Indeed, the exchange bears 
the hallmarks of a “trophy” interview, where corporate PR departments control tone 
and substance (Butterick 2015, p.95). Horta-Osorio predictably confirms that Lloyds 
has changed, and does so without challenge. Peston concludes his report thus: 
 
 
 
Peston’s coda rhetorically asks whether banks are becoming too powerful - a 
question that might have been more usefully asked of the Lloyds CEO during the 
interview. The emergent conclusion is that despite there being a case of excess for 
the banks to answer, BBC1 are often complaisant, with executives allowed the space 
to develop their own narratives amid passive questioning. ITV1, in contrast, were 
more combative; Figure 6.19 includes key elements of their parallel report about 
Barclays, which begins with an introduction from anchor Mark Austin: 
 
Figure 6.19    Barclays’ falling profits and increasing bonuses on ITV1 on 11/2/14. 
 
 
 
The report is continued by ITV1’s Economics Editor, Richard Edgar: 
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Edgar interviews Anthony Jenkins, who explains that based on “paper performance 
and competitive position”, they took the “right decision in the long term in interests 
of their shareholders”. Edgar interjects with incredulity: 
 
 
 
Edgar continues the report with some preamble before interviewing Roger Barker 
from the Institute of Directors: 
 
 
 
Barker questions whether paying executives bonuses “seven or eight” times their 
salaries was really appropriate. The report cuts back to the interview and Jenkins is 
asked about job losses. He explains that the bank needs less people, but Edgar 
interrupts once more: 
 
 
 
Edgar’s report concludes with a live exchange with anchor Mark Austin, who begins 
by noting that “Barclays are just the first of the high street banks to show its hand…” 
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Continuing the homogeneity of channels evident throughout this research, these 
BBC1 and ITV1 reports were identical in length (both 187 seconds), similarly 
positioned within bulletins (2nd on ITV1, 3rd on BBC1) and have similar opening 
introductions. Both featured contributions from Anthony Jenkins and the Institute of 
Directors. Aside from this increasing convergence regarding bulletin content, 
structure and format however, the positions adopted by reporters Robert Peston 
(BBC1) and Richard Edgar (ITV1) when interviewing Anthony Jenkins are notably 
different.  
 
Peston asks only moderately probing questions of Anthony Jenkins (“Can you 
explain?”, “Does it damage?”) which encourage predictable responses. Furthermore, 
he does not challenge Jenkins’ argument that CEOs operate in a global market, 
despite research showing that few executives move across borders (High Pay Centre 
2013). On ITV1, Richard Edgar adopts a different editorial stance. Figure 6.20 shows 
that there are even differences in the staging of the interviews:  
 
Figure 6.20   Comparative settings for interviews with Anthony Jenkins on 11/2/14. 
 
 
 
Settings and locations have connotative significance (Machin 2007), and BBC1’s 
interview was conducted in a large room, the interviewer and interviewee facing 
each other suggesting symmetry and equality. However, in ITV1’s report, Anthony 
Jenkins appears more cornered. This might be coincidental, but nevertheless it 
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resonates with Edgar’s more adversarial approach, including interrupting Jenkins and 
claiming a “reward for failure”. In addition, Edgar does not accept the argument of 
pay being driven higher in global markets, dismissing it as “an argument from 
another era”. Generally, Edgar holds Jenkins to account in a way that Peston does 
not.     
          
The final live exchange on ITV1 between Edgar and Austin is further evidence of a 
more overtly critical position. Edgar contrasts Barclays’ comparative failure with the 
prosperity of Lloyds, exemplar of how company results can be either enhanced or 
condemned when compared with others (Butterick 2015).  The differing treatment of 
Anthony Jenkins supports conclusions that while BBC1 is more deferential towards 
elite personalities and institutions (Berry 2013a), ITV1 is more adversarial and “while 
remaining serious”, appear “more in tune with the people’s anxieties” (Cushion 2012, 
p.45). ITV’s Head of News and Current Affairs, Michael Jermey5, claims a similar 
positioning for the channel more widely: 
 
People have always been at the heart of ITV news, and we think we are 
good at telling stories from a people’s perspective - we’re on a channel 
that used to be called “The People’s Channel”. There are many decades 
of us being good at people-centred views…  (interview with Michael 
Jermey, 1st October 2015). 
 
 
Despite their format, content and conventions becoming homogenous, BBC1 and 
ITV1 adopt different styles and approaches to EBF news. This difference in approach 
to EBF reporting was not revealed by quantitative methods, but is instead revealed 
by qualitative analysis, resonant of how the two approaches often complement each 
other (Cushion et al. 2015). These qualitative findings provide some expectations as 
to how PIE issues might be covered. For example, when compared with the 
established logics of a commercially funded news platform, ITV1 sometimes takes a 
surprisingly combative stance. Through the closer examination of its relationship with 
Barclays, it can be clearly demonstrated that any traditional assumptions that media 
defers to advertisers can be challenged. It is to this issue that the analysis now turns. 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 For the full transcript of this interview, please see Appendix 8. 
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6.8     Advertiser influence: Influence or impotence? 
Case studies enable critical realist research to identify “causal mechanisms” or 
“processes” (Ackroyd and Karlsson 2014, p.24). One such mechanism in the realm of 
TV news provision is funding. ITV1 and BBC1 operate according to different 
regulatory burdens, and are also funded differently. Unlike BBC1, ITV1 is funded by 
advertising (Johnson and Turnock 2005). The ability of commercial broadcasting to 
generate advertising revenue is undisputed, especially since the exponential post-
war increase in consumerism (Schiller 1995). The Broadcasting Act of 1990 reduced 
ITV’s regulatory burden in terms of public service (Cushion 2012; O’Malley 2001), and 
though some reduced obligations remain in place, in its current form, ITV is a 
“money-making television news service” and “answerable to shareholders” (Cushion 
2012, p.52).  
 
That its broadcast news is facilitated by advertising is potentially pivotal to the way 
ITV1 reports business, and more specifically, to how it reports the business of its 
sponsors and potential sponsors. This dilemma for commercial newsmakers has been 
especially debated within the deregulated and wholly commercial U.S broadcasting 
system. Herman and Chomsky (2002) for example, provide a damming critique, 
proposing that advertising shapes news output, and that newsmakers do not hold 
advertisers robustly to account. The chief concern is that sponsors will “discriminate 
against unsympathetic media institutions” (Herman and Chomsky 2002, p.16-17), and 
that programming will “often follow the dictates directly or indirectly, of their 
sponsors” (Schiller 1995, p.197). This may take the form of being “charitable to 
advertisers”, creating “a buying mood” among viewers, moderating “controversial” 
elements within stories about advertisers, and favouring high income groups who 
have most to spend (Baker 2014, p.44). 
 
This critique is not directly transferrable to U.K broadcasting, since even though ITV1 
is commercially-funded, it is still bound to adhere to public service principles6. 
However, the notion that commercial organisations might influence news reporting 
challenges the fundamentals of a free press (Winston 1994). Advertising revenue 
provided by huge multinationals, and banks in particular, represents considerable 
leverage within print journalism. In February 2015, for example, Daily Telegraph chief 
                                                          
6 ITV’s public service obligations are here http://licensing.ofcom.org.uk/tv-broadcast-
licences/current-licensees/channel-3/  
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political commentator Peter Oborne reported that the newspaper had repressed 
stories about HSBC in order to retain the bank’s advertising (Plunkett and Quinn 
2015). Following his resignation from the paper, Oborne offered a clear example of 
commercial influence, directing his most explicit comments towards Telegraph Media 
Group Chief Executive Murdoch MacLennan: 
 
 
Winning back the HSBC advertising account became an urgent priority. It 
was eventually restored after approximately 12 months. Executives say 
that Murdoch MacLennan was determined not to allow any criticism of 
the international bank … (Oborne 2015). 
 
 
Large advertisers are clearly important to print media, and even more so to free-to-
view internet sites. However, perhaps because of a general decline in newspaper 
readership (Turvill 2015), advertising revenues are reduced (Jackson 2015) and 
therefore especially precious. The imperative to retain large advertising accounts 
may not be so intense within television and further, the broadcast medium presents 
a high-profile opportunity many commercial organisers will be keen to secure.  
 
As explained in Chapter 5, in 2007, though commercial breaks appeared elsewhere in 
ITV programme schedules, they were absent from late evening ITV1 news, and the 
bulletin was only punctuated by the local news disconnect, before then returning to 
a summary of headlines. By February 2014, despite a period of advert-free news 
(Holmwood 2015), ITV1 had re-introduced the advertisement break that traditonally 
characterised past formats of News at Ten (Harrison 2000, p.95). This however, was 
sporadic, and advertisement breaks were indentified in only 41.4%7 of ITV1 bulletins 
in the 2014 sample.  
 
As a precursor to what follows in section 6.11, in 2012, insurance company Aviva was 
a major advertiser on ITV1, and featuring vignettes starring comedian Paul 
Whitehouse in a series of advertisments (Kollewe 2011; Fletcher 2013). Aviva 
sponsorship was associated with ITV1’s drama Downton Abbey (Aviva 2009; Sweney 
2011), but at the same time it was one of several corporations experiencing 
shareholder dissent over executive remuneration.  
 
                                                          
7 Advertisement breaks were present within 101 of  the 244 bulletins in the sample. 
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Figure 6.21 shows excerpts from two ITV1 reports on the issue: 
 
Figure 6.21   ITV1 reports executive remuneration at Aviva on 3/5/2012 and 8/5/12.  
 
 
 
 
In Figure 6.21, ITV1’s Business Editor Laura Kuenssberg ridicules the slogan “Get the 
Aviva deal”, and refers to “red faces”. She goes further in her implied criticism by 
intertextually referring to the Aviva advertisments actually used on ITV1, creating a 
play on words about their executive remuneration being “out of step” with public 
opinion. This is a direct reference to Whitehouse’s ballroom dancing in the 
accompanying footage and more significantly,  a preliminary indicator that it cannot 
be assumed that ITV1 will be deferential to their sponsors. 
 
6.9    ITV1’s relationship with Barclays: the fearless coverage of a channel sponsor. 
While ITV1 advertising rates are not officially publicised, from data that is available 
(for example, TV Agency 2013;  Guerillascope 2015), it appears that a single 30-
second advertisement on ITV1 during the “late peak” 8pm-11pm costs between 
£35,000 and £50,000. Of the 101 commerical breaks identified in 2014, 84 were 
single advertisment breaks all featuring only Barclays, one of the banks dominating 
financial sector coverage. Therefore, by a conservative estimate, Barclays spent at 
least £3 million on these advertisements in 2014, aside from any additional 
premiums to secure exclusivity within the advertising break. Consequently, these 
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Barclays advertisements presented a potential dilemma for editors when deciding 
how stories should be presented. Establishing the tone and content of Barclays 
stories within 2014 offers some insight into the commercial channel’s willingness to 
adopt an uninhibited approach to reporting the corporate workings (but more often 
“problems”) of their sponsors. 
 
This combative approach taken by ITV1 towards Barclays predates 2014. In 2012 for 
example, Barclays experienced shareholder dissent, and in an examination of how 
this dissent was reported on BBC, ITV and SKY, ITV1 anchor Alastair Stewart refers to 
“remarkable” barracking”, “shareholder fury” and “bumper pay” (Thomas 2016, 
p.105). These are all lexical selections indicating that the remuneration in question is 
high, even in the context of executive pay. Reporter Laura Kuenssberg describes boos 
and derision at the Barclays meeting, and of the three reports, only ITV1 mentioned 
that Barclays prevented the attendance of news cameras and protestors. The tone 
and framing of the ITV1 report is notably critical, and challenges any notion that the 
channel takes a mild approach to corporate affairs (for a detailed analysis, see 
Thomas 2016).  
 
Table 6.6 shows all Barclays stories on ITV1 in 2014, and how these corresponded to 
the pattern of advertising breaks immediately before and after each bulletin in 
question. The term “Barclays only” refers to breaks that feature only Barclays 
advertising messages: 
 
Table 6.6     Barclays stories and advert breaks in 2014 on ITV1. 
 
 
 
From Table 6.6, the report on 3/2/14 is not especially noteworthy, since it lasts only 
11 seconds and simply explains that CEO Anthony Jenkins had refused his bonus. On 
11/2/14 and 24/4/14, there were no Barclays adverts punctuating the ITV1 bulletins, 
but there were adverts on adjacent days, meaning that news and commentary about 
Barclays was in close proximity (the day before and day after) to the bank’s 
advertising messages. The report on 11/2/14 has already been described in detail 
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(see Figure 6.19). It featured an adversarial approach by Richard Edgar who 
interrupted Anthony Jenkins, expressed incredulity, and presented a strong contrast 
with a bank that was apparently performing better. Figure 6.22 describes a Barclays 
story on 24/4/14, reporting a dissenting vote at their AGM. It was introduced by Julie 
Etchingham: 
 
Figure 6.22     ITV1’s report about Barclays on 24/4/14. 
 
 
The report is continued by Joel Hills, who comments over a small vignette performed 
by protestors outside the meeting, where one “banker” is handed a handful of 
banknotes: 
 
 
 
Hills asks some Barclays shareholders whether they are “happy with the way the 
bank is being run” and receives various responses: 
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After explaining that while profits have decreased and bonus payments have 
increased, Hills continues his commentary: 
 
 
 
The report cuts to a contribution from Dr Roger Barker from the Institute of 
Directors, who responds to Hills’ question whether “it is enough to avoid government 
intervention - to avoid legislation?”: 
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The critical tone of this report is established at an early stage, with Julie Etchingham’s 
visceral description of a “Barclays bonus backlash” and shareholders being “fed up”. 
Joel Hills continues by reminding viewers that criticism of Barclays is not new. 
Further, the leitmotif of conflict is constructed through the vox populis, the first of 
which highlights excess. By way of balance and showing a plurality of views, the 
second vox populis refers to the dangers of not paying bonuses (staff retention). The 
female shareholder explains she has no choice but to trust the management, though 
her words hardly represent an endorsement. Hills makes the rhetorical and 
metaphorical contrast between Manchester United and Colchester United, which 
many viewers would recogonise as comparing a successful and famous football team 
with one that is neither. All three shareholder discourses therefore, are critical. 
Furthermore, the event is described as “embarrassing” for Barclays, intensified by 
emphasising that Vince Cable had specifically referred to the bank when talking 
about remuneration excess. 
 
Moreover, a dissenting vote of “one third of shareholders” might be newsworthy 
after the revolt of 2012, but such shareholder votes are far from unprecedented, and 
occurred regularly over the preceding decade (Peston 2012). In short, this was a story 
that ITV1 might have quite legitimately not reported at all; indeed, the parallel BBC1 
bulletin did not do so. That ITV1 ran the story reconfirms notions that newsroom 
priorities and news values might take precedence over sponsor preferences.   
 
While Barclays themselves are subject to criticism, and even some elements of 
“schadenfreude” (Thomas 2016, p.109), the question as to whether intervention is 
appropriate within a free-market system is not asked. When unhappy with their 
returns or the behaviour of the companies they own, large shareholders have the 
choice of “exiting” (selling up), “voicing” (expressing discontent) and “loyalty” where 
they remain passive (Hirschman 1970). Evidence suggests that institutional 
shareholders are often passive (Goergen and Renneboog 2001; Faccio and Lasfer 
2002; Sheehan 2011), so when Dr Roger Barker suggests that shareholder inaction 
invites a “regulatory response” and that this was a concern, he apparently sets state 
intervention as negative. The underlying message is that market forces should be left 
unimpeded, and Joel Hills does not challenge this mantra. 
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There were also single Barclays adverts punctuating bulletins carrying news stories 
about the bank on 17/2/14 and 7/5/14. Figure 6.23 describes the entire Barclays 
story on 17/2, where anchor Nina Hossain reports that three Barclays executives had 
been charged with conspiracy to defraud: 
 
Figure 6.23     ITV1’s report about Barclays on 17/2/14. 
 
 
At 16 seconds long, this is a short report (BBC1’s parallel story was 17 seconds long). 
Rather than a description of “three former Barclays workers” which anonymises 
those involved, these executives are specifically named, resonant with the usual 
protocols associated with the reporting of crime. Furthermore, this story appeared 
barely two minutes of news time following a Barclays advertisement, which supports 
the notion that ITV1 takes an abrasive approach towards its sponsors. In the Barclays 
story reported on 7/5/14 however (Figure 6.24), the story was last in the pre-advert 
segment, meaning that it segued directly into a Barclays advertisement. Mark Austin 
explains that Barclays are shedding jobs as part of its programme to reform its 
workforce and bonus system. The report then cuts to a live two-way with Joel Hills: 
 
Figure 6.24      ITV1’s report about Barclays on 7/5/14.  
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Hills appears to suggest that jobs might be sacrificed by the Chief Executive in order 
to assert his authority. Moreover, the promise of a “new ethical dawn” implicitly 
points to the past being unethical. From Hills’ commentary, it seems that job cuts are 
preferred, for example, to any draconian measures directed towards executive pay. 
As before, there is implicit and explicit criticism of Barclays, further amplified since 
once again, BBC1 did not run this story.  
 
Despite pressures to adhere to the political economy of their news organisations, 
some editors determinedly profess to be immune from external pressures from 
advertisers (see Parsons 1989), and ITV1 typify such independence. Indeed, in 
response to a question about the relationship between the newsroom and the 
corporations that might also fund the station via advertising, Michael Jermey claims 
that “I don’t have very much to say because it doesn’t enter my mind”.  Furthermore, 
he asserted: 
 
…journalists cover stories we think our viewers will find interesting and 
sure, we’re on a commercial channel funded by advertisers… but I don’t 
know who’s advertising at any given time… (interview with Michael 
Jermey, 1st October 2015). 
 
 
After explaining that “the advertising sales team can put breaks where they want to 
across the schedule”, he continued: 
 
 
…I have never had a discussion with the advertising people at any point 
about those [Barclays] ads - they’ve kept running, and I’ve never had a 
discussion with the programme editor about what stories they chose to 
run… so there is a disconnect between the two… (interview with Michael 
Jermey, 1st October 2015). 
 
 
Continuing with the refuting of any wider symbiosis with elite business figures, he 
asserted that:    
   
Our journalists obviously talk to people in the City. I spend no time 
whatsoever talking to people in the City… we all have biases and 
backgrounds but if someone is looking for a power elite (in ITV1) not in 
touch with the real world, that’s not the case… (interview with Michael 
Jermey, 1st October 2015). 
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These are perhaps predictable responses, but should be taken at face value. 
However, ITV1 are not “charitable to advertisers”, and because of their segueing 
from critique to advert, they do not apparently create “a buying mood” or moderate 
any controversy about Barclays (see Baker 2014). Moreover, by attending to the 
perceptions of ordinary people (such as the shareholders outside the AGM), neither 
do ITV1 obviously favour high-income groups. In sum, and even aside from Michael 
Jermey’s explanations, there is no on-screen evidence of any deference to Barclays, 
even despite the bank’s considerable sponsorship. 
 
6.10      Barclays adverts: getting their retaliation in first? 
The Barclays advertisements punctuating the bulletins in question promote very 
different corporate activities to those discussed in the reports they were adjacent to. 
They confirm claims that advertisements have production values “at least as high as 
the programming they interrupt” (Lewis et al. 2005, p.463). At between 30 and 40 
seconds long, the Barclays adverts were of average length for a TV commercial, and 
featured self-contained vignettes, pictorially represented in Figure 6.25: 
 
Figure 6.25     Barclays adverts punctuating ITV1 News during 2014. 
 
 
Running clockwise from top left, these commercials explain: 
 
 How a small busines owner moved house and how a Barclays mortage enabled her to  
“enjoy family life more”. 
 How a blind comedian uses Barclays ATM machines that have been adapted for the 
visuallly impaired. 
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 How a Barclays “Digital Eagle” taught an elderly man to make internet contact with 
his nephew.  
 How a couple running a small hotel benefit from Barclays networking events. 
 How a young man beaome a more confident speaker because of the Barclays “Life 
Skills” programmes. 
 
These services focus on human consequences and life enhancement, rather than the 
more traditional and prosaic aspects of banking. They promote accessible, positive 
messages about how Barclays improve lives; as Jermey correctly observed, “quite a 
lot of those brand spots for Barclays were about young people” (interview with 
Michael Jermey, 1st October 2015). Mindful that corporate motivations can only be 
inferred from actions and behaviour (Merrett 1968), it is not possible to extend 
beyond speculating about the intentions regarding the content and positioning of the 
Barclays adverts within ITV1 bulletins. Accordingly, the levels of agency within ITV1 
and Barclays are unclear. However, the adjacency of Barclays news reports to their 
adverts makes it clear that while ITV1 news bulletins benefit from their sponsorship, 
they are also prepared to report pejorative stories. Despite ITV’s willingness to 
provide critical commentary of Barclays, what is in more doubt is whether the free 
market economic system that allows them to operate is subject to the same sort of 
censorious appraisal. 
              
These circumstances cannot be considered within a vacuum, and can be mapped to 
the wider context of media advertising. While advertising in newspapers has 
decreased, on TV it is thriving (Durrani 2015; Hammett 2015; IBSA 2015) and 
consequently, perhaps ITV1 can afford to take a more robust approach. Therefore, in 
anticipation of the news reporting they might be subjected to, Barclays might have 
strategically positioned these adverts. Michael Jermey suggests a less deliberate 
strategy, noting that since the channel is only permitted to run “40 minutes of 
advertising between 6pm and 11pm at an average of about 8 minutes per hour”, the 
ITV1 advertising team run those minutes around the programmes “with the biggest 
audiences”.  
 
It can be reasonably assumed that being the sole sponsor within an advertising break 
enables the advertisement to stand out, since there is no competing “noise”. Further, 
it is diffcult to take issue with Michael Jermey, when he suggests people might also 
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be keen to advertise during news bulletins since they represent “a serious 
environment within which to see your advertisement” (interview with Michael 
Jermey, 1st October 2015). The lighter and more “human” nature of advertising 
content might also be promoted as a pre-emptive move to counter any negative 
Barclays stories, as they perhaps strive to “create their own buying mood” (Baker 
2014, p.44). In other words, as Lewis et al. (2005) suggest, television advertising 
content is ideologically active; perhaps the same might be said about their 
operational positioning. Of course, the decision-making process and agency regarding 
the placement of these advertisements is unknown.  
 
However, that they appear in such close proximity to stories implicitly critical of 
Barclays might be because of ITV1’s lack of concern about offending their corporate 
sponsors. Michael Jermey confirms that adverts can be withdrawn by sponsors at 
short notice. That Barcays did not do so when they must have suspected some 
negative coverage on that evening’s ITV1 bulletin supports the proposition that the 
bank might have been attempting to counter such negativity. Understanding that 
advertiser influence could not be relied upon, Barclays might have anticpated that 
their own action was required. In general, and notwithstanding such speculation, 
what seems more certain is that the Barclays case study shows that the citing of 
advertiser influence over programme content as a potential news influencer (Herman 
and Chomsky 2002) does not fully explain the provision of news provided by U.K 
commercial broadcasters.  
 
Furthermore, the Barclays example is another indicator that where once it might 
have been a data-heavy specialism, EBF news is now a more mainstream, human-
centred discipline driven by news values. The approach taken by ITV1 suggests that 
EBF news has been, to some degree, redefined by the financial crisis. For example, 
while financial sector actors were previously recognised for their resilience following 
the 2005 terrorist bombings in London, the same elite group were now seen as 
complicit in the global crisis, and responsible for “the hardship inflicted on the lives 
of working people” (Kelsey 2012, p.286).  
 
In sum, “individuals and institutions” that were previously revered “suddenly became 
widely detested” (Whittle and Mueller 2012, p. 112). While Kelsey (2014) shows how 
post-crisis, bankers are portrayed as having “mythological trickster traits”, Whittle 
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and Mueller (2012) found that under scrutiny, bankers are constructed as villains 
with moral voids, yet see themselves as “victims”. However, if the financial crisis 
tempered banker pay and bonuses, from the 2014 reports about executive pay on 
BBC1 and ITV1, it is hard to contest that “the pre-crisis remuneration culture soon 
returned” (Joutsenvirta   2013, p.460). 
 
Politicians might be thought of as either having the agency to intervene in executive 
remuneration, or to be ineffectual in the face of “market forces” (Joutsenvirta 2013, 
p.474). This could be the choice between regulating the banking industry with salary 
caps and so on, or allowing the sector to do as it wishes, even in the face of tangible 
dissent. If this is the case, while politicians can decide on party and personal 
standpoints, TV news channels can also frame such issues within the same range of 
choice. Schifferes (2011) asks whether EBF reporting has risen to the challenge of 
“providing the essential guide and companion as our economic and financial world is 
remade once again”. The conclusion here is that the answer can only be “partly”. As 
will be shown, while TV journalism takes an adversarial approach on personal and 
organisational levels, in the broadest terms it is essentially silent, and the overarching 
economic system emerges from coverage unscathed.  
 
6.11    The relentless promotion of neoliberalism.   
While their tone and approach to EBF news may differ, as with their conventions, 
format and general agenda it is evident that BBC1 and ITV1 are united in their 
general approach to capitalism. Both could examine alternatives to neoliberal 
economics, but because growth is presented as a panacea (see section 6.2), this is 
unlikely. This failure on the part of both channels to meet the expectations of public 
service broadcasting is exemplified by further analysis of banking sector coverage. 
Figure 6.26 details a BBC1 report on 15/1/14 regarding plans to cap banker bonuses. 
This report offers journalists the chance to consider the political and regulatory 
choices. Capping bonuses, for example, might be interventionist (and therefore 
consistent with a Keynesian approach), but leaving them unchecked is indexical of a 
free-market approach. Huw Edwards begins by explaining the issue in simple terms: 
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  Figure 6.26   BBC1’s reports the potential cap on Banker’s bonuses on 15/1/14. 
 
 
 
In his edited package, Political Editor Nick Robinson gives a brief summary before 
cutting to a parliamentary exchange between the two main party leaders. Labour’s 
Ed Miliband questions the Prime Minister as to whether he thinks it is acceptable 
that RBS should give 100% bonuses to those already earning multi-million pound 
salaries. David Cameron responds thus: 
 
 
 
After another brief, factual summary, the report returns to the parliamentary 
exchange:  
 
 
 
 
Nick Robinson resumes his report: 
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Using presupposition, Robinson concludes that everyone feels that the solution to 
lending inertia is more competition - in other words, extending the market rather 
than regulating it. This assumption is made, it seems, based on the opinions of elite 
politicians, who, while they might debate the nuances, do not challenge the wider, 
prevailing banking system which is where, after all, “capitalism red in tooth and claw 
is still alive and kicking” (Morgan and Whitley 2012, p.39). Figure 6.28 describes how 
ITV1 reported this story. Anchor Mark Austin introduces a report which is then 
continued by Deputy Political Editor Chris Ship: 
 
Figure 6.27   ITV1’s report about the potential cap on Banker’s bonuses on 15/1/14. 
   
                                 
The report cuts to the same Parliament exchange featured by BBC1: 
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Chris Ship resumes his report: 
 
 
 
The report cuts to an interview between Ship and then Business Secretary Vince 
Cable. Ship asks Cable how the Government would react to a proposal from RBS to 
pay someone a bonus in excess of 100% of their salary: 
 
 
 
Ship’s package covers the unequivocal opinions expressed by both Parliamentary 
Select Committee member Andrew Tyrie MP and Bank of England Governor Mark 
Carney. Both say that bonus caps are not the correct solution. Ship concludes his 
commentary: commas 
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Finally, in a live studio exchange, Austin asks Business Editor Laura Kuennsberg about 
the fears behind capping bonuses. Kuennsberg answers:   
 
 
 
This story is inherently political, and both introductions frame it accordingly. Further 
degrees of structural and narrative homogeneity between the channels are also 
present, since both feature the parliamentary exchange between Cameron and 
Miliband, the footage of Mark Carney being questioned by a Commons Select 
Committee and the use of similar graphics explaining the story’s numerical aspects. 
Further, qualitative analysis reveals that although both channels flirt with the issue of 
whether neoliberalism should be challenged, neither fully engage with it. ITV1’s Chris 
Ship gets closest to the broader issue of whether governments should take action on 
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bankers’ pay, when he suggests that David Cameron “was invited to reject huge 
bonuses but didn’t”. This point, however, is not developed further.   
 
Notions of government intervention are hardly supported by some neutral 
comments by Vince Cable, which suggest that it is the banks that need to practice 
self-restraint, rather than having this forced upon them. By expressing a wish not to 
discuss “hypotheticals”, he appears to dismiss even the notion of intervention. 
Moreover, Laura Kuenssberg’s cautionary tone suggests that if bonuses are capped, 
the sector might relocate, tax revenues may fall, and senior roles - essential for 
sensible stewardship - would be less attractive. This represents a robust defence of 
the banking sector, but the question as to whether such bonuses are justified during 
austerity is left to the parliamentary exchange, and is otherwise not commented 
upon journalistically. Some insight into how both channels miss the opportunity to 
debate the nature of financialised or “casino capitalism” can be gleaned from David 
Cameron’s words (Figure 6.28), as he responds to claims that the Government should 
intervene at RBS:    
 
Figure 6.28   David Cameron’s responses to bonus capping at RBS. 
 
 
 
 
On BBC1, Cameron says he will veto attempts to increase the total pay and bonus bill. 
On ITV1, he says the total pay bill must come down. This may be considered as 
“hedging”, “circumlocution” and creating an obscuring “fog” (see Resche 2004), since 
Cameron appears to support something, which is actually a limit on the total RBS pay 
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budget. This is different to vetoing bonus payments, since increased salaries and 
bonuses are still fully possible, presumably so long as some counterbalancing action 
occurs elsewhere. Enforcing redundancies boosts profitability (Dial and Murphy 
1995); here they might be used to protect bonus payments by reducing overall salary 
expenditure. On BBC1, Nick Robinson notes that senior manager numbers are 
decreasing, but does not explain that safeguarding high executive remuneration 
might result in a reduction of lower level jobs. Seemingly, both channels fail to 
address whether allowing unfettered market forces to prevail is appropriate in a 
post-crisis economic landscape, where “humanistic ideals such as honesty, 
moderation, and care for others” are more prominent (Joutsenvirta 2013, p.474).  
 
It cannot be assumed, post-crisis, that any shift from market-based statistical data 
towards more human elements means that financial elites are subjected to a re-
energised watchdog function within TV journalism. Take for example, Robert 
Peston’s report on BBC1 on 3/2/14, describing how Lloyds Bank had improved its 
performance (Figure 6.29). Anchor Huw Edwards explains that Lloyds was to sell 
around £5 billion worth of shares to the public, but that the prevailing share price 
had fallen after the announcement that £1.8 billion was being allocated to settle 
claims caused by mis-selling Payment Protection Insurance (PPI). Robert Peston’s 
subsequent report, however, puts a very positive spin on what many would consider 
a financial scandal: 
 
             Figure 6.29    BBC1’s report on the Lloyds Banking Group story on 3/2/14. 
 
 
Members of the public then report the impact of their compensation: 
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Peston describes the funds set aside for compensating customers, but frames this in 
positive terms, referring to the consequent boost to the economy and the benefits to 
the public in terms of lifestyle. Growth is championed once again, boosted by the 
spending of those who have received windfalls due to the unfair business practices of 
many within the banking sector. While the former is “spun” as an advantage, the 
latter is barely mentioned. Put differently, the reasons behind the systemic failings 
are given much less attention, as it is implied once again, that markets will self-
manage, self-adjust and ultimately, self-heal.      
 
6.12     The partial redefining of EBF news. 
Ways in which EBF topics are presented are likely to have ideological influence over 
audiences (Parsons 1989), and it seems clear that particular words and images can 
both strengthen or mitigate such underlying messages. In the case of Northern Rock, 
such was the apparent influence of some journalists (Hulbert 2015), that some 
people even blamed them for the “run on the bank”. 
 
Chapter 5 demonstrated that in terms of operational conventions and agendas, news 
on BBC1 and ITVC1 is increasingly homogeneous. This is further supported by the 
data presented in this chapter, but qualitative investigation reveals that even if 
topics, times and typologies are similar, the two channels take different approaches 
to EBF reporting. Despite being the most trusted source of financial information 
during a crisis (Schifferes 2015), BBC1 are deferential towards corporations and their 
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affairs. On the other hand, ITV1 are often more combative and questioning. 
Consequently, and as demonstrated by the Barclays case study, suggestions that 
commercial logics and advertiser influence shape news output are challenged. In fact, 
according to the data presented here, there may be no clear correlation between 
advertising and news output. While neither channel offers ideal coverage, it can be 
concluded that ITV1‘s approach to EBF reporting is often nearer to the normative 
watchdog ideal than that taken by BBC1. 
 
Both channels however, must contend with the omnipotent challenge of providing 
meaningful background and context in television reports only a few minutes long, 
even if, in the words of journalist John Lloyd, they are “the one place I think you 
could make a bit of difference”8. On both channels, the tendency to simplify is 
exemplar of “image crowding out rational analysis” (Bird, 2000, p.221), reflective of 
the debate asking whether “dumbing down” serious news is unhelpful (Franklin 
1997; McNair 2000) or engages wider audiences (Temple 2006). Simpler 
interpretations offered particularly on ITV1 might be useful for audiences struggling 
to understand complex issues. Indeed, Esser and Umbricht (2014, p. 244) propose 
that so long as news remains more about substance than style, more interpretive 
approaches to news “may even contribute to an enriched public sphere”. The 
simplification of EBF news is not therefore, fundamentally flawed, as long as it 
concentrates on content rather than stylistic flourishes. 
 
There is a compelling case that the financial crisis functioned as a “critical juncture” 
for media coverage (Kalogeropoulos 2014, p.13). While public trust in both politicians 
and institutions is in decline (Schifferes 2015), there is evidence to show that in 2014, 
EBF news reporting on BBC1 and ITV1 embraced more human elements and other 
news values editors and audiences prefer. This is reflected in the abandonment of 
ITV1’s short market summary during the research period of 2007-2014. Some 20 
years after Winston (1994) reported a general dissatisfaction from his practitioner 
and business sample that TV coverage of EBF issues focused on personal aspects, by 
scrutinising corporate and personal actions, the specialism has completed its journey 
                                                          
8  John Lloyd was a contributor on BBC Radio 4 “the Media Show” broadcast on 15th October 
2014. 
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to the mainstream, transitioning from “Wall Street” to “Main Street” (Joutsenvirta 
2014, p.474; Bromley 2015), and from “city” to “citizen”. 
 
Formerly the crisis was framed as an exogenous phenomenon (Olsson and Nord 
2014); a “natural disaster” beyond the agency of “banks, financial markets, 
speculators, politicians and governments” (Bickes et al. 2014, p. 435). This research 
shows that post-crisis, framings were of unethical behaviour, malpractice and out-of-
control remuneration. This development can be mapped as beginning with an 
apparently blameless Northern Rock, concluding with the incredulity expressed at 
seemingly limitless remuneration. The crisis, therefore, has been rebranded as a 
moral tale, transcending the usual norms of EBF reporting (Kelsey 2014). Stories of 
personal and institutional conflict, of behaviour deemed ethically, morally or legally 
dubious (see also Thomas 2016) and the impact on ordinary citizens are all indicative 
of this redefinition of EBF journalism. 
 
Ahead of the specific analysis of the key PIE issues, qualitative evidence confirms that 
executive pay has been subjected to intensified scrutiny (see also Davis 2015). 
However, critical realism seeks to find explanations within wider structures and 
circumstances, and accordingly, little has changed in terms of the ways that EBF 
journalism probes and interrogates the wider model of capitalism. The consequence 
is a not-so-new landscape where even though some have behaved immorally, the 
banking system is not seen to be in need of fundamental change (Kelsey et al. 2016), 
the focus remaining on misbehaving individuals rather than the system within which 
they operate (Butterick 2015).  
 
Elites always appear to defend and promote their own interests (Piketty 2014). The 
marginalisation of traditional Keynesianism both in terms of practice and 
pedagogically dates back to the mid 1980’s (Farrell and Quiggin 2012). In the U.K, this 
can be mapped to Thatcherism and the emphasis on market-driven growth (Murdock 
2015). The narrative developed in Chapter 6 can be summarised thus: 
 
 News reports are impactful, and can be intensified by the strategic use of particular 
language, words and images. 
 
 Post crisis, EBF issues are increasingly humanised, with more emphasis on personal 
behaviour. 
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 Newsworthy elements - measured in terms of news values - are more obviously 
evident, particularly in terms of conflict, and the challenging of elite characters. 
 
 Simplified coverage indicates that while EBF news might be generally classified as 
hard, the coverage of this news itself might be soft. 
 
 The banking sector predominates business coverage on ITV1 and BBC1 10pm news 
bulletins in 2007 and 2014. 
 
 BBC1 often take a more conservative and deferential approach to organisations 
and those working for them, while ITV1 are often more combative. 
 
 Growth is presented as both the overall economic aim and the panacea for any 
economic problems.  
 
 Despite being obliged, to varying extents, to act in the public interest, neither 
channel seriously challenges the prevailing neoliberal economic model, and neither 
describes or discusses ways in which capitalism might better serve the public.  
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Chapter 7. PIE in the news: a poor show, or a wealth of 
coverage? 
Chapter 6 described, in qualitative terms, the landscape of EBF reporting on TV news, 
where coverage often has a considerable impact through language and imagery, and 
where the banking sector predominates. Coverage has become humanised, the 
emphasis changing from statistical data to an increased focus on people and their 
failings. Often, there are discernible differences between channels, with ITV1 
developing a more combative approach to reporting corporations and their affairs, 
seemingly at odds with traditional understandings of the relationships between 
commercial media and their advertisers. Often however, coverage on both channels 
is characterised by increasing homogeneity. Finally, the economic model of 
neoliberalism is unchallenged by both BBC1 and ITV1. 
 
As it moves from the generality of EBF news to the specific nature of PIE reporting, 
Chapter 7 tightly focuses on the quantification of the characteristics, themes and 
trends evident in PIE issue reports. This data emerging from Level 2 Content Analysis 
identifies typical blueprints and pertinent examples, which are then more deeply 
examined using qualitative analysis in Chapter 8. On the basis of findings so far, it 
seems likely that discourses concerning extreme financial conditions (poverty and 
wealth), those with affected lifestyles (the squeezed middle) and the gap between 
them (income inequality) may not contain critiques of the system creating such 
outcomes. Real world data shows that all these PIE issues are increasing problematic. 
For example: 
 
 POVERTY - Around 20% of the UK’s population live in poverty (MacInnes et al. 2013; 
Milmo 2014; Oxfam 2015).   
 
 The SQUEEZED MIDDLE - Average weekly wages in the UK have fallen, in real terms, 
since 2009, and are some way from returning to those levels (Corlett and Gardiner 
2015). 
 
 WEALTH - Between period 1979-2012, top executive salaries increased far faster 
than average pay and inflation (Atkinson 1997; Finch 2007; Topham 2013) and in 
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2016, there is evidence showing that these increases were continuing without 
restraint (Mongahan 2016). 
 
 INCOME INEQUALITY - income inequality in the U.K has been “well above the OECD 
average in the last three decades” (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 2015, p.1), and the nation is now “the most economically unequal state 
within Europe” (Dorling 2016). 
 
As previously explained, and consistent with other analysis of income inequality 
coverage (McCall 2013), PIE issues were often found in stories about a wide range of 
topics, some qualifying as EBF, but also in stories beyond that description. As before, 
only the dominant category was coded, and the units of measurement are the news 
items containing references to PIE issues1.  
 
7.1      Preparedness of news channels to report PIE, and levels of embeddedness. 
As a first step, this analysis considers the conventions and stories carrying PIE issues. 
Accordingly, Table 7.1 shows which types of news conventions most often carried 
references to PIE issues in 2007 and 2014: 
 
Table 7.1    Overview of all PIE news items (by percentage). 
 
 
Table 7.1 shows that collectively, PIE issues were more reported in 2014, with ITV1’s 
shift to more serious news perhaps accounting for the considerable increase in such 
                                                          
1 The tables in this chapter contain as much detail as possible. Where certain 
categories contain very few observations which are not significant within the chapter’s 
narrative, these are often grouped as “others”. 
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reporting on the channel. The dominant news convention carrying PIE issues across 
both years and channels were edited packages, consistent with TV news in general 
(Cushion and Thomas 2013; Cushion et al. 2015). Within these packages, reporters 
provide commentary alongside visual images and on-screen sources, but are not 
reporting “live” (Cushion et al. 2015). Such packages are generally scripted, are less 
interpretive, and use a wider range and greater number of social actor sources in an 
attempt to achieve “balanced” reporting (Cushion and Thomas 2013; Cushion et al. 
2015). Traditionally, these packages supply background and context, while live news 
in contrast, is more interpretive, and assists in providing up-to-date or breaking news 
(Robinson 2012; Cushion and Thomas 2013).  
 
PIE issues are not noted for “breaking news” characteristics, since generally they are 
not suddenly occurring; the squeezed middle and income inequality for example, can 
both be considered as developing and background phenomena. Accordingly, edited 
packages, which offer the opportunity for context and deeper investigation are the 
obvious and most natural home for such issues. In sum, serious, balanced discussions 
about PIE issues are most likely to occur during longer, more considered news 
conventions and logically, it is here, without the breathless urgency of live coverage, 
that these issues would be reported in cerebral, purposeful and impactful ways. 
While Table 7.1 indicated that PIE stories are located within the most potentially 
useful convention, Table 7.2 shows within which types of news story PIE issues were 
found: 
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Table 7.2   The location of PIE issues (by percentage). 
 
 
Table 7.2 demonstrates that PIE issues are found in what are commonly recognised 
as hard news categories such as Politics and Foreign Affairs. This further indicates 
that it is unlikely that these issues will be treated with levity. In sum, though not 
often deserving of coverage in their own right, PIE issues are located within the 
stories and conventions providing the greatest potential opportunities for serious 
discussion. 
 
Finally, as has been explained, TV news stories can be expressed more generally 
(thematically) or in more specific, individualised (episodic) ways. Figure 7.1 describes 
whether PIE reports were expressed episodically or thematically, and whether there 
were discernible differences between the two. Figure 7.1 shows that items could not 
always be emphatically assigned, since they could contain a mixture of approaches. 
Where there was no discernible difference, items were coded as “roughly equal”. 
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Figure 7.1     Framing of PIE news items (by percentage). 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 demonstrates that once again, there is a considerable degree of similarity 
between channels. It is clear across both years and channels, apart from the issue of 
wealth, that all of the PIE issues are generally reported thematically. Coverage of 
poverty is slightly less clear cut across years and channels, suggesting that although 
thematic treatment predominates, episodic coverage and a mixture of both framings 
are also evident - especially in 2014. The squeezed middle and income inequality are 
both presented almost entirely thematically. The change in poverty coverage 
towards a more epsiodic approach - albeit marginal - resonates with the advocacy 
that episodic coverage is more effective in disseminating the plight of the poor 
(Castell and Thompson 2007; Robinson et al. 2009). 
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However, while evidence shows that thematic framings deal with weighty issues 
within a wider, societal context, episodic framings often reduce serious issues to 
anecdotal and superficial presentations lacking a cohesive and organised explanation 
(Iyengar 1991; De Vreese 2003; Dimitrova and Strömbäck 2012). Ahead of specific 
analysis of content therefore, it can be concluded that in general, PIE issues are 
presented using the conventions and stories most conducive for serious coverage 
that provides context, causality and effect. 
 
7.2    PIE coverage: volume, prominence, geography and themes. 
Moving to the substantive content of the news reports, Figure 7.2 demonstrates how 
each of the 410 individual PIE news items were distributed in terms of percentage, 
across the subheadings Poverty, Wealth, Income Inequality and the Squeezed Middle.  
 
Figure 7.2   Total distribution of PIE stories (by percentage). 
 
 
Figure 7.2 clearly demonstrates that despite increasing social concerns about poverty 
and income inequality (described in Chapter 3), these issues featured less in 2014 
than they did in 2007. While in 2007, poverty is featured notably more on BBC1, and 
wealth more on ITV1, in 2014, the inter-channel homogeneity reappears. Emphasis 
on the squeezed middle however, notably increased on both channels in 2014. 
Pragmatically, news audiences include millions of ordinary citizens who, mid and post 
crisis, have found their living standards and discretionary incomes squeezed. Once 
again therefore, popular news values prevail as a news selection mechanism. 
 
Figure 7.3 shows the prominence of PIE issues within the stories carrying them. This 
indicates whether PIE issues are central, or whether they are just mentioned in 
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passing. Figure 7.3 shows the percentage of stories where references to, or 
discussions about, a PIE issue were a substantial element within the item carrying it.  
 
Figure 7.3     Percentage of news items where PIE issues were substantive. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3 demonstrates that in 2007, in those stories containing references to 
poverty, the issue was presented with greater emphasis and prominence more often 
on ITV1 than it was on BBC1. The prominence of poverty on ITV1 is explained by their 
intensive coverage of Zimbabwe, with several bulletins actually presented from the 
South Africa/ Zimbabwean border, focusing on the plight of ordinary people as the 
country’s economy imploded. By 2014 however, this story had lost its intensity. In 
those stories containing references to the squeezed middle, the issue was presented 
with greater emphasis and prominence on ITV1 in 2014. Notwithstanding these 
relatively small variances between channels, Figure 7.3 shows that in general, PIE 
issues were less emphasised as substantive in 2014 than they were in 2007. 
 
In interim conclusion, across years and channels, PIE news is located within hard 
news stories and edited packages, encouraging these issues to be dealt with in a 
cerebral, contextual way. Proper discussions about these important social issues 
therefore, are, at first glance, given every opportunity to develop. Emphasis has 
shifted to the squeezed middle, and reductions in the reporting of poverty and 
income inequality in 2014 (see Figure 7.2) indicate that these issues are less 
important within news agendas than they were in 2007.  Moreover, PIE topics are 
also generally less prominent in the news items carrying them (see Figure 7.3), 
suggesting that the sharp news focus is elsewhere, and that these human conditions 
are background topics. Notably, therefore, despite contemporary framings of income 
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inequality as a global risk (World Economic Forum 2014; 2015), its coverage has 
decreased both in terms of volume and prominence. Figure 7.4 shows the 
geographical locations associated with PIE stories across channels and years.  
 
Figure 7.4   Geographic locations of PIE stories (by percentage). 
 
                                        2007                                                                    2014 
                                                                             Poverty 
 
      Wealth 
 
      Income Inequality 
   
Squeezed middle 
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Figure 7.4 once again demonstrates inter-channel homogeneity. In 2007, poverty was 
largely expressed through an African prism, but in 2014, attention was more globally 
spread, with the emphasis shifting towards the U.K in particular. Of course, U.K 
events were not as extreme as say, African poverty, but had a greater resonance for 
local viewers. The focus on the U.K was further intensified by the increase in episodic 
framings (see Figure 7.1), as poverty is shown to be a condition to impact people, 
rather than a broad socio-economic issue. Across years and channels, wealth, income 
inequality and the squeezed middle were generally U.K-based. This analysis now 
moves to examining the themes within PIE stories, and Table 7.3 demonstrates the 
subthemes in stories containing references to poverty: 
 
Table 7.3    Breakdown of poverty stories (by percentage). 
 
 
Table 7.3 demonstrates that in 2007, both channels focused on cruel and 
controversial political regimes, which usually resulted in miserable living conditions 
for ordinary citizens. This is chiefly explained by an emphasis on Robert Mugabe’s 
actions, and his policies in Zimbabwe; events reached a nadir in 2007 but generally 
disappeared from news agendas by 2014.   
 
The focus on associations with war and conflict was repeated in 2014, alongside a 
greater spotlight on criminality and descriptions of prevailing poverty. Description of 
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poverty stories included reports on increasing poverty levels, how people are 
increasingly reliant on food banks, church leaders criticising welfare reform, and so 
on. Criminality stories include “modern day slavery” and how traffickers exploit the 
poor and vulnerable. Another notable change is that in contrast with 2007, in 2014 
there were no stories describing any potential solutions to poverty, and the emphasis 
instead was on the simple description of the issue rather than the prescribing of any 
policy options. Across channels and years, wealth remains predominately a U.K-
based issue, and Table 7.4 shows subthemes in stories containing references to it: 
 
Table 7.4   Breakdown of wealth stories (by percentage). 
 
 
Table 7.4 shows that in 2014, both channels polarised their coverage towards stories 
about high pay and the controversy associated with it, indicative that news has 
adopted a new emphasis towards human stories about what people earn, and 
whether such sums are justified. As an aside, wealth stories often feature stories 
about the pay of sporting celebrities; the focus on elite characters (reinforced by the 
earlier finding that wealth was highly episodic) indicates that wealth contains many 
news values that editors find attractive. The misdeeds and excesses of the wealthy 
are also evident within coverage across years and channels, albeit the sample is 
relatively small and the themes are varied. Income inequality (when it featured) was 
largely a U.K-based issue, and Table 7.5 shows the subthemes in stories containing 
references to it: 
191 | P a g e  
 
Table 7.5      Breakdown of income inequality stories (by percentage). 
 
 
Table 7.5 indicates that within a small sample, discussions about prevailing economic 
and political circumstances dominate, alongside budgets and wider legislation. These 
are notable because of their generic nature, and are characterised by long reports 
covering a wide range of economic elements (see section 6.2). Table 7.6 shows the 
subthemes in stories containing references to the squeezed middle: 
 
Table 7.6   Breakdown of squeezed middle stories (by percentage). 
 
 
As has been already established, coverage of the squeezed middle has increased 
considerably, and remains almost entirely and exclusively a U.K-based issue (see 
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Figures 7.2 and 7.4). Once again, the news value of resonance, and the sensitivities 
and concerns of U.K citizens seem to drive coverage. In 2014, the emphasis extends 
to stories about debt and borrowing (relating to mortgages in particular), the cost of 
living more generally, and broader discussions about the economy. These are all 
more specific than in the case of income inequality, and resonate with the causes of 
the squeezed middle identified in Chapter 3. It is to expressions of causation that the 
analysis now turns. 
 
7.3   PIE issues: Causes.  
During the analysis of the reports, any expression of causation was recorded in terms 
of what it referred to, and who was referring to it. Figure 7.5 shows how often PIE 
concepts were explained in terms of what might cause them. 
 
Figure 7.5   The frequency of causal explanations in all PIE stories. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.5 demonstrates once again, since in most cases the red and blue columns 
are nearly identical, that there is an uncannily high degree of similarity between 
channels. In 2007, poverty, wealth and income inequality are explained in terms of 
causality in 30% to 40% of cases. In 2007 however, the few squeezed middle 
observations were almost always assigned some specific causal explanation. In the 
more meaningful 2014 sample, squeezed middle causality decreased, but causality 
was nonetheless more prominent than for any other PIE category. This could be 
interpreted as the result of a perceived need to define the more nebulous nature of 
the squeezed middle, and that channels offered more reasons for the financial 
predicament of many of those watching. With the exception of BBC1’s poverty 
reporting in 2014, ITV1 holds at least an equitable position in terms of causal 
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explanations. Notably, income inequality can not only be said to be covered less in 
2014, but that it was also explained less in terms of its causes. This is discussed in 
more detail in Chapters 8 and 9, but this analysis now moves to the more detailed 
examination of causes, when they are given. Table 7.7 focuses on the quoted causes 
of poverty in more detail: 
 
Table 7.7   Expressed causes of poverty. 
 
 
Table 7.7 shows that across both years and channels, poverty is attributed to factors 
such as war, crop failure, government policies, increasing prices, lack of work and 
victimhood, which can all be interpreted as causes beyond personal agency. Notably, 
these are also state-based or structural issues (as defined in Chapter 3); the inability 
of markets and commercial organisations to provide minimum living standards for 
example, is not presented as a cause of poverty. Table 7.8 shows the breakdown of 
causes in stories about wealth: 
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Table 7.8    Expressed causes of wealth.  
 
 
Samples sizes are small, but what can be gleaned from Table 7.8 is that in 2014, the 
news focus was on high salaries and bonuses, alongside criminality. This is consistent 
with the trend of humanisation within EBF news, where stories about individual 
wealth are enhanced by the more salacious details of gain through nefarious 
activities.   
 
Causes of income inequality were rare, with a total of only 25 instances across years 
and channels. There is no clear pattern emerging, and conclusions are not possible. 
Causes associated with the squeezed middle were considerable however, and are 
shown in Table 7.9: 
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Table 7.9     Expressed causes of the squeezed middle. 
 
 
As well as showing some striking similarities between channels in 2014, Table 7.9 
demonstrates that squeezed middle causality is clearly attributed to a combination of 
increasing prices and low or frozen wages. Once again, these are factors outside the 
control of those affected; they might also be interpreted as the consequences of 
market forces. Moreover, the context of such causes can be also described as 
localised and narrow. The absence of any wider context is notable, as is any 
connection to global events and markets. A key emerging narrative is that reporting 
is superficial and cursory, and the generative mechanisms to explain this are 
discussed in Chapter 9. 
 
Table 7.10 shows a summary of the social actor types who are seen to express an 
opinion about what causes any of the PIE issues detailed in Tables 7.7-7.9.  
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Table 7.10    Social actors expressing causality across PIE issues. 
 
 
 
Table 7.10 emphatically demonstrates that unsurprisingly, it was journalists who 
most often expressed causality in 2007. In 2014 however, journalists still dominated, 
but citizens were increasingly prominent in describing causal explanations. 
 
The theory of mediatisation claims that media take a central position within the 
“social process” (Blumler and Kavanagh 1999, p.211). Rather than allowing other 
social actors to determine news narratives, journalists increasingly interpret the 
words and opinions of others (Semetko et al. 1991; Cushion and Thomas 2013; 
Cushion 2015). If this is extended beyond political realms (Lundby 2009), then 
certainly in poverty stories, mediatisation can be refined, since BBC1 and ITV1 not 
only use journalists to build narratives, but also use citizens to assist them. This is on 
the basis, perhaps, that real people discussing poverty adds realism and credibility, 
and that descriptions of what it is like to be poor contain numerous news values. The 
prominence of citizens appears to represent another shift in EBF reporting, since 
traditional scholarship suggests citizen voices are marginalised versus elite actors 
(see, inter alia, Arrese and Vara 2015; Herkman and Harjuniemi 2015; Picard and 
Salgado 2015; Puustinen et al. 2015). Notably, academic, medical and legal experts 
are almost totally absent from both channels in both years, especially economic 
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experts, consistent with U.S findings (Harrington 2016). Furthermore, the increasing 
reliance on the public to develop PIE narratives means that experts and evidence are 
more likely to be marginalised in favour of personal anecdote2.  
 
There were only 13 political actors quoting any PIE causation in 2014; over 50% 
represented Labour, with the rest spread among the Conservatives, the Liberal 
Democrats and UKIP. Since Labour were the main opposition and are traditionally 
allied to the working class, it is unsurprising that they might be keener to discuss 
poverty, inequality and excessive wealth. Notably, “fringe” parties were absent, and 
trade unionists in particular were almost wholly absent; of the 274 social actors seen 
and heard quoting causation, only 3 represented trade unions. This is consistent with 
research finding that trade unionists are no longer featured within news (Wahl-
Jorgensen et al. 2013). It is difficult to imagine trade unionists refusing to contribute 
to news stories about executive remuneration for example, and so perhaps their 
absence can reasonably be attributed to editorial decision-making. 
 
7.4    PIE issues: Consequences. 
Having considered expressions of causation, this analysis now moves to expressions 
of PIE issue consequences. Table 7.11 shows the breakdown of consequences 
associated with poverty: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 The diminished value of expert evidence was a strong subtheme within discussions 
about the vote by British citizens to leave the European Union in June, 2016. Indeed, 
the advertising material ahead of an event at The University of Warwick in November 
2016 suggests that “this year’s Brexit campaign and its aftermath saw the value of 
expertise reduced to an all-time low” since despite pollsters predicting a vote for 
remain, and academics “almost universally” warning against a vote to leave, “experts 
were ignored, discredited and rendered ineffective” (University of Warwick 2016). 
198 | P a g e  
 
Table 7.11      Expressed consequences of poverty. 
 
 
Table 7.11 indicates that whereas in 2007 consequences of poverty were varied, by 
2014, these had polarised into repercussions of desperation and extreme forms of 
discomfort. Crime, disease and poor living conditions not only contain many news 
value elements, they also represent straightforward narratives for journalists to 
describe. As has been determined by the overall nature of poverty stories, discourses 
concerning wider societal consequences are not evident, apart from a small showing 
that populations are forced to migrate because of poverty in their countries of origin. 
Table 7.12 shows the breakdown of the expressed consequences of wealth: 
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Table 7.12    Expressed consequences of wealth. 
 
 
Table 7.12 indicates that the consequences of wealth are expressed in terms of 
glamourous lifestyles, and more specifically, opportunities for high value acquisitions 
such as cars and homes. Table 7.13 shows the breakdown of consequences 
associated with the squeezed middle:  
 
Table 7.13   Expressed consequences of squeezed middle. 
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Table 7.13 demonstrates that squeezed middle consequences can be wholly 
summarised as personal, where discomfort and hardship are experienced by ordinary 
people in the form of restricted lifestyles and financial worries. Again, EBF news has 
become humanised, with stories about people becoming more compelling. Table 
7.14 demonstrates how consequences are expressed in stories about income 
inequality: 
 
Table 7.14   Expressed consequences of income inequality. 
 
 
Table 7.14 indicates, consistent with a general reduction in coverage of income 
inequality, that there are fewer expressions of consequence in 2014 than in 2007. It 
appears that the main consequences of income inequality have shifted from physical 
discomfort towards protest and unrest, but sample sizes are insufficient for any firm 
conclusions. Nonetheless, the social consequences of income inequality (see Chapter 
3) are wholly absent, consistent with the argument that prevailing neoliberal 
economic models are not seriously challenged. 
 
Table 7.15 shows which social actors were prominent when expressing causality: 
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Table 7.15    Social actors expressing consequences across PIE issues.  
 
 
Table 7.15 demonstrates once again, that there is a high degree of similarity across 
channels and years. Journalists, by some distance, are the most prominent social 
actors expressing PIE issue consequences. Once again however, the prominence of 
citizens supports notions that in PIE stories, journalists use the public to build 
narratives. In turn, within the humanisation of business news, the lived experiences 
and opinions of ordinary people appear to be more compelling for news editors than 
more official discourses. Again, trade unionists, who, it can be assumed, would 
usually describe the consequences of poverty and the squeezed middle most 
vociferously, are all but absent. There were few politicians expressing the 
consequences of PIE issues in 2007 but in the larger sample in 2014, those politicians 
who did feature primarily represented Labour, with Conservative politicians almost 
totally absent. Albeit the sample of politicians is small, results again reflect that those 
representing Labour - traditionally a party with working class values - are more in 
evidence than those representing any other parties. Figure 7.6 shows an overview of 
the frequency of causes and consequences prominence within all PIE stories: 
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Figure 7.6     The frequency of causes and consequences within PIE stories. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.6 demonstrates that generally in 2007, there seems a greater willingness to 
report consequences than causes, apart from in the case of the squeezed middle. In 
2014, the squeezed middle is articulated in terms of causality more often than in 
terms of consequence, perhaps because it had, by then, become accepted public 
discourse and more widely understood. Moreover, while most of the squeezed 
middle might understand the realities of hardship, they might also be interested in 
discovering the reasons why it was happening in the first place. 
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If journalism’s function is to report, explain and give context, then this obligation 
appears to have declined, since in most cases, PIE reports generally include less cause 
and consequence in 2014 than in 2007. Analysis now moves to examining the 
attribution of blame within PIE stories.  
 
7.5   PIE issues: Blame. 
While causation might be considered to be more systemic, blame, in contrast, is 
characterised as more specific, and more personal. Table 7.16 shows how often 
blame is attributed within PIE issues:  
 
Table 7.16    PIE stories attributing blame (by percentage). 
 
 
Table 7.16 demonstrates that blame is only attributed by social actors sporadically 
and infrequently. While wealth is not generally a “problem” involving “blame”, 
income inequality and the squeezed middle are rarely blamed on any organisation, 
group or individual. The only substantial instances of blame relate to poverty in 2007, 
and Table 7.17 considers these in more detail: 
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Table 7.17   The attribution of blame in poverty stories. 
 
 
While the number of observations is small, the analysis of blame in stories including 
references to poverty is notable, because in almost all cases (13 out of 15 on BBC1; 4 
out of 4 on ITV1), blame is assigned by journalists themselves. This is unusual, since 
even aside from any requirements that TV journalists should be impartial, normative 
models of behaviour suggest that they should not show emotion when delivering the 
news (Mongomery 2007). In 2007, much of the dominant “particular political actor” 
category in Table 7.17 is accounted for by Robert Mugabe being held responsible for 
the deteriorating economic conditions in Zimbabwe. In other words, when someone 
is blamed, it is journalists who do the blaming, and it is governments and political 
actors who are blamed. Within democratic regimes, blame is more difficult to 
apportion, and perhaps for journalists, pointing the finger at distant political 
dictatorships is less problematic. Once again, there is no significant suggestion that 
any local or international economic system (capitalism) should be held responsible. 
The analysis now moves to the examination of those occasions when action is called 
for to solve/ease/ reduce PIE phenomena. 
 
7.6   PIE issues: Action. 
Action can be considered as the natural progression of cause, consequence and 
blame; where actions are identified and proposed, advocating remedial action is the 
obvious next step. Table 7.18 shows the incidence of such advocacy within stories 
containing PIE issues: 
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Table 7.18   PIE stories including calls for action is called for (by percentage). 
 
 
Table 7.18 shows that action is called for only sporadically in 2007, but that by 2014, 
it has become more regular. Paradoxically, although income inequality is scarcely 
reported, when it was featured, stories often included social actors calling for 
remedial action. Generally, calls for action are unusual in 2014, apart from in the case 
of income inequality. PIE stories are grouped in Table 7.19, making analysis more 
meaningful:  
 
Table 7.19   Breakdown of actions called for within all PIE stories (by percentage). 
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Table 7.19 indicates that in both years, when action is called for, it is mainly directed 
at the U.K government. In 2007, any advocacy directed towards the private sector is 
completely absent, but in 2014 however, and resonant with their more adversarial 
approach towards corporations and commercial organisations in general, ITV1 
feature a number of calls advocating private sector action. The majority of calls 
across years and channels are focused on stories emphasising human suffering and 
so on. Table 7.20 shows which social actors are most often seen to advocate action: 
 
Table 7.20   Social actors advocating action within PIE reporting (by percentage). 
 
 
Journalists do not habitually ascribe blame, and Table 7.20 demonstrates that they 
do not advocate remedial action. There were various social actors calling for action in 
2007, but in 2014, such calls were mainly made by politicians and businesspeople. 
Overwhelmingly however, actions were called for by politicians, and by combining 
the findings from Tables 7.19 and 7.20, it can be concluded that actions are perceived 
to be within the remit of legislative bodies, and are advocated by elected politicians 
capable of influencing change. Market changes, and business actors calling for them 
are much less evident. Table 7.21 shows which political actors called for action 
regarding any of the PIE issues: 
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Table 7.21   Affiliations of politicians advocating action (by percentage). 
 
 
 
Table 7.21 indicates a small sample of political actors, particularly in 2007. However, 
in both years, Labour politicians were the most prominent.  
 
7.7    PIE issues: Other discourses. 
Besides discourses that could be clearly categorised as cause, consequence, blame or 
action, there are other pertinent discourses which, in the context within which they 
are mentioned, do not fit within these categories but are notable nevertheless. Table 
7.22 summarises these additional discourses: 
 
Table 7.22   Other poverty discourses (by percentage). 
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Table 7.22 demonstrates that across years and channels, the other discourses 
associated with poverty generally involve descriptions of misery and the conditions 
surrounding it, embracing both economic and political elements. The misdeeds and 
greed of the wealthy are also evident across both channels and years. Table 7.23 
analyses additional discourses associated with wealth: 
 
Table 7.23    Other wealth discourses (by percentage). 
 
 
Table 7.23 indicates that across both channels and years, these additional discourses 
were generally uncomplimentary about those acquiring wealth, and the ways it is 
acquired. Discourses supportive of wealth, including how it benefits the economy 
and facilitates philanthropy were much less evident. Table 7.24 shows the other 
discourses associated with the squeezed middle: 
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Table 7.24    Other squeezed middle discourses (by percentage). 
 
 
 
From Table 7.24, little can be concluded about 2007 due to the small number of 
observations. In 2014 however, other discourses about the squeezed middle were 
generally concerned with discussions surrounding whether there is a financial 
recovery or not (total of 46.4% on BBC1, and 37.5% on ITV1). Notably, given that the 
view amongst many in mainstream economics is that austerity is not the appropriate 
economic strategy (see, inter alia, Jolly et al. 2012), there were relatedly few 
discourses criticising it. 
 
Table 7.25 shows the other discourses associated with income inequality: 
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Table 7.25   Other income inequality discourses (by percentage). 
 
 
Table 7.25 reflects that income inequality has been consistently associated with 
greed and misbehaviour. However, there is an interesting paradox. While rising 
inequality and its details are the most strongly evident, nonetheless coverage is less 
in 2014 than it was in 2007, resonant with the finding that there is no correlation 
between an increase in income inequality and its coverage (McCall 2013). 
 
7.8    Political actors, images and metrics. 
This analysis now considers some additional elements of the news reports about PIE 
issues. These include the affiliations of party politicians, the use of images and 
metrics, and the way that stories were framed during these reports. Table 7.26 
breaks down all political actors quoted in all PIE reports by party affiliation: 
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Table 7.26    Party representation of all political actors (by percentage). 
 
 
Notwithstanding that a few of the featured politicians may be international, Table 
7.26 shows that of all the politicians quoted during Level 2 Content Analysis (heavily 
skewed towards 2014), over 42.2% represented Labour. However, despite signs that 
their coalition was becoming fragmented (Pitel 2014; Syal 2014; Watt and Allen 
2014), if Conservative and Liberal Democrat (i.e Government) voices are combined, 
then they are represented almost the same amount as Labour (44.0% versus 42.2%). 
Generally however, the range of political parties within PIE stories shows a clear lack 
of diversity. Indeed, if the U.K’s political landscape is now a multi-party system 
(Blumenau and Hix 2015), the increasing popularity of UKIP and the Green Party for 
example, is not reflected in Table 7.26. The absence of the Green Party is especially 
significant, since they in particular, might be reasonably expected to challenge the 
prevailing economic system which relies heavily on growth, even if this results in 
environmental degradation.  
 
As has been stressed within Chapter 4, messages can be constructed not only using 
words, but also images. Table 7.27 examines the nature of images that are 
identifiably associated with poverty: 
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Table 7.27   Images shown in association with poverty. 
 
 
Table 7.27 demonstrates that across both years and channels, there is a general lack 
of innovation within the pictorial representation of poverty, or any variance from the 
use of familiar images that might be anticipated ahead of coverage (see Chapter 3). 
Most often, images are of poor third world villages and general inactivity, and are 
consistent with the causes of poverty being structural, and generally outside the 
agency of ordinary people. Table 7.28 details the types of images associated with 
wealth: 
 
Table 7.28   Images shown in association with wealth. 
 
 
From Table 7.28, it is clear that despite relatively few observations, wealth is 
generally indexed by acquisition, possession and consumerism. Not only are images 
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of cars, homes and wealthy lifestyles easier to show pictorially, they also might 
satisfy the imaginations of audiences increasingly preoccupied by celebrity, where 
personal lives and the trappings of wealth are frequently reported (Berger and Choi 
2010). Table 7.29 considers the images associated with the squeezed middle:  
 
Table 7.29    Images shown in association with the squeezed middle. 
 
 
Again, there are few observations, but Table 7.29 shows little consensus regarding 
the squeezed middle, emphasising that the “squeeze” is difficult to show visually. 
However, images of families and their homes are used regularly. Table 7.30 examines 
imagery associated with income inequality: 
 
Table 7.30   Images shown in association with income inequality. 
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Table 7.30 indicates that dissent and protest was most often associated with income 
inequality, and that this was repeated in 2014. Again, notwithstanding a small 
sample, ITV1 preferred to articulate income inequality using images also familiar 
within poverty coverage. In 2014, income inequality was indexed by images of 
protest; discontent contains many popular news values which in turn might be 
expected to generate news coverage. 
 
Finally, this analysis considers the use of metrics (numeric measures) within PIE 
reports. Figure 7.7 shows how often - as a percentage of all PIE items - some form of 
metric was used within PIE reporting: 
 
Figure 7.7    PIE items quoting some sort of metric (by percentage). 
                              
 
 
From Figure 7.7, it seems that by 2014, poverty was slightly less often articulated 
using any metrics. Increasingly however, wealth and the squeezed middle were 
almost always described using some form of quantifying measure. While wealth can 
be straightforwardly described using salaries and bonuses, poverty appears to be 
presented as more of a state of being, with less quantification. The squeezed middle, 
resonating, as it does, with wider audiences, can be quantified to explain to ordinary 
people what is happening to their lives, including details about fluctuating pay and 
prices. Income inequality was again enigmatic. Data suggests that it is increasing and 
yet coverage was less in 2014. However, when it is mentioned in 2007, statistics and 
measures are given on BBC1 considerably more often than they are on ITV1. That 
discrepancy aside, there are considerable similarities between channels. Table 7.31 
215 | P a g e  
 
considers all mentions of metrics and measures across all PIE issues, and breaks them 
down by category: 
 
Table 7.31    Breakdown of types of measures used within PIE reporting. 
 
 
While Figure 7.7 shows that the squeezed middle is the PIE issue most expressed in 
terms of metrics, Table 7.31 demonstrates that most often these metrics are levels of 
pay, personal wealth, the prices of essential items, and the rate at which these prices 
change. In other words, aside from any more standard/accepted statistical measures 
(such as the Gini coefficient for example) or wider societal impacts (such as levels of 
disease, mortality rates and so on), there is a preoccupation with what people are 
paid, and how their incomes are under increasing pressure. The lens, therefore, is 
fairly narrow, and the lack of wider impact is noted. In general terms, the analysis in 
this chapter has established: 
 
 PIE issues are usually addressed within edited packages and “hard” news.  
 
 Besides stories about wealth, issues are treated thematically. All contribute to 
providing a serious, cerebral platform for these issues to be discussed.  
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 Poverty and income inequality are featured less in 2014 than they were in 2007, 
but coverage of the squeezed middle is significantly more. Wealth was roughly the 
same. All PIE issues are featured less prominently in 2007 than in 2014. If these 
issues have become higher profile since 2014, this is not reflected in the volume 
and prominence of coverage. 
 
 In 2007, poverty was predominantly an African issue, but by 2014 the emphasis 
shifted towards the U.K. Wealth, income inequality and the squeezed middle 
remain almost exclusively U.K-based issues.  
 
 Causality and consequence are reported less in 2014, but causation catches up with 
consequence in 2014. The attribution of blame is best described as sporadic, but 
calls for remedial action are more prevalent in 2014. Actions are defined in terms of 
governments and politicians; markets and the private sector are much less called 
upon. 
 
 There is evidence that in 2014, citizens are used increasingly by journalists to 
describe PIE issues.  
 
 Misdeeds/unethical behaviour and criminality are a consistent theme.  
 
 Whether there is an economic recovery or not, coverage of the squeezed middle is 
preoccupied by pay and prices. 
 
 There is no evidence of right wing political preference, but neither is there any 
diversity within the political parties represented. 
 
 Poverty and wealth are indexed with simple visuals, while income inequality and 
the squeezed middle are less easy to represent visually. 
 
 The theme of homogeneity between channels generally continues across the 
analysis of BBC1 and ITV1 in both years. 
 
The tables and figures in this chapter have contributed to general blueprint of PIE 
coverage across years and channels. Table 7.32 summarises the blueprint and 
provides the key themes for the more textual analysis in Chapter 8.  
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Table 7.32   Summary of quantitative findings from Chapter 7 – the characteristics of PIE news 
 Poverty Wealth Income Inequality Squeezed middle 
Coverage Less in 2014 Roughly equal in 2007 ad 2014 Less in 2014 Much more in 2014 
Prominence Less substantive in 2014 Less substantive in 2014 Less substantive in 2014 Less substantive in 2014 
Geographic location  Africa in 2007; spread in 2014 UK issue in both years UK issue in both years UK issue in both years 
Themes Cruel regimes in 2007; criminality, 
prevailing poverty, war but no 
solutions in 2014.  
Misdeeds prominent across years; in 
2014 attention polarises to high pay. 
Sports stars much in evidence. 
Prevailing economic and political 
circumstances dominate across 
years. 
Debt and borrowing dominate in 2007; 
wider discussion about cost of living, pay 
and the economy prevail in 2014. 
Causality mentioned In about 30-40% of cases in 2007; less 
in 2014. 
In about 30% of cases in both years. In about 30% cases in 2007; less than 
25% in 2014. 
Almost always despite small 2007 sample; 
around 60% of cases in 2014. 
Causes War, crop failure, government policies, 
prices, joblessness, victimhood and 
other issues beyond personal agency. 
Markets not complicit. 
Various in 2007; in 2014, payment of 
high salaries and bonuses, alongside 
criminality and/or unethical and 
immoral behaviour. 
Sample too small for meaningful 
conclusions. 
Small sample in 2007; low wages and 
increasing prices in 2014. 
Actors expressing causality Emphatically journalists in 2007; similar picture in 2014, but citizens and politicians are more evident. 
Consequences Varied in 2007; by 2014, crime, disease 
and poor living conditions - localised, 
individual and group conditions. 
By 2014, polarised towards 
glamourous lifestyles, possessions, 
acquisitions and expensive purchases. 
Small sample in 2007; in 2014 largely 
personal consequences of discomfort 
and hardship. 
Small sample, physical discomfort in both 
years, protest and unrest added in 2014. 
Actors expressing consequences Across both years and channels consequences are expressed by journalists most, then citizens, with no other group especially prominent. 
Causation and consequence Causation and consequence are generally less in 2014. Generally more consequences in 2007, less distinct differences in 2014. 
Blame Mugabe within Zimbabwean context in 
2007; blame largely absent in 2014. 
Generally attributed by journalists. 
No blame attributed. Very little blame attributed. Very little blame attributed. 
Actors expressing blame Almost always journalists in 2007; 
sample very small in 2014. 
No blame attributed. Very little blame attributed. Very little blame attributed. 
Action In 2007 and 2014, action directed at the UK government. 
 
Actors advocating action Overwhelmingly politicians in both years, but business people more prominent in 2014. 
Other discourses  Generally involves misery, prevailing 
economic and political conditions. 
Misdeeds and greed also evident. 
Uncomplimentary. Discourses in 
support of wealth, for example 
philanthropy, much less evident. 
Consistently linked to greed and 
misbehaviour. Rise and specifics of 
inequality also noted. 
In 2014, generally whether there is a 
financial recovery or not, albeit other 
discourses also represented. 
Political parties quoted Across both years and channels, Labour is the most quoted political party. Very little diversity outside of the main parties. 
Images within reports Conclusively poor third world villages, 
and general inactivity.  
Generally indexed by acquisition and 
possession. 
A small sample, but indexed by 
images of protest. 
A small sample, but generally ordinary 
families at home. 
Framings Thematic in 2007, less so in 2014 Conclusively episodic. Emphatically thematic. Emphatically thematic. 
How often metrics Less often than the other issues. More often in 2014. The most often in both years. More often than not in both years. 
What sorts of metrics Conclusively levels of pay, pricing levels and the changes therein.  
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Chapter 8. Rich material but poor journalism? Reporting 
PIE issues on TV news. 
 
Chapter 7 established the typical characteristics of PIE reporting. This chapter 
enhances these characteristics by adding qualitative richness to complement 
numerical findings. Each PIE issue is now examined in turn; key findings include a 
considerable shift in the focus of poverty coverage, a preoccupation with 
consumerism and misbehaviour within wealth coverage, a notable paucity of stories 
about income inequality, and the post-crisis dominance of the squeezed middle. The 
emerging narrative - resonant with findings from Chapter 6 and further developed in 
Chapter 9 - is that while the crisis may have refashioned EBF reporting, the major 
concepts of capitalism and neoliberal economics prevail without challenge. The 
analysis begins with an examination of poverty coverage. 
 
8.1    Poverty: business as usual, then famines to foodbanks. 
Poverty is generally found within a wide range of news stories embracing issues such 
as homelessness, welfare, education, charity, employment, law, crime and a range of 
others (see also Gilens 1996). The summary of poverty coverage (see Table 7.32) 
indicates that in 2007, poverty was an international issue. In total, 45.1% of BBC1 
poverty stories and 56.2% of those on ITV1 concerned conflict and controversial 
regimes overseas, with a specific focus on Zimbabwe. Consequences are articulated 
more often that causality, and blame is also sometimes attributed, with Robert 
Mugabe and his regime clearly held responsible for Zimbabwe’s deterioration. These 
dramatic events resonate with “burglar alarm” reporting standards that highlight 
startling, extraordinary events (Zaller 2003). Simply reporting events however, is not 
the same as providing a detailed examination of context, background and impact. 
 
Data presented in Chapter 7 demonstrates the changing nature of pre and post crisis 
poverty coverage. While in 2007, coverage was more typical of the poverty coverage 
outlined in Chapter 3, this had changed by 2014 in terms of themes, blame and 
framing. As coverage of poverty concentrated more on the U.K (see Figure 7.6), 
reporting was less visceral but more complex. However, causality was still state-
focused, and any private sector complicity was largely absent. Figure 8.1 shows how, 
in a BBC1 report from 2/7/07, Huw Edwards explains that Mugabe’s government was 
demanding action from the country’s private sector, threatening sanctions against 
those who were not conforming: 
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Figure 8.1   BBC1’s report about Zimbabwe on 2/7/07.  
 
 
 
Reporter Orla Guerin begins her report by explaining infant mortality rates. A charity 
representative comments that many are dying, before Guerin resumes: 
 
 
 
Guerin outlines how Mugabe’s government has supressed opposition: 
 
 
 
Her report considers the realities of everyday life: 
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Guerin’s conclusion is that people are so poor, even dying is financially problematic. 
Figure 8.2 shows that arguably, ITV1’s report on 24/9/07 is even more powerful; the 
story was introduced by Mark Austin, live from the Zimbabwean/South African 
border: 
 
Figure 8.2   ITV1’s report from Zimbabwe on 24/9/07.  
 
 
Austin’s edited report describes scarce employment and poor living conditions:  
 
 
 
The report then focuses on a grandmother’s story: 
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Austin visits another township where a teacher risks identification by describing 
Zimbabwe as being on the brink of “total collapse”. The report returns to the 
grandmother, as Austin delivers some maize. The family dance and sing, “grateful for 
even the smallest of mercies”. The report switches focus to more violent elements: 
 
 
 
Reporter Martin Geissler explains how Mugabe recruited squads to supress 
opposition: 
 
 
 
The report concludes with an interview with Archbishop of York John Sentamu, who 
further highlights the cruel regime and developing humanitarian crisis. 
 
If poverty coverage impacts legislators and policymakers (Lugo-Ocando 2014), then 
both reports contain the potential to influence, by virtue of their striking imagery and 
language. A specific focus on children, for example, is a familiar trope within poverty 
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reporting, and one likely to generate powerful emotional responses (Seymour 2009). 
For example, on BBC1, Orla Guerin describes a decimated family and asks viewers - 
most of whom would have no conception of such tragedy - to “imagine” the 
challenge of buying basic foodstuffs. 
 
ITV1’s report is even more dramatic. Introducing the story live adds more urgency, 
and the “family” narrative is arguably even more tragic than that shown on BBC1, as 
a woman must deal with the death of eight family members and care for her 
grandchildren amid hunger and squalor. Finally, “cries of pain” and “cries for help” 
are suppressed by “brutal henchmen”, while references to “blind faith” and 
“repression” resonate with claims that poverty is often accompanied by 
sensationalism (McKendrick et al. 2008; Robinson et al. 2009).  
 
Both reports further support inter-channel homogeneity. Seemingly, journalists from 
competing news channels share a single worldview (Lugo-Ocando 2014). Both 
channels for example, feature dramatic metrics quantifying the crisis, and both 
include tragic family stories, themes of suppression, brutality and hopelessness. In 
addition, a brutal political regime is explicitly blamed (Addae-Korankye 2014; Dogra 
2014; Luis-Ocando 2014) despite findings that ascribing blame is unusual. However, 
both reports are exemplar of the themes established by past research which 
contribute to the establishment of a “traditional” blueprint of coverage. First, 
poverty is associated with specific, distant geographical areas (Lugo-Ocando 
2014; Spectacle Productions 2014). While in these reports, ordinary Zimbabweans 
are shown to be deserving of sympathy, nonetheless their problems are far removed 
from the experiences of U.K TV news audiences. The spectacle of poverty, therefore, 
is accentuated for public consumption. 
 
Further, while journalists condemn international regimes, discourses about western 
complicity are absent (Lugo-Ocando 2014). Earlier in 2007 for example, it was 
reported that Barclays, Standard Chartered Bank and Old Mutual “had lent the 
Mugabe regime about £100 million by purchasing treasury bills and government 
bonds” (Barnett and Christopher 2007). There is a suggestion, therefore, that 
coverage of international politicians might partly depend on their relationship with 
elite nations (Herman and Chomsky 2002; Luis-Ocando 2014). This suggests that 
global capitalism’s unsavoury by-products are often hidden from view.  
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In addition, the imagery accompanying commentary is dominated by passive women 
and children living in slums, with little power, status or hope (see, inter alia, Graves 
1999; Seymour 2009; Lugo-Ocando 2014). Children particularly, are considered 
blameless and attract strong emotional responses (Seymour 2009). Accordingly, 
poverty has compelling potency, consistent with theories that it is “aestheticized” for 
public consumption (Sorenson 1991; Hanley 2009: Jensen 2014). Such powerful 
imagery can dominate coverage, detracting from wider explanations and contexts 
(Belle 2006; deMause and Rendall 2007; McKendrick et al. 2008). However, these 
images also resonate with expectations already established in viewers’ minds; more 
maverick (and perhaps more creative) expressions of poverty might not be featured 
since they do not conform with newsroom protocols (Lugo-Ocando 2014).  
 
Adhering to “traditional” poverty coverage norms, the issue is framed within the 
narrative of chaos and crisis, meeting the criteria for “burglar alarm coverage” (Zaller 
2003). Indeed, such crisis events justify journalistic attention (Lugo-Ocando 2014); 
perhaps ITV1 would not have committed to several days of live broadcasts had the 
Zimbabwean crisis been less acute. Finally, in powerfully emotive reports, journalists 
show personal commitment to the causes they report, often becoming witnesses 
rather than simply observers (Shaw 2012).   
 
8.2   Poverty in focus, or celebrity in danger? 
There was less coverage of poverty in 2014 than there was in 2007, and the 
geographical focus changed from Africa in 2007 to the U.K in 2014. However, 
international poverty still featured, again conforming to traditional reporting norms. 
For example, Figure 8.3 shows an ITV1 item from 23/6/14, describing how actress 
Sienna Miller witnessed first-hand danger on a humanitarian trip to Lebanon. The 
story was introduced by Mark Austin: 
 
Figure 8.3    ITV1’s report about Sienna Miller’s trip on 23/6/14. 
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Reporter Nina Nannar describes Miller’s visit to a refugee camp:  
 
 
 
 
 
Nannar concludes the report by describing a dramatic end to Miller’s visit: 
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This report contains established and standard images of women, children and 
general passivity. However, it begins and ends with details of Sienna Miller’s “narrow 
escape”. Closer analysis of the language used, however, suggests that this might not 
have been as close as suggested. For example, the explosion at the checkpoint they 
“had come through that morning”, was actually much less close than the “narrow 
escape” indicated by Mark Austin. The report concludes with another reminder of 
the apparent danger to Sienna Miller, and overall, her appearance resonates with 
contentions that while celebrities attract media attention, overly theatrical coverage 
detracts from the real issue of poverty (Van den Bulck and Panis 2010; Lugo-Ocando 
2014). In this report, it is a lesser concern than Sienna Miller’s “escape”, and while 
relief agencies might welcome celebrities to act as conduits for media attention 
(Sorenson 1991), celebrity news values prevail nonetheless. 
 
In sum, poverty in 2007 resonates strongly with the traditional and depressing 
models of international poverty outlined in Chapter 3. Most notably, poverty is 
international, and incorporates drama, startling images and statistics. Section 8.3 
meanwhile, shows how the financial crisis has refashioned poverty reporting, 
bringing it closer to home and changing it into a new form.  
 
 
8.3      U.K poverty in 2014:  a new type of “bank” and new types of tyranny. 
In 2014, “home” coverage of poverty did not involve oppressed dissent, high inflation 
and short life expectancies, but criminality and immorality are still evident within a 
new U.K context. Criminality and slavery, for example, are the main themes in 23.2% 
of BBC1 poverty stories, and 32.2% of those on ITV1 in 2014 (see Table 7.3). Figure 
8.4 relates to a BBC1 story on 7/1/14, when reporter Danny Savage delivered a 
typical tale of “modern day slavery”: 
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Figure 8.4      BBC1’s report about modern day slavery on 7/1/14. 
 
 
Savage describes the judge’s comments during sentencing: 
 
 
 
Similarly, Figure 8.5 describes another report about slavery, delivered by ITV1’s Juliet 
Bremner on 5/12/14. The episode featured as a sub story in a report outlining how 
the proposed Anti-Slavery Bill may not adequately protect the vulnerable. However, 
it begins with a victim of slavery: 
 
Figure 8.5    ITV1’s report about modern day slavery on 7/1/14. UK 
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The report focuses on the victim (Anula) and her attempts to escape and how, in the 
process, she became an illegal immigrant because her employers withheld her 
passport. Bremner concludes by suggesting that there are many such victims. Once 
more, a visceral, powerful story attracts attention (Shiff 2003), and is enhanced by a 
narrative reflecting civilised society’s horror that such poverty and misery can occur 
so locally (Luis-Ocando 2014). Again, traditional perceptions that poverty is 
inevitable, or due to laziness or demotivation (Hanley 2009) can be challenged. Both 
stories are characterised by strong imagery of the vulnerable and the needy.  
 
In addition, both reports feature the main types of “other discourses” present within 
poverty stories across years and channels, namely the misery and distress of poverty, 
and the sometime criminal and/or questionable behaviour of the powerful. These are 
significant themes across PIE coverage, embracing outright imprisonment, cruelty 
and fraud, and more subtle examples that might be considered as unethical or 
immoral. Almost by definition, U.K poverty will be less dramatic but can be powerful 
nonetheless. This is exemplified in Figure 8.6, which outlines a BBC1 report on 
8/12/14 which discusses a parliamentary report about U.K poverty. The edited report 
is narrated by Mark Easton: 
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Figure 8.6      BBC1’s report about increasing poverty in the UK on 8/12/14. 
 
 
 Mark Easton continues with some statistical comparisons:  
 
 
 
Easton’s report includes a soundbite from Frank Field, a Labour politician known for 
his strong views about poverty: 
 
 
 
The report then features a brother and sister, apparently reliant on foodbanks:  
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The report switches focus to the press conference delivering the report, before 
Easton concludes:  
 
 
 
On 16/4/14, and as shown in Figure 8.7, ITV1 also ran a story about the increasing 
reliance on foodbanks, which took the form of an edited package by Penny Marshall: 
 
Figure 8.7   ITV1’s report about increasing poverty in the UK on 16/4/14. 
 
 
Marshall asks what Steven Jones would do without the foodbanks - his stark 
response is that he would “probably starve”: 
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Marshall continues: 
  
 
 
This is followed by some food bank volunteers commenting about how busy they are, 
before Penny Marshall quotes the government as saying that publicity has fuelled the 
use of foodbanks. This, in turn, is followed by a soundbite from Coalition 
Employment Minister, Esther McVey MP: 
 
 
 
The report is concluded by Marshall, who again refers to Steven Jones, now shown 
with his family: 
 
 
 
Both reports are characteristic of 2014 poverty coverage, where episodic framings 
are more prominent than in 2007 (see Figure 7.1). Once again, there is homogeneity 
between channels as general discourses are intertwined with personal stories. The 
unnamed brother and sister and Steven Jones are central to these reports. While 
their discomfort may not compare with Zimbabwean poverty for example, 
nonetheless their daily lives appear challenging; stories of collapsing in work, and 
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near starvation are consistent with claims that food, and food banks in particular, are 
strongly indexical of poverty (deMause and Rendall 2007; Blundell and Etheridge 
2010; Trussell Trust 2016).  
 
“Local” poverty seems less easy to show than international poverty (Luis-Ocando 
2014).  The use of U.K foodbanks “tripled in the 12 months prior to September 2013” 
(Dorling 2014, p.75-6), and here they are key indicators, since while clearly people do 
not choose poverty (Dorling 2014), in strong contrast with the Zimbabwean stories, 
there are less visual indicators to demonstrate the condition in the U.K. Indeed, Mark 
Easton introduces the rhetorical contrast with Germany to assist his making of an 
otherwise problematic point. 
 
What can be established from both reports is that in contrast to considerable 
research regarding poverty coverage, the poor are neither faceless, invisible nor 
undeserving, and unlike established claims that it ignores those affected (Luis-
Ocando 2014), the poor themselves are prominent. In 2014, for example, citizens 
represent 26.7% those citing causality on BBC1 and 22.6% on ITV1. These have 
increased from 6.3% and 8.0% respectively in 2007 (see Table 7.10).  
 
In both years, and aside from journalists, citizens are the dominant contributors in 
PIE reports. The appearance of citizens, and the lesser prominence of primary 
sources supports the emerging trend that EBF issues have become humanised. 
However, while 2014 poverty coverage shows variances from established norms, 
some other elements of poverty coverage have not changed. For example, while the 
consequences of poverty are clear (hunger, misery, desperation and so on), long 
term causes are not discussed in detail, consistent with the pattern that causality is 
overshadowed by consequence (Kim et al. 2010; Lugo-Ocando 2014). Those causes 
that are mentioned include the lack of work mentioned by Penny Marshall, and the 
inadequate welfare systems proposed by Steven Jones. Any claims that austerity is to 
blame are refuted by Esther McVey, whose suggestion that she herself was having a 
“tough time” goes unchallenged. If BBC news discourses are often claimed to placate 
the Coalition Government (Gilligan 2013), then on this evidence, ITV1 can be similarly 
charged.  
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Steven Jones’ assertion that inadequate welfare systems cause poverty is consistent 
with governments being held responsible in thematic reports (Iyengar 1990; Kendall 
2012). Indeed, Table 7.19 shows government action is presented as the major 
solution to help ease the four PIE issues (73.7% of BBC1 stories, 47.8% on ITV1). Any 
lack of serious critique of the government is confirmed, however, when in conclusion, 
Mark Easton acknowledges that the parliamentary report cites the complicity of the 
welfare system. This however, is mitigated by his prefix that the report does not wish 
to “point its finger at any particular institution”. 
 
Omissions are key within CDA, since if ideas are not mentioned, they are not 
scrutinised (Huckin 1997). Significantly, there is no mention of any private sector 
complicity. Disposal of excess food for example, involves producers and retailers 
whom have agency to address the supply/demand deficit. They might fill what Penny 
Marshall suggests is the gap between the state and the volunteers who offer their 
time and food. Major supermarkets donating surplus stock to charity is fully feasible 
and realistic (Molloy 2015), yet the private sector is absent in these stories, despite 
the fact that, as discussed in Chapter 3, their employment, recruitment, training and 
pay policies are all considered to be factors that increase poverty. Agency to change 
remains with the state rather than with the markets (Hay and Smith 2000; De Ville 
and Orbie 2014). For example, any suggestions that capitalism is complicit in the 
increasing reliance on foodbanks are absent, and the familiar master narrative of 
neoliberalism is not challenged. Furthermore, the general lack of any expert voices 
throughout PIE coverage means that such criticisms are unlikely.  
 
However, poverty coverage is not unchanged; it has moved “closer to home”, and as 
per the news value of consonance, more locally-based stories are more meaningful 
for ordinary people than criminally violent foreign regimes and the lack of basic 
essentials. Further, the 2014 coverage of poverty strongly challenges some other 
media theories.  
 
One theory that can be challenged, for example, is that poverty coverage is 
dominated by elite, primary definers and that media do not attend to the poor 
themselves (Cohen 1997; deMause and Rendall 2007; McKendrick et al. 2008). In 
2014, and consistent with the increasing prominence of citizen voices in TV news 
reports about PIE issues, the poor themselves are featured front and centre. In 
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addition, rather than the poor being shown as underserving and complicit in their 
own condition (Mantsios 2005), or as some form of lawless, deviant underclass (see, 
inter alia, Shields 2001; Hodgetts et al. 2005; Mantsios 2005; Hanley 2009), the poor 
are seen more as victims of circumstance beyond their control.  
 
Even though poverty presentations are slightly more episodic in 2014, individual 
attributions are missing, and causes are systemic, structural and fatalistic rather than 
individual (see Chapter 3). This challenges claims that in TV news, “poverty is clearly 
an individual-level rather than a societal phenomenon” (Iyengar 1990, p.22). 
Alongside claims that thematic framings might be impersonal (Kendall 2012) or 
harder to understand (Dorling 2011), poverty coverage in 2014 is notably less 
thematic than in 2007. This is consistent with those who suggest that poverty 
coverage is more impactful when episodic (see, inter alia, Kendrick et al. 2008; 
Delvaux and Rinne 2009; Robinson et al. 2009). 
 
In sum, as Lugo-Ocando (2014) suggests, the financial crisis has redefined poverty. 
This research finds that coverage has become localised and humanised by involving 
citizens whose experiences resonate with U.K audiences. However, as is the case with 
EBF reporting more generally, though it has made progressive steps away from 
clichéd reporting, some elements of hackneyed and stereotypical coverage endure. 
Wider discussions of cause, effect and policy are marginalised, and socio-economic 
connections are well hidden, if not absent altogether (Belle 2006; DeMause and 
Rendall 2007; McKendrick et al. 2008). The open market, liberalisation, privatisation 
and deregulation are all unchallenged, and news is constructed to suit market-driven 
economies (Redden 2011; Luis-Ocando 2014). Any critical examination of capitalism, 
and the ways it might contribute to poverty are absent. The reasons for this are 
discussed in Chapter 9. 
 
8.4   Wealth: spend, spend, spend. 
Political debate relating to inequality is preoccupied with poverty, disadvantage and 
“hard-working families”, while focus on the “extremely wealthy” is much less 
prominent (Sheldon et al. 2009, p.10). In contrast, this research finds that while there 
were appreciably more stories containing poverty than wealth in 2007, in 2014 the 
number of stories was similar. In both years, coverage was conclusively episodic, 
consistent with theories that episodic framings are more common than thematic 
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framings in TV news (Iyengar 1990; Shields 2001), also resonating with notions that 
human stories are more compelling than social causes (McKendrick et al. 2008). 
Wealth reports in both years continued to focus on individuals, a trend exemplified 
by the U.S trial and imprisonment of media tycoon Conrad Black. 
 
Figure 8.8 shows ITV1’s story on 13/7/07, describing the conclusion of the trial. It 
functions as a microcosm of wealth coverage, containing many emergent elements 
and themes. The story is introduced by James Mates, who explains that Black was 
found guilty of fraud, and obstruction of justice: 
 
Figure 8.8    ITV1 reports the conclusion of Conrad Black’s trial on 13/7/07. 
 
 
Reporter Bill Neely reminds viewers about Black’s bullishness, but that this was 
unfounded: 
 
 
The report cuts to the official prosecutor who expresses satisfaction over the 
conviction before Neely resumes and describes Black’s lifestyle: 
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Neely describes Black’s indulgent lifestyle, and the report cuts to some miniature 
soldiers: 
 
 
 
This is followed by a short contribution by Black’s biographer, who describes his 
arrogance and greed, and another by Black’s lawyers, who say they will mount a legal 
challenge. Bill Neely concludes the report: 
 
 
236 | P a g e  
 
Coverage continues with a live exchange between James Mates and Andrew Neil, 
who is described as “someone who knew Conrad Black”: 
 
 
 
Mates asks if Black’s parties were “as extravagant as made out in court”, and Neil 
responds: 
 
                                  
 
Black was not sentenced until 10/12/07, and the BBC1 report that day (shown in 
Figure 8.9) includes a report by Adam Brookes. He begins by explaining that Black’s 
legal team were protesting his innocence and would appeal the judgement. Brookes’ 
commentary begins with a summary: 
 
Figure 8.9    BBC1 reports the sentencing of Conrad Black on 10/12/07. 
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The report includes various clips of Black claiming his innocence before Brookes 
suggests that “this is a story of colossal hubris…” The report then cuts to Andrew 
Neil: 
 
 
 
The report concludes by noting that despite expressing regret, Black had not actually 
apologised. Both reports typify the dominant episodic framings evident in wealth 
coverage across years and channels, and despite some obvious transatlantic 
elements, the U.K emphasis dominates since Black is primarily framed as an 
ennobled member of British society. Consistent with many wealth stories across both 
years, the narrative strongly focuses on the details of one wealthy person, 
emphasising Black’s criminality and fall from grace, including references to the “bank 
robber in the shirt and tie” and the “arrogant” belief he was beyond the “rules”. The 
focus, therefore, is episodically directed and focuses on events, rather than 
surrounding causes and circumstances. 
 
Placing this coverage within wider theoretical contexts, the concerns of the wealthy 
differ from those of ordinary people. Table 7.23 shows that discourses of 
philanthropy are overwhelmed by negative framings of wealth (11.8% versus 32.4% 
on BBC1, and 0% versus 66.7% on ITV1 in 2007; 3.2% on ITV1 versus 50.8% on BBC1 
and 7.1% on ITV1 versus 59.5% on BBC1 in 2014). There is little onscreen evidence 
therefore, that the wealthy are caring and kind. In contrast with positive 
presentations of endeavour and success (Ladd and Bowman 1998; Kumar 2005; 
McCall 2013), these reports reflect some degree of entertainment and pleasure at 
the misfortune of the wealthy and the exposure that their wealth is undeserved 
(Seymour 2009; Kendall 2012; Thomas 2016). Both quantitatively (see Chapter 7) and 
qualitatively, therefore, wealth is framed negatively (see also McKendrick et al. 2008; 
Kinsley and Clarke 2009; Cassidy 2011), and the wealthy are often shown to be 
miscreants (see also Mantsios 2005; Kendall 2012). Moreover, rather than a 
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discussion embracing the wider societal implications, the reporting horizon is limited 
to the here and now. 
 
In addition, considerable attention is paid to Black’s “lavish lifestyle”. James Mates 
for example, asks specifically about his parties. On both channels, particular items are 
mentioned, such as the “$6,000 toilet seat”, the “$2,000 handbag”, “toys”, “private 
jets” and “parties” attended by royalty. Such detail further contributes to inequality 
rhetoric such as “the richest spend more on scatter cushions than the poorest spend 
on food” (Hood 2015). This focus is consistent with media preoccupations with 
celebrity lifestyle (Sedghi 2013), the costs of possessions (Kendall 2012) reflecting the 
post-war consumption boom (Butterick 2015). Descriptions of defrauded millions, it 
seems, are insufficient, and must be re-emphasised with the extra details of the 
acquisition the crime facilitates. Here, more unusually however, while the 
consequences of wealth are explained (lifestyle), so are the causes (criminality). The 
wider issue of corporate governance, however, which lacks any obviously salacious 
news value, remains unexplored. 
 
These reports also confirm that inter-bulletin homogeneity was evident in 2007, as 
both reports take a similar form and feature Andrew Neil, who describes Black as 
“Master of the Universe” on different channels, five months apart. Specific analysis 
of these interviews with Neil provides added insight. First, they are notably different 
in terms of pace, ITV1’s live element offering a breathless contrast to the more 
reflective tone of the later BBC1 report. While these are different, both interviews 
are characterised by references to the apparently unimpeachable rules of corporate 
governance. Indeed, explains Andrew Neil, Black was not being punished for his 
lifestyle, but for the way he obtained his wealth. Seemingly, creating wealth for 
shareholders is something to aspire to. The inference is that although such behaviour 
is unacceptable, the way capitalism incentivises such behaviour is legitimate, so long 
as “rules” are observed. As Chairman of the “right wing” Spectator magazine, Andrew 
Neil’s views would have been well known to those constructing these reports.  
 
8.5    Executive pay: people, rather than systems under pressure. 
Criminality, or unethical/immoral behaviour strongly underpin the wealth reporting 
within this research. In 2014 however, Table 7.8 shows that high salaries or bonuses 
were the dominant driving source of wealth (37.5% of BBC1 stories, and 58.3% of 
239 | P a g e  
 
ITV1 stories). There is also a focus on whether such executive remuneration is 
deserved. Since the Shareholder Spring of 2012, there has been increased scrutiny of 
such issues (Thomas 2016), typified by Figure 8.10, which shows how, on 11/7/14, 
ITV1 reported that Burberry shareholders had rejected the remuneration of their 
CEO, Christopher Bailey. The report featured a package by Business Editor Richard 
Edgar who began his report: 
 
Figure 8.10   ITV1’s report about CEO remuneration at Burberry on 11/7/14. 
 
 
The report cuts to a contribution from a representative from the Institute of 
Directors: 
 
 
 
The report returns to Edgar, who explains Bailey’s salary using studio graphics: 
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The report cuts to an advisor to Burberry shareholders, who explains how large 
companies had begun to take notice of such dissent. Edgar concludes the report with 
some final commentary over more fashion images: 
 
 
 
The emphasis on lifestyle and consumption is still evident in wealth stories in 2014, 
strongly indexed here by the images opening and concluding Edgar’s report. As in the 
Barclays story in Figure 6.23, criticism of high-end remuneration is enhanced by 
comments by the Institute of Directors, whose natural position can be assumed to 
generally support director-type salaries. 
 
Resonant with extant literature, from Edgar’s report it is clear that Bailey’s pay is 
“camouflaged” by dividing it into separate dimensions (Kay and Van Putten 2007; 
Weisbach 2007). Since these dimensions will be taxed differently (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 2006; 2012), the package is likely to be 
“tax efficient”. Basic salaries indeed, are a decreasing element of executive 
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remuneration (Piketty and Saez 2006; Bell and Van Reenen 2010), and in this case, 
Bailey’s basic pay is considerably less than 20% of his annual remuneration. As has 
been explained, such sums inevitably require justification (Main et al. 1995; Kostova 
and Zaheer 1999), especially when others are experiencing unprecedented financial 
pressure.  
 
Such justifications of high remuneration include tournament or superstar theory 
(Lazar and Rosen 1981; Bell and Van Reenen 2010; Lloyd 2010), or the rationale that 
such roles require extraordinary commitment and sacrifice (Takala and Aaltio 2007; 
Gwartney et al. 2011). Instead, Burberry’s defence is one of retention, and that high 
pay will prevent competitors “poaching” Bailey. This somewhat vague and slippery 
argument is difficult to test and is undermined by Richard Edgar, who implies excess 
and a disconnect with any measures of performance. Such executive pay stories 
contain several elements that make them compelling and interesting (Hamilton and 
Zeckhauser 2004). Here however, although ITV1 tangibly moved beyond statistically-
driven EBF news stories, numerical data is still important. Furthermore, the example 
provides further evidence that ITV1’s approach to executive remuneration is 
combative, and not discernibly influenced by commercial pressure. 
 
In general, and across channels and years, stories about wealth are dominated by the 
financial sector. The general criticism of high remuneration in the banking industry is 
exemplified by the BBC1 report on 30/7/14. This is detailed in Figure 8.11, and 
explains that bankers’ bonuses may be subject to repayment in the event of any 
unethical or illegal behaviour. Anchor Huw Edwards introduced the story: 
 
Figure 8.11   BBC1’s report on 30/07/14 about how bank bonuses might be repaid.  
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Reporter Simon Jack the looks at an expensive car, and suggests that if he were a 
banker, such a purchase would be within financial reach. However, he says, there is a 
complication: 
 
 
Jack’s report cuts to a contribution from a banking industry representative: 
 
 
 
A former financial sector worker then offers some interpretation: 
 
 
 
Simon Jack then summarises the story: 
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The report then includes some vox pop contributions: 
 
 
 
 
 
Simon Jack concludes the report thus: 
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This report is typical in that it focuses on the banking sector which dominates EBF 
reporting and contains many of the “elite 1%” (Dorling 2014, p.51). It is unusual, 
however, since it presents pay thematically rather than episodically.  
 
Once more, wealth is indexed by what it might be spent on, which in this case is an 
expensive car. Consistent with theories that some organisations are favoured for 
media scrutiny (Otten 2010), as per the earlier case study, Barclays is singled out as a 
bank beset with problems. Speaking for the banking sector, Anthony Browne 
introduces the familiar banking defence that onerous industry rules will make London 
a less attractive financial centre, placing it in a potentially disadvantageous 
competitive position versus other financial centres. Notably, perhaps to elicit popular 
support, he expands the argument to embrace “jobs” and “tax”. Philip Augar 
reiterates another common defence that if bankers were more regulated, they will 
“run offshore”. 
 
Once again, as in the earlier interviews with Andrew Neil, Simon Jack and Philip 
Augar refer to “rules”, once again suggesting a preoccupation with adherence to 
systems, rather than any focus on the fundamental principles underpinning them. 
Ultimately, the pertinent question is not whether bonuses are deserved, but if and 
how they should be repaid if recipients were found to be operating “outside the 
rules”. Payments to those operating within the regulations are unchallenged. Indeed, 
the first two vox pops of the three featured do not support recalling bonuses. Simon 
Jack’s coda uses the rhetorical device of metaphor, as he suggests the champagne 
should stay “on ice a little while longer”. Not only does this again use a lifestyle 
reference to index wealth, it implicitly suggests only a delay in consuming the 
champagne, and not a cancellation. BBC1 once again appear to defer to neoliberal 
economic thinking. 
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Another element within wealth coverage is a preoccupation with the salaries 
commanded by sporting stars - particularly footballers (Seymour 2009) - despite 
sportspeople representing a “tiny fraction” of the “elite 1%” (Dorling 2014, p.50). 
Figure 8.12 shows a typical example. It describes an ITV1 report on 1/9/14, explaining 
that Manchester United had made a major new signing. The report consisted of a live 
exchange between Mark Austin and Sport Correspondent Ian Payne: 
 
Figure 8.12   ITV1 report that Falcao has signed for Manchester United on 1/9/14.  
 
 
 
Again, this report is typically episodic, and focuses on the sum involved. Austin 
rounds the salary to “nearly £50,000”, adding to the underlying astonishment, since 
in contrast to suggestions that the sums paid to celebrities and CEOs are not 
perceived as “inherently unjust” (Ladd and Bowman 1998, p.4), the whole report is 
underpinned by a sense of disbelief. In addition, the lexical choice of “wages” is 
somehow incongruous, yet implicitly encourages viewers to compare the sum to 
their own “wages”. The preoccupation with pay is reconfirmed, and despite the 
incredulity, neither reporter questions the system allowing such large sums. The “big 
question” indeed, is not how such salaries are justified against the prevailing socio-
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economic backdrop, but how such amounts might be spent. The emphasis, again, is 
on consumerism and acquisition.   
 
The coverage of wealth can therefore be simply summarised. Consistently covered 
across both years in terms of the quantity of coverage, it is a U.K-based issue, and 
almost always presented episodically. Despite pre-recession research findings that 
wealth was generally perceived as positive (Ladd and Bowman 1998), post-crisis 
misdeeds, criminality and unethical behaviour are consistent themes, with evidence 
of wealth facilitating philanthropy and good deeds almost entirely absent. Payment 
of high salaries and bonuses are especially scrutinised in 2014, and wealth is typically 
framed in terms of what possessions and lifestyles it provides. In general, while those 
at the top of the income distribution have “money to burn” and viewers are invited 
to consider how they might spend £346,000 per week, many watching will be 
concerned about how to cover their essential monthly costs. Moreover, the system 
allowing wealth to be accumulated might have changed slightly, with adherence to 
“the system” also appearing more important than challenging the system’s basic core 
(Mantsios 2005).  Besides poverty and wealth, the third PIE condition is the squeezed 
middle, and it is to this that the analysis now turns.  
 
8.6   The squeezed middle:  a more recent phenomenon.  
The redefinition of U.K class in recent times is characterised by several new phrases 
including “the squeezed middle” (Biressi and Nunn 2013). The phrase has been 
adopted as a political discourse - often by Labour politicians - to describe how 
ordinary people have been affected by falling pay, austerity and other factors 
connected to the financial crisis (Dittmann et al. 2011; Thomas 2016). Millions may 
have been “squeezed” by reduced living standards, albeit the discomfort falls short of 
the official measure of poverty. The squeezed middle category barely existed in 2007; 
there were only 18 stories containing references to it, but over five times more in 
2014. Consequently, this analysis focuses on coverage in 2014. Of the four PIE issues, 
the squeezed middle comfortably receives most coverage; this is consistent with 
Michael Jermey’s claim that ITV1 “have featured lots of stories about people who are 
the squeezed middle because a lot of those people are our core audience” (interview 
on 1st October 2015)1.  
                                                          
1 For full interview transcript, see Appendix 8. 
247 | P a g e  
 
Coverage of the squeezed middle is thematic across channels and years, and almost 
exclusively U.K-based. Coverage is typified by a preoccupation with pay and prices, 
the cost of living and the levels of discomfort that this might bring. Table 7.6, for 
example, shows how in 2014, pay or the prices of essential outgoings were the 
dominant themes. The report on ITV1 on 16/1/14 (shown in Figure 8.13) was the 
bulletin’s lead story that evening, and exemplar of this focus. Anchor Julie 
Etchingham described how Chancellor George Osborne had speculated about a 
possible increase in the National Minimum Wage (NMW): 
 
Figure 8.13     ITV1’s report on the Chancellor’s comments on 16/1/14. 
 
 
Reporter Chris Ship begins with suggestions of a disagreement between the 
Chancellor and Business Secretary Vince Cable, who in a short soundbite, reminds 
viewers that the Low Pay Commission sets the NWM, and not the Chancellor. Ship 
explains what had happened to pay: 
 
 
The report cuts to John Cridland from the Confederation of British Industry: 
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The report then includes a contribution from an employer: 
 
 
Ship recaps the Conservative Party’s relationship with the NMW, followed by a 
contribution from Labour’s Chukka Umunna, who suggests that the Chancellor is 
failing, and that wages are lower than when the Conservatives took office. The report 
concludes with live contribution from Economics Editor Richard Edgar, who refers to 
the aforementioned suggestions that the NMW causes unemployment: 
 
 
 
After this exchange, Julie Etchingham notes the timing of the Chancellor’s 
announcement, and elaborates upon this during a live exchange with Chris Ship: 
 
 
 
While the ITV1 report typifies the focus on pay, Figure 8.14 shows a BBC1 report on 
19/8/14 which is indicative of a parallel focus on pay and the prices of various 
essentials. Reeta Chakrabarti introduces the story by explaining that rail fares may be 
increasing: 
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Figure 8.14   BBC1’s report about increasing rail fares on 19/8/14. 
 
 
Kamal Ahmed then begins his report: 
 
 
 
Rail passengers then contribute to the report: 
 
 
 
 
The report cuts to the Government Rail Minister, who suggests that ideally price 
increases would be less. Kamal Ahmed suggests that although inflation is falling, the 
cost of living is still “a challenge” for many. The report then cuts to some vox pops 
from Llandudno: 
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Kamal Ahmed continues the narrative, noting the reference to “baby boomers”, and 
using it to make the contrast with the 1970s: 
 
 
 
Ahmed reports “mixed messages” about the economy; while inflation is at 1.6% and 
clothing and food are going down, house prices and travel costs are rising. The report 
cuts to an economist who speculates about when interest rates may change. Finally, 
Kamal Ahmed places the development within a wider political context:  
 
 
 
These two stories reflect how the focus on pay and prices dominated coverage of the 
squeezed middle. Indeed, the contribution by the mother in Llandudno sets 
increasing prices against stagnant wages, and functions as a microcosm for squeezed 
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middle reporting.  On BBC1, one commuter’s comments about “crippling” prices are 
exemplar of how coverage of “ordinary” people emphasises downsized lifestyles (see 
also Kendall 2012). However, by introducing a rhetorical contrast with the 1970s, 
Kamal Ahmed infers that contemporary affairs are much less serious. 
 
The beginning of ITV1’s report is characterised by expressions of dissent against the 
NMW, with suggestions - both by John Cridland of the Confederation of British 
Industry (CBI) and an employer (Leanna Hewitt) - that increasing it would cause 
unemployment. Hewitt indeed, proposes that making her guards unemployed is a 
real possibility, and Cridland emphasises the point by suggesting that the recovery is 
fragile, and that unemployment is likely. Public discourse is directed at “ordinary 
people” (Hanley 2009), reflecting their interests rather than those of investor 
communities (Shaw 2015). Further, any claims that the NMW causes unemployment 
are strongly refuted by Richard Edgar, who trumps anecdotal suggestions with 
evidence provided by “scores” of empirical studies. Once again, ITV1 are prepared to 
challenge private sector discourses, when BBC1 seem more reluctant to do so. 
 
Figures 8.13 and 8.14 exemplify that within much of the economic discussion in 2014, 
there is a strong General Election framing, reflecting the close contemporary 
relationship between economy and state governance (Kenny 2012). Indeed, given 
that the austerity imposed by the Coalition Government was considered central to 
the 2015 election, the data presented here demonstrates that economic reporting is 
often coloured by strong party political themes. This is typified by Chis Choi’s 
suggestion that “the gloves are coming off”, and Kamal Ahmed’s comment that 
interest rate changes might be strategically rejected by the Government as it 
positions itself ahead of polling day. The economy was clearly dominant within 
election coverage in 2015 (Cushion and Sambrook 2015a; Deacon et al. 2015), and 
the emphasis on process rather than policy (Aalberg et al. 2012) is also evident as 
party prospects are compared. 
 
Figure 8.15 shows another example where the squeezed middle was featured as part 
of a BBC1 report about the economy on 29/4/14. Huw Edwards introduces the report 
by explaining that the U.K economy had grown for the fifth successive quarter. Chief 
economic correspondent Hugh Pym began his report thus: 
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Figure 8.15    BBC1’s report about economic growth on 29/4/14  
 
 
Hugh Pym then explains that one particular company is growing quickly, and explains 
that there are expansion plans which are then confirmed by the firm’s owner: 
 
 
 
Pym then explains that one self-employed associate of the company is struggling 
financially: 
 
 
 
Pym then compares the U.K economy with other nations: 
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Pym quotes the Chancellor’s verdict that this is good news, and features this 
soundbite:   
 
 
 
This report is typical of the economic growth stories described in Chapter 6, where 
the concept is presented as a fiscal panacea. Metaphor is used again, but this time 
visually as well as verbally; growth is expressed in terms of movement as it is likened 
to fast cars “revving up” and “motoring forward”.  
 
Pym positions growth as a key marker of a “balanced and sustained recovery”. 
However, his report also presents a confusing growth-centred narrative; it is “the 
most exciting time in the automotive industry for 100 years” and yet insufficiently 
prosperous to ease the financial concerns of people like Nick. The U.K economy is 
growing, and yet it has neither returned to its pre-crisis levels, nor apparently 
compares to the growth rates of other economies, particularly the U.S and Germany. 
The confusion is amplified as growth is numerically suggested as slow, yet visually 
and verbally, it is aligned with power and speed, reminiscent of the regular use of 
sporting metaphors in EBF reporting (Butterick 2015; Joris et al. 2015).  
 
While recovery is officially ratified by continuing growth, Nick in Figure 8.15, and 
most citizens featuring in Figure 8.14 are seemingly yet to experience it. Such inertia 
is reflective of the apparent failure of “trickle-down” economics, where wealth is 
intended to cascade from the top down (Atkinson 2014; Dorling 2014; Piketty 2014).  
A landscape where “not all boats rise equally” is therefore supported. Indeed, 46.4% 
of the other discourses within squeezed middle stories on BBC1, and 37.5% of those 
on ITV1 centred on whether there was a recovery or not.  
 
A further consideration is that while showing a sustained five-month pattern, growth 
is still framed as uncertain and slow, justifying the cautious approach taken by the 
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Chancellor. Accordingly, BBC1 might be said to implicitly support these policies, 
showing that while austerity is working, it is still unfinished. The tentative recovery 
and contradictory narratives of prosperity and discomfort are reflected in the themes 
surrounding the squeezed middle (see Table 7.24), and qualitatively, within the 
reports shown in Figures 8.14 and 8.15. ITV1’s report in Figure 8.16 about potential 
interest rate increases on 13/6/14 repeats this uncertainty, and exemplifies a wider 
preoccupation within housing costs. Of the images indexing the squeezed middle in 
2014 for example, housing is prominent (22.7% on BBC1, 50.0% on ITV1). Anchor 
Charlene White’s introduction explains how interest rate increases might affect 
homeowners: 
 
Figure 8.16     ITV1’s report about potential interest rate increases on 13/6/14. 
 
 
Chris Choi begins the report: 
 
 
 
Chris Choi describes the situation in Scunthorpe, where semi-detached houses are 
available for as low as £50,000. He cites one mortgage payer as unhappy about 
paying more for his mortgage, even though house prices are decreasing: 
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Choi’s report shows George Osborne at a construction site, “building media profile 
for ideas to cool the market”. The Chancellor contributes this soundbite:  
 
 
 
The report cuts to an explanatory graphic with a voice over by Choi: 
 
 
 
The report cuts to Matthew Whittaker of the Resolution Foundation:  
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Choi concludes by reconfirming the uncertainty felt by mortgage customers. Once 
again, the general recovery claimed by the Chancellor is not reflected by homeowner 
Andy Munro, who can neither sell his house, nor feel any relief in terms of lower 
mortgage payments. Moreover, the discomfort experienced by ordinary people is 
enhanced with references to increased rates set to “push homeowners over the 
edge”, adding stress to those already “financially stretched”. Further, Matthew 
Whittaker’s contribution emphasises the importance of housing as the major 
contemporary economic issue (Dorling 2014; Butterick 2015), and that despite being 
the zenith of personal achievement, it is nonetheless elusive (O’Brien 2011; Niemietz 
2012; Wardrip 2013; Whittaker 2013).  
 
The organisation represented by Whittaker - the Resolution Foundation - was also 
quoted by Richard Edgar in his defence of the NMW (see Figure 8.13). The Resolution 
Foundation (2015) describe themselves as “a non-partisan and award-winning think-
tank that works to improve the living standards of those in Britain on low to middle 
incomes”. Matthew Whittaker can therefore be assumed to promote the interests of 
the financially stretched, and makes the telling lexical choice of “families”, 
demonstrating that children share in the general discomfort.  
 
In addition, by suggesting that some will “leave housing”, he invokes some sense of 
homelessness when in reality, many of those leaving housing would presumably 
move to rented accommodation (Cory 2013; Plunkett at al. 2014). The report in 
Figure 8.16 demonstrates the wide appeal, news value and resonance of the 
squeezed middle as it focuses on the impact on ordinary people. It shows how once 
again, ITV1 can often take a populist approach, promoting “ordinary” discourses 
(Hanley 2009), and that the strategic use of language is not the monopoly of 
powerful elites. Further, while EBF news might have become humanised and 
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increasingly features citizens, discomfort can be shown thematically, and statistics 
can still add narrative impact. 
 
The nature of Hugh Pym’s report about growth implicitly suggests that austerity is a 
reasonable neoliberal economic response to the crisis. There is further apparent 
support for free market principles within BBC1’s report on 1/1/14 (shown in Figure 
8.17), which describes Labour’s plans to reform the rental market. The report 
continues the theme of housing, and begins with anchor Sophie Raworth describing 
Labour leader Ed Miliband’s policy announcements during local and European 
election campaign launch: 
Figure 8.17    BBC1’s report about rent reform on 1/05/14. 
 
 
Nick Robinson begins his report thus:  
 
 
 
 
Nick Robinson outlines Miliband’s plan, which was to set a ceiling on the rate of 
increases. While this was supported by housing charities, the Royal Institute of 
Chartered Surveyors did not agree with a cap. A private landlord contributes thus: 
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The report then includes two citizens apparently representing “generation rent” - 
those who rent as an immediate step before home ownership: 
 
 
 
Nick Robinson explains the history of rent control, before reminding viewers that 
only increases would be regulated, not the level at which rents are set to begin with. 
The report cuts to Ed Miliband, who explains that he wants to debate the cost of 
living crisis at the election. Robinson, on the campaign trail with the Labour leader, 
concludes the report: 
 
 
 
This report again confirms that squeezed middle reporting is invariably interwoven 
with political themes, as well as reflecting the intense focus on housing. This 
resonates with suggestions that economic news is usually articulated and understood 
within political frames (Puustinen et al. 2015). Further, it contains many of the 
images dominant in squeezed middle reporting, namely houses, and “For Sale” or 
“For Rent” signage. Strong lexical choices such as “pain”, “pressure” and “insecurity” 
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undoubtedly resonate with the audience; Nick Robinson suggests that four million 
families may be impacted and by implication, this is a large proportion of the 
electorate. 
 
However, while it is claimed that charities might support the capping of rent 
increases, the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors do not, and the disagreement 
from private landlords is summarised by a passionate defence from private landlord 
Andrew Wernick. His suggestions of “nanny state” action and the apparent attempt 
to stifle free enterprise are strongly indicative of deregulated markets and     
neoliberal ideology. The citizens supporting the suggestion that renting is difficult to 
escape could be viewed as hardly typifying discomfort. Both, for example, have 
sufficient discretionary income to afford gym membership. 
 
While rent capping is undermined - albeit subtly - by these elements, Nick Robinson’s 
sign off further adds to the erosion. Playfully suggesting that there is no plan to cap 
the price of fish and chips might be a simple mechanism to link Miliband’s informal 
walkabout with the main story, but nonetheless “price control” in general is 
flippantly subverted. This may be unintended but is nonetheless detectable. Further, 
claims that BBC1 favours a government line to the detriment of the opposition is 
supported by suggestions that during the General Election 2015, U.K TV news 
generally marginalised Labour-preferred polices, while “the big winners of the media 
coverage were the Conservatives” as “coverage focused on their favoured issues” 
(Deacon et al. 2015, p.12; see also Cushion and Sambrook 2015a). 
 
Coverage of the middle class squeeze is under researched (Champlin and Knoedler 
2008), but empirical work that does exist finds discourses describing middle class 
fiddling and defrauding (McKendrick et al. 2008). Such discourses are absent in this 
particular project, and coverage is instead characterised by political/election 
framings and increased citizen participation. Further, there is greater willingness to 
discuss causality and a preoccupation with pay, and notably, housing costs invoke 
concepts of the new poor, who find paying mortgages increasingly difficult (Devereux 
1998; Breen and Devereux 2003). Far from showing resentment to those “below” the 
middle classes (Mantsios 2005) and demonstrating middle class aspirations towards 
self-improvement (Champlin and Knoelder 2008), coverage simply emphasises 
discomfort. Furthermore, coverage constructs a rather confused and dichotomous 
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picture of the economy, suggesting recovery while at the same time heavily featuring 
those who appear to be suffering financial discomfort.  
 
As large numbers are impacted, metrics and statistics remain important narrative 
builders. A satisfied middle class is seen as important for democracy (Bourguignon 
and Verdier 2000), and coverage of the squeezed middle reflects impact on ordinary 
people (Hanley 2009). However, while citizen stories are prominent, their interests 
are not privileged over those favouring commerce (Shaw 2015). Indeed, the 
neoliberal ethos of non-intervention - as indexed by the “nanny state” and the 
“stifling of free enterprise” - is once again supported. Any alternatives remain 
unidentified, absent, and unexplored. Furthermore, if the middle class are indeed 
portrayed as victims (see Mantsios 2005), they are apparently victims of wider 
economic circumstances which can be solved by the actions of governments or 
central institutions, rather than commercial organisations. 
 
If, as has been mentioned, poverty, wealth and the squeezed middle are lived 
conditions, contrastingly, income inequality is a comparative measure of the gap 
between rich and poor (Schramm 2005; Wong et al. 2009). Income inequality is at 
the heart of this research project, and it is to this issue that the analysis turns.   
 
 8.7      Income inequality: sparse, embedded coverage, and solved by growth. 
Levels 1 and 2 Content Analyses enabled the analysis of wider news agendas, and EBF 
and PIE news more specifically. The increasing prominence of income inequality as a 
societal issue is indicated by an increase in academic study, various bestselling books 
and advocacy from the World Economic Forum (see Chapter 3). There has also been 
increased scrutiny of executive pay and the banking sector, and so it is surprising that 
the issue is reported less often within BBC1 and ITV1 10pm bulletins in 2014 than it 
was in 2007 (see Table 7.5). This is despite assertions by ITV1’s Michael Jermey that 
the channel did actually reflect the issue across news coverage, and that “if someone 
only watched ITV news, it was something that was discussed at various points”. 
Furthermore, income inequality is less often a substantive issue, and also less often 
accompanied by causes and consequences than it was in 2007.  
 
In 2007, income inequality did not have the wider recognition and momentum as an 
issue of concern that it did in 2014. However, some focus on the issue is evident 
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within a story covered by both channels on 20/6/07.  Both reports explain how senior 
figures within top U.K private equity firms had appeared before a Commons Select 
Committee to explain and justify their taxation arrangements. Figure 8.18 shows how 
ITV1 reported the story, introduced by anchor Mark Austin: 
 
Figure 8.18    ITV1 explains how MPs quizzed private equity bosses on 20/6/07. 
 
 
Reporter Libby Wiener explains that these “millionaires” own some of the U.K’s 
“biggest brands”, and that “controversially” they pay only 10% in tax for profits when 
the brands are resold. MPs, she continues, demanded that these private equity 
bosses explain themselves. After the main protagonists introduce themselves, Angela 
Eagle MP asks: “Are you proud that you’re paying less tax than your cleaners?” The 
report cuts to the response from one of the private equity bosses: 
 
 
 
Libby Wiener continues the report: 
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The report cuts to the response from another private equity boss: 
 
 
 
The report switches to some parliamentary footage, with Libby Wiener’s narration 
explaining that the Liberal Democrats think the situation “indefensible”: 
 
 
 
Wiener comments that the equity bosses said little as they left parliament, and 
concludes: 
 
 
 
Figure 8.19 shows how BBC1 addressed the story, as introduced by anchor Fiona 
Bruce: 
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Figure 8.19    BBC1 explains how MPs quizzed private equity bosses on 20/6/07. 
 
 
 
The report cuts to an introduction by Robert Peston, who focuses specifically on “two 
of the main players” - Dominic Murphy and Damon Buffini. He describes them as 
“immensely wealthy partners of private equity firms which buy and sell whole 
companies”. He explains how they testified about their activities, and cuts to this 
exchange, which begins with a question from Sion Simon MP: 
 
 
 
Damon Buffini replies accordingly: 
 
 
 
The report switches to footage of a protest: 
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The report cuts to this contribution, apparently from a protester: 
 
 
 
The report then returns to the hearing, and in identical footage to that used in the 
BBC1 report, Angela Eagle MP asks whether the man is proud to pay less tax than his 
cleaners. It elicits this familiar response: 
 
 
 
The MP suggests to another participant that he is proud to pay less tax than his 
cleaners, which elicits a reply that this is not the case. Peston explains that private 
equity bosses and the MPs might have come from “different planets”, and that the 
hearing had comprised of “a series of uncomfortable exchanges” with “barely a 
glimmer of comprehension on either side”. Meanwhile he says, the Treasury are 
reviewing these tax arrangements. Peston then introduces an interview against a 
London backdrop: 
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Peston concludes: 
 
 
 
These reports are exemplar of the ways that BBC1 and ITV1 approach income 
inequality and other EBF issues. ITV1 are implicitly critical of the individuals involved, 
who are seen as taking advantage of the “tax loophole” clearly displayed on the 
explanatory graphic. Claims that the businessmen are “worth it” are not supported 
by any evidence, and a strongly critical contribution from Liberal Democrat leader Sir 
Menzies Campbell explicitly outlines the gulf between the rich and poor. His 
reference to taxation not only confirms this as a way to address inequality (Dorling 
2014), but also suggests that tax avoidance should be legislated against (Giddens 
2004) even though direct taxation on incomes and capital gains are generally 
unpopular, especially with high earners (Prasad 2008; Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development 2012). In conclusion, Libby Wiener recognises the role 
played by trade unions, and that they can still challenge the legitimacy of free trade. 
This is despite the general decline of unions (Dreher and Gaston 2007) and their 
apparent disappearance from news (Wahl-Jorgensen et al. 2013) detailed in Chapter 
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7. Indeed, Wiener suggests if it was not for trade union agitation, these equity bosses 
may not have been scrutinised at all. 
 
When reports are analysed in parallel, despite many common elements in terms of 
content and format, BBC1 takes a different approach in terms of framing and tone. 
First, Fiona Bruce’s introduction emphasises bosses colluding over answers more 
than anything more serious, and at an early stage, she introduces more specific 
benefits regarding jobs and pensions, coupling endeavour and success to wide 
societal benefits. The defence is developed by Damon Buffini, who refers to “30 
million pension fund investors” which, by definition, might include many of those 
who watched this particular TV news report. 
 
The images of protest are exemplar of a key populist reaction to inequality (see also 
Occupy London 2012; Luis-Ocando 2014), and confirm the prominence of protest 
revealed in Table 7.30. Further, protestor Anthony Seifah’s contribution that while 
“the rich get richer, the poor get poorer” has become iconic shorthand for income 
inequality. BBC1 shares common footage with ITV1, but after referring to the 
testiness of the parliamentary exchanges, their report rather bolsters the defence of 
private equity firms. The “warning” from “investment superstar” Guy Hands is stark, 
and resonates with the justification offered by the financial sector actor in Figure 
8.11; if taxation and salary regulations are too onerous, then equity firms will 
relocate, taking tax revenue and jobs with them. Robert Peston’s coda confirms that 
more progressive taxation regimes are difficult to enforce, and his concluding 
remarks are that private equity firms leaving would “cost” Britain.   
 
BBC1 again appear less critical of corporate affairs, and support the unfettered 
workings of the free market while ITV1 in contrast, are rather less supportive and 
refer to the trade unions being responsible for holding these figures to account. 
Neither report, however, places income inequality in any wider context of 
consequences and causes. In contrast, a BBC1 story from 13/12/07 does so to some 
degree, by examining the issue through the lens of social mobility. The story about 
how bright children from poor families fare worse than less bright children from 
richer families is shown in Figure 8.20. The story was introduced by Fiona Bruce: 
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Figure 8.20   BBC1 discuss inequality and the educational divide on 13/12/07. 
 
 
The report cuts to a teacher explaining the practical elements and implications of the 
disparity, suggesting, for example, that richer homes will have access to more books. 
Children are seen playing, and Higham explains that they will settle in the same social 
class as their parents. In a series of vox pops, several youngsters explain what jobs 
they would like to do when they are older. Higham further reports that the 
Government have attempted to help poorer children with initiatives such as extra 
tuition, but that it is too soon to determine the success of such measures. However, 
he says, the research on which the report is based “suggests something rather 
different”. A representative of the Sutton Trust claims that talent is being “wasted”. 
Finally, Higham signs off: 
 
 
 
Although the source of the report is unclear, it does establish the extent of the 
problem associated with social mobility. Higham simplifies the issue when he 
concludes that it is largely down to money. Logically, and far removed from 
normative models of “needs-blind” access to education (Giddens 2004), parents 
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educated to higher levels will have greater discretionary incomes and higher social 
capital; this report at least connects income inequality to the purported solution of 
education (see, inter alia, World of Work Report 2008; Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development 2012; André et al. 2013).  
 
However, Higham’s coda, almost bereft of any hope, implies that only the 
Government has responsibility to solve the problem. Once again, if the private sector 
does have a role, such as improving the quality of work it provides (Prasad 2008; 
Standing 2011; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2012), 
then this is wholly overlooked. Social mobility, and by inference, income inequality, 
appears entirely the responsibility of the state, with the operations of capitalism 
wholly uninvolved. The report also notes that this problem has been present for 30 
years; after all, it is the free-market principles of Thatcherism that are said to have 
driven U.K income inequality (see Chapter 3). 
        
If this social mobility story had occurred within the U.S, the aspiration for self- 
improvement and social advancement is allied to the “American Dream” (McCall 
2013). Within the U.S, income inequality has had considerable traction, given that it 
has been cited as a major social problem (Sutter 2013). Its compelling nature is 
indicated in the BBC1 report on 29/1/14 shown in Figure 8.21. It features an edited 
package by Washington Correspondent Nick Bryant, describing President Obama’s 
State of the Union speech. 
 
Notably and perhaps explaining the timing of the speech, it occurred only days after 
the WEF summit at Davos, where income inequality had been identified as a major 
global risk (World Economic Forum 2014). Nick Bryant’s commentary accompanies 
footage of the President meeting ordinary people - those indeed, that the speech 
was “aimed at”. Bryant suggests the speech was made against the backdrop of a 
“gridlocked” Presidency, where Obama’s attempts at reform were hampered by the 
legislative process. The President, notes Bryant, was pledging to “by-pass the 
system”. The report cuts to footage of the speech: 
 
 
 
 
269 | P a g e  
 
Figure 8.21   BBC1’s report on the State of the Union speech on 29/1/14. 
 
 
Bryant contextualises the speech more widely: 
 
 
 
The report cuts to the President’s speech, pre-empted by Bryant’s suggestion that 
the “American Dream” might be an “empty promise”: 
 
 
 
Bryant suggests that the proposed reforms are largely “bitesize” and lack substance. 
Republicans, explains Bryant, are critical, and a Congresswoman emphasises the 
point: 
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The report cuts to people queuing for food handouts, and vox pop contributions from 
two citizens describing Obama’s apparent powerlessness. Nick Bryant concludes: 
 
 
 
It is clear that within the U.S, success is conceptualised as the “America Dream” (see, 
inter alia, Kumar 2005; Kendall 2012) where the spirit of capitalism is both relevant 
and worthy of reward. Congresswoman Rodgers confirms the theory, implying that 
while Americans can accept inequality of wealth, they are less tolerant about 
inequality of opportunity (Ladd and Bowman 1998). Moreover, this example suggests 
that any central narrative concerning income inequality appears overwhelmed by 
other issues (McCall 2013). Here, the legislative process is seen as hampering the 
President. Indeed, even those apparently disadvantaged by inequality are shown 
bemoaning the President’s lack of agency rather than anything else. We are neither 
given any explanation of what causes income inequality, nor indeed, any explanation 
of its specific or general consequences.  
 
One important concept within CDA is silence, or the omission of some discourses 
(Huckin 1997). Such exclusions can be as ideologically significant as those discourses 
that are mentioned. In TV news, such discourses are absent within social actor 
contributions in the first place, or are removed during editing. From the sound bite in 
Figure 8.21, Obama’s words are reported thus:  
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…the cold hard fact is that even in the midst of recovery, too many 
Americans are working more than ever just to get by, let alone to get 
ahead… 
 
The official transcription of the speech2, however, provides some context, and 
particularly what proceeds this particular sound bite: 
 
Today, after four years of economic growth, corporate profits and stock 
prices have rarely been higher, and those at the top have never done 
better.  But average wages have barely budged.  Inequality has 
deepened.  Upward mobility has stalled.  The cold, hard fact is that even 
in the midst of recovery, too many Americans are working more than 
ever just to get by, let alone get ahead…   
 
 
The extended version of the President’s soundbite shows with considerably more 
compulsion that Americans have failed to see the benefits of recovery, and that 
despite sustained economic growth, inequality has increased. The inadequacy of 
economic growth by itself, and the failure of “trickle-down” economics is omitted by 
BBC1; the result is that the sanctity of economic growth is preserved. 
 
In the same way that income inequality was not the central element in the report 
about the President’s speech, other reports from 2014 - though very few - featured 
the issue more prominently. Two of these were broadcast around the time of the 
WEF summit at Davos in late January 2014, when inequality clearly had some 
momentum. Figure 8.22 shows that the BBC1 report on 23/1/14 was actually 
presented from Davos. It was introduced by Sophie Raworth: 
  
Figure 8.22    BBC1’s report from Davos on 23/1/14. 
 
 
                                                          
2 Transcript is available here: http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obamas-2014-state-of-the-
union-address-full-text/  
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Robert Peston then interviews Prime Minister David Cameron, asking whether amid a 
period of genuine economic recovery, he thinks “we can have confidence that’s going 
to go on?” The Prime Minster responds: 
 
 
 
The report cuts to Robert Peston speaking directly to the camera: 
 
 
 
The report cuts back to the interview with David Cameron, and Peston asks when 
people might feel the benefits of the recovery: 
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The report cuts to another interview, when Peston invites viewers to “meet a new 
member of the Davos elite, the U.S Treasury Secretary”. Peston asks for his 
assessment:  
 
 
 
Peston concludes: 
 
 
 
After the generally upbeat opening announcing positive economic news, BBC1 
indexes wealth with images of a helicopter arriving at a summit where income 
disparity was specifically identified as a serious global risk (World Economic Forum 
2014). In his commentary however, Peston suggests that the world’s problems do not 
seem “quite so deep or severe” given the signs of economic recovery. Moreover, his 
questioning again appears rather insipid, as he simply asks David Cameron to confirm 
that growth might continue.  
 
Peston’s use of “we” establishes group membership and commonality (Pennycock 
1994; Krzyżanowski 2005) and implicitly suggests that everyone should have reason 
to look forward with confidence, that the recovery will benefit everyone, and that 
“trickle down” economics will work for all. Peston’s piece to camera presents the 
faintly ridiculous notion of “billionaires and grandees” celebrating with champagne 
and canapés, but complaining that they get too large a share of the rewards of 
economic growth. His apparent flippancy undermines the seriousness of increasing 
inequality. While “demystification” of technical jargon and concepts can be a 
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successful strategy for EBF journalists (Butterick 2015), the trivialising of important 
issues also betrays their importance. 
 
In the report in Figure 8.22, the link with growth is made by the U.S Treasury 
Secretary, who advocates “policies to drive investment and demand”. Growth, once 
again, is implicitly proposed as the cure-all. While wealth is indexed by helicopters, 
expensive watches and descriptions of lavishness, poverty is wholly absent. 
Moreover, Peston’s sign-off plays down the importance of income inequality, and 
gives an elite-driven take on the issue, suggesting that it matters less to the “super-
wealthy”. A matter of days later, on 28/1/14, and as shown in Figure 8.23, ITV1 
reported that in the midst of positive economic news, the Chancellor suggested 
austerity is not over. The report is introduced by anchor Mark Austin: 
 
Figure 8.23   ITV1 reporting the Chancellor’s claims on 28/1/14.  
 
 
Tom Bradby continues the report: 
 
 
 
The report then features this soundbite from the Chancellor George Osborne: 
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In another soundbite, a construction industry manager suggests that confidence has 
returned, and tenders are plentiful. Bradby commentates over some graphics: 
 
 
 
This is followed by an angry parliamentary exchange; Labour wish to restore top rate 
of tax to 50p, but the Chancellor claims that they have lost the economic argument. 
Ed Balls says while growth is welcome, for most it does not represent a recovery. The 
package is ended by Bradby thus: 
 
 
 
The story itself is concluded with a live exchange between Austin and Bradby that 
examines the political positioning and strategy of each party, rather than the issue of 
the widening gap between rich and poor.  
 
Growth is prominent in the ITV1 report, which is delivered within a strong political 
frame looking forward to the election. The question throughout is not whether there 
is a recovery, since it seems taken for granted that “we are out of the economic 
woods”, but the rate at which this will be felt by everyone (the rate of “trickle 
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down”). The language surrounding growth therefore, assumes that it will solve many 
problems; as revealed by CDA, some concepts, groups and ideas are presupposed, 
unexplained and taken for granted (Richardson 2007). Further, from the Chancellor’s 
words, it is clear that despite such growth, the “long term economic plan” of 
austerity must continue. The ability of “growth” to solve other social issues 
apparently associated with inequality is not discussed. Income inequality indeed, is 
shown to be politically complex rather than socially complex. In section 8.7, coverage 
of income inequality is strongly associated with politics, further reinforced by regular 
references to the General Election in 2015; Table 8.1 shows that most U.K-based 
stories containing references to income inequality in 2014 were framed in political 
terms: 
 
Table 8.1   Income inequality stories in 2014. 
 
 
Table 8.1 demonstrates that party politics, and more specifically, the 2015 General 
Election, is the major platform, such as it is, for any discussion concerning income 
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inequality in 2014. Of the 14 stories3, only those about the Asda pay inequality, and 
the women’s football are not obviously politically situated. These examples 
therefore, confirm that the central narrative of inequality may be lost amid other 
story frames (McCall 2013). In 2014, for example, the issue is overwhelmed by 
political and economic frames, meaning that the wider social implications of income 
inequality are unexplored. Explanations of both cause and consequence are notably 
less in 2014; perhaps without descriptions of both, the coverage might be said not to 
treat the issue with any great purpose and rigour. 
 
This analysis concludes with the single story within this large sample which does, in 
fact, consider income inequality without deeply burying it within distracting 
economic or political frames. This story was run by BBC1 on 27/5/14, and is shown in 
Figure 8.24. It describes a speech by Mark Carney - the Governor of the Bank of 
England - who appeals for action over greed and inequality. The report was 
introduced by anchor Jane Hill: 
Figure 8.24    BBC1’s report about Mark Carney’s speech on 28/1/14. 
 
 
Kamal Ahmed begins his report: 
 
 
 
The report then cuts to an excerpt from the Mark Carney’s speech: 
                                                          
3 This table refers to stories (which may include several items), rather than individual news 
items. 
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The report cuts to a new scene, accompanied by Kamal Ahmed’s commentary: 
 
 
 
This is followed by a short clip from a speech by Prince Charles: 
 
 
 
Kamal Ahmed continues the report and refers to the Occupy protests in 2011: 
 
 
Ahmed then interviews Christine Lagarde from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), who explains her preferred taxation strategy: 
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Kamal Ahmed concludes the report with the following conclusion:  
 
 
 
In the anchor introduction, which so often sets the tone for what follows, Jane Hill 
not only establishes the magnitude of the problem (“levels not seen for 100 years”) 
but also gives some indication of causality (“globalisation”) and consequence 
(decreased “social mobility”). Kamal Ahmed adds to the list of consequences (riots), 
and links income inequality to the prevailing economic system in a way that is not 
evident elsewhere in other stories referring to income inequality. Indeed, his choice 
of the emotive term “punctured capitalism” infers that this is an ailing system.  
 
Further, Mark Carney develops the themes of causality; these include globalisation 
and increased technology, both cited within income inequality research (see Chapter 
3). However, Carney’s advocacy for “increasing social capital” is not explained and 
developed, and leaves an element of ambiguity; perhaps lay audiences might require 
a simple definition of the term. Indeed, Carney’s lexical choices are characteristic of 
deep, scholarly discussions rather than anything more accessible. Arguably this 
makes his rhetoric suited to an elite, learned audience, but less suited to those for 
whom “social capital” and “globalisation” are more difficult concepts to comprehend, 
especially since the latter has so many causal dimensions with regard to income 
inequality (see, inter alia, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
2011, 2012; United Nations 2012; Lee at al. 2013). 
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Ahmed suggests that the consequences of inequality threaten democracy, and that 
the issue is being considered by high-ranking elites. The clip from Prince Charles’ 
speech, for example, resonates with the discussion of growth coverage carried out by 
Lewis and Thomas (2015). Their analysis includes another speech in which Prince 
Charles challenges “the dominant consumer capitalist consensus” (ibid p.95). 
Further, they remark upon the irony - coincidentally repeated here - that “the most 
critical voice” against capitalism was “a member of the British Royal Family” 
highlighting the absence of any such criticism from “economists, environmentalists, 
and social scientists” (ibid p.96). None of these potential contributors are as 
newsworthy as royalty, indicating, once again, the increased salience of news values 
within report construction and editing. Moreover, this single challenge comes from a 
public figure who has often been described as “eccentric” (Kennedy 2006; Hastings 
2010; Taylor 2015), meaning perhaps, that its value is diminished. 
 
Ahmed also introduces the theme of protest, notably evident in stories containing 
traces of income inequality in 2014, but it is the contribution of IMF Managing 
Director Christine Lagarde that offers a potential solution to the problem of income 
inequality. She clearly proposes that more progressive regimes of taxation are key 
mechanisms to redistribute wealth (see Chapter 3). Moreover, Ahmed’s statement 
that business and economic leaders themselves are advocating wealth redistribution 
appears a major advancement beyond earlier claims that such measures have sparse 
and decreasing support. This, indeed, is the only story where income inequality is 
treated seriously as a central and standalone issue, with attention paid to causes, 
solutions, and some glimpse of a challenge to prevailing capitalism. Finally, Ahmed’s 
conclusion is unusual in that it appears to unequivocally advocate reform. It is the 
same topic covered by Robert Peston in Davos but is given added credibility perhaps, 
since Peston’s “eccentricity” is not part of the report. 
 
However, reasons for serious optimism may be unfounded. Ahmed’s coda notes a 
future visit to Britain by Christine Lagarde, when income inequality apparently might 
be revisited. This would have potentially provided an opportunity to continue the 
cerebral narrative about inequality. However, the thrust of newspaper coverage of 
her visit the following month focused entirely on Lagarde’s apology for 
underestimating the strength of the U.K’s economic growth (see Armitstead 2014; 
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Inman 2014). Further, the set piece interview with BBC1’s Andrew Marr on 8/6/144 
does not mention income inequality at all. Instead it also focuses entirely on the issue 
of underestimated growth, as well as speculation that Ms. Lagarde may, in the 
future, consider becoming President of the European Commission. The inevitable 
conclusion is that while there is a small advancement in reporting income inequality, 
it is short lived, episodic and opportunistic.  
 
8.8    PIE coverage: the summary. 
In conclusion, this chapter has shown that qualitative analysis of text and images 
used in reports containing references to PIE issues enhances quantitative 
investigation. It has shown that across the research sample, coverage of poverty for 
example, increasingly centres on the U.K, with food banks replacing famines as the 
main site for attention. While benefits are apparently failing to provide basic living 
standards, it is up to the state to address the issue, rather than the private sector and 
its free-market ethos.  
 
Coverage of wealth, meanwhile, is characterised by episodic and specific instances of 
high salaries and bonuses, often gained through nefarious means. Rather than 
seriously addressing the validity of such wealth, coverage is often preoccupied with 
acquisition and high-level consumerism. ITV1 may take a more combative approach 
than the more anodyne BBC1, characterised by the apparent deference of some 
reporters, but the overarching model of free-market capitalism is never seriously 
challenged. Coverage of the squeezed middle incorporates the major theme of 
growth, pay, prices, inflation and interest rates. These reports are concerned with 
when economic recovery will be felt by the wider population, with an unspoken 
inference that this will represent a satisfactory conclusion to the temporary condition 
of being “squeezed”. 
 
Inequality has changed from being “one of the great debates”, to Kamal Ahmed’s 
evaluation that it is now “the major debate” (see Figure 8.24). Despite such an 
upgrading, income inequality is often lost within coverage because of competing 
narratives. Notwithstanding the evident loss of momentum in terms of coverage, this 
report indicates that it is possible to treat it as a free-standing issue, meriting more 
                                                          
4 The full transcript of this interview is at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/0806201402.pdf  
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cerebral journalistic approaches. Against supposed normative ideals of income 
inequality coverage, it could be judged that any traction generated by the report is 
soon lost. After all, the report in Figure 8.24 was triggered by a significant speech by 
Mark Carney; whether BBC1 would have reported income inequality otherwise is a 
moot point. 
 
Chapter 9 now addresses the wider issues emerging from this analysis; specifically, 
the current and likely future landscapes of TV news, and their ability to accurately 
and helpfully report EBF news. More specifically, it addresses the wider themes 
within PIE coverage considered as part of an evaluation as to whether operationally 
and ideologically, audiences can be adequately served by the coverage of such issues 
provided by the U.K’s two most trusted news channels.   
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Chapter 9. BBC1 and ITV1: Natural homes to social 
justice, or to the status quo of capitalism? 
 
Previous chapters find that BBC1 and ITV1 do not generally provide critical coverage 
of EBF and PIE issues in their weeknight 10pm news bulletins. This chapter considers 
the reasons for this paucity and the wider implications. It draws together findings 
from chapters 5-8, and provides the master narrative developed from this project. 
 
Ahead of the discussion about PIE issue coverage, on a superficial level at least, the 
U.K TV news landscape, as represented here by BBC and ITV, apparently provides 
what should be a fertile home for the reporting of serious news and topics associated 
with social justice. Hard news is increasing, and issues of social importance are 
generally covered within longer news conventions that provide an opportunity to 
furnish greater detail. Furthermore, the financial crisis has changed the ways that EBF 
news is reported; it is more prominent within wider news agendas and features more 
citizens and human-centred reporting. Finally, ITV1 demonstrate a greater willingness 
to challenge big business than might have been reasonably expected, and therefore 
the channel can be said to more closely meet the normative ideals of probing, 
insightful journalism.  
 
However, these apparently positive findings are problematic. The increasing 
homogeneity between channels for example, can be interpreted as a reduction in 
choice and variety. Perhaps more importantly, while there is more EBF coverage as 
part of the wider increase in hard news, this might only be because reports 
accentuate the more salacious story elements, and do not sufficiently investigate 
causes and consequences. Furthermore, while citizens are used more often in news 
reporting, their interventions do not seriously challenge elite discourses. Finally, ITV’s 
willingness to take a more combative approach to corporate affairs is encouraging, 
but the comparison with the BBC also serves to accentuate the indolence shown by 
the nation’s primary public service broadcaster. 
 
Alongside these less encouraging elements, the quality and quantity of EBF and PIE 
issue reporting is found to be unsatisfactory. Economic growth is championed 
without alternative, alternatives to traditional capitalism are absent, and the 
overarching system of neoliberal economics remains unchallenged, despite 
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widespread concerns that the system has failed so many people. While the first part 
of this chapter describes and discusses these deficiencies, a critical realist approach 
to research seeks to explain, drawing upon the particular structures, mechanisms and 
influences in operation. The second part of this chapter therefore, explains why EBF 
and PIE reporting is as it is, and why there so little TV coverage of income inequality 
when the phenomenon has gained so much momentum elsewhere.  
 
9.1   Increasingly homogeneity: masking a lack of serious coverage? 
 
Quantitative and qualitative analysis demonstrate the increasing convergence of ITV1 
and BBC1 10pm news bulletins. The balance of content and categories is also 
congruent, as is a general increase in EBF coverage. ITV1 had dropped its market 
summary convention by 2014, enhancing the overall similarity between channels, 
and both ITV1 and BBC1 have changed EBF reporting news into a softer, more 
anthropocentric discipline. 
 
The convergence of BBC1 and ITV1 news follows new institutional theory where 
“politics and rituals” within many realms - “including mass media” - operate with 
increasing isomorphism (Clausen 2003, p.33). Dimaggio and Powell’s (1983) model of 
institutional isomorphism offers three pertinent mechanisms. First, under coercive 
isomorphism, “formal and informal” external pressures including official mandate 
(Dimaggio and Powell 1983, p.150) force organisations into conforming to a given 
standard. Here, the benchmark could be the varying public service mandates both 
channels must adhere to. Secondly, according to mimetic processes, when 
organisational goals are unclear or problematic, organisations may model themselves 
on others (Dimaggio and Powell 1983, p.151). Despite both bulletins “hunting the 
same mass audience” (Wallis and Baran 1990, p.55), ITV1’s 10pm news consistently 
attracts fewer viewers than BBC1’s simultaneous bulletin (Cushion 2012; Mosey 
2016), and so is it possible that ITV1 have followed BBC1’s traditionally harder 
agenda in order to more seriously compete. Notably, and adding further to the points 
of convergence, in late 2015, ITV1’s 10pm bulletin changed from a dual to a single 
presenter (ITV 2015). A targeted attempt to mimic the BBC’s “gold standard” of 
reporting (Machin 2008, p.60) is hinted at by Head of ITV News and Current Affairs 
Michael Jermey, who claims there is a conscious effort to enhance the quality of 
ITV1’s journalism: 
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Over the last few years we have had a strategy to invest in journalism on 
ITV… roles like Penny Marshall, our social affairs editor, our excellent 
political editor Tom Bradby, and in business and economics where we 
employed in around 2012, top business and economic editors in Richard 
Edgar who came from the Financial Times, Laura Kuenssberg who came 
from the BBC (and has since gone back), and we replaced Laura with Joel 
Hills who has a great track record in business reporting… (interview on 
1st October 2015) 
 
 
Finally, according to normative pressures, professionals within different organisations 
have similar roles, objectives and institutional influences (Dimaggio and Powell 
1983). Indeed, and as Jermey points out, there is evidence of inter channel migration. 
For example, two journalists prominent within this research (Nick Robinson and 
Laura Kuenssberg) have held editorial roles at both channels. Also, Penny Marshall 
moved from ITV to BBC and back again within 2014, political reporter Allegra Stratton 
moved from BBC to ITV at the end of 2015, and even more pertinently, Robert 
Peston also moved from BBC to ITV at around the same time. Accordingly, it is 
reasonable to assume that as well as the onscreen similarities already documented, 
elements of education, on-the-job learning and “acquiescence to convention” 
(Dimaggio and Powell 2012, p.10) are other factors driving convergence.  
 
However, despite interpreting the shift to harder news as a positive move benefiting 
viewers since they are delivered more news about weightier issues, inter-channel 
convergence in terms of convention and content may generate concerns about a lack 
of plurality. Moreover, while “few would dispute that homogeneity of content across 
outlets is a threat to pluralist understandings of media and politics” (Chadwick 2011, 
p.39), this increasing homogeneity explains little about the coverage of EBF and PIE 
issues. In this regard, perhaps the more compelling concern associated with the 
increasing similarly between BBC1 and ITV1 is that an increase in hard news content 
does not necessarily mean that the quality of the news presentation also increases. 
 
EBF and PIE stories contain elements of drama and emotion (Underwood 1998; 
Allern 2002; Meyer 2003) and the monetary sums often involved further contribute 
to making stories “sexy” (Butterick 2015, p.121). Such stories inevitably appear more 
interesting to wider audiences, and as was shown in Chapters 6 and 8, news reports 
often highlight characteristics such as negativity, shock, drama, criminality, excess, 
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morality and conflict. While audiences might find these more attractive, such 
emphasised story elements are not likely to foster cerebral, serious coverage. 
 
In practice, these attractive elements include customers queuing outside Northern 
Rock, a ready supply of “villains” (Schifferes and Knowles 2015) and “entertainment 
and intellectual fizz” (Lambert 1998, p.x). The attraction of the new type of EBF news, 
and the validation of news values as a relevant critical lens is implicit within the 
words of Michael Wilson, SKY’s TV Business and Economics editor at the beginning of 
the financial crisis. Such extraordinary events he claimed, benefited TV news, since 
they were happening “not in a banana republic but in a leading industrialised country 
whose administration had been selling the ‘financial stability’ story for 10 years”.  
The action he reflects, was happening “in a town near you” and had “marched right 
in through the front door, to you and your family” (Wilson 2008, p.61).   
 
TV news therefore, developed and humanised previously complex (and perhaps 
uninteresting) EBF stories. As a consequence, such reporting, however, is sometimes 
“light” and “knockabout”, and examples include the simplified and trivialised 
presentation of the Northern Rock bail out (Figure 6.14), the WEF forum at Davos 
(Figure 8.22), and the personality-fuelled style of contributors such as Robert Peston 
(see Section 6.6). Although news has become harder in terms of content, there must 
be legitimate concerns that its presentation has also become dumbed down, and that 
“traditional” approaches to news are undermined by newer ones (Thussu 2008, p.5) 
where audiences are entertained rather than informed (see, inter alia, Jensen 1979; 
Franklin 1997; Doyle, 2007). Accordingly, the quantitative findings from Chapter 5 
and qualitative findings from Chapters 6 and 8 can be synthesised into the shifts in 
channel content and presentation shown in Figure 9.1: 
 
Figure 9.1   The changes in news content and delivery from 2007 to 2014. 
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The counter argument that more populist presentations engage wider audiences 
(Temple 2006; Langer 1998) is attenuated by the nature of what is being reported. 
The proliferation of squeezed middle stories for example, resonates with claims that 
ordinary people are increasingly keen to know more about their financial affairs 
(Schifferes 2011). In other words, many EBF stories are already compelling, and do 
not require simplification.  
 
However, despite such innate appeal, there is a general reluctance within PIE 
reporting to articulate causes and consequences (see Chapter 7). In emphasising 
personality, sensationalism and conflict, the wider social, economic, or political 
implications are marginalised (Callaghan and Schnell 2001), and coverage, as a result, 
is often superficial. While news is presented with less gravitas, and drama is 
preferred to significance and consequence, it must be concluded that obligations to 
serve the public are not fully met. In sum, while humanising EBF news extends appeal 
and interest beyond narrow, elite and specialist audiences, the process of attending 
to human stories by itself, does not guarantee coverage that might engage the public 
and policymakers on a more serious level. 
 
9.2    The humanisation of EBF news: does “City” now compete with “citizen”? 
Technological advances have increased the volume and availability of EBF 
information to audiences increasingly keen to receive it (Schifferes 2011). Such news 
is often complex (see, inter alia, Doyle 2007; Davis 2015; Schifferes 2015), and 
interpretive intervention might be useful for citizens attempting to understand the 
new information (Kleinnijenhuis et al. 2013). One normative function of EBF 
journalists therefore, is to decipher and simplify (Seymour 2009). 
 
As demonstrated by the Northern Rock case study (see Chapter 6), EBF news 
reporting has considerable impact. In line with normative ideals, news reporting 
should be critical, objective and sufficiently probing (see inter alia, Kovach and 
Rosentiel 2007; Starkman 2014; Butterick 2015; Tambini 2015). As has been 
discussed, both bulletins increased their volumes of EBF news coverage, and also 
during the research period, ITV1 abandoned their statistically-driven 
market/currency summary. As the crisis generated stories about high salaries and the 
squeezed living standards of millions of ordinary people, EBF news became 
humanised. According to Michael Jermey for example, ITV1’s budget coverage in 
288 | P a g e  
 
2015 covered “business and economic sides of things, but also the social impact on 
the squeezed middle and the poor” (interview on 1st October 2015). It is difficult to 
contest that within the sample, EBF news shifted from ‘‘Wall Street’’ to ‘‘Main 
Street’’ (Joutsenvirta 2013, p.474), and by virtue of citizens appearing onscreen more 
regularly, official voices were being increasingly replaced by ordinary ones. 
 
If the roles and prominence of various social actors were destabilized by the financial 
crisis (Joutsenvirta 2013), the prominence of citizen contributions potentially 
challenges some established theories pertinent to EBF reporting. Indeed, it is 
tempting to recast social actors according to a well-established model whereby 
perpetrators (including say, bankers) are villains, the journalists drawing attention to 
them are heroes, suffering citizens are victims, and events surrounding them are 
interpreted by experts (Cook et al. 1983). Table 9.1 shows the total of social actors 
identified within Level 2 Content Analysis, and demonstrates that citizen 
contributions consistently dominate PIE reports on BBC1 and ITV1 in both 2007 and 
2014. Business voices however, are less prominent1 among the range of social actors 
quoted throughout PIE coverage:  
 
Table 9.1   Breakdown of social actors in PIE coverage (by percentage). 
 
 
                                                          
1 In their large scale content analysis, Wahl-Jorgensen et al. (2013) found business actors 
amounted to 11.1 % of the total sources on the BBC, virtually identical to the 11.2% in the 
2014 data herein. 
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The theory of mediatization posits that journalists take centre stage within news 
reporting (Blumler and Kavanagh 1999), reflecting the “accrual of power created by 
the increased pervasiveness and autonomy of media institutions, values and 
technologies” (Deacon and Stanyer 2014, p.1033). Operationally, this means that 
journalists interpret the words and opinions of others (see, inter alia, Cushion and 
Thomas 2013; Cushion 2015). There are fundamental concerns about mediatization’s 
legitimacy (see Deacon and Stanyer 2014), but nevertheless in its simplest form, the 
theory challenges established ideas about how news is shaped by elite sources, 
particularly within EBF reporting (see, inter alia, Arrese and Vara 2015; Picard and 
Salgado 2015; Puustinen et al. 2015).  
 
Superficially, the increased citizen involvement demonstrated in Table 9.1 is at odds 
with findings that elite commercial voices are an informational default dominating 
EBF news reports (see Berry 2012). The increase in citizen voices has contributed to 
the increase, albeit marginal, in episodically framed reports covering all PIE issues 
apart from in the case of income inequality (see Table 7.3). In sum, if EBF news has 
moved from “Wall Street” to “Main Street”, then the demographic of those 
contributing to reports has also moved, from “City” to “citizen”, with the coverage 
focusing on “middle street”.  
 
If citizen participation is considered in terms of quantity and quality, while the 
greater involvement of citizens seems clear from Table 9.1, the quality (measured in 
terms of usefulness to the audience) is less certain, since after all, when ordinary 
people are permitted to contribute, editorial control is still retained by the media 
(Robinson et al. 2009).  
 
Indeed, despite their increased prominence in terms of frequency, citizens appear to 
have little agency. First their interventions often simply support the overarching 
narratives developed by journalists, for example confirming an injection of cash into 
the economy in the wake of mass PPI refunds (6.29), the threat of job losses if the 
NMW was increased (Figure 8.13), an increasingly widespread reliance on foodbanks 
(Figures 8.6 and 8.7), and the difficulty of escaping the rental market (Figure 8.17). 
 
Furthermore, when citizens are shown giving opposing viewpoints, their 
interventions simply serve to demonstrate that some issues are contentious, such as 
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the merits of bonuses for bank executives (Figure 8.11), the impact of increased rail 
fares (Figure 8.14) and the widespread nature of economic recovery (Figure 8.15). 
Finally, citizen interventions can also simply enhance the light, “knockabout” nature 
of coverage, such as the collapse of Northern Rock (Figure 6.14).  
 
The comparatively low impact of citizen contributions is further confirmed by their 
length. The examples in Chapters 6 and 8 demonstrate that when citizens are 
featured, their opinions and comments are presented in the form of brief, edited 
soundbites, consistent with research findings showing that other social actors such as 
politicians are granted considerably more onscreen time than citizens (see Cushion 
and Sambrook 2015b; Cushion et al. 2015). In sum, it is difficult to contest that 
despite any increased frequency in citizen appearances, “this does not necessarily 
mean that they frame public debate or provide new perspectives on political issues” 
(Wahl-Jorgensen 2013, p.17).   
 
9.3   Refining homogeneity: ITV1’s different approach. 
As has been discussed, quantitative and qualitative analysis demonstrate that BBC1 
and ITV1 are similar in the news they present, and in the formats and contributors 
they use to do so. However, analysis also reveals points of difference regarding the 
tone and general approach to EBF and PIE issues. Such additional insight validates a 
mixed methods research approach, and the addition of qualitative analysis following 
quantification (see also Cushion et al. 2015). Lawson (2015b) recognises the similarity 
between how BBC1 and ITV1 select their stories, but also cites “tonal differences” 
between “the two Tens”. The “usual view” is that the BBC is “more analytical and 
internationalist”, while ITV is more “popular and jolly” (Lawson 2015b).  Based on this 
research data, such a “usual view” can be challenged. 
 
EBF and PIE reports on BBC1 for example, are often characterised by a lack of probing 
questioning (Figures 6.17 and 6.18), and the implicit defence (or at least, a lack of 
critique) of the banking and private equity sectors (for example Figures 6.27, 6.29, 
and 6.30). These examples add weight to arguments that the BBC adheres to “an 
establishment view” (Hargreaves and Thomas 2002, p.6), rather than putting the 
interests of the public first, as per the reasonable expectations of a public service 
broadcaster. Furthermore, implying that BBC1 take an increasingly light approach, 
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and reminiscent of how fast cars were used to index growth (Figure 8.15), Lawson 
(2015a) refers to another report by BBC1’s Robert Peston, which includes “artily 
filmed footage” of a “seaside big dipper” also used to represent growth. “Such 
metaphorical flourishes - visually lavish but often simplistic in content” claims 
Lawson, are “a BBC news signature”. While ITV correspondents deliver their reports 
in “fairly straight” ways, the BBC aim more for “operatic notes of tragedy… and 
comedy”; “the reporter as performer” more logically expected on ITV is “more likely 
to be found on the other side” (Lawson 2015a). Such an interpretation is consistent 
with the earlier argument that as part of the general thesis of humanisation, Robert 
Peston incorporates such elements of “performance” within his BBC1 reporting. This 
research data therefore, shows no support for traditional understandings that the 
BBC will take a more sober, serious approach to news than its main commercial rival. 
 
Data concerning ITV1, on the other hand, reveals an unexpected finding versus the 
expectations according to its critical political economy, in that there is no evidence 
indicating that the channel takes a deferential approach to its commercial sponsors 
(see also Thomas 2016). Furthermore, the Barclays case study offers sustained 
evidence that instead, ITV1 often takes an overtly critical view of a commercial 
organisation in the full knowledge that the company in question has paid for 
advertising to be screened during the very news bulletins carrying those critical 
reports.  
 
ITV1’s more challenging approach incorporates asking questions and adding 
commentary, and is unexpected on a commercial station. Accordingly, while BBC1 
might be described as providing news for business people and the establishment, 
ITV1 represents "the people's news" (Brown 2000; Barnett 2012, p.70). Examples of 
how ITV1 adopt a “people’s view” include the defence of the NMW (Figure 8.13), and 
a recognition of the efficacy of trade union activism (Figure 8.18). Michael Jermey 
supports such a notion, claiming that “people have always been at the heart of ITV 
news, and we think we are good at telling stories from a people’s perspective”, also 
noting that “we’re on a channel that used to be called ‘The People’s Channel’” 
(interview on 1st October 2015).  
 
The analysis in Chapters 6 and 8 justifies a challenge to the clean functioning of the 
theory of critical political economy, since by featuring news discourses often serving 
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“the people”, ITV1 put aside commercial logics and corporate influence, resulting in 
more incisive, effective reporting (see also Mosey 2016). BBC1 on the other hand, 
often defer to elite opinions, and take a more conservative line when reporting 
corporate affairs. The often stark contrast with ITV1’s approach only serves to 
highlight the deficiencies in the ways that the nation’s primary public service 
broadcaster reports EBF and PIE issues. The reasons for the BBC’s more cautious 
approach can be expressed in both political and contextual terms, and these are 
discussed in section 9.8. 
 
9.4   PIE overage: more similarity, and the resilience of political economy. 
Analysis shows that the trend of inter-channel homogeneity is largely mirrored in 
coverage of PIE issues. Superficially, early conclusions were encouraging from a 
normative viewpoint since PIE issues were generally presented thematically, and 
were generally found within hard news categories and edited packages providing the 
greatest opportunities for serious, cerebral coverage. 
 
However, poverty coverage in 2007 - generally international - often demonstrates 
close adherence to traditional models of poverty reporting, where the issue appears 
aestheticized and sensationalised. In 2014, coverage focused more on the U.K, 
addressed new forms of poverty, and featured more episodic framings which lacked 
context but allowed for more personal narratives. Furthermore, despite extant 
research proposing otherwise, individualistic causes of poverty were less evident 
than systemic causes. 
 
In 2014, PIE coverage on both channels was dominated by the squeezed middle. 
However, there was less coverage of income inequality despite notable increases in 
policymaker recognition (World Economic Forum 2014, 2015), more scholarly 
attention (see for example Wilkinson and Pickett 2010; Dorling 2014; Piketty 2014; 
Atkinson 2015), and suggestions that it was becoming “one of the great debates of 
our age” (see Figure 6.16). Indeed, within the research sample of 9,338 news stories, 
income inequality was usually obscured by political framings. There was only one 
serious example of critical coverage, and any connections to social and personal 
consequences were almost wholly absent. The conclusion that there is no correlation 
between increasing income inequality and its media coverage (McCall 2013) is 
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difficult to resist; there was less coverage in 2014, it was less substantive within the 
reports featuring it, and these reports contained less commentary about cause and 
effect.  
 
By way of background, and unlike U.K TV channels, newspapers are not obliged to 
provide news impartially, and can overtly align themselves with the political ideology 
of their choosing. “Quality”, or broadsheet newspapers are those most likely to cover 
such a social issue, and Table 9.2 shows the number of articles containing the term 
“income inequality” within the print versions of U.K broadsheets in 2013, 2014, 2015, 
and the first half of 2016. 
 
Table 9.2   The use of “income inequality” in UK broadsheets (by percentage).  
 
 
 
Table 9.2 shows that in stark contrast to the analysis of broadcast news coverage, 
income inequality has become increasingly discussed in printed broadsheets. 
However, this increase is almost entirely driven by the coverage provided by 
publications allied to the political left. In 2013, the Guardian/Observer mentioned 
“income inequality” around six times more often than the Telegraph, a competitor 
allied to the political right, and whose owners have extensive business interests. By 
the midpoint of 2016 however, the Guardian/Observer mentioned the phrase over 
80 times as much than the Telegraph, and is entirely dominant in income inequality 
coverage.   
 
Of the broadsheet titles, only the Guardian has an ownership model whose profits 
“do not benefit a proprietor or shareholders” (Guardian 2015). Such governance 
means that “normal” profit-driven tensions (Forgan 2011) are avoided. Such an 
apparently independent position without an imperative to provide profit for 
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shareholders and promoting “liberal journalism” (Guardian 2015) means the 
newspaper might take a different view to its competitors. This comparison serves to 
illustrate that the theory of critical political economy seems to straightforwardly 
explain how U.K broadsheets cover income inequality. In short, where there is a need 
to generate value for owners and shareholders, capitalism and commercialism are 
the dominant codes, and income inequality is marginalised.  
 
In 2014, however, albeit to different degrees, the critical political economy of ITV1 at 
least can be challenged, since organisations and people are increasingly scrutinised. 
Overall however, the theory prevails within TV news, since both BBC1 and ITV1 
ultimately defer to neoliberal thinking, seemingly following the right of centre/ 
market-driven agenda evident in the Times and Telegraph, rather than the more 
centre/left thinking promoted by the Guardian. 
 
This adherence to neoliberal thinking can be demonstrated by the ways in which 
both channels articulate consumerism without consequence, the ways that they 
relentlessly champion economic growth, and the ways that they both generally 
promote neoliberal economic ideology. Each of these is now considered in turn. 
 
9.5   Articulations of consumption without consequence. 
While coverage of wealth highlights the illegal and/or immoral ways it was 
accumulated (see Chapter 6), there was also continuing interest in the specific details 
of consumerism. Examples include Conrad Black’s lifestyle (Figures 8.8 and 8.9), the 
spending power provided by bank bonuses (Figure 8.11) and the possibilities 
provided by the huge wages paid to footballers (Figure 8.12). Indeed, in Figure 8.12, 
how such wealth might be spent is cited as the “one big question”. Logically, 
increased output of goods and services (growth) is only sustained by continuing 
demand. Relentless consumption is fuelled by advertising, in turn described as 
society’s “dominant cultural industry” (Lewis 2013a, p.63).  
 
Heinberg (2011) warns against “a dream world” where “growth knows no bounds, 
where debt can be repaid with more debt, and where natural resources are assumed 
to be endless”. The exclusively positive nature of growth, and the ongoing demand 
and consumption that fuels it are established media discourses (e.g. Lewis and 
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Thomas 2015) despite this being “in defiance of both common sense and ecological 
knowledge” (Duane 1999, p.250). Assumptions of a correlation between growth and 
environmental harm is challenged by the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) 
hypothesis. Maturing economies experience “industrialization” from agriculture to 
industry and then “postindustrialization” from industry to service (Soubbotina and 
Sheram 2000), with the latter becoming dominant (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development 2000). The EKC model claims that environmental 
impacts change as economies mature; as agriculture gives way to industry, pollution 
and degradation increase. As populations become wealthier however, environmental 
care becomes both more affordable, and public pressure drives policymaking 
(Galeotti 2007; Burnett and Bergstrom 2010). Thereafter, as industrial economies 
morph into service economies, environmental damage decreases. Accordingly, it is 
claimed that growth is not environmentally harmful. 
 
The far more compelling argument however, is that “the more we grow, certainly 
using current economic thinking, the more resources we need to use and the more 
pollution we create” (Maxton 2015). Consequently, even aside from considerable 
empirical evidence challenging it (see Stern 2004 for a full summary), the EKC 
hypothesis appears inadequate amid the more compelling rationale of environmental 
degradation and a decline in non-renewable resources (Figueroa 2013) to the point 
where reversal is impossible (see Lewis 2013a for a full summary). Indeed, in 2011, 
Fatih Birol (Chief Economist at the International Energy Agency) warned that this 
point of no return was imminent, and expressed concern that “if we don't change 
direction now on how we use energy, we will end up beyond what scientists tell us is 
the minimum [for safety]. The door will be closed forever" (Harvey 2011). 
 
Indeed, global carbon emission levels have increased by 117% since 1971 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2013) and in 2015, when 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere reached 400 parts per million (ppm), climate 
change scientists stated that: 
 
…values are more than 100 ppm higher than at any time in the last one 
million years and maybe higher than any time in the last 25 million years 
(Dr. Charles Miller cited in NASA 2016) 
 
… climate change is a threat to life on Earth and we can no longer afford 
to be spectators (Dr Erika Podest, cited in NASA 2016)  
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Further, former NASA climatologist James Hansen envisaged “that conflicts arising 
from forced migrations and economic collapse might make the planet ungovernable, 
threatening the fabric of civilization” (Hansen at al. 2015, p. 20119). This research 
data from 2007 and 2014 supports notions that relentless consumerism is 
unchallenged on BBC1 and ITV1, while its environmental impact is marginalised. 
Indeed, news about the environment almost disappeared altogether during the 
seven-year span of the sample, declining from 2.5% (ITV1) and 1.6% (BBC1) of total 
airtime in 2007 to respectively 0.2% and 0.3% in 2014”2. Indeed, the environment 
was previously the 15th most prominent category out of 32 in 2007, but had fallen to 
31st position by 2014 (See Table 5.5). 
 
 Such findings support research by Dando (2014), and by Lewis and Thomas (2015), 
whose study found only one article that substantively linked growth to stalling 
wellbeing and environmental degradation out of 591 newspaper articles mentioning 
“economic growth”. In sum, society has created “a dysfunctional economic system 
that, when it works according to its self-imposed mandate of growing the pace of 
production and consumption, destroys the ecological systems upon which it 
depends” (Prádanos 2015). There appears a convenient lack of conscience or “rising 
complacency” (Lewis 2015) regarding climate change within these TV bulletins, while 
wealth and consumption are championed. Climate change, therefore, might be 
considered a “potential catastrophe” that consumerism created, but was “incapable 
of addressing” (Lewis 2010, p.162).  
 
Commercial channels such as ITV1 rely on advertising, promoting major purchases 
such as cars, homes, consumer durables and items far beyond what is needed for 
basic survival. There is no evidence on either channel, however, of discourses 
suggesting that consumer desire should be reduced for the greater good. Evidence 
here therefore, shows that BBC1 and ITV1 will not broaden the debates and take a 
more probing approach to the relationship between consumption and environmental 
damage. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2  Monbiot (2015a) and Lewis (2015) both quote the data from this empirical research. 
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9.6     The championing of economic growth and the absence of redistribution. 
The plight of the squeezed middle - the PIE category generating most coverage - 
appears inextricably linked with economic growth. Capitalism’s fundamental premise 
is that companies must grow (Butterick 2015); it is also the primary measure of 
economic performance (Picard 2015). Increases in GDP - growth - are driven by 
demand fuelled by advertisements punctuating commercial broadcasting schedules. 
That growth is good is the “perceived wisdom” (Lewis and Thomas 2015) and the 
clear discourse, despite its sustainability being long challenged (see Meadows et al. 
1972). Within small businesses for example, continual growth is risky (Hess 2010), the 
operational emphasis often instead focusing on improvement and efficiency. Aside 
from environmental arguments, other charges against growth include unsatisfied 
desire (Lewis 2013a), and that beyond certain thresholds, there is a non-linear 
relationship between wealth and happiness (Layard 2005; Bok 2010). Finally, political 
reliance on growth as a cure-all for recessionary problems is also considered the 
“main barrier” to addressing poverty and inequality (Knight 2011, p.122).  
 
There are considerable arguments questioning the value of relentless growth. 
However, qualitative findings here support theories that growth has become an 
essential objective and a political panacea (see also Heinberg 2011). This evidence 
includes the strong, dynamic metaphors used in reports highlighting growth (Figure 
6.2), exemplar of the taken-for-granted assumptions that it is always and wholly 
positive. 
 
The relationship between growth and inequality is uncertain (Gallo 2002; Hoeller et 
al. 2012; Ostry et al. 2014; Harrington 2016). Most pertinently, Dobson and 
Read (2015) describe “a macabre dance of reciprocal legitimation” where inequality 
is regarded as necessary for growth in order to provide incentives for social mobility, 
with growth existing “to quieten the voices of those asking for more equality by 
holding out the promise of an ever bigger cake, from which some crumbs will surely 
find their way into the mouths of the less fortunate”. 
 
Accordingly, the significance of growth, and explaining its prominence within EBF and 
PIE reporting, is the implied notion that it will “trickle down”. The “trickle-down” 
thesis asserts that all citizens “benefit from a dynamic, growing economy”, or, to use 
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another common metaphor, “a rising tide lifts all boats” (Wisman 2014, p. 11). From 
squeezed middle stories on BBC1 and ITV1, there seems considerable doubt as to 
whether wealth really does cascade to the bottom of society, and “scant evidence 
that recovery alone will address a long term squeeze in living standards both sides of 
the Atlantic” (Draut 2012, p.131). “Trickle down” economics has therefore failed 
(Dorling 2014; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2014; 
Dabla-Norris et al. 2015). Indeed, Figure 7.22 indicates that in 2014, the discussion as 
to whether there was a recovery or not for ordinary people was the most dominant 
“other discourse” within squeezed middle stories, despite official metrics 
determining the economy to be in “recovery”.  
 
Oxfam (2016) note that the world’s “richest 62 individuals” hold as much wealth as 
“the poorest half of the world’s population” and that in 2010, this wealth was held by 
the 388 richest citizens. In addition, since 2000, “the poorest half of the world’s 
population has received just 1% of the total increase in global wealth, while 50% of 
that has gone to the 1% of people on the top of the pile” (Childs 2015). Both statistics 
suggest that “trickle down” might be better described as an “upward flow”. 
According to Galbraith’s older, more visceral metaphor, in the “horse and sparrow” 
model, if the horse is fed enough oats “some will pass through onto the road to feed 
the sparrow” (Palley 2012, p.138). From the point of view of the people featured in 
these reports, the mythical horse it seems, is constipated. There appears to be no 
apparent choice for policymakers other than the pursuit of growth (Lugo-Ocando 
2014), but Dobson and Read (2015) provide the most compelling advocacy when 
they insist that “we must let go of this ‘trickle-down’ nonsense once and for all”.  
 
The failure of “trickle-down” economics has contributed to the increase in inequality. 
Since liberal economies function on fear and greed (Turnbull and Wass 2010), there 
are claims that inequality offers incentives and rewards (see, inter alia, Rycroft 2009; 
The International Labour Organization 2009; Dabla-Norris et al. 2015). Overall, 
however, the more forcible argument is that there is “remarkably little evidence” 
supporting the notion that income inequality is positive (Rowlingson 2011, p.36). This 
idea is reflected in populist terms by late oil baron and politician Clint Murchison. He 
used another manure-based metaphor, and concluded that “if you spread it [money] 
around, it does a lot of good. But if you pile it up in one place, it stinks like hell” 
(Choron and Choron 2011, p.248).  
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If growth, by itself, is not guaranteed to reach society’s lower reaches, then some 
mechanism of redistribution, either by benefits or taxation, is needed to ensure that 
first, its benefits reach more of the population, and secondly, that it eases income 
inequality (see, inter alia, Hoeller et al. 2014; Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development 2014; Dabla-Norris et al. 2015). However, of the few 
income inequality stories identified by this analysis, only one demonstrates such a 
link to income redistribution. This was BBC1’s report featuring an interview with 
Christine Lagarde from the IMF, where she proposed a programme of “tax on real 
estate, appropriate but not excessive tax on inheritance, appropriate and properly 
redistributive tax on income - not excessive - but appropriately progressive” (see 
Figure 8.24).  
 
Notwithstanding Lagarde stressing that policies should not be “excessive”, this single 
example of inequality being linked to redistribution was eventually overwhelmed by 
the preoccupation with growth.  While many economists and policy makers subscribe 
to the “trickle down” thesis (Wisman 2014, p.16-17), the same can also be said about 
the ways that BBC1 and ITV1 report such issues, since they do not obviously 
challenge the way wealth is dispersed (Lugo-Ocando 2014). While individuals and 
corporations may be singled out for their misdemeanours, traditional models of 
consumerism and growth (without reference to distribution) persist.   
 
9.7    Defending the indefensible, absent trade unions and a lack of alternatives. 
This research reveals ideological loadings within language and imagery, the major 
ideological thrust within news reports being the underpinning of the neoliberal 
economic system. Neoliberalism is often associated with political Conservatism, but 
its dominion transcends traditional political divides. The Labour Party for example, is 
considered to have moved towards neoliberalism under Tony Blair (Schifferes and 
Knowles 2015, p.42). Accordingly, “New Labour” adopted many Thatcherite traits, 
deeming them compatible with socialism (see Hay and Smith 2000; Hay and 
Rosamond 2002; Schmidt and Woll 2013). Indeed, Walsh (2015) contends that 
irrespective of political affiliation, a series of Chancellors have protected and 
promoted dominant market philosophy. It is claimed therefore, that in contemporary 
neoliberal systems, agency and blame has shifted from the markets to the state (Hay 
and Smith 2000; De Ville and Orbie 2014). Indeed, Tables 7.19 and 7.20 for example, 
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show that corrective action is generally expressed as the state’s responsibility, and 
that the private sector avoids any such agency. 
 
This analysis demonstrates that neoliberalism appears naturalised as a simple fact 
beyond question (Fairclough 2001). In practice, support for such free market ideology 
can be evidenced for example, by the lack of any mention of any Western corporate 
complicity in Robert Mugabe’s regime in Zimbabwe, the lack of private sector 
causality regarding new forms of U.K poverty, and the general failure to connect 
corporate behaviour to the wider system enabling greed and excess.  
 
The key indicators demonstrating the pre-eminence of neoliberal economics are that 
groups of social actors such as trade unionists are marginalised, that liberal markets 
are taken for granted, and that coverage often points out the problems with 
restricting the financial sector. Moreover, few alternatives are offered to the basic 
system of market growth and soft touch regulation (see, inter alia Davis 2015; Shaw 
2015; Murdock 2015). These are now addressed in turn. 
 
The idea that elite discourses are more influential in defining news narratives than 
those offered by ordinary citizens is further supported by the absence of trade union 
actors within this research. This is consistent with findings that trade union voices 
have all but disappeared from news generally (Wahl-Jorgensen et al. 2013). As the 
“largest mass democratic organisations in civil society” (Berry 2013b), trade unions 
are noted for their ability to negotiate pay, and for their impact on reducing income 
inequality (see, inter alia, Kaufman 2002; Turnbull 2003). Where unions are absent, 
pay is depressed, but where unions are stronger, the lower paid are protected and 
inequality does not increase (Lemieux 2008). Trade unions therefore, are an 
important potential check to the runaway dominance of free markets.   
 
On one occasion, ITV1 notably mention that trade union influence was key in 
ensuring that equity bosses were questioned in parliament (Figure 8.18). However, 
this cannot mask the channel’s marginalisation of trade union discourses. As shown 
in Table 9.1, starting from no appearances at all in 2007, trade union figures 
represented only 1.5% of social actors contributing to PIE reports on ITV1 in the 2014 
sample. On BBC1, the figure increased only marginally, from 1.1%, to 3%. In all, of the 
426 non-journalist social actors contributing to PIE news reports across channels and 
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years, only 8 (1.9%) represented trade unions. Although unions are not actively 
“demonised” (Schmidt and Woll 2013, p.120), they are all but absent from EBF and 
PIE coverage. 
 
As has been detailed throughout this analysis, EBF and PIE reporting is characterised 
by episodes of bad behaviour, criminality, and what might be popularly considered as 
greed and immorality3. However, there is evidence that such behaviour is defended 
and mitigated, and that the system allowing such behaviour is defended within EBF 
and PIE reporting. For example, on BBC1, a report about earnings and taxation within 
the private equity sector (which many might feel includes the injustice of an apparent 
tax loophole) featured the strongly delivered defence that the sector may move 
overseas if it was regulated further (Figure 8.19). The disadvantage of additional 
regulation and/or more stringent taxation is summarised by Robert Peston’s coda 
that “there would be a cost to Britain” if private equity activity moved overseas. 
Moreover, there is an emphasis on banks self-relegating (Figures 6.22 and 6.27), or 
the need to increase competition (Figure 6.26) rather than the advocating of any 
official intervention. Furthermore, the focus is on the decrease in tax revenues if 
banks relocated (Figure 6.27 and 8.11), a focus on “breaking the rules” rather than 
“breaking the law” (Figures 8.8 and 8.9), and the “benefits” of the PPI scandal (Figure 
6.29). 
 
In interim conclusion, the reporting of issues such as poverty “seldom challenges 
prevalent worldviews and ideologies” (Lugo-Ocando 2014, p.5). More specifically, 
since finance has replaced industry, and is now the primary creator of growth (Walsh 
2015), the spirit of neoliberalism predominates. Adair Turner, Chairman of the 
Financial Services Authority in 2009 (in Schifferes 2011) called for recognition that 
the crisis was not the fault “of specific institutions and a failure of specific 
regulations” but was “a crisis for the entire intellectual theory of efficient, rational 
and self‐equilibrating markets”. The inevitable conclusion is that news media 
generally promotes the idea that issues such as poverty can be reduced and solved 
by the markets, and that Keynesian solutions are obsolete (Lugo-Ocando 2014). 
                                                          
3 This theme has continued into 2016, exemplified by the controversy surrounding former 
owner of British Homes Stores, Sir Philip Green. One newspaper headline - in the Mail Online - 
captured all the themes of greed, injustice and immorality: “Whale ahoy! Shirtless Sir Shifty 
soaks up the sun on his £100m superyacht - as staff and pensioners face uncertain future” 
(Finan et al. 2016).   
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While EBF issues have become humanised, and the operational practices of some 
financial actors confronted, the system, and the institutions and structures allowing 
such behaviours is not (see, inter alia, Murdock 2015; Schifferes and Knowles 2015; 
Thompson 2015; Kelsey et al. 2016). The data and analysis presented in Chapters 5-8 
supports the conclusion that the market is “sacred” (Appadurai 2016, p.55), and that 
if news coverage is a shaping influencer of public opinion, neither audiences nor 
policymakers are being encouraged to think any differently.  
 
One way that free market economics could be challenged is by the presentation of 
some valid alternatives. Critical discourse analysis considers the significance of 
silences and absences, and this research finds that any discussion, or even any 
explicit mentions of alternatives to neoliberalism are notably absent. This is 
consistent with conclusions that there is little challenge to the basic system of market 
growth and soft touch regulation (Davis 2015; Murdock 2015; Shaw 2015). 
 
Given the economic, social and environmental nadir accentuated by the global 
financial crisis, “a world in which things simply go on as usual is already 
inconceivable” (Jackson 2009, p.6). Consequently, ideas regarding new economic 
systems incorporating egalitarianism and a lesser reliance on growth are emerging 
(see, inter alia, Center for The Advancement of the Steady State Economy 2015; Post 
Growth 2015; Economy for the Common Good 2016; New Economics Foundation 
2016).  These alternative systems embrace and promote elements including investing 
in infrastructure, fiscal prudence, addressing inequality and work/life balance, 
changing the consumer culture, operating within pre-set environmental limits 
(Jackson 2009), the regulation of incomes (Daly 2008), and corporate “decapitation” 
where the CEO-led systems become more egalitarian (Lloyd 2010). There are also 
calls for a return to a culture of repair rather than replace (Wilkinson and Pickett 
2010; Lewis 2013a), for moneyless trade/bartering, and the further regulation of 
advertising (Layard 2005; Alexander 2014).   
 
In this sample, no such alternatives are discussed or acknowledged by either BBC1 or 
ITV1. Indeed, one solitary point of potential difference - the alternative model of 
corporate governance favoured by the Co-operative Bank - is described as 
“unreformed and cumbersome” (Figure 6.13). These findings are consistent with 
such alternative regimes and systems remaining on the peripheral of mainstream 
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debate because they are often ostracised or ignored (Davis 2015), or marked as 
“extremist” or “hardline” (Kay and Salter 2014, p.764). Without the oxygen provided 
by TV news coverage, such alternatives will find credibility elusive.  
 
The intransigence shown by BBC1 and ITV1 in not exploring alternatives to traditional 
capitalism is incongruous. Many ordinary people - including the squeezed middle 
who dominate PIE news coverage - do not appear to have tangibly benefited under 
the prevailing free market system. Indeed, society has “come to the end of what 
higher material living standards can offer us” (Turnbull and Wass 2010, p.273). 
Indeed, most recently, economic neoliberalism can be considered to have been 
seriously called into question. The extreme financial situation and near total 
economic collapse in Greece for example, represents a notable event “in the long 
tradition of subordinating human welfare to financial power” (Monbiot 2015b). In 
the U.K, the neoliberal model pursued by a succession of governments between 2007 
and 2014 can be therefore characterised thus:  
 
…the slow jobs recovery, difficult income conditions of the long-term 
unemployed, questions over how households manage their reduced 
welfare entitlements and evident problems experienced by young people 
all point to an urgent need for a radically different programme of policy 
actions… (Grimshaw and Rubery 2012, p.55) 
 
 
Even at the previously discussed WEF summits, agendas are often “far removed from 
the concerns of ordinary people”, as “grand narratives” determine that “we must not 
do anything to upset the rich”, and that “despite the biggest banking crash, there has 
been little effective reform of the financial system as governments seem unwilling to 
upset the financial wheeler and dealers” (Sikka 2015). Consequently, neoliberal 
policies are “inherently incompatible with democracy, as people will always rebel 
against the austerity and fiscal tyranny it prescribes” (Monbiot 2015c). Even when 
neoliberalism fails, it seems that there is no sense of self-reflection (Davis 2015; 
Murdock 2015; Kelsey et al. 2016), and the continued defence of banking and 
capitalism more generally revealed by this analysis confirms as much. 
  
In sum, this analysis reveals that despite neoliberalism being “holed below the 
waterline” (Schifferes 2011), it remains largely unchallenged as media shy away from 
blaming markets. The financial sector’s defence against regulation is simply and 
explicitly refined into a threat to move overseas without an apparent backward 
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glance. In these cases, no-one points out that this invariably results in personal gain 
for just a few senior executives. If, with their obligations to serve everyone, 
journalists on BBC1 and ITV1 do not offer “credible alternatives” to “casino 
capitalism” (Kleinnijenhuis et al. 2013, p.287), then others seem unlikely to do so. 
 
As Kelsey et al. (2016, p.12) summarise: “despite the failings of free market 
capitalism… familiar economic structures and practices of past and current 
governments across periods of boom and bust have remained securely engrained in 
the discursive practices of political and financial institutions”. Put more succinctly, 
and supporting conclusions offered by Kay and Salter (2014), this analysis culminates 
in the final summary that at a point when free market economics can be justifiably 
held to account by public service media, they fail to do so, and instead, they continue 
to promote what appears to be a flawed model serving the few, and not the many.   
 
9.8    Why is coverage so unsatisfactory? The thesis of unsuitability. 
As has been shown, income inequality coverage fell away between 2007 and 2014. At 
first glance, this seems incomprehensible given that the issue was identified as the 
“greatest global risk in terms of likelihood” by the World Economic Forum in 2012, 
2013 and 2014, and that around a third of “other” discourses within income 
inequality stories in 2014 mention that inequality is increasing (see Table 7.25). 
 
The paucity of income inequality coverage within this research sample might be 
explained by the concept being absent from political debate until relatively recently. 
Broadcasters therefore, might simply be said to have been following mainstream 
political agendas. Then, when income inequality’s public profile became elevated, the 
lack of coverage can be explained by news value theory, as the issue may have lacked 
some key characteristics and may be too complex to understand (McCall 2013). Some 
mechanism therefore, may be required to propel it onto news agendas. Kitzinger 
(2009) proposes that media often portray “risk” irresponsibly, preferring sensational 
impacts over cumulative outcomes, events before backgrounds, and stories involving 
a focus of blame. Indeed, the complex, gradual nature of income inequality may be 
less newsworthy than other stories because it is a “slow burn” issue, and also 
because differences/gaps/comparison are more abstract. According to the “burglar 
alarm” model (Zaller 2003), it is extraordinary events such as catastrophes, trials and 
misdemeanours that promote stories onto news agendas. Michael Jermey notes 
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pressure from competing news stories, but claims that “when income inequality 
reports have come out they’ve hit our agenda”. The data presented in this study does 
not support such an assertion, at least in terms of the 10pm weeknight news 
bulletins. However, if income inequality had contained more “burglar alarm” 
characteristics, then the issue might have appeared more often. 
 
Notwithstanding these other reasons, the most compelling explanation as to why 
BBC1 and ITV1 do not deeply interrogate this issue is that there is a “cognitive bias” 
towards free market economics, shared by “policy‐makers, economists and financial 
journalists alike” (Schifferes 2011). The thesis of unsuitability proposes that BBC and 
ITV news platforms are fundamentally ill-suited to provide a fully probing critique of 
EBF news, and the progressive coverage of income inequality and other PIE issues. 
 
Epistemologically, critical realism advocates the investigation and discussion of 
“generative mechanisms” (Ackroyd and Karlsson 2014, p.39). Accordingly, the 
unsuitability of BBC1 and ITV1 can be explained by mechanisms embracing themes of 
power, politics, governance, public service, funding and tradition.  In the case of ITV1, 
their provision of news is unusually combative when set against traditional 
understandings of the critical political economy of a commercially driven news 
provider. As has been shown by some direct comparisons, on occasions, ITV1 often 
probe and contest, when BBC1 often accept and acquiesce. ITV1’s assertiveness 
remains confined to individual and corporate levels, but does not extend as far as the 
systemic level concerning the prevailing environment of encouraging growth without 
balance, and consumerism without regress to environmental consequence. 
 
Consistent with the “immanent critique” highlighting dissonance and divergence 
which then generates theories to explain empirical findings (O’Mahoney and Vincent 
2014), ITV1’s incisive line towards corporate figures (including a major advertiser) 
might be part of a concerted effort to increase its credibility as it upgrades its 10pm 
bulletin. Their newest format incorporates Tom Bradby as sole presenter. If Bradby’s 
brief was indeed to “drive the bulletin upmarket” and to “talk human being to human 
being” (Foster 2015), then the hardening of the news agenda and the humanisation 
of EBF news (see Chapter 6) were underway before such changes. This apparent 
rebranding indeed, is because, as Michael Jermey claims, the channel has recognised 
that their viewers “want highly credible journalism around foreign and domestic 
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current affairs”, and are “looking at every turn to invest in high quality journalism” 
(interview on 1st October 2015). Finally, the recruiting of Robert Peston and 
Newsnight Political Editor Allegra Stratton are further indicators that ITV is investing 
heavily in its hard news provision (Martinson and Conlan 2015; Hewlett 2016; Mosey 
2016). To some degree, a strategy of harder news and more probing EBF reporting 
will serve viewers in ways more closely akin to the normative ideals of journalism. 
Indeed, Peston is quoted as moving to ITV in part because “I admire what Tom 
(Bradby) and the others are trying to do, making it more upmarket with more space 
for serious stories” (Martinson 2016). 
 
ITV1’s lack of progression beyond individual and corporate levels of critical reporting 
might have a straightforward explanation. Neoliberalism - the regime of limited state 
intervention – actually requires a strong legislature to implement deregulation 
(Schmidt and Woll 2013). When the state exercises such power to deregulate, 
commercial broadcasters flourish as they take advantage of “new commercial 
opportunities” (Street 2011, p.151). It is unsurprising therefore, that ITV1 do not 
fundamentally disrupt the economic system enabling such opportunities, and the 
corporations that fund them to thrive4. Indeed, Michael Jermey implicitly confirms 
the lack of challenge. While many of his comments describe a concerted strategy to 
invest in high quality journalism, even he, as the instigator of this strategy, concedes 
that “you’re probably right that our criticism will be about behaviour that our 
audience finds unethical or illegal, rather than our programmes daily challenging the 
basis of capitalism” (interview on 1st October 2015). 
 
As demonstrated in Chapters 5-8, while their content is generally harder, and 
consistent with normative expectations of public service broadcasting, BBC1’s 
approach appears at odds with such expectations. It may be anticipated that BBC1 
might cover PIE issues in cerebral, impartial and informative ways, and also more 
often than their commercial rivals5. However, stories about banks and private equity 
                                                          
4 Harrington (2016) finds that while U.S commercial broadcaster Fox News discussed 
inequality and poverty surprisingly often versus their competitors, they promoted solutions to 
these problems that “would actually make inequality and poverty worse”. 
 
5 Harrington (2016) found that PBS – America’s most trusted broadcaster which does not aim 
to make a profit - “dedicated three times as much coverage” to economic inequality as CNN, 
its “closest broadcast competitor” in terms of objectives and ethos. 
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firms are among examples where the channel appears to defend free market 
activities. Such findings are consistent with other empirical work finding that the 
corporation adopts a generally narrow neoliberal focus (see, inter alia, Berry 2013a; 
Lewis 2013a). Despite its role as a public service broadcaster, the BBC might be 
considered to be in breach of its noble objectives, especially in face of “the incessant 
prodding of commercial interests, combined with the Thatcherite love of the market” 
(McChesney 2000, p.249). In the past too, BBC business reporting was found to avoid 
the questioning of fundamental ideology and the financial status quo in favour of a 
more superficial focus (see, inter alia, Svennevig 2007, Lewis 2013a; Jones 2014; 
Higgins 2015).  
 
On a broader level, BBC1’s pro-business coverage develops into perpetuating 
hegemonic neoliberalism (Kay and Salter 2014), and an unwillingness to compromise 
its principles or to validate more Keynesian approaches (Kelsey et al. 2016). As part of 
this process, the data presented here can be interpreted as pro-establishment, pro-
governing elite, and more specifically, pro-Conservative. It seems clear from such 
master narratives that EBF journalists might be beset with bias and vested interests 
(Shaw 2015). These inhibit the offering of alternative views and the forcible 
conclusion is that “the BBC tends to reproduce a Conservative, Eurosceptic, pro-
business version of the world, not a left-wing, anti-business agenda” (Berry 2013a). 
As a further example, the BBC gives “unchallenged air time” to “climate change 
sceptics” (Painter 2015) who, presumably, are unlikely to support the urgent slowing 
of consumption and growth so prominent within the post-crisis research data in 
2014. Moreover, the dominance of the Conservative party’s preferred economic 
policies aligned with neoliberalism in General Election coverage on TV news in 2015 
(see Cushion and Sambrook 2015; Deacon et al. 2015) further support notions that 
the BBC is underpinned by pro-Conservative tendencies. 
 
What makes BBC1’s coverage more disappointing is that U.K broadcasters are 
obliged to be impartial. In practice, and on a superficial basis, BBC1 stories do 
actually contain different viewpoints. However, the structuring of reports ensures 
that pro-market discourses are privileged and are usually given the “last word”. For 
example, in Figure 8.15, economic growth might not be immediately benefitting 
everyone, but the report concludes with Chancellor George Osborne’s promise that 
his economic plan is working. In Figure 8.17, Labour’s plans to cap rents might be 
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designed to assist “generation rent”, but the report’s coda frames the plan as a 
strategy simply to win an election. In Figure 8.19, there is evidence of protest against 
equity firm operations, but the final conclusion is that if these organisations 
relocated, the U.K would suffer. Finally, in Figure 8.22, while the rich and powerful 
are concerned about income inequality, the report begins and concludes with implicit 
suggestions that growth is more important. In each case, the underlying “takeaway” 
message is clear. 
 
Kay and Slater (2014, p.768) propose that the BBC’s support for free market logics is 
explained by a threefold process. These are the “the broader mainstream media and 
political context in which neoliberalism is conflated with economic ‘common sense’”, 
“specific instances of government pressure”, and the “ongoing vulnerability of the 
BBC in respect of the state”. 
 
To take these in turn, Robert Peston - a key onscreen figure in both 2007 and 2014 
research samples - describes the BBC as preoccupied about not breaking accepted 
rules and conventions when training its journalists (Higgins 2014). This institutional 
and individual rooting is underpinned by general concerns that editorially, despite 
any claims that the BBC is traditionally left leaning (see Chapter 2), it is increasingly 
moving to the right of the political continuum. Indeed, even former BBC Chairman 
Christopher Bland claims that because of proposals by then Chancellor George 
Osborne to force the BBC to provide licence subsidies to pensioners and so on, the 
BBC is fast becoming an “arm of government” (Stone 2015). Empirically, the BBC’s 
pro-establishment positioning is academically supported by research conducted by 
Wahl-Jorgensen et al. (2013), summarised by Justin Lewis as showing that “under 
pressure”, the BBC “has been pushed to the right” (Burrell 2014). The previously 
mentioned analysis of election coverage further supports this conclusion. 
Furthermore, from the research data presented here, the traditionally socialist values 
of trade unions are overwhelmed by implicit and explicit pro-business discourses. The 
shift to the political right therefore, is difficult to contest.  
 
Moving away from the institutional to a more personal level, and fuelled by a system 
incorporating costly levels of education followed by unpaid internships, evidence 
shows that journalists are increasingly drawn from privileged backgrounds. Jones 
(2014) indeed, provides a detailed and compelling examination of BBC hierarchy from 
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Chairmen to editors, producers and senior journalists, and reveals their indisputable 
support for conservative ideology and free market ideals.  
 
As one journalist suggested, “when push comes to shove, senior people at the BBC 
consider themselves part of the establishment” (Higgins 2014).  Indeed, it is difficult 
to contest that the BBC is an innately conservative organisation whose key 
journalistic staff are ideologically allied to the political right. For example, Robert 
Peston spent long periods of employment with the Financial Times and Telegraph, 
both considered as politically right of centre (Leveson Inquiry 2012). Andrew Neil, 
another prominent BBC political commentator (see Figure 8.9), is quoted by Hasan 
(2009) as calling for a “liberalisation” of the economy, radical tax reduction and 
private sector competition on a scale “not yet contemplated”. Furthermore, former 
BBC Political Editor Nick Robinson is a former chair of the Young Conservatives “at 
the height of Thatcherism”, and Robbie Gibb (currently Editor of BBC Live Political 
Programmes) is a former deputy chair of the Federation of Conservative Students, 
eventually shut down by Norman Tebbit for being “too right wing” (Hasan 2009). 
 
Further, posit (Kay and Salter 2014, p.763), “the BBC is ingrained into the cultural 
fabric of the British state and is structured through the constitutional framework of 
liberal capitalism, and a class-based liberal nationalism upon which the former rests”. 
While still employed by the BBC, Peston conceded that “the broadcaster actually 
veers towards a right-wing, pro-establishment view for fear of criticism” (Sommers 
2015). In sum, the reason that the BBC, in its role as primary public service 
broadcaster does not provide incisive and probing reporting of EBF and PIE issues is 
that on institutional and personal levels, it is too closely aligned to the neoliberal 
model that enables poverty, the squeezed middle and income inequality to thrive. 
 
Moving to the second and third parts of Kay and Slater’s (2014) three-part 
explanation, the pressure to adhere to right wing political and economic agendas 
might be interpreted as being the direct result of the imminent renewal of its Royal 
Charter in 2016. Indeed, Justin Lewis reflects that “it is the BBC’s cyclical dependence 
upon whoever happens to be in government during the licence renewal period that is 
the greatest threat to its impartiality” (cited in Burrell 2014). In addition to the 
institutional and personal leanings within the corporation, in the current pre-charter 
period, there might also be a tendency for even more caution as the corporation 
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strives to retain its current form and funding.  For example, ahead of its Royal Charter 
Review in 2016, the Government published a green paper making numerous 
statements indicating the increased degree to which the BBC and its operations 
would be scrutinised. Such statements include: 
  
We also need to ask some hard questions in Charter Review if we are to 
ensure the future success of the BBC… 
 
The BBC has fallen short of the high standards we should expect… there 
have been editorial failings related to these revelations [the Jimmy Savile 
case] and in other areas...  
 
Pay-offs for senior executives and the growth in the number of senior 
managers and size of their salaries have drawn criticism that the BBC has 
only recently begun to address… 
 
Governance systems have proved opaque and cumbersome. Lessons 
must be learned in all of these areas if the BBC is to address the 
challenges of the future…  (Department for Culture Media and Sport. 
2015, p.2). 
 
Such statements are in addition to more anecdotal evidence, such as then Prime 
Minister David Cameron’s suggestion that he was going to “close down” the 
corporation, which Nick Robinson claims, “joke or threat”, is “too close to what many 
in his party want to be laughed off” (Toynbee 2015). In conclusion, the BBC’s critical 
political economy - a public service broadcaster funded by a licence fee with indirect 
influence from the government of the day - actually impinges on its ability to be 
objective, independent and sufficiently probing on behalf of an audience that 
traditionally trusts it to act in its best interests. Such caution is unlikely to foster any 
critique of neoliberal economics, and the proposal of any radical alternatives.  
 
9.9   Defining unsuitability in terms of absence. 
The way that BBC1 reports EBF and PIE issues has a wider impact on public 
perceptions, but these research findings also have implications for the corporation’s 
obligations to provide “due impartiality” (see also Berry 2013a; Thomas 2016).  
The BBC’s required impartiality was formerly conceptualised as a “seesaw” model, 
where the left/right political binary received equitable coverage and opportunity. 
More recently, this model has been redefined as a “wagon wheel”, incorporating a 
wider spectrum of opinion (Bridcut 2007, p.7). Mindful that neoliberal economics is 
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not the exclusive domain of the political right and also finds favour within for 
example, the Labour Party (see, inter alia, Hay and Rosamond 2002; Schmidt and 
Woll 2013; Walsh 2015), the range of politicians featured within PIE coverage rarely 
moves outside of mainstream politics and does not for example, consider the Green 
Party who might offer alternative thinking (see Table 7.26). Theories about a narrow 
range of permitted ideologies are supported by the BBC’s decision not to allow the 
Green Party any party political broadcasts outside election campaigns (Perraudin 
2016).  
 
Elsewhere, the move from “seesaw” to wagon wheel has been empirically challenged 
(Wahl Jorgensen et al. 2013). Kay and Salter (2014, p.765) express concern that the 
BBC do not “fulfil its duty to act impartially between competing policy options, and to 
furnish citizens with a range of views, ideas, facts and policies that could form the 
basis of democratic will-formation in a public sphere”. The lack of a range of opinions 
across party politics, academia, trade unionism and the third sector in his research 
(see Chapter 7) means that such a conclusion can be fully supported.   
 
Even if the BBC is undeniably allied to an establishment underwriting right of centre 
philosophies and neoliberal economics, by simply adhering to its obligations to 
provide wagon wheel impartiality, it would at least be providing a wider debate, 
including some of the social actors, political organisations and alternative economic 
systems that would undeniably drive deeper discussion about income inequality. 
ITV1 however, does not provide fully balanced economic coverage either. Michael 
Jermey notes that ITV programming is monitored by panels considering diversity 
(interview on 1st October 2015), but these do not appear to have corrected for 
example, the lack of trade union contributions to news reports.  Accordingly, there 
can be legitimate concerns that by converging in terms of format, conventions, and a 
lack of challenge to the systemic status quo, the U.K’s two most watched news 
bulletins are not offering any real choice. Michael Jermey claims that “there are 
places where you can see challenges to capitalism” on ITV, but they are not evident 
anywhere in this research sample. 
 
That narrative developed by this research is that news has become harder and more 
serious on BBC1 and ITV1, as the channels have become increasingly similar in terms 
of the news they present and the conventions they employ do so. EBF news has been 
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redefined by the financial crisis, as ITV1 in particular take a more critical approach to 
reporting corporations and their employees. EBF stories increasingly appeal to 
editors and audiences because news now concerns people and their flaws rather 
than statistical data. Income inequality however, may not contain sufficient news 
values, but more compellingly, beyond the corporate level, neither ITV1 (because of 
their reliance on advertising) and BBC1 (because of their connections to “the 
establishment”) provide sufficiently progressive and emancipatory coverage of an 
issue that scholarly communities have framed as having such contemporary 
importance. 
 
The increase in attention and significance of income inequality is not reflected in the 
coverage it receives, and until this happens and the issue is illustrated, debated, 
tested, and the causes and consequences examined, any legislative action or changes 
in behaviour, policy and ideology seem unlikely.  
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Chapter 10.  Change is unlikely, but still possible. 
Underpinning this research project is a wish to change the state of affairs where “inequality, income 
concentration, the behaviour and influence of the super-rich tend to be treated as part of the 
natural order of things, warranting no more than marginal social science attention” (Wade 2014, 
p.2).  
 
Accordingly, the study began with the objective of establishing if, and how income inequality - “the 
great debate of our age” - was being discussed on two of the U.K’s most watched news bulletins. TV 
news is a key carrier of public information, and its coverage of PIE issues is a key site for analysis, 
since media has “real influence by improving understanding of, and interest in, the situation of poor 
people… It can stimulate and feed debate and ensure that readers, viewers and listeners are better 
informed” (Seymour 2009, p.42). Research into TV news is especially important, since unlike print 
and online journalism, broadcast news must be impartial, and in the case of BBC and ITV, it must 
also provide varying degrees of public service. Aside from the clear political, cultural and commercial 
ideologies evident in, and promoted by, print and online news, broadcast news is one place where 
the public can reasonably expect to find incisive, useful and balanced coverage of matters of socio-
economic importance. 
 
The conceptualising of income inequality as a multifaceted phenomenon comprising poverty, wealth 
and the squeezed middle, and the complexity of identifying the location of these stories necessitated 
a wide examination of news. Focusing on the BBC1 and ITV1 10pm bulletins in 2007 and 2014, this 
comprehensive quantitative sweep and the qualitative analysis that followed it enabled some 
conclusions about news agendas in general, EBF news in particular, and PIE issues most specifically 
in two discrete years bookending the global financial crisis. 
 
The project findings can, in part, be summarised as “old wine in new bottles”. Although the specific 
EBF and PIE foci are, as far as can be established, unprecedented in terms of their siting within U.K 
TV news, the data shows that consistent with the consensus emerging from extant research, 
coverage of these issues generally falls below what can justifiably be expected from public service 
broadcasters. Indeed, within a detailed content analysis covering two years and a total of over 9,000 
news stories, income inequality is barely touched upon, and indeed, is less evident in 2014 than it 
was in 2007.  
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Within the U.K’s hybrid model combing public service and commercial objectives, the BBC1, as 
primary public service broadcaster, could reasonably be expected to provide the “gold standard” in 
EBF and PIE news coverage. However, given that the public are not being adequately served by our 
broadcast system, it can be concluded that ITV1 might be the “story”, and BBC1 “the problem”. 
Evidence shows that the BBC provide a generally indolent examination of corporations and the 
financial sector in particular, while ITV1 are notably more gladiatorial, albeit this does not extend 
beyond a corporate level to any critique of the wider financial system.  Accordingly, these research 
findings can challenge the traditionally established approaches that these channels are considered 
to take.  
 
Critical realist research and the imperative to move beyond description towards explanation 
facilitates the thesis of unsuitability, which proposes that both channels, for different reasons, 
provide coverage of PIE issues that mainly serves the interests of those who are apparently suffering 
the least. Accordingly, fundamental and ultimately improbable changes are needed before these two 
channels in particular, and journalism more generally, attend to income inequality and its associated 
issues with the focus and attention they merit. While journalism has a general lack of bite, 
pedagogical practices in Business and Management Schools might also be complicit.  Tourish et al. 
(2010, p.S45-46) for example, claim that “typically” within teaching programmes, “there is little 
mention of greed, shame, duplicity, stupidity, hubris, soaring salaries, power, and lack of 
democracy/employee involvement”.  
 
Furthermore, via different relationships with media outlets, NGOs may be more successful in 
publicising public narratives about PIE focusing on causation and solutions (Hanley 2009). 
Accordingly, social actions regarding PIE issues would be more strongly promoted (McKendrick et al. 
2008; Robinson et al. 2009). In sum, if corporate behaviour was different, and issues like inequality 
were packaged differently, reporters would have different, and more compelling stories to tell. The 
BBC1 report outlined in Figure 8.24 shows that this type of reporting is possible, however the 
combined efforts of businesspeople, economists, politicians, NGOs and and journalists are needed 
for a sustained improvement.  
 
Overall however, despite some unexpected and hopeful sub-narratives, this research reveals an 
expectedly bleak outlook. The project began by asking whether Robert Peston’s claim that income 
inequality was “fast becoming one of the great debates of our age” was justified in terms of 
coverage. The conclusion is that it is not, but this can be most pertinently summarised by the 
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unlikely figure of Niccolò Machiavelli, whose name is synonymous with the duplicitous and 
unscrupulous behaviour that has featured as such a strong theme within EBF and PIE coverage. 
Quoted by La (2015), “the reason there will be no change” claims Machiavelli, “is because the people 
who stand to lose from change have all the power. And the people who stand to gain from change 
have none of the power.” While this is the case, even if income inequality is actually a great debate, 
it certainly is not when measured by the volume and type of coverage provided by the U.K’s leading 
TV news providers.  
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                  Appendix 1. Bulletins missing from the research sample. 
 
                 2007 
                         (All bank holidays excluded) 
BBC1 
29th January       
30th January        
31st January 
1st February    
2nd February   
5th February    
6th February    
7th February    
8th February    
9th February  
14th February 
 
 
30th April 
 
1st May         
2nd May         
3rd May         
4th May          
7th May         
8th May         
9th May       
10th May     
11th May      
14th May     
15th May      
16th May     
17th May     
18th May     
21st May     
22nd May    
23rd May     
24th May     
25th May     
28th May  
22nd June        
27th June 
  1st November 
14th November 
23rd November 
27th November  
11th December 
 
 
ITV1 
5th February    
6th February    
7th February    
8th February    
9th February 
30th April 1st May            
2nd May            
3rd May            
4th May            
7th May           
8th  May         
10th  May       
11th   May      
14th   May      
15th   May      
16th   May      
17th   May      
18th   May      
21st  May      
22nd  May      
23rd   May      
8th July 
 
1st October  
2nd October  
3rd October   
4th October   
5th October   
8th October   
9th October 
10th October 
11th October 
12th October 
15th October 
16th October 
17th October 
18th October 
19th October 
22nd October 
1st November 
2nd November 
5th November 
6th November 
7th November 
8th November 
9th November 
12th November 
13th November 
14th November 
15th November 
16th November 
19th November 
20th November 
21st November 
22nd November 
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24th   May      
25th   May      
28th  May 
4th June              
5th June              
7th June              
8th June 
 
23rd October 
24th October 
25th October 
26th October 
29th October 
30th October 
31st October 
23rd November 
26th November  
27th November 
28th November 
29th November 
30th November  
3rd December 
10th December 
11th December 
12th December 
13th December 
14th December 
 
                   2014 
                                (All bank holidays excluded) 
BBC1 
30th January   18th July               
21st July               
23rd July 
  
ITV1 
30th January        
31st January 
 6th May 9th July 26th September  
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Appendix 2. Coding Manual for Levels 1 and 2 Content 
Analyses. 
 
The coding frame was designed to introduce as much nuance as possible to the 
understanding of news agendas, and to capture the information appropriate to the 
research questions. The coding frame can be understood in terms of specific 
categories and more generic, default categories which accommodate stories that 
cannot be reasonably otherwise allocated. It can also be considered in terms of 
British and international categories, and others which are procedural conventions for 
the television channels considered in this research.  
 
Variables were developed from extensive trial and error piloting, involving the coding 
and recoding of a range of examples, and the subsequent refining of the coding 
frame, especially where variable choices were limited (for example, 
thematic/episodic framing). Many categories were added inductively, and then 
reallocated to a narrower range of more general categories constructed from all 
captured categories. This narrower range was synthesised by grouping together 
variables that had some obvious synergy. 
 
Each category is marked as either “one chosen” or “can be more than one”. In all 
cases, for categories where only one choice was required, the most dominant of the 
possible options was selected.  
 
Whole bulletins were watched and coded. The first news story was deemed to begin 
following the bulletin idents and headlines. Routine weather updates at the end of 
the bulletins were not included. Every available weekday bulletin between New 
Year’s Day and the end of the last complete week before Christmas Day were 
considered. Weekends and Bank Holiday bulletins were also omitted. 
 
Level 1 Content Analysis. 
 
Channel (one chosen)      Either BBC1 or ITV1. 
 
Date (one chosen)      The date was recorded in the format: day/ month/ year. 
 
Story category  (one chosen)     The overriding criterion used within the decision-
making process was the thrust of the story. In other words, where more than one 
category could be selected, only the most dominant was chosen based on time 
spent, dominance within story framing and so on. Stories were assigned one 
category from the following: 
 
These categories attended to U.K news only – 
 
Political Process/policy/obituary - this category was considered as a political 
“default”. It was also selected where one particular political personality was central 
to the report, for example the death or memorial of a political figure. 
 
Political Scandal/Controversy about politicians themselves - concerning any 
controversial behaviour, scandal, crime or criminal activity associated with a British 
politician or politics more widely. Political scandals involving international politicians 
were either categorised as “Foreign Affairs” ort “Political Personalities” depending 
on the thrust of the story.   
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Education - concerning issues associated with any level of British education and the 
social actors participating within it. 
 
Royal Family - concerning the British Royal Family, where their involvement within 
the story is seen as the dominant element. 
 
Defence - concerning British Defence/Armed Forces, separate from combat/war 
situations themselves. 
 
Transport - concerning British transport systems, like air, sea, road or rail.  
 
Economy - concerning the wider British economic landscape, rather than specific or 
generic business stories, which are more narrowly focused. These included issues 
such as the economic recovery, growth, housing market, interest rates, 
unemployment and so on.  
 
NHS / Medical - concerning the National Health Service, or the medical profession in 
the U.K. Some scientific advances might be more appropriately coded as “scientific”. 
 
Scottish Independence - concerning the 2014 issue of Scottish Independence and 
the associated referendum campaign. 
 
Home Affairs - concerning British issues not fitting easily into any other category. For 
example, prison overcrowding, police procedures or the legal system. 
 
These categories transcend international boundaries and deal with news in the U.K 
and beyond: 
 
Crime - concerning any specific criminal activity, case or trial. Where the general 
issue of crime was concerned (like statistics, trends or crime legislation), “Home 
Affairs” or “Foreign Affairs” was often considered more appropriate if the story was 
U.K-based.  
 
War/Conflict/Terror - concerning any terrorist activity or atrocity, or any intra-
national or international conflict involving injury and destruction beyond what may 
be reasonably considered as “civil unrest” or “foreign affairs”. (The commemorations 
of WWI during 2014 for example, were often coded as “Art / Culture / History”). 
 
Religious/Religion - concerning a dominant religious element, but not when 
sectarianism was overshadowed by war or terrorism.  
 
Accidents/Tragedies/Disasters - concerning an unforeseen accident or tragedy 
involving loss of life or loss of property. Some such stories were coded as “Weather”, 
depending on the central thrust of the story. 
 
Science/Technology/Space - concerning scientific or technological advances, and 
developments which could not be accommodated elsewhere. Some stories about 
medical equipment were also considered as “Health/Medical”, depending on the 
thrust of the story. 
 
Sport - concerning any sort of sport. Where the story thrust concerned a single 
personality rather than any sport they play, then “Celebrity” was sometimes chosen, 
if more appropriate. 
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Celebrity - concerning any well-known personality or personalities, where their 
celebrity was a central, rather than an incidental element of the report, and where 
the story may not have made the news if it was not for the celebrity element. 
 
Health/Medical/Disease/Research - concerning health issues, or disease, or the 
investigations into disease and illness (for example the Ebola crisis). Stories 
concerning the UK’s National Health Service or the actions or activities of medical 
professionals or practitioners which were coded “NHS/Medical”. 
 
Popular Entertainment - concerning popular entertainment such as films, pop music 
and so on. In other words, entertainment and culture commonly considered as “low 
culture”.  
 
Immigration/Asylum - concerning the movement (legal or otherwise) of individuals 
or groups from one country to another.  
 
Civil Unrest - concerning peaceful protesting and the general unrest within any 
country stopping that stops short of war, conflict and loss of life.  
 
Environment - concerning environmental affairs and issues, including climate 
change. 
 
Human Interest - concerning a human element (often light-hearted) that cannot be 
categorised elsewhere. 
 
Animal related - concerning animals, whether trivial/light-hearted or more serious 
issues such as bird flu or foot and mouth. 
 
Foreign Affairs - concerning affairs not categorised as “war/conflict/terrorism”, and 
where the focus was not on an individual politician. Also includes foreign economies, 
but not specific or generic business stories. 
 
Weather - concerning the weather and its consequences. Where there was 
significant loss of life, these were coded as “accidents”.   
 
Media - concerning the functions and operations of media organisations. The 
business and commercial elements of media are coded as either “Business Specific” 
or “Business Generic”. 
 
Art/Culture/History - concerning more highbrow entertainment, which could be 
described as “high culture”. Also includes references to history often intertwined 
with cultural icons and artefacts.  
 
Newspaper headlines/Review - concerning a review of the next day’s newspaper 
headlines. 
 
Business Specific - concerning a specific commercial organisation or personality.  
 
Generic Business - concerning a business sector, or group of businesses that were in 
some way connected, such as the insurance or cosmetic industries for example.  
 
Market Summary - concerning stock market or currency news. 
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Nuancing of “Business Specific” or “Business Generic” sub stories (one chosen).       
If “Business Specific” or “Business Generic” were chosen, then such items were 
coded further, to capture the particular sector, and the particular issue being 
reported on. These categories captured these business sectors: 
 
Banks/Lenders - concerning banks, building societies or pay day lenders. 
 
Insurance - concerning any form of insurer. 
 
Motor - concerning motor manufacturers, rather than the more generic “Transport” 
sector. 
 
Technology/Media/Communications - concerning organisations like computer 
/tablet/mobile phone manufacturers, media organisations and PR companies. 
 
Fashion/Cosmetics - concerning clothing/fashion companies and make-up. 
Pharmaceuticals (non-cosmetic) were coded accordingly.  
 
Agriculture - concerning any story about farming or the products of farming.  
 
Energy - concerning gas, electricity, oil and any other sort of energy source. 
 
Hospitality/Catering/Travel/Leisure - concerning hotels, theme parks, leisure 
centres, restaurants, and holidays more widely. Some stories were coded as 
“Transport” if this was better described the major thrust of the story. 
 
Home improvement/Building property development - concerning construction, 
home improvements and property management / speculation. 
 
Transport - concerning roads, rail, airports, buses, planes and so on. Motor car 
manufacturing was coded as “Motor”. 
 
Supermarkets - concerning large or small supermarkets. 
 
Pharmaceuticals - concerning the manufacture of drugs and medicines (non-
cosmetic). 
 
Food Production - concerning any high or low technology food processing (as distinct 
from “Agriculture”). 
 
Online retail - concerning reports where the online element of retail was central. 
 
Postal - concerning stories about any postal or delivery services. 
 
Toys - concerning toy or fancy goods manufacturing. 
 
Generic retail - a default category when the story does not fit other retail categories 
(such as “supermarket”, “online” and so on). 
 
Betting - concerning the broad gambling industry (including online gambling). 
 
Coffee or wine retail - concerning the sales of coffee or wine. 
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Steel - concerning the manufacturers of steel. 
 
Arms - concerning the manufacturing of munitions and ordnance. 
 
Public sector - concerning the civil service, and any nationalised institutions not 
covered by any of the other categories.  
 
Engineering - concerning engineering/industrial manufacturing not adequately 
described by any other categories. 
 
Water - concerning the private/public utility of water supplies. 
 
Mining - concerning the mining of materials (which are not otherwise described as 
“energy”). 
 
Unspecified - where the sector is unclear. 
 
 
Further nuancing of “Business” sub stories (one chosen). 
Once the sector was selected, “Business Specific” or “Business Generic” reports were 
nuanced further. These categories captured business issues - 
 
Pensions - concerning the provision of pensions by employers, and their payment to 
employees/retirees. 
 
Scotland - concerning the implications to business from any possible future Scottish 
independence. 
 
Taxation - concerning any types of tax including VAT, income, capital gains, 
corporation and so on. 
 
Climate Change/environment - concerning the impact of business on climate change 
and the environment. 
 
Working hours - concerning the length of the working day, or any other issue 
concerned with the amount of hours that people work, or are required to work.  
  
Migration/offshoring of jobs/relations with overseas companies - a wide category 
concerning how organisations and their jobs moved overseas, and/or the trading 
relationships between organisations across national borders. 
 
Workplace issues - this is a default category about places of work where no other 
category was appropriate. 
 
Data protection - concerning all matters of data storage, accessibility and protection. 
 
Productivity – concerning issues regarding levels of output. 
 
Pay - concerning all elements of remuneration, ranging from executive salaries, to 
the minimum wage and all points in between. 
 
Failing organisations - concerning companies that are struggling or in decline. 
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Product/plant/vessel launch - concerning the opening of any new building or 
industrial facility, or the launch of any new product. 
 
Refurbishment - concerning reports about the refitting of buildings or ships. 
 
Strikes - concerning all types of industrial action. 
 
Market dominance of geographical area -  concerning reports where industries or 
sectors dominate a specific geographical area. 
 
Profitability/prices/sales levels - concerning reports about the sales performance 
and pricing strategies. 
 
Takeover/merger/sales/alliance - concerning reports about any ways in which 
organisations join forces, permanently, formally or otherwise. International 
relationships may be often coded as “Migration/offshoring of jobs/relations with 
overseas companies” if more appropriate. 
 
Compensation - concerning reports about how compensatory payments are made 
from one party to another. 
 
Customer/supplier relations - concerning the interaction between organisations and 
their suppliers or customers, as opposed to the relationships between companies.  
 
Unethical/illegal behaviour - concerning the nefarious activities of either whole 
organisations, or groups or individuals within them. This includes behaviour that 
appears or is described as unethical even though it may still be legal.  
 
Recalls/Faulty products - concerning products being recalled by their manufacturers. 
 
Planning issues - concerning the application for constructing new buildings. 
 
Home improvement of building - concerning the construction industry more widely. 
 
Share value - concerning the movement/fluctuation of company share values. 
 
Leadership issues - concerning organisational leadership, and where no other 
category is more appropriate. 
 
Ethical shopping - concerning the issue of sourcing any materials from organisations 
who promote and support ethical sourcing of their products, and/or avoid certain 
types of investment and so on. 
 
Job losses - concerning redundancies and job losses that are not involved in 
companies moving across international borders (see “Migration/ offshoring”).  
 
Industry showcase - concerning special events or occasions when industries are 
showcased (military displays, for example). 
 
Employee relations - concerning interaction between companies and their 
employees (as opposed to the relationships between companies and their customers 
or suppliers). 
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Advertising regulations - concerning the legislation, rules and the general policing of 
advertising. 
 
Union issues - concerning any reports where trade unions or their members are 
central. 
  
General levels of employment and job creation - concerning employment rates, and 
creating jobs, rather than job losses or reductions.  
 
New regulations - concerning legislation or regulation generally (but not advertising). 
 
Sustainability - concerning the long term survival of a particular sector/industry. 
Sustainable energy for example, was coded as either “environment” or “energy”, 
depending on the dominant element of the report. 
 
Product availability - concerning the availability of products, including shortages, 
over production, and so on. 
 
Water supplies and suppliers - concerning the supply of water and those 
organisations supplying it. 
  
Safety issues - concerning the general issue of safety of employees, customers and 
suppliers. 
 
 
Further nuancing of “Economy” sub stories (one chosen)    
If “Economy” was chosen, then these items were analysed further to capture the 
particular issues being covered. These issues were as follows - 
 
Banking/Lending - concerning the lending of money. 
 
Energy - concerning the provision of energy in the broadest sense. For example, this 
would include the debate about nuclear power stations and how these may impact 
the wider economy. 
 
Transport - concerning road, sea or air transportation. 
 
Property development - concerning the speculation of land and property. 
 
Inflation - concerning the rate of inflation. 
 
Interest rates or mortgages - concerning reports about interest rates and/or the 
financial products known as mortgages, rather than about housing prices and the 
process of buying a house, which are coded accordingly. 
 
House prices or housing market - concerning the state of the housing market in 
terms of prices and fluctuations. 
 
Budget - concerning the periodic and formal financial statements by the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer. 
 
Government borrowing - concerning the sums involved in government borrowing. 
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Cost of living - concerning more general descriptions of fluctuations in the prices of 
commonly required items.  
Trade deficit/national debt - concerning the amount owed by a particular nation, or 
the gap between exported and imported products.  
Minimum wage - concerning the legally set minimum rate of pay. 
Pensions - concerning either private or state pensions. 
Eurozone - where the entity of the European trading area/union is central to the 
report. 
Ireland - specifically concerning the economic landscape of the Republic of Ireland 
(Northern Ireland issues are coded as per the remainder of the U.K).  
Taxation - concerning any sort of taxation. 
National Assets - concerning artefacts, commodities, land or buildings which are 
owned by the state. 
Currency - concerning any national or international currency. 
General financial situation - concerning the general financial landscape, and where 
no other category is appropriate. 
Growth/GDP - concerning the rate of increase of a nation’s Gross Domestic Product. 
Austerity - concerning a government’s adoption of policies involving cutbacks and 
spending restraint thought to impact many ordinary people. 
Productivity - concerning the rate of output, and/or manufacturing efficiency. 
Pay - concerning rates of pay other than the minimum wage. 
Market/area dominance - concerning reports of how one geographical area is 
dominated by a particular sector. 
Employment/job creation - concerning rates of employment on a 
general/nationwide basis. 
Investing in business - concerning the ways in which governments promote and 
invest in industry.  
Summary (one chosen). 
This was a short explanation of the whole story capturing its central feature. For 
example: “Prime Minister announces a new bedroom tax”. 
Story Order (one chosen). 
This notes the order in which the story (usually comprising more than one news 
items) appeared within the bulletin. 
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Story Length (one chosen). 
The length of the story (usually comprising of more than one news items) in seconds. 
This was measured from the start of the anchor or reporter speaking until the end of 
their speech act, or the end of the videotape. 
 
There were no more variables involved with Level 1 Content Analysis. 
 
Level 2 Content Analysis. 
For items deemed to contain traces/references of the key PIE issues, then additional 
variables in addition to those variables attended to by Level 1 analysis:   
 
Journalistic conventions (one chosen). 
There were instances where stories were sub divided into a number of conventions. 
For example, a general story about foodbanks might begin with a general 
introduction, followed by another item (by a different reporter) explaining the 
reasons why foodbanks are increasing, focusing on the lived experiences of those 
involved. In such a case, this would be coded as two separate items. 
The news item itself was categorised as being either of the following: 
 
Anchor - where the story was only dealt with by the news anchor on a self-contained 
basis. If a very short anchor introduction then moved to another convention, the 
other convention was chosen. 
 
Live two way - a live interaction between the news anchor and a reporter. 
 
Live two way with embedded package - where the interaction between news 
anchor and reporter contained an edited package - usually the non-live section was 
positioned between live elements. 
 
Edited package - a non-live intervention narrated by a reporter (not an anchor) 
which may include interviews, footage, graphics and so on. 
 
Context (one chosen). 
Each PIE item was deemed to be concerned with one of the following: 
 
Poverty - a story was deemed to be about poverty when the narrative contained 
reference to financial hardship on a collective or individual basis exceeding what 
might be described as discomfort. 
 
Wealth - a story was deemed to be about wealth when the narrative contained 
reference to financial prosperity on a collective or individual basis. 
 
Income inequality - a story was deemed to be about income inequality when the 
narrative contained reference to the comparison between wealth and poverty, high 
pay and low pay, or financial comfort and discomfort. 
 
Squeezed middle - a story was deemed to be about the squeezed middle when the 
narrative contained reference to financial discomfort rather than anything that might 
instead be considered as poverty. 
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Prominence within report (one chosen) 
This measured the prominence of the PIE theme within the news items. Items were 
deemed to be one of the following: 
Passing - where the PIE theme was present, but was hardly referred to and 
mentioned only in passing, or where the PIE theme was clearly present and referred 
to more strongly, but it is still not the central to the report. 
Substantive - where the PIE theme was central to the report. 
Area (one chosen) 
The geographical region referred to in the PIE report the poverty were determined to 
be one of the following: 
Africa - concerning the whole of the African content. 
U.K - concerning England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
Asia - concerning all parts of Asia including the Middle East, China and India. 
Rest of Europe - concerning countries in Europe other than the UK. 
The Americas - concerning North, South and Central America. 
Rest of the World - concerning nations not included in the other categories, or 
where the story was a generic “world” issue. 
The ways that journalists frame stories (one chosen). 
Each PIE report was categorised as being thematic, episodic, or a mixture of both: 
Wholly or mainly thematic - where the report was presented mainly or completely 
in general terms, with little or no specific examples.  
Wholly or mainly episodic - where the report was presented mainly or completely in 
specific terms, with little or no wider context.  
Roughly equal – where there was no clear imbalance one way or the other. 
Causes of POVERTY expressed by journalists (more than one chosen). 
If a POVERTY news item (irrespective of whether implied, passing or substantive) 
included a mention of description of causality, one or more of the following are 
selected: 
Low wages/seasonal work/no work/wages below inflation - concerning work and 
wages.  
Prices/rents/interest rates/inflation/others going up - concerning these general 
item increases and /or the overall level of increase (inflation). 
Overspending/risk taking/borrowing/ ddiction - concerning these elements which 
can be collectively described as individualistic causes and “living beyond ones 
means”. 
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War/migration/failure of crops/disease/lack of aid - concerning war and its impact, 
natural phenomena, poor health and hygiene and a lack of assistance. These might 
be considered fatalistic causes. 
 
Actions by commercial organisations - refers to companies moving abroad, closing 
factories and any other sort of commercial sector action.  
 
Government polices including benefit cuts/delays - where government policies are 
seen to be the “systemic” causes of poverty. 
 
Rich exploiting the poor/enforcing slavery/criminality - these are more fatalistic 
causes of poverty. 
 
Causes of WEALTH expressed by journalists (more than one chosen). 
If a WEALTH item (irrespective of whether implied, passing or substantive) included a 
mention of description or causality, one or more of these were selected: 
 
Economic or political stability/government or EU policies - refers to the general 
economic conditions that might be conducive to prosperity. 
 
Criminality and unethical behaviour - where the wealthy gained their money from 
nefarious means. 
 
High salaries/bonus payments - where wealth was acquired through high salaries 
and bonus payments. 
  
Globalisation/migration - where wealth was acquired through expansion and 
offshoring. 
 
Good fortune - including windfalls, lottery wins, inheritance and so on. 
 
Entrepreneurship and endeavour - a recognition that hard work, innovation, and 
other (legal) endeavour has been responsible for creating wealth. 
 
Causes of INCOME INEQUALITY expressed by journalists (can be more than one). 
If an INCOME INEQUALITY item (irrespective of whether implied, passing or 
substantive) included a mention or description of causality, one or more of these 
were selected: 
 
Difference in educational opportunity - concerning the disparity in the chances to go 
to various schools, access to higher education and so on. 
 
Rich exploiting the poor/enforcing slavery/criminality - these are fatalistic causes, 
concerning how the poor are being somehow exploited by the poor. 
 
Government polices including benefit cuts/delays - where government policies are 
seen to be the “systemic” causes of poverty. 
 
Companies offshoring or being dominant in their sector - where companies moving 
overseas or dominating their industry sector somehow caused an increase in 
inequality levels. 
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High salaries/bonus payments - where high end salaries increasing more than 
average salaries in turn increased the gap between the wealthy and the poor. 
 
Gender imbalance - where gender issues increased inequality. For example, this 
could be where male salaries are more than female salaries, causing localised 
inequality. 
 
Benefits with jobs or pensions that increase disposable income - where 
accommodation, bonuses and other benefits mean that some workers have even 
greater salaries than is initially apparent. 
   
Causes of SQUEEZED MIDDLE expressed by journalists (can be more than one). 
If a SQUEZZED MIDDLE item (irrespective of whether implied, passing or substantive) 
included a mention or description of causality, one or more of these were selected: 
 
Prices/rents/interest rates/inflation/others going up - where general increases have 
caused poverty. 
 
Low or frozen wages/seasonal or no work/wages below inflation - where the lack 
of work, or lowly paid work, or low wages more generally have caused poverty. 
 
Market collapse/falling demand - where a lack of demand has brought poverty to 
the lives of those within that market or sector. 
 
Government polices - where government policies (perhaps including benefit cuts or 
delays but not including taxation) are seen to be the “systemic” causes of poverty. 
 
Poor lending practices - where people have been drawn into poverty by 
poor/excessive lending practices of the financial sector.  
 
Pension failures - where people have experienced poverty because their pensions 
have failed or have been reduced. 
  
War/migration/failure of crops/disease - if poverty has been brought on by war and 
its impact, natural phenomena and poor health / hygiene. 
 
Consequences of POVERTY as expressed by journalists (can be more than one). 
If an item referring to POVERTY (irrespective of whether implied, passing or 
substantive) included a description of consequences, one or more of these were 
selected: 
 
Forced into slavery/bonded labour/prostitution/begging/selling body parts/selling 
children/forced sterilisation/attempted suicide - where people are forced to do any 
of these things because they are poor. 
 
Disease and ill health - where bad health outcomes are consequential of poverty. 
              
Hunger - where a lack of ability to afford to buy food is seen as a consequence of 
poverty. 
  
Poor living conditions/sanitation/squalor/overcrowding - where people are forced 
into poor physical living conditions. 
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Financial hardship/debt/bankruptcy/must deal with inflated prices – a general 
category referring to the more financial consequences of poverty. 
  
Migration - where people are so poor they are forced to leave their home countries. 
 
Other - consequences that are not addressed by any of the other categories. 
 
Consequences of WEALTH as expressed by journalists (can be more than one). 
If an item referring to WEALTH (irrespective of whether implied, passing or 
substantive) included a description of consequences, one or more of these were 
selected: 
 
Glamorous lifestyles/expensive homes and possessions and projects - where 
wealth was said to bring obviously glamourous lifestyles. 
 
Facilitates philanthropy - where wealth enables financial help for others and good 
causes. 
 
Bad/criminal behaviour - where the consequence of wealth is that the wealthy 
behave badly and/or abuse the power it brings. 
 
Anger/protest/instability - where wealth was reacted to by others in terms of 
protest. 
 
Wealth means that divorce is costly/does not bring quality of life - where divorce 
settlements are higher, or other instances where wealth has not obviously improved 
the quality of someone’s life. 
 
Brings security/prosperity/happiness/ influence - a more general category capturing 
other ways that wealth has improved someone’s life. 
 
 Brings benefits to the markets/economy - where wealth makes a difference to 
commerce and the wider economy.  
 
Consequences of INCOME INEQUALITY as expressed by journalists (can be more 
than one). 
If an item referring to INCOME INEQUALITY (irrespective of whether implied, passing 
or substantive) included a description of consequences, one or more of these were 
selected: 
 
Economic hardship/repossessions/dependence on aid/benefits - where the 
consequences of income inequality are shown to be more about the lack of money. 
 
Disease/ill health - where the consequences of income inequality are poor health 
outcomes.  
 
Protest/anger/strike - where inequality causes expressions of protest and anger. 
 
Physical discomforts such as hunger, poor housing, squalid conditions - 
concentrates on the more physical consequences of inequality (apart from disease 
and ill heath). 
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Differentials in opportunity - where there is a difference in the types of opportunity 
available to the rich and poor. 
 
Misdeeds of the rich - where the consequence of inequality is that the wealthy 
behave badly and/or abuse the power that it brings. 
 
Loss of work - where inequality is shown to directly or indirectly cause job losses. 
 
Less economic stability/dysfunctional society - where society more widely is seen to 
suffer as a result of income inequality. 
 
Glamorous lifestyles - where inequality of earnings means that some people benefit 
in terms of their lifestyles.   
 
Consequences of SQUEEZED MIDDLE as expressed by journalists (can be more than 
one) 
If an item referring to the SQUEEZED MIDDLE (irrespective of whether implied, 
passing or substantive) included a description of consequences, one or more of these 
were selected: 
 
Economic hardship/repossessions - where the consequences are the more financial 
aspects of discomfort. 
 
Disease/ill health - where the consequences are associated with poor health 
outcomes. 
 
Protest/anger/strike - where squeezed middle express protest and/or anger. 
 
People force to take extra work to enhance pensions/income - where people are 
forced to consider and pursue additional sources of income. 
 
Other - consequences that are not addressed in any of the other categories. 
 
Blame for any PIE issue as expressed by journalists (can be more than one). 
If any PIE story included an ascription of blame, one or more of these were selected: 
 
Government - where any government is collectively to blame. 
 
Particular political actor - if any politician, or head of state is to blame. 
 
Organisations - if any organisation (commercial or otherwise) is said to be complicit. 
 
Consumers - if consumers are to blame because of for their excessive behaviour. 
 
Actions called for by journalists in PIE issue story (can be more than one). 
If any PIE story included any call for action, one or more of these were selected: 
 
Intervention by UK Government - calls for the government of the day to step in and 
take some action, which could be economic, legal military and so on. 
 
The “west” must help the “east” - calls for richer nations in the west to give 
monetary aid, or apply sanctions and/or other help to poorer countries in the east. 
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Private sector action - calls for the commercial sector to take action, perhaps by 
increasing pay, or by not employing illegal labour for example. 
Unspecified help - where “help” is referred to generically and is not articulated in 
specific terms. 
Consumer action - where action should be taken by ordinary people in terms of their 
purchasing habits, or using their shareholding to express protest for example. 
There are other expressions about PIE issues that are significant, but do not occur in 
the context as either cause, consequence, blame or action. Attending to these other 
types of discourses ensured that the key themes associated with PIE stories were 
captured within the data. They were coded according to the following: 
Other discourses about POVERTY expressed by journalists (can be more than one). 
If, within poverty items, there were other evident discourses that were not identified 
either as cause, blame, consequence or action, one or more of these were selected: 
Discourses about the misery and distress of poverty - describing the way poverty 
makes people feel. 
Discourse about the increasing poverty - describing how more people are affected 
by poverty. 
Discourses about greed or misbehaviour of the wealthy - describing greed and 
misbehaviour, usually of the rich. 
Discourse about lack of agency on behalf of governments and agency - describing 
how governments are not taking steps to address the issue of poverty. 
Discourses about how poverty is being addressed by governments - describing how 
governments are taking steps to address the issue of poverty. 
Discourses about how poverty is not being addressed by the private sector - 
describing how the commercial sector is not taking steps to address the issue of 
poverty. 
Discourses about protest and revolt - describing revolt and protest. 
More neutral descriptive discourses/commentary describing poverty - the default 
category where poverty is being described as neither positive nor negative. 
Other discourses about WEALTH expressed by journalists (can be more than one).     
If, within wealth items, there were other evident discourses that were not identified 
either as cause, blame, consequence or action, one or more of these were selected: 
Discourses about greed/misbehaviour/excess - describing how wealth is associated 
with bad behaviour, greed, excessive spending and lifestyles and so on.  
Discourses about the prevailing conditions associated with wealth - describing the 
wider economic system.  
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Discourses about intangible benefits of wealth - describing less physical and 
measurable benefits of wealth, including fame, the building of power and so on. 
Discourses about how wealth is good for the economy - describing how wealth 
stimulates and generally benefits the wider economic landscape. 
Discourses about negative aspects of wealth - describing how wealth brings more 
negative associations, for example, with higher taxation and unwanted fame and 
scrutiny, for example.  
Discourses about philanthropy - describing how wealth facilities assistance for good 
causes. 
Discourses about how endeavour brings wealth - describing the association 
between hard work and financial success.  
Discourses about how wealth/high wages are necessary for staff retention or 
attraction or to properly reward performance - describing the necessity of paying 
high salaries to keep and attract the best staff. 
Other discourses about INCOME INEQUALITY expressed by journalists (can be more 
than one).      
If, within income inequality items, there were other evident discourses that were not 
identified either as cause, blame, consequence or action, one or more of these were 
selected: 
Discourses about greed, excess and misbehaviour - describing how wealth is 
associated with bad behaviour, greed, excessive spending and lifestyles and so on.  
Discourses about how inequality is increasing - describing the increasing gap 
between the rich and poor, whether with some form or measurement or not. 
Discourses comparing pay/lifestyles/differences between genders - describing 
some sort of explicit comparison. 
Discourses about the misery and distress of poverty - describing the types of 
negative feelings associated with poverty makes people feel. 
Discourses about the prevailing conditions - describing the wider economic system 
and conditions that allow inequality to exist.  
Discourse that defend the wealthy - describing how the wealthy are not complicit. 
Discourses about recovery - describing how the economic is improving. 
Discourses about protest and revolt - describing how income inequality has 
generated expressions of revolt and protest. 
Discourses about the different positions between Labour and Conservative - 
describing how Labour would tax the wealthy, but the Conservatives would be more 
sympathetic to them.  
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Discourses about how the private sector is complicit - describing the association 
between rising inequality and how the commercial sector drives the problem. 
 
Discourses about how the trade unions are helpful - describing the positive 
contribution made by trade unions in easing income inequality. 
 
Discourses about how governments and central banks are attempting to ease 
inequality - describing how these institutions are adopting polices that are at least 
not make the problem worse, and may even be easing it.  
 
Other discourses about the SQUEEZED MIDDLE expressed by journalists (more than 
one can be chosen)                  
If, within squeezed middle items, there were other evident discourses that were not 
identified either as cause, blame, consequence or action, one or more of these were 
selected: 
                   
Discourses about negativity or distress - describing the distress associated with 
financial discomfort. 
 
Discourses comparing pay/lifestyles/differences between gender or geography - 
describing some sort of explicit comparison. 
 
Discourses about recovery - describing how the economic is improving. 
 
Discourses about how governments and central banks are attempting to ease 
discomfort - describing how these institutions are adopting polices that are at least 
not making the problem worse, and/or how austerity is necessary.  
 
Discourses about the prevailing conditions - describing the wider economic system 
and conditions allowing the middle to be squeezed.  
 
Discourses about how many people not feeling any benefit despite an apparent 
recovery - describing the lack of an association between the supposed recovery and 
people benefiting from it. 
 
Discourses about governments exacerbating discomfort - describing how 
government policies in general are making the discomfort even worse.  
 
Discourses about the pain of austerity - describing how the specific policies 
associated austerity are causing distress. 
 
Discourses about protest and revolt - describing how income inequality has 
generated expressions of revolt and protest. 
 
Discourses about how wages have caught up with inflation - describing the parity 
between pay and inflation, so that its impact is negated.  
 
Discourses about greed, excess and misbehaviour - describing how wealth is 
associated with bad behaviour, greed, excessive spending and lifestyles and so on.  
Other – other discourses that are not addressed in any of the other categories. 
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Images shown during POVERTY reports (can be more than one).                  
If there were any identifiable images that are clearly used to index poverty, then one 
or more of these was selected: 
 
Slums/overcrowding/poor villages in Africa or Asia/homelessness/overcrowding - 
typically familiar images involving poor housing, lack of sanitation and so on. 
 
People being inactive - people sitting around and not engaged in any particular 
activity. 
 
People queuing for food - people in queues for food.  
 
People migrating - people leaving their homes, with their possessions and relocating.   
 
Protest and violence - people in protests, demonstrations or violent confrontations.   
 
People doing menial jobs - people engaged in routine, simple manual tasks. 
 
Houses/ house buying or generic consumer spending - images associated with 
spending money, often including supermarket shopping and “house for sale” signs. 
                  
Images shown during WEALTH reports (can be more than one).                  
If there were any identifiable images clearly used to index wealth, then one of more 
of these was chosen: 
 
The trappings of wealth - usually houses, cars, jewellery, and other apparently 
expensive items. 
 
Overcrowding/slum living - typically familiar images involving poor housing, lack of 
sanitation and so on, shown as a contrast to wealth. 
 
Generic shots of consumerism - images associated with spending money, often 
including supermarket shopping and “house for sale” signs. 
 
People doing menial jobs - people engaged in routine, simple manual tasks. 
 
Images of protest and violence - in response to perceived injustice.  
                  
Images shown during INCOME INEQUALITY reports (can be more than one).  
If there are any identifiable images clearly used to index income inequality, then one 
of more of these was chosen: 
  
Images of protest and dissent - in response to perceived injustice. 
 
Images of slums/overcrowding/poor villages in Africa or Asia/homelessness/ 
overcrowding - typically familiar images involving poor housing, lack of sanitation 
and so on. 
 
People doing menial jobs - people engaged in routine, simple manual tasks. 
 
The trappings of wealth - usually houses, cars, jewellery, and other apparently 
expensive items. 
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Generic shots of consumerism - images associated with spending money, often 
including supermarket shopping and “house for sale” signs. 
 
People being inactive - people sitting around and not engaged in any particular 
activity. 
 
People queuing for food - people in queues for food.  
 
Images shown during SQUEEZED MIDDLE reports (can be more than one).  
If there are any identifiable images clearly used to index the squeezed middle, then 
one of more of these was chosen: 
 
Families and homes - images of “regular” families a home or around their homes. 
 
Consumer spending - images associated with spending money, often including 
supermarket shopping and “house for sale” signs. 
 
Images of protest, terrorism and violence - in response to perceived injustice. 
  
People doing menial tasks - people engaged in routine, simple manual tasks. 
 
Overcrowding - typically familiar images involving poor housing, and people living in 
cramped conditions. 
 
Metrics used by journalists to describe PIE issue (can be more than one).                  
If PIE issues were quantified or expressed using numeric measures, then one of more 
of these was chosen: 
  
Inflation - expressed in terms of a percentage. 
 
Levels of pay/personal wealth/personal expenses - expressed in amounts, or rates 
of pay. 
 
Employment rates - expressed in figures or percentages. 
 
Stats from proprietary report - any numerical references to official figure. 
 
Prices of key staple items - prices of housing, food, other essential bills and so on 
expressed in terms of cost or percentage increases/decreases. 
 
Levels of disease and life expectancy - expressed in various ways. 
 
Levels of debt - expressed in figures or percentages. 
 
Levels of aid - expressed in figures or percentages. 
 
Levels of crime - expressed in figures or percentages. 
 
Official levels - expressions of the official definition of poverty (60% of median 
income), Gini coefficient and so on. 
 
Comparisons with the wealthiest/other regions - comparisons in terms of sums or 
percentages. 
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Housing levels - expressed in figures or percentages. 
 
Levels of benefits - expressed in figures or percentages. 
 
“Quality of life” - this could be expressed in terms of a variety of ways, including 
survey results etc. 
 
Growth - expressed in terms of percentages. 
 
Cost of borrowing/interest rates/return on savings - expressed in figures or 
percentages. 
 
Numbers of repossessions - expressed in figures or percentages. 
 
Stock markets - expressed in figures or percentages. 
 
Taxation levels - expressed in figures or percentages. 
 
Consumer spending - expressed in figures or percentages. 
 
Public spending - expressed in figures or percentages. 
 
Educational achievement/social mobility - expressed in terms of levels of 
attainment, expressed in figures or percentages. 
 
This concludes the section of analysis attending to journalistic contributions. From 
this point onwards, variables concern contributions made by other social actors. 
 
Type of social actor contributing to PIE reports (one chosen). 
This concerns social actors other than journalists contributing to PIE news items. 
Onscreen information (captions, commentary and so on) assisted the categorisation 
of social actors, otherwise they were researched in further detail an ascribed one of 
the following: 
 
Family help group/campaigners - includes any sort of protest/campaigning/lobbying 
group. 
 
Citizen/citizen poll - includes anyone who in the absence of any verbal or visual label 
can be assumed to be an ordinary employee, a member of the public, or a poll 
quoting the public opinion. 
 
Politician - anyone labelled as a politician, including former politicians who are not 
clearly belonging to any other category. 
  
Business person/financial sector actors - anyone who is identified as representing a 
commercial organisation. 
 
Charity/Citizen Advice Bureau - anyone who is identified as representing a charity or 
the CAB. 
 
Criminal - anyone who is identified by their criminal activities. 
 
Religious leader - or anyone representing any religion group or movement. 
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Trade union - anyone representing any trade union. Unless they are labelled as such, 
members of the public are coded as “citizens” even if it is suspected that they may 
be trade union members. 
 
Celebrity - anyone who is famous but does not clearly fit into any other category.   
 
NGO/Head of Sporting Association - anyone identified as representing organisations 
who are neither commercial not government departments, and who do not fit into 
any other category. 
 
Academic/legal/economists/think tank - any of these social actors who are often 
presented as “experts”. 
 
Government department/public sector - including central banks, and medical or 
military sources. 
 
Political actors contributing to any PIE report (one chosen).  
If the social actors were coded “politician”, the parties they were identified as 
representing were coded accordingly. 
  
Conservative 
Labour 
Lib Dems 
Green 
UKIP 
 
Other/unknown – if no party was given but it was clear that the contributor was a 
politician, they were coded as “other/unknown”.    
 
Causes of POVERTY expressed by other social actors (can be more than one). 
If a poverty item (irrespective of whether implied, passing or substantive) includes a 
mention of description of causality, one or more of these are selected: 
 
Low wages/seasonal work/no work/wages below inflation - concerning work and 
wages.  
 
Prices/rents/interest rates/inflation/others going up - concerning these general 
increases. 
 
Overspending/risk taking/borrowing/addiction - concerning these elements which 
can be collectively described as individualistic causes and “living beyond ones 
means”. 
 
War/migration/failure of crops/disease/lack of aid - concerning war and its impact, 
natural phenomena, poor health and hygiene and a lack of assistance. Might be 
considered fatalistic causes. 
 
Actions by commercial organisations - refers to be companies moving abroad, 
closing factories and so on 
  
Government polices including benefit cuts/delays - where government policies are 
seen to be the “systemic” causes of poverty. 
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Rich exploiting the poor/enforcing slavery/criminality - these are also fatalistic 
causes, but also caused by poverty. 
 
Causes of WEALTH expressed by other social actors (can be more than one). 
If a wealth item (irrespective of whether implied, passing or substantive) included a 
mention of description or causality, one or more of these were selected: 
 
Economic or political stability/government or EU policies - this refers to the general 
economic conditions that might be conducive to prosper. 
 
Criminality and unethical behaviour - where the wealthy have gained their money 
from nefarious methods. 
 
High salaries/bonus payments - where wealth is attained through high salaries and 
bonus payments. 
  
Globalisation/migration – where wealth has been attained through expansion and 
offshoring. 
 
Good fortune - this might include a windfall, lottery win, inheritance and so on. 
 
Entrepreneurship and endeavour - a recognition that hard work, innovation, and 
other (legal) endeavour has been responsible for creating wealth. 
 
Causes of INCOME INEQUALITY expressed by other social actors (can be more than 
one). 
If an income inequality item (irrespective of whether implied, passing or substantive) 
included a mention or description of causality, one or more of these were selected: 
 
Difference in educational opportunity - concerning the disparity in the chances to go 
to various schools, access to higher education and so on. 
 
Rich exploiting the poor/enforcing slavery/criminality - these are also fatalistic 
causes, but also caused by poverty concerning the poor being somehow exploited by 
the poor. 
 
Government polices including benefit cuts/delays - where government policies are 
seen to be the “systemic” causes of poverty. 
 
Companies offshoring or being dominant in their sector - where companies moving 
overseas or dominating their industry sector has caused an increase in inequality 
levels. 
  
High salaries/bonus payments - where high end salaries increasing more than 
average salaries has increased the gap between the wealthy and the poor. 
 
Gender imbalance - where the issue of gender has increased inequality. For 
example, this could be where male salaries are more than female salaries, causing a 
localised inequality. 
 
Benefits with jobs or pensions that increase disposable income - where 
accommodation, bonuses and other benefits mean that some workers have even 
greater salaries than they appear to have. 
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Causes of the SQUEEZED MIDDLE expressed by social actors other than journalists 
(can be more than one). 
If a squeezed middle item (irrespective of whether implied, passing or substantive) 
included a mention or description of causality, one or more of these were selected: 
 
Prices/rents/interest rates/inflation/others going up - concerning these general 
increases. 
 
Low or frozen wages/seasonal or no work/wages below inflation - concerning work 
and wages. 
 
Market collapse/falling demand - where a lack of demand has impacted the lives of 
employees within that market or sector. 
 
Government polices - where government policies (not including taxation) are seen to 
be the “systemic” causes of financial discomfort. Can include benefit cuts / delays.  
 
Poor lending practices - where people have been drawn into financial discomfort by 
poor /excessive lending by the financial sector.  
 
Pension failures - where people have experienced discomfort because their pensions 
have failed or being reduced. 
  
War/migration/failure of crops/disease - concerning war and its impact, natural 
phenomena and poor health and hygiene which might be considered fatalistic 
causes. 
 
Consequences of POVERTY expressed by other social actors (can be more than 
one). 
If a poverty item (irrespective of whether implied, passing or substantive) included a 
description of consequences, one or more of these are selected: 
 
Forced into slavery/bonded labour/prostitution/begging/sell body parts/selling 
children/forced sterilisation/attempted suicide - where people are forced to do any 
of these things because they are poor. 
 
Disease and ill health - where bad health outcomes are consequential of poverty. 
              
Hunger - where a lack of ability to afford to buy food is seen as a consequence of 
poverty. 
  
Poor living conditions/sanitation/squalor/overcrowding - where people are forced 
into poor physical living conditions. 
  
Financial hardship/debt/bankruptcy/must deal with inflated prices - this general 
category refers to the more financial consequences of poverty. 
  
Migration - where people are so poor they are forced to leave their home countries. 
 
Other - consequences that are not addressed in any of the other categories. 
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Consequences of WEALTH expressed by other social actors (can be more than one). 
If a wealth item (irrespective of whether implied, passing or substantive) included a 
description of consequences, one or more of these are selected: 
 
Glamorous lifestyles/expensive homes and possessions and projects - where 
wealth is said to bring obviously glamourous lifestyles. 
 
Facilitates philanthropy - where wealth enables financial help for others and good 
causes. 
 
Bad/criminal behaviour - where the consequence of wealth is that the wealthy 
behave badly and/or abuse the power it brings. 
 
Anger/protest/instability - where wealth is reacted to by others in terms of protest. 
 
Wealth means that divorce is costly/does not bring quality of life - where divorce 
settlements are higher, or where wealth has not obviously improved the quality of 
someone’s life. 
 
Brings security/prosperity/happiness/influence - a more general category capturing 
other ways that wealth has improved someone’s life. 
 
 Brings benefits to the markets/economy - where wealth makes a difference to 
commerce and the wider economy.  
 
Consequences of INCOME INEQUALITY expressed by other social actors (can be 
more than one). 
If an income inequality item (irrespective of whether implied, passing or substantive) 
included a description of consequences, one or more of these are selected: 
 
Economic hardship/repossessions/dependence on aid/benefits - where the 
consequences of income inequality are shown to be more about the lack of money. 
 
Disease/ill health - where the consequences of income inequality are poor health 
outcomes.  
 
Protest/anger/strike - where inequality causes expressions of protest and anger. 
 
Physical discomforts such as hunger, poor housing, squalor - concentrates on the 
more physical consequences of inequality (apart from disease and ill heath). 
 
Differentials in opportunity - where there is a difference in the types of opportunity 
available to the rich and poor. 
 
Misdeeds of the rich - where the consequence of inequality is that the wealthy 
behave badly and/or abuse the power it brings. 
 
Loss of work - where inequality is shown to directly or indirectly cause job losses. 
 
Less economic stability/dysfunctional society - where society more widely is seen to 
suffer as a result of income inequality. 
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Glamorous lifestyles - where inequality of earnings means that some benefit in 
terms of their lifestyles.   
 
Consequences of SQEEZED MIDDLE expressed by other social actors (can be more 
than one). 
If a squeezed middle story (irrespective of whether implied, passing or substantive) 
included a description of consequences, one or more of these are selected: 
 
Economic hardship/repossessions - where the consequences are the more financial 
aspects of discomfort. 
 
Disease/ill health - where the consequences are poor health outcomes. 
 
Protest/anger/strike - where squeezed middle causes expressions of protest and 
anger. 
 
People force to take extra work to enhance pensions/income - where people are 
forced to consider and pursue additional sources of income. 
 
Other - consequences that are not addressed in any of the other categories. 
 
Blame for PIE issues expressed by other social actors (can be more than one). 
If any PIE item included an ascription of blame, one or more of these were selected: 
 
Government - where any government is collectively to blame. 
 
Particular political actor - if any politician, or head of state is to blame. 
 
Organisations - if any organisation (commercial or otherwise) is said to be complicit. 
 
Consumers – for their excessive behaviour. 
 
Actions called for by journalists in PIE issue story (can be more than one). 
If any PIE item included any call for action, one or more of these were selected: 
 
Intervention by UK Government - calls for the government of the day to step in and 
take some action, which could be economic, legal military and so on. 
 
The “west” must help the “east” - calls for richer nations in the west to give 
monetary aid, apply sanctions and/or other help to poorer countries in the east 
 
Private sector action - calls for the commercial sector to take action, by increasing 
pay, or by not employing illegal labour. 
 
Unspecified help - where “help” is referred to generically and is not articulated in 
specific terms. 
 
Consumer action – where action should be taken by ordinary people in terms of 
their purchasing habits, or using their shareholding to express protest for example. 
 
There are other expressions about PIE issues that are significant, but do not occur in 
the context as either cause, consequence, blame or action. Attending to these other 
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types of discourses ensured that the key themes associated with PIE stories were 
captured within the data. They were coded according to the following: 
 
Other discourses about POVERTY expressed by other social actors (can be more 
than one).                  
If, within poverty items, there were other evident discourses not qualifying as cause, 
blame, consequence or action, one or more of these were selected: 
 
Discourses about the misery and distress of poverty - describing the way poverty 
makes people feel. 
 
Discourse about the increasing poverty - describing how more people are affected 
by poverty. 
 
Discourses about greed or misbehaviour of the wealthy - describing greed and 
misbehaviour. 
 
Discourse about lack of agency on behalf of governments and agency - describing 
how governments are not taking steps to address the issue of poverty. 
 
Discourses about how poverty is being addressed by governments - describing how 
governments are taking steps to address the issue of poverty. 
 
Discourses about how poverty is not being addressed by the private sector - 
describing how the commercial sector is not taking steps to address the issue of 
poverty. 
 
Discourses about protest and revolt - describing how poverty has generated 
expressions of revolt and protest. 
 
More neutral descriptive discourses/commentary describing poverty - the default 
category where poverty is being described as neither positive nor negative. 
                       
Other discourses about WEALTH expressed by journalists (can be more than one).                  
If, within wealth items, there were other evident discourses not qualifying as cause, 
blame, consequence or action, one or more of these are selected: 
 
Discourses about greed/misbehaviour/excess - describing how wealth is associated 
with bad behaviour, greed, excessive spending and lifestyles and so on.  
 
Discourses about the prevailing conditions associated with wealth - describing the 
wider economic system and conditions that facilitate wealth.  
 
Discourses about intangible benefits of wealth - describing the less physical and 
measurable benefits of wealth, including fame, the building of power and so on. 
 
Discourses about how wealth is good for the economy - describing the relationship 
between wealth and the wider economic landscape. 
 
Discourses about negative aspects of wealth - describing the relationship between 
wealth and it more negative associations.  
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Discourses about philanthropy - describing the relationship between wealth and 
good causes. 
               
Discourses about how endeavour brings wealth - describing the association 
between hard work and financial success.  
 
Discourses about how wealth/high wages are necessary for staff retention or 
attraction or to properly reward performance - describing the necessity of paying 
high salaries to keep and attract the best staff. 
                      
Other discourses about INCOME INEQUALITY expressed by journalists (can be more 
than one).                  
If, within income inequality items, there were other evident discourses not qualifying 
as cause, blame, consequence or action, one or more of these are selected: 
 
Discourses about greed, excess and misbehaviour - describing how wealth is 
associated with bad behaviour, greed, excessive spending and lifestyles and so on. 
 
Discourses about how inequality is increasing – describing the increasing gap 
between the rich and poor, whether with some form or measurement or not. 
 
Discourses comparing pay/lifestyles/differences between genders - describing 
some sort of explicit comparison. 
 
Discourses about the misery and distress of poverty - describing the feelings 
associated with poverty. 
 
Discourses about the prevailing conditions - describing the wider economic system 
and conditions that allow inequality to exist.  
 
Discourse that defend the wealthy - describing how the wealthy are not complicit. 
 
Discourses about recovery - describing how the economic is improving. 
 
Discourses about protest and revolt - expressions of revolt and protest. 
 
Discourses about the different positions between Labour and Conservative - 
describing how Labour would tax the wealthy, but the Conservatives would be more 
sympathetic to them.  
 
Discourses about how the private sector is complicit - describing the association 
between rising inequality and how the commercial sector drives the problem. 
 
Discourses about how the trade unions are helpful - describing the positive 
contribution made by trade unions in easing income inequality. 
 
Discourses about how governments and central banks are attempting to ease 
inequality - describing how these institutions are adopting polices that are at least 
not make the problem worse, and may even be easing it.  
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Other discourses about SQUEEZED MIDDLE expressed by journalists (can be more 
than one).                  
If, within squeezed middle stories, there were other evident discourses not qualifying 
as cause, blame, consequence or action, one or more of these are selected: 
                   
Discourses about negativity or distress - describing the distress associated with 
financial discomfort. 
 
Discourses comparing pay/lifestyles/differences between gender or geography - 
describing some sort of explicit comparison. 
 
Discourses about recovery - describing how the economic is improving. 
 
Discourses about how governments and central banks are attempting to ease 
discomfort - describing how these institutions are adopting polices that are at least 
not make the problem worse, and/or how austerity is necessary.  
 
Discourses about the prevailing conditions - describing the wider economic system 
and conditions that allow the middle to be squeezed.  
 
Discourses about how many people not feeling any benefit despite an apparent 
recovery - describing the lack of an association between the supposed recovery and 
people benefiting from it. 
 
Discourses about governments exacerbating discomfort - describing how 
government policies in general are making the discomfort even worse.  
 
Discourses about the pain of austerity - describing how the specific policies 
associated austerity are causing distress. 
 
Discourses about protest and revolt - expressions of revolt and protest. 
 
Discourses about how wages have caught up with inflation - describing the parity 
between pay and inflation, so that its impact is negated.  
 
Discourses about greed, excess and misbehaviour - describing how wealth is 
associated with bad behaviour, greed, excessive spending and lifestyles and so on.  
 
Other - discourses that are not addressed in any of the other categories. 
 
Metrics used by other social actors to describe PIE issue (can be more than one).                  
If poverty, income inequality, and so on were quantified or expressed using some 
numeric measure, then one or more of the following were chosen: 
  
Inflation - expressed in terms of a percentage. 
 
Levels of pay/personal wealth/personal expenses - expressed in amounts, or rates 
of pay. 
 
Employment rates - expressed in figures or percentages. 
 
Stats from proprietary report - any numerical references to official figure. 
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Prices of key staple items - expressed in terms of cost or percentage 
increases/decreases. 
 
Levels of disease and life expectancy - expressed in various ways. 
 
Levels of debt - expressed in figures or percentages. 
 
Levels of aid - expressed in figures or percentages. 
 
Levels of crime - expressed in figures or percentages. 
 
Official levels - expressions of the official definition of poverty (60% of median 
income), Gini coefficient and so on. 
 
Comparisons with the wealthiest/other regions - comparisons in terms of sums or 
percentages. 
 
Housing levels - expressed in figures or percentages. 
 
Levels of benefits - expressed in figures or percentages. 
 
“Quality of life” - this could be expressed in terms of a variety of ways, including 
survey results etc. 
 
Growth - expressed in terms of percentages. 
 
Cost of borrowing/interest rates/return on savings - expressed in figures or 
percentages. 
 
Numbers of repossessions - expressed in figures or percentages. 
 
Stock markets - expressed in figures or percentages. 
 
Taxation levels - expressed in figures or percentages. 
 
Consumer spending - expressed in figures or percentages. 
 
Public spending - expressed in figures or percentages. 
 
Educational achievement/social mobility - expressed in terms of levels of 
attainment, expressed in figures or percentages. 
 
Notes were made indicating what might be good examples of particular 
phenomenon, or whether items represented typical or atypical cases. 
 
This coding manual was provided to the researcher who carried out the reliability 
testing. More details of the testing process is outlined in Appendix 3a and 3b. 
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Appendix 3a. Reliability testing for coding. 
In order to validate the quantitative elements within this study, a researcher within 
Cardiff University was approached and asked to conduct an intercoder analysis on a 
sample from those stories appearing within Level 1 and Level 2 Content Analyses. This 
was to ensure that coding decisions had been consistent and that the analysis was 
repeatable, and that other researchers using the same methods and sample would 
generate similar results. 
Since the Level 1 Content Analysis sample was over 9,300 new items, a sample of just 
over 1% (100 items) was selected at random and given to the researcher. 
The Level 2 Content Analysis sample was 410 news items, and so the researcher was 
given a random sample amounting to 10%. Full coding manuals were also provided, and 
the researcher’s report is provided in Appendix 3b. The researcher was paid at the 
standard research rate from the candidate’s ESRC research allowance. 
As can be seen in Appendix 3b, of the Krippendorf Alpha scores calculated for this study, 
four variables are between 0.77 and 0.80, which are described as showing “substantial” 
agreement (Landis and Koch 1977, p.165). The remaining 12 scores are in excess of 0.81, 
which are described as showing “almost perfect” agreement (Landis and Kock 1977, 
p.165). 
The intercoder process is outlined in Appendix 3b. 
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Appendix 4a. Level 1 Content Analysis Coding sheet. 
 
BBC / ITV      Date.................................    Story order...................................................... 
 
Start time…………………………………………….  End time……………………….. Length in secs……………… 
 
Summary……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….   
                   
STORY CATEGORY (one only) 
 
UK ONLY – i.e. for UK politics, UK education, UK economy etc. 
Political Process / 
policy / obituary 
Political 
Scandal/Controversy  
Education Royal Family 
Home Affairs Defence Transport Economy 
NHS / Medical Scottish Independence   
UK AND BEYOND – i.e. crime can be US crime, Environment can concern the Artic etc. 
Crime War /Conflict/ Terror Religious / Religion Accidents/ Tragedies/ 
Disasters 
Science/ 
Technology 
Sport Celebrity Health/Medical/Disease/
Research 
Business Specific Popular Entertainment Immigration/Asylum Civil Unrest 
Environment Human Interest Animal related Foreign Affairs 
Weather Media Generic Business Art/Culture/History 
Newspaper 
headlines / Review 
Market Summary   
 
If ECONOMY is selected, chose one of these to describe the ISSUE being discussed: 
 
 
Banking / Lending Energy Home improvement or 
building 
Transport 
Property development Inflation Interest rates or 
mortgages 
Budget 
House prices or housing 
market 
Government borrowing Cost of living - Trade deficit / national 
debt 
Minimum wage Pensions - Eurozone Ireland  
Taxation National Assets Currency General financial 
situation 
Growth / GDP Austerity Productivity Pay 
Market / area dominance Employment / job 
creation 
Investing in business  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Code item 
Number 
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If BUSINESS SPECIFIC or BUSINESS GENERIC selected, choose one to describe the SECTOR being 
discussed: 
 
Banks/ Lenders Insurance Motor Technology/Media/Communications 
Fashion/Cosmetics Agriculture Energy Hospitality/ Catering / Travel / 
Leisure 
Home improvement / 
property development 
Transport Supermarkets Pharmaceuticals 
Food Production Online retail Postal  Toys  
Generic retail Betting Coffee or wine 
retail 
Steel 
Arms Public sector Engineering Water 
Mining Unspecified   
 
If BUSINESS SPECIFIC or BUSINESS GENERIC selected, choose one to describe the ISSUE being discussed: 
 
Pensions Scottish Independence Taxation Climate Change / 
environment 
Working hours Migration / offshoring / 
relations with overseas 
companies 
Workplace issues Data protection 
Productivity Pay Failing organisations Product / plant / vessel 
launch 
Refurbishment Strikes Market dominance of 
geographical area 
Profitability / prices / sales 
levels 
Takeover/merger 
/sales / alliance 
Compensation Customer / supplier 
relations 
Unethical / illegal 
behaviour 
Recalls /Faulty 
products 
Planning issues Share value Leadership issues 
Ethical shopping Job losses Industry showcase Employee relations 
Advertising 
regulations 
Union issues General levels of 
employment and job 
creation 
New regulations 
Sustainability Product availability Water supplies and 
suppliers 
Safety issues 
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Appendix 4b. Level 2 Content Analysis Coding Sheet. 
 
BBC / ITV      Date...........    Story order......  News item order.......... 
                   
JOURNALIST INTERVENTION (one only) 
Anchor  Anchor/reporter live two way 
Reporter edited package  Anchor/reporter live two way with embedded package 
 
Name reporter ...................................................Reporter title…………………………………………………………………..  
  
Which PIE issue?     P / IE / W / SM   (one only)                 Substantive / Central to report?    YES / NO 
 
Geographical location referred to…………………………………………………………………………………………………………... 
 
Subthemes within report (one only)………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
CAUSES of PIE issues present?     YES/ NO    Which PIE issue? (one only)…………………………………………………….   
 
Which causes?  (multiple if required) ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
 .......................................................................................................................................................................... 
 
CONSEQUENCES of PIE issues present?     YES/ NO    Which PIE issue? (one only)………………………………………..  
 
Which causes?  (multiple if required) ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
 .......................................................................................................................................................................... 
 
BLAME for PIE issues present?     YES/ NO    Which PIE issue? (one only)……………………………………………………..  
 
Who is blamed?  (multiple if required) ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
 ........................................................................................................................................................................... 
 
ACTION CALLED FOR present?     YES/ NO    Which PIE issue? (one only)……………………………………………………...  
 
Who is blamed?  (multiple if required) ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
 ........................................................................................................................................................................... 
 
Any other discourses used (multiple if required) ……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
Types of image used (multiple if required) ………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
Framing of report    
 
 
Metrics used?     YES/ NO   Which ?………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Wholly / mainly thematic Wholly / mainly  episodic Roughly equal 
Code item 
Number 
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 NON-JOURNALIST INTERVENTION WITHIN THE REPORT (use multiple sheets if required) 
 
Name ………………………………………………………. Social actor type (one only) …………………………………………………… 
 
If politician which party? ................................................................................................................................. 
 
Which PIE issue?     P / IE / W / SM   (one only)                 Substantive / Central to report?    YES / NO 
 
CAUSES of PIE issues present?     YES/ NO    Which PIE issue? (one only)…………………………………………………….   
 
Which causes?  (multiple if required) ………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
 ........................................................................................................................................................................... 
 
CONSEQUENCES of PIE issues present?     YES/ NO    Which PIE issue? (one only)………………………………………..  
 
Which causes?  (multiple if required) ………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
 .......................................................................................................................................................................... 
 
BLAME for PIE issues present?     YES/ NO    Which PIE issue? (one only)……………………………………………………..  
 
Who is blamed?  (multiple if required) ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
 ........................................................................................................................................................................... 
 
ACTION CALLED FOR present?     YES/ NO    Which PIE issue? (one only)……………………………………………………...  
 
Who is blamed?  (multiple if required) ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
 ........................................................................................................................................................................... 
 
Any other discourses used (multiple if required) ……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
Metrics used?     YES/ NO   Which ?………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
 
 
Notes   (Things that are noteworthy that coding frame has not captured)  
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Appendix 5. Glossary of CDA terms. 
These are the CDA analytical “tools” applied to the talk and text within the study, the results of which 
are described mainly in Chapters 6 and 8. Each is briefly described according to the definitions used 
by prominent scholars in the field: 
Tool Explanation / definition Informing References 
Presupposition Statements that might be contentious may go 
unchallenged in talk or text. For example, “shareholders 
feel that” assumes a consensus. Presuppositions help to 
generate wide agreement with what, in the absence of any 
questioning, appear to be reasonable and logical 
arguments. Statements are not themselves presumptive, 
but are given this characteristic by the speaker/writer.  
Fairclough (2000),          
Huckin (2002),               
Machin and Mayr 
(2012), Bahaa-eddin 
(2014) 
Lexical choices Different words generate different reactions from 
audiences. “Large” and “excessive” for example, might 
both be used to describe an executive salary. While both 
are evaluative, one suggests the salary is too high, while 
the other simply suggests it is considerable. Selecting one 
word over another can therefore develop a different story 
frame.   
Leitner (1980),              
Fairclough (2000),          
Machin and Mayr 
(2012) 
Metaphor Metaphors are used to explain phenomena, feelings, 
ideas, events and so on, in terms of something else that is 
often more familiar to audiences. Metaphors are figures of 
speech which may be more evocative or impactful. For 
example, the “financial tsunami” is more dramatic than 
“the financial crisis”. 
Morgan (1997),                    
Lakoff and Johnson 
(2003) 
Modality  Modality refers to the level of commitment that people 
demonstrate in talk or text. High or low modality shows 
variations in the degree of certainty. For example, the 
suffixes “I think”, “maybe” of “if” reduce the certainty of a 
statement.  
Wood and Kroger 
(2000), Hodge and 
Kress (2003), Machin 
and Mayr (2012) 
Absences and 
silences 
While what is present in talk and text is important, what is 
not present is also significant. Alternative opinions, 
explanations and interpretations that are not present can 
reveal a particular slant in the way that ideas are reported 
and presented. 
Huckin (1997),            
Blommaert (2005) 
Hedging Hedging is the purposeful avoidance of risk and a lack of 
certainty and commitment. Typically, hedging takes the 
forms of caveats, conditions and the introduction of 
uncertainty so that the speaker / writer cannot be held to 
account at some future point.  
Resche (2004),              
Machin and Mayr 
(2012) 
Three-part list A rhetorical device that is pleasing for the listener or 
reader, and appears to completely encapsulate an idea.  
For example, “for you, for me, for everyone” is a three-
part list which develops plenitude. The politically and 
Atkinson (1984, 
2004), Jones and 
Wareing (2010)  
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culturally famous “education, education, education” and 
“location, location, location” indicate that there are no 
other considerations other than schooling, or where you 
live. 
Use of “we” “We” can be inclusive or exclusive. Depending on its use, 
“we” can be used to develop a sense of commonality and 
shared experience. Alternatively, it can also be used to 
identify, isolate and separate.    
Fairclough (1989),    
Pennycock (1994), 
Krzyżanowski (2005)  
Rhetorical 
contrast 
A rhetorical contrast describes a phenomenon, feeling, 
idea, event and so on in terms of opposites. These 
opposites can be presented as pejorative and undesirable, 
thus making their alternative as a more positive default. 
Brown and Levinson 
(1978, Pennycock 
(1994),  Broda–Bahm 
et al. (2004), Machin 
and Mayr (2012) 
                  
Images and other visual data was analysed according to Barthes’ semiotic model: 
 
Tool Explanation / definition Informing References 
Denotation There is no neutral interpretation of any image, since 
readers will bring their own knowledge, perspective and 
opinions. The denotative level of interpretation is the most 
purely descriptive as it explains what can be seen, or what 
could be widely recognised. 
 
 
 
Barthes (1973; 1977), 
Bignell (2002), 
Chandler (2002), 
Machin (2007) 
 
Connotation The connotative level of interpretation considers the 
socio-cultural associations that readers are reminded of 
when looking at the image. Readers will imagine meanings 
from other domains when interpreting the image.  
Myth The myth is the ideological realm resulting from the 
combination of denotation and connotation. It is the 
widest and most abstract level of interpretation. For 
example, the appearance of very expensive cars and 
bottles of champagne in a report about executive 
remuneration evoke the ideological backdrop of opulence 
and excess. 
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Appendix 6. Interview consent. 
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Appendix 8. Transcript of interview with Michael 
Jermey (Head of News and Current Affairs, ITV) on 1st 
October 2015 at ITV Headquarters in Southbank, 
London.
RT = Author. 
MJ= Michael Jermey 
RT I have detected an element of homogeneity within the news output of ITV1 and 
BBC1.  ITV1 is seems, has moved to a harder agenda… you are nodding – is that 
because it’s something you know about, or were planning? 
MJ Yes… um... I find it fascinating that you looked at 2007 and 2014, and you’re 
absolutely right - it doesn’t surprise me that you’ve seen a difference [between the 
two years]. I took over my current role at the end of 2008/early 2009, although I’ve 
been involved in news a long time. Over the last few years we have had a strategy to 
invest in journalism in ITV, and to offer a high quality and highly credible set of 
programmes. Building on what’s been done over the years, I think if you looked 
you’d see some variation in positioning of news and so on. I won’t go back and talk 
about 2007, but I’ll talk about what we aim to do. We are aiming to expand our 
current affairs output across the range.  
ITV has long had Britain’s most watched current affairs programme which is the 
Tonight programme, which unpacks sometimes quite complex issues in a very 
accessible way for a mass audience. What we’ve done in the last number of years is 
to extend this into investigate journalism with Exposure, um …which most notably 
exposed the Jimmy Savile scandal. We’ve extended into political discussion – The 
Agenda with Tom Bradby and we’ve extended in national current affairs with The 
Assignment. Investigative current affairs, foreign current affairs and political current 
affairs were things that in the recent past - the first 7 or 8 years of the decade - 
weren’t really there on ITV.  
There’s history of them being there though, and so we’ve reintroduced them - within 
our network news programmes we recognised and believe that our viewers want 
highly credible journalism around foreign and domestic current affairs. We’ve 
invested in specialist journalism - roles like Penny Marshall, our Social Affairs Editor, 
our excellent Political Editor Tom Bradby, and in Business and Economics where we 
employed in around 2012, top Business and Economic Editors in Richard Edgar who 
came from the Financial Times, Laura Kuenssberg who came from the BBC (and who 
has since gone back), and we replaced Laura with Joel Hills who has a great track 
record in business reporting. We’ve invested in those areas, and in your specialism - 
business and economics, and the other end of it, social affairs. If you looked at say, 
our budget programme recently we had both the business and economic sides of 
things, but also the social impact on the squeezed middle and the poor. With Penny 
Marshall, and Ragi Omar has been employed in that period to as international affairs 
editor we are looking at every turn to invest in high quality journalism… 
RT So what I detected then, may be the manifestation of this investment and this 
conscious decision-making? 
MJ I don’t want to be in any sense critical of the past, because I have been involved 
myself in different roles, but we have made a conscious decision to make our 
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journalism as good as it can possibly be, because we think that’s the fight thing to 
do. I suspect that also, it flows well with the times – if you look back historically, I 
think there was probably a sense around 1989-90, the sort of end of history, end of 
the cold war, then there was the Bosnian civil war, and people remember a new 
seriousness of international affairs post 9/11- post the crash you know, there was an 
awful lot more attention on domestic economics and so forth, so I suspect it reflects 
a bit of a public mood as well. 
RT You have largely answered this I think, but regarding your approach to EBF news - 
in the same way you’ve invested in these other things, given the people you’ve 
recruited and your general approach, do you also have a more serious approach to 
EBF news? There’s one particular element that I’d like to ask you about. In 2007 
you used to run this 20 or 30 second market update, tracking the Dow Jones, the 
pound versus the dollar and that sort of thing.  This has disappeared by 2014 - now 
my take on that is that EBF news has become less about market fluctuations and 
more about people earning vast sums, working for banks that are complicit in the 
crash, and EBF news has become humanised almost - it’s no longer about numbers 
it’s about people - um - is that reflective of the decision to drop that market 
summary convention? 
MJ Sometimes decisions about things like that aren’t necessarily conscious. People have 
always been at the heart of ITV news, and we think we are good at telling stories 
from a people’s perspective - we’re on a channel that used to be called “The 
People’s Channel”. There are many decades of us being good at people-centred 
views - what we’ve tried to do in the last few years is to combine that people-
centred approach with great expert analysis and making that expertise relevant to a 
mass audience. I think when you have limited time those conventions [the market 
summary] are a less good use of time, and not as good as some analysis or a people-
centred story. To be honest I can’t remember when or why we dropped it, we are 
always refreshing things in all sorts of ways… for example, this month when we 
relaunch News at 10 we’ll probably drop the newspaper headlines at the end and 
have something more looking forward to tomorrow… and that’s not a profound 
statement about newspapers, it’s more about making better use of the time we 
have… 
RT My take on your newspaper review at the end was - and you might not be 
surprised to hear it - that you cover more stories per bulletins - around 2 stories 
more than BBC. They are slightly shorter, but what seems clear is that by 
introducing the newspaper headlines at the end is that almost all of the time those 
stories haven’t appeared elsewhere in the bulletin, so it’s a further way to extend 
the news agenda… 
MJ That’s interesting. I suspect you’ll find that the new News at 10 will contain fewer 
stories than the current model so we can so we can include more analysis. I think 
that sequence at the end will look at things that are happening tomorrow, looking 
ahead in a televisual way rather than with a news agenda um… and we’ll experiment 
a bit… we’re moving to a single anchor rather than a duel anchor in Tom Bradby… 
RT The other thing - on a more general level - as academics we have theories 
suggesting that news is controlled by various outside factors, and in particular, 
who is advertising on your channel will shape news output - this is the theory of 
political economy. What is your view, as a commercial broadcaster, of how you 
present business news – news about business and corporations that potentially 
today or tomorrow, may be going to fund you with advertising? 
MJ My overall answer to that is that I don’t have very much to say because it doesn’t 
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enter my mind. 
RT So it’s a non-thing? 
MJ Yes, it’s a non-thing… journalists cover stories we think our viewers will find 
interesting and sure we’re on a commercial channel funded by advertisers… but I 
don’t know who’s advertising at any given time… look at our Volkswagen coverage 
from last week - I’m sure that Volkswagen are advertising with us - we gave proper 
rigorous scrutiny to Volkswagen…      
RT The reason for the question is this. I did some work concerning the shareholder 
spring in 2012 when some corporations experienced revolts over pay. I was 
interested in for example, how Bob Diamond of Barclays was vilified as something 
of a pariah, so I looked at a Barclays shareholder meeting in April 2012, and how 
ITV’s 6.30 bulletin and Sky’s 9pm and BBC’s 10pm bulletins covered it. They were 
quite different - SKY probably did the best job because they connected it to 
ordinary people. In general, there was some fogging about the differences 
between private and institutional shareholders - the people in revolt were private 
shareholders with little power. The ITV package by Laura Kuenssberg was the 
toughest in the way it approaches the story, in contrast to the others which were 
more reserved – she mentioned trying to get into the meeting, how executives 
were jeered at and so on. It held Barclays to account in ways the other channels 
didn’t. I looked at some more – Aviva for example. At the time, Aviva were 
sponsoring Downton Abbey, and they had a similar problem with a shareholder 
revolt over pay. Laura Kuenssberg had a live 2-way exchange with Alastair Stewart 
– she said that there were red faces and embarrassment at Aviva.
It seemed that these theories of political economy were not so relevant any 
more… so that got me on that track of what I’ll ask you about in a moment. For 
now, just to summarise, the nature and detail of advertising has no impact on the 
way you conduct your journalism? There is no connection with those who decide 
where certain stories appear in the running order, and which stories don’t – would 
the editor of the day know the details about the advertising slots – and would it 
have any bearing on what is run and not run? I’m asking because there are a 
number of stories about Barclays, and several are very critical. Of the 101 advert 
breaks, over 80 were single advert breaks, with Barclays the only advertiser. I 
found a good handful of stories - some not run by the BBC at all - where your 
critical stories about Barclays actually segued into a Barclays advertisement. It 
could be a coincidence, or a deliberate demonstration that Barclays adverts have 
no effect on the news, or you might be saying the two things have no connection 
at all? 
MJ There would be connection whatsoever. Let me explain what’s behind whether 
there is an ad break or not. It’s not really a case of reintroducing an ad break… the 
advertising sales team can put breaks where they want to across the schedule … 
there are a finite number of minutes of adverts that can be run between 6 and 11, 
and it’s averaged over that time…you can look up those rules… I think its 40 minutes 
over that time…at an average of about 8 minutes an hour, but you can run up 12 in 
any given hour and therefore on the whole the advertising will run the minutes 
mainly around things like Coronation Street, Emmerdale and the peak dramas. In 
other words, where we have the biggest audience. Therefore, there will be less 
advertising around either the 6.30 news or News at 10, simply because of that, and 
you’ll see advertising reappear after 10pm, because those are the rules. But, if an 
advertiser wants to advertise somewhere else, then they’ll create a slot for them. I 
think – although I’ve never really discussed this with the advertising team, that they 
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put a break in (the news) because people are quite keen to advertise in the news um 
… and now I’m guessing, because it’s a serious environment within which to see your 
advertisement and if my memory serves me right, quite a lot of those brand spots 
for Barclays, they were about young people… 
RT Yes they were - they were the ads about the digital eagles and all of those things… 
MJ The programme editor won’t have been aware of who was going to advertise there… 
although as you say they do appear there so often… 
RT So they’ll have a rough idea that that is going to happen? 
MJ I have never had a discussion with the advertising people at any point about those 
ads, they’ve kept running, and I’ve never had a discussion with the programme 
editor about what stories they chose to run…so there is a disconnect between the 
two. 
RT I guess - and this is a question for Barclays really - knowing that as an organisation 
they were going through trauma on a number of fronts, would they then fund 
some adverts that promoted a different side of banking – “we help people, we 
have a human side” and so on – it’s like getting their retaliation in first I suppose… 
MJ What does occasionally happen is that if airline x had a campaign scheduled in 
various programmes, and that airline has a crash that day, they might chose to take 
their ads out of the schedule, that’s the sort of change more likely to happen… 
RT So if an organisation has an agreement with you whereby you run x number of 
their adverts every day, and then something happens, fairly quickly they could 
come on to you and say – please don’t run our ads today? 
MJ Yes but they would come on to the advertising sales department, and not the news 
department. 
RT So these are departments that are running autonomously and journalistically, 
never the twain shall meet? 
MJ Yes, yes…. 
RT And could they withdraw adverts that same day for example? 
MJ Yes, that could be arranged very quickly, yes. 
RT More broadly, within journalism studies, we have a range of selection theories – 
you’ve probably heard of the gatekeeper one – and there is another one which we 
call news values – that suggests that stories about elite people, elite nations, bad 
news, news with consonance with a white Anglo Saxon audience, that’s more 
likely to make the news… 
MJ Well, I think our audience is more diverse - the thing is, whether our newsrooms are 
diverse enough… 
RT So those institutional biases - we suspect that news is rated in terms of whether 
people will find it interesting or not… is it any more formal than that gut feel of 
this is a good story and that isn’t? In other words, there is no big list of 
characteristics to tick off? 
MJ I think this is really interesting territory… and …. yes, of course there is no list, but I 
think we are more conscious now than when I started in the news  about 
unconscious bias, about not just doing what people are interested in… there is much 
more challenge and discussion about what goes into programming… regional news 
for example, in all ITV regions have a regional diversity panel that reaches out to all 
community groups - we get them to review our programmes to get their perspective 
on how different communities have been treated in the news - that didn’t happen 30 
years ago. I think we’re conscious that a lot of news viewers are in inverted commas 
“white and male”, and we look to make that not exclusively the case… we are very 
open to you know… we want our programmes to be more diverse reflecting the UK 
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as a whole, yes… but there’s a 30-minute programme and you have to make 
decisions as to what goes in it. We don’t necessarily think there are tablets of stone 
around right or wrong decisions - we are happy to debate those and to challenge 
ourselves.  
RT So what you’re saying then is that there are news selection processes, but they are 
very reflective, they are more careful than they ever were, and are more 
determined to be more diverse and so on, but even so they are news selection 
processes, built on the experience of those making the decisions… you know, 
that’s an important story and we know why that’s the case, and it may get into the 
bulletin ahead of something else… 
MJ And also over a period of time, so we don’t do the same things all the time, you 
know - we looked at Zimbabwe, so that doesn’t come in every day, but we 
absolutely need to make space for it… 
RT And what was interesting in 2007 was - and I recall twice when you did this - you 
did a thing on global warming and you had Mark Austin [ITV anchor] pretty much 
presenting News at 10 from a boat in the Antarctic and once a massive shard of ice 
fell in the sea behind him…  
MJ I remember it very well… 
RT The other time was when you delivered a week’s worth or programmes from the 
border between South Africa and Zimbabwe, and there was some covert filming. I 
guess if you’ve sent your team there, you need to get your money’s worth out if it? 
MJ It’s recognition also that there are some stories that you cover on a daily basis and 
there are others like global warming in the Antarctic that are harder to get at so 
you… you chose a time to do that so people who are watching over months have 
been exposed to a range of wider issues rather than just what happened on a 
particular day… 
RT In terms of business news, do all the same things apply? Some things are episodic 
and unusual - would you say that was the case? I mean, there’s nothing special 
about business news that wouldn’t have the same rules and decisions making 
processes? 
MJ Um, it not a business channel, it’s a general channel, so there are social affairs, 
politics, sport and breaking news that will all feature on any given day… and you 
might get a particular business story – how much prominence it gets will depend on 
what else is happening in the world… 
RT Yes, because from 2007, to 2015 there was an appreciative jump in the amount of 
business news – do I take from your answer than this would be you just following 
world events – this was not you saying we have to cover more business news? 
MJ No, it’s a bit of both – I think we need to invest in our business and economics, we 
made a conscious decision to improve our business reporting which was triggered by 
two things - one - it was in absolute terms I thought we should do better, but also 
post-crash, it was of more immediate relevance to our viewers. 
RT The financial crash - do you think that its changed your approach to business 
news, which I guess you’ve answered - you’ve made conscious efforts and 
investment in improvement, with the quality of your recruits and slightly 
following world events as well, um… but you’ve not all sat around and said 
there a financial crash, we must change the way that we look at? 
MJ There’s a constant review where we look at what we’re doing and how we’re doing it 
and if we could do better, and I suppose none of ever said we are going to do x or y 
about it, but how can we get better, but that would apply equally to pour political or 
sporting coverage… 
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RT Finally, um... we have this theory that you know, journalist are in the pockets of 
the big hitters in the city… 
MJ Our journalists obviously talk to people in the city. I spend no time whatever talking 
to people in the city…  if someone is looking for a power elite not in touch with the 
real world, that’s not the case. 
RT From the examples I’ve quoted like Barclays and so on, if that was the case, you 
wouldn’t be reporting things so critically, especially when BBC are ignoring those 
stories, but I think I found across the board that where these theories of political 
economy might not always be so useful to analyse news outputs. The other thing 
you’ve told me about today is strategic improvement programme that you have 
carried out. But what doesn’t happen although you’re prepared to criticise 
corporations and organisations like banks, this whole neoliberal model of “the 
markets will fix it” um… and these kind of radical ideas that you are getting from 
various sources that there should be a different way of doing things - neither 
channel seem to be advancing that far, so the criticism has gone so far, but has 
then stopped… 
MJ Yes, this is part of a whole debate that is also part of impartiality and so on - we are a 
broadcaster that has impartiality running through our DNA - it exists in the form of 
the regulations, but also culturally it’s also there. If you lifted the impartiality 
regulations, it would still be there culturally - we believe that rather than it just being 
imposed upon us.  So that means in the debate between Piketty and neoliberals in 
the U.S, we are impartial and we try to examine both views. Does that mean that if 
you’re coming from either of those views you see us as entirely impartial, that’s a 
more philosophical debate. We think it’s right to air those views and um… we try to 
give people a range of views and information. But you’re probably right that our 
criticism will be about behaviour that our audience finds unethical or illegal, rather 
than our programmes daily challenging the basis of capitalism... and one of the great 
things about pluralistic media is that there are places where you can see challenges 
to capitalism and challenges to state intervention. 
RT Perhaps it’s not entirely a failing of broadcasters either - maybe the models - the 
alternatives models - they aren’t well enough defined and until they become a 
little more sophisticated, and better explained, they might not get the coverage?  
MJ We are a mainstream news service and as part of that we will give coverage to issues 
that interest mainstream audiences - now that doesn’t mean that we won’t look at 
stuff outside of the mainstream - we will - but it does mean we’ll spend less time 
doing that but you know, if you look at the election of Jeremy Corbyn [as Labour 
Party leader] … some ideas that weren’t discussed in the mainstream are now being 
discussed, and we’re dealing with that in the same way we’ve always dealt with 
those things… 
RT It brings me to my last question, which is about income inequality. I can see that 
wealth would be something relatively easy to show on TV news - there are some 
clear indexical indicators of that… Rolls Royces, nice houses and so on … then 
there’s poverty, which would be people struggling, food banks and so on. But this 
thing income inequality is a kind of abstract things that lives in between those two 
somewhere - my take on that is that because its less tangible - it’s a difference, a 
gap - it’s hard to cover - how do you show it ? It’s something with a lot of traction, 
that inequality in society causes all of social ills - I’m sue you’ve come across “The 
Spirit Level” by Wilkinson and Pickett, where they connect to drug taking, teenage 
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pregnancy, mental illness and so on. Would you see a difficult issue like this as just 
coming out in the wash, or would you say that we need to do what we can to make 
that understandable… it’s just that there are very few stories about income 
inequality on TV news… 
MJ That’s interesting. We have featured lots of stories about people who are the 
squeezed middle …um because a lot of those people are our core audience if you 
look at the demographic split…  
RT Yes, and there were so many more stories about tem than about the issue of 
income inequality, because that’s where the population is? 
MJ I think we reflect that issue… for example, we might commission a current affairs 
programme on income inequality and we’ve done stories on stories about John 
Lewis and specific stories about um… I think it’s probably something that we have a 
reasonably accurate impression of what’s happening on that rather than us doing it 
every night. 
RT Yes, it seems to be an inferred thing rather than “yes, now were going to talk 
about income inequality, and we’re going to tell you why it’s important”. That part 
of the narrative is missing, but the bit that is there, as you say, is that you used to 
be able to go on holidays every year, but now you can’t, your mortgage was 
affordable and now it isn’t, borrowing money was easy now it isn’t. What I was 
interesting to find out was whether this big idea of Wilkinson and Pickett’s - that 
the problem was the gap - whether it’s mentioned or not - so you’ve sort of 
answered this by suggesting that the forum to make the connection maybe 
somewhere other than a 3-minute news package… 
MJ Although I’d like to think we did reflect it across our news coverage and that if 
someone only watched ITV news is was something that was discussed at various 
points, and to be honest, I watch our programmes all the time, and you know, in 
2013, for example, our special budget programme very directly addressed some of 
that - um - when income inequality reports have come out they’ve hit our agenda, 
and um, it may be something alongside lots of other things we should do a bit more 
of, but you know, given the pressure of lots of other things… 
RT Yes, its certainly all the data is - you could have this complex report on income 
inequality and what it is and how its evaluated and so on… or we could talk to our 
audience about how their lives have been affected by the recession and so on…and 
that’s clearly easier to understand and to present… and clearly that means more to 
people… 
MJ Having watched the whole of 2014 news output as you have- what surprised you? 
RT I went into it thinking ITV news was going to be much more sensational and 
dramatic, there was a lot of homogeneity, I was surprised that ITV was as close to 
BBC as it was, in terms of production values news agenda, and the general formats, 
and in many cases and that you provided a level of probing that BBC do not. That’s 
my “surprise” thing. 
  The interview was concluded up after some general discussion not related to the topic. 
